Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law Ch.3
Summary
TLDRDans ce chapitre, Kelson explore la relation entre le droit et la science, en contrastant avec son traitement plus bref du droit et de la moralité. Il distingue entre une théorie statique, qui se concentre sur les normes, et une théorie dynamique, qui s'intéresse à la création et l'application des normes. Kelson explique que le droit est un système auto-référentiel, s'autocréant et s'autopérennisant. Il souligne la différence entre la causalité en sciences naturelles et l'imputation en sciences sociales, argumentant que le droit relève de cette dernière. Enfin, il critique le réalisme américain et défend sa théorie pure comme étant anti-idéologique.
Takeaways
- 📚 Kelsen établit une distinction entre la théorie statique et dynamique du droit : la première se concentre sur le comportement régulé par des normes, la seconde sur le processus de création et d'application des normes.
- ⚖️ La loi se régule elle-même avec des règles qui déterminent comment interpréter, créer ou abroger des lois, créant un système auto-référentiel.
- 🔬 Kelsen met en contraste le droit et la science, en notant que la loi fonctionne par imputation, alors que la science naturelle fonctionne par causalité.
- 🧠 L'imputation implique une projection humaine, reliant des événements par ce qui devrait se produire plutôt que par des lois naturelles strictes.
- 🌍 Selon Kelsen, la nature a été inventée par la société lorsque la causalité a été découverte, remplaçant des explications basées sur des imputations morales.
- 🔄 Contrairement à la causalité, qui est infinie dans le monde naturel, l'imputation dans le droit exige une fin logique où la responsabilité s'arrête.
- 🧑⚖️ Kelsen critique le réalisme juridique américain pour avoir tenté de prédire les décisions judiciaires sur la base de la causalité plutôt que de l'imputation.
- 🎯 Kelsen défend sa théorie pure du droit comme étant non idéologique, affirmant que ses critiques projettent des valeurs idéologiques ou morales.
- 🔍 La science du droit, selon Kelsen, se limite à décrire objectivement la réalité juridique, sans prescrire un ordre social moral ou idéal.
- ⏳ L'imputation diffère de la causalité car elle nécessite une fin, ce qui permet au droit de tenir quelqu'un responsable, définissant ainsi la liberté.
Q & A
Quelle est la distinction que Kelsen fait entre la théorie statique et la théorie dynamique du droit ?
-Kelsen distingue la théorie statique du droit, qui se concentre sur le comportement régulé par les normes (les actes), de la théorie dynamique, qui porte sur le processus d'évolution et d'application des normes elles-mêmes.
Pourquoi Kelsen consacre-t-il plus de temps à la relation entre le droit et la science qu'à celle entre le droit et la morale ?
-Kelsen semble considérer la relation entre le droit et la science comme plus complexe et nécessitant davantage de clarification que la relation entre le droit et la morale, c'est pourquoi il y consacre un chapitre plus long.
Comment Kelsen décrit-il la particularité du droit concernant sa propre création et application ?
-Kelsen explique que le droit a la particularité de réguler sa propre création et application, ce qui en fait un système autoréférentiel ou autopoiétique.
Qu'est-ce que Kelsen entend par 'règles de droit' et en quoi cela diffère-t-il de 'l'État de droit' ?
-Les 'règles de droit' selon Kelsen sont des normes que le droit applique à lui-même (comme les règles sur la création ou l'interprétation des lois), tandis que 'l'État de droit' fait référence au principe selon lequel les lois doivent gouverner une nation.
Quelle est la différence entre la causalité et l'imputation selon Kelsen dans le domaine du droit ?
-La causalité se réfère à une relation de cause à effet dans les sciences naturelles, tandis que l'imputation, propre au droit, implique une décision humaine qui lie des événements selon ce qui 'devrait' se produire, plutôt que ce qui 'se produit nécessairement'.
Comment Kelsen explique-t-il l'évolution de l'humanité de l'imputation à la causalité ?
-Kelsen suggère que les sociétés primitives expliquaient les événements naturels par l'imputation (une interprétation morale ou religieuse), tandis que l'avènement de la science moderne a introduit la causalité, permettant d'expliquer les phénomènes naturels par des lois physiques plutôt que des jugements moraux.
Pourquoi Kelsen critique-t-il le réalisme américain en droit ?
-Kelsen critique le réalisme américain parce qu'il tente de prédire les décisions judiciaires en se basant sur la causalité, alors que Kelsen affirme que le droit repose sur l'imputation, et non sur des relations causales directes.
Quelle est la définition de la liberté selon Kelsen dans le contexte de l'imputation ?
-Pour Kelsen, la liberté consiste non seulement à faire ce que l'on veut, mais surtout à accepter la responsabilité d'être le dernier maillon de la chaîne d'imputation, c'est-à-dire d'assumer les conséquences légales de ses actes.
Comment Kelsen défend-il sa théorie pure du droit contre les accusations d'idéologie ?
-Kelsen rejette les accusations d'idéologie en affirmant que sa théorie est anti-idéologique précisément parce qu'elle ne prescrit aucune loi morale ou idéal social. Il se considère comme un scientifique qui décrit le droit tel qu'il est, sans s'engager dans des jugements de valeur.
Quelle est la différence fondamentale entre la science naturelle et le droit, selon Kelsen ?
-Selon Kelsen, la science naturelle repose sur des relations de causalité, tandis que le droit repose sur des relations d'imputation, où les normes indiquent ce qui 'devrait' se produire (un lien normatif) plutôt que ce qui 'doit' nécessairement se produire (un lien causal).
Outlines
📘 Introduction to Law and Science in Kelsen's Theory
Dans ce paragraphe, l'auteur discute des distinctions faites par Kelsen entre la loi et la science, ainsi que de l'accent mis sur la relation entre la loi et la morale dans les théories positivistes. Kelsen s'intéresse particulièrement à la distinction entre une théorie statique de la loi (basée sur les normes existantes) et une théorie dynamique (basée sur l'évolution des normes). Il mentionne également le concept d'auto-régulation de la loi, où elle crée et applique ses propres normes.
🔍 La Science Juridique et Son Objectif Descriptif
L'auteur explique que, selon Kelsen, la science juridique ne cherche pas à prescrire des comportements mais à décrire le système juridique. Ce système se construit à partir d'observations sociales qui sont interprétées comme des normes juridiques. La science juridique décrit simplement ces normes, comme on décrit des lois naturelles, bien que Kelsen distingue les sciences sociales (basées sur l'imputation) des sciences naturelles (basées sur la causalité).
🌩️ L'imputation dans les Sociétés Primitives
Ce paragraphe aborde la manière dont les sociétés primitives expliquaient les phénomènes naturels à travers l'imputation plutôt que la causalité. Lorsque des désastres naturels se produisaient, les individus ne cherchaient pas à en comprendre la cause physique mais imputaient une responsabilité morale, pensant que ces événements étaient des punitions divines ou naturelles pour leurs actions. Kelsen fait le lien avec l'animisme et les religions anciennes.
⚖️ Imputation, Responsabilité et Liberté
Kelsen développe l'idée selon laquelle l'imputation nécessite un point final, contrairement à la causalité qui peut s'étendre indéfiniment. Il associe cette notion à la responsabilité et à la liberté, expliquant que la liberté implique de pouvoir être tenu responsable en dernier ressort. En termes juridiques, cela signifie accepter les sanctions légales pour ses actes, ce qui marque la fin de la chaîne d'imputation.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Positivisme juridique
💡Norme
💡Théorie statique du droit
💡Théorie dynamique du droit
💡Auto-référence du droit
💡Causalité
💡Imputation
💡Validité
💡Réalisme juridique américain
💡Liberté
Highlights
Kelson emphasizes the distinction between a static theory of law, which focuses on behavior regulated by norms, and a dynamic theory, which focuses on the norms themselves.
The law is a self-regulating system that creates and applies its own norms, a concept Kelson refers to as the rules of law, not to be confused with the rule of law.
Kelson introduces the idea that law has a self-referencing system, where it not only applies to external acts but also has norms that apply to its own processes, such as creating, interpreting, and repealing laws.
Kelson compares natural science, which works through causality, with social sciences, particularly law, which operates through imputation.
Imputation in law links acts through norms with an 'ought' rather than a strict causal 'if-then' relationship, highlighting the difference between legal and natural causality.
The idea of imputation reflects a human decision-making process where responsibility and judgment come into play, unlike the deterministic nature of causality in the natural sciences.
Kelson speculates that primitive societies explained natural phenomena through imputation rather than causality, attributing events to moral or spiritual forces.
He argues that the shift from imputation to causality was a key development during the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, which led to the 'discovery' of nature as we know it.
Despite the advances in scientific thought, Kelson acknowledges that causality in modern science is often governed by probability rather than strict laws, reflecting a more complex view of natural relationships.
Kelson criticizes American legal realism for attempting to predict court decisions based on past cases, arguing that this confuses legal imputation with causal prediction.
According to Kelson, imputation in law requires a logical endpoint or responsibility, unlike causation, which can continue indefinitely without a clear conclusion.
Kelson connects the concept of legal imputation with the idea of freedom, suggesting that freedom entails responsibility for one's actions as the final instance of imputation.
He defends his pure theory of law as being anti-ideological, rejecting any notion of moral or correct laws, positioning himself as a scientist merely describing legal reality.
Kelson emphasizes that his theory is not interested in prescribing social order or ideal laws, but solely in the scientific description of the legal system as it exists.
The chapter focuses on the broader relationship between law and science, with Kelson drawing key distinctions between legal theory, social sciences, and natural sciences, emphasizing the unique role of imputation in law.
Transcripts
foreign
[Music]
theory of law we saw in the first
chapter Kelson laid the groundwork for
where he goes with his theory
in the second chapter
he
got to what is
often most talked about when we talk
about
positivist legal theories talks about
law and morality and we saw in quite a
fairly short chapter right
he doesn't spend that much time making
his case there
but now in the third chapter it's a
significantly longer chapter than the
second one
he talks about law and science
so
I'm assuming
that this is for calcin
a more important distinction and a more
important topic than that of law
morality or at least the question that
is more complex perhaps that requires
more clarification
I think it's interesting
that he spends This Much Time on Law and
science
rather than law and morality right it
seems to be a greater concern for him so
we know from chapter one that he says
that the science of law
is concerned with the law
manifested through
norms
applied to human acts
he he says okay legal Acts
that are relevant to the law
again he starts with a distinction he
talks about a static theory of Law and a
dynamic theory of law
one at rest one in motion a static
theory of law according to Carlson is
one that focuses on the behavior that is
regulated by norms we could say the acts
a dynamic Theory
is one that focuses on the Norms
themselves that are regulating
like we said in the previous chapter
that I'm making certain human acts more
probable than others so in a static
Theory the object of study would be
the system of valid Norms in a dynamic
Theory the object
is
the process of how these Norms are
developed and being applied so not just
this Corpus of
a system of norms
but how it's changing dynamically Kelson
has an interesting quote early in the
chapter
where he says that
it is a most significant peculiarity of
law
that it regulates its own creation and
application
today I would call that or at least
since the 1980s we could call that the
autopoiesis of the law
or the self-reference of the law but
okay Carlson didn't have that word at
his disposal but he's already
recognizing
this self-creating nature of the legal
system this kind of closed
or semi-closed Loop that it's
perpetuating itself in and he says
what's also worth noting is that law
doesn't only have norms
that apply externally to itself to
society or to human beings
but that it also has Norms that apply to
itself
for example how to interpret how to
create a new law how to get rid of a law
so
the law has
law for itself this is what Carlson
calls the rules of law
not to be confused with the rule of law
so he tries to
answer how this happens how does this
self-regulating self-perpetuating system
with its own secondary
rules of law
come into being
and he goes back all the way to for
this he says that
using
the epistemology of that
the law creates its own object
through observing itself as a whole
meaning that
the law or the legal system
sees different things happening in
society and sees them as related and
pulls them together under this category
that it calls law
and it it sees a hole or a system there
he says this is a purely epistemological
move
these connections are not
obvious in a certain sense but they're
they're constructed socially right
much like
looking at the chaos that surrounds us
and calling that nature for example you
know just as Nature has been invented by
Society so
the
singular coherence of the law has been
created by society and the purpose of
legal science as we know by now is not
in prescribing it
drawing on morals or whatever
utility I don't know it
only has the purpose of describing the
legal system this is what legal science
has to do description and we have
descriptions of the law everywhere he
says
you know the law is for example the
penal code
and a description of that is your
criminal law textbook so you have
first order and second order observation
there already
so anyway returning to Natural Science
Kelson puts
the Natural Sciences and the social
sciences at odds with each other and law
Falls within the category of the social
sciences
so he says that Natural Science
Works through causality
if a then B happens or if you have B
then you know a was behind it these are
the laws of nature so to speak
and he says that human behavior in human
society can also
be linked through causality right the
social sciences and
the Natural Sciences are perhaps not
that different he says that causality is
always there
but the social sciences law
has a second quality apart from
causation
namely imputation
so if you have a and b you can connect a
and b through causation or through
imputation which I think you can already
get a sense that it implies
a human decision being made a projection
and a decision linking these two things
but the difference between these links
if causational Natural Sciences says a
then B what the law does it doesn't use
then
it uses ought
if a
b or
to happen
so the connection
between A and B is different
a norm is not
a scientific or natural law
that B has to logically follow a
it's a command and ought to
and sometimes B doesn't happen
and that's where validity comes into
play how valid is that Norm really if it
doesn't happen
every single time
it's not a causal link
it's a description that connects amb
that make it socially logical
for B to follow a if you
commit a crime
a
you don't blink your eyes and suddenly
you're in prison B right there's a lot
that has to be happening between it's
not a direct causal connection
may look like it but
it's not it's
imputed there's a lot of
social things that have to happen in
between a lot of communication that has
to happen in between a and b
and it ought to happen but it's not
taken for granted
Carlson goes on an interesting detour in
this chapter two again talking about
primitive man
I don't like the term but let's
take it within the
historical context that Kelson was
writing this in
but
he says that
primitive man probably did not he's
speculating here of course but he says
that it did not explain nature
through causality
but
rather through imputation what does this
mean it means that when something
happened in nature let's say a natural
disaster of some sort
humans at that time
didn't have natural causal laws to
explain why that happened the way we
would now
but they would impute
a value a judgment
on the disaster happening right so if
your town was hit by a disaster
the question wasn't
what happened what caused this the
question was who caused this what did we
do wrong to cause this there's a sense
of moral value judgment taking place you
know the idea that nature is punishing
you somehow he connects us with the idea
of animism or animistic religions the
idea that
nature and humans have this relationship
kind of like
what people have in between them where
if you treat nature badly it comes to
take revenge on you or something like
that or the spirits they take revenge on
you and he says if anything was a
breakthrough
in the Scientific Revolution or the
enlightenment it was
the invention of causality moving from
imputation
to causation and then through this he
makes a
Kind of a Funny observation
he says that it's not that we had nature
and later Society was invented but that
the whole world including nature
was
Society first
relationships
governed linked through norms and
imputation
and that with science
the natural world was invented nature
was discovered through
causality when causality was discovered
nature came to the fore
and Carlson is aware enough that he says
that causation is also
not taken that seriously within the
philosophy of science even when he wrote
this book already you know that science
does not work on strict laws but that
probability is what governs
natural relationships if I can call it
that so using this term causation the
whole time
is is fine as long as we keep in mind
that this is already
something
linked multi-probability than certainty
on another detour he also takes some
time to criticize American realism
the
realist School of legal Theory and he
says that the problem is with American
realism is that it
tries to somehow predict Court decisions
and he criticizes this because he says
you know it's taking the pass on the
future A and B and trying to connect it
with causality
and he says that no it's not causality
it's still an imputation
the court decision is still an ought to
it's not a natural consequence
and I think although I don't think he
says that explicitly he probably would
also if we remember chapter one he would
also
I suppose criticize American realists
for confusing a pure theory of law with
political or sociological theories of
law so while
a realist approach can have
some power descriptive or predictive
power
um it's not rooted
within the law itself it's rooted in
other disciplines
so in this distinction between causation
and imputation you know Carlson also
says that
another important difference between
them and which is necessary for the law
to work
causation never has an end point right
we know that
you have a then B then C and D
the physical world is always Dynamic
always
having Domino effects
forever
there's no end point to causation
whereas with imputation on the other
hand
there has to be a logical end or you
can't to take it in the other direction
you can't regress infinitely when we
blame someone you know you can always
pass the buck
to something else
with imputation
that chain has to stop somewhere The
Buck has to stop somewhere and someone
has to take responsibility
and this Carlson says by the way is the
definition of freedom
it's yes being able to do what you want
but
the responsibility of
being the last instance of imputation
you know you have the responsibility for
that and you have to take the legal
sanction
or whatever
finally Carlson ends the chapter by
defending his pure Theory again
he says that he's been accused of
being ideological in his theory and he
says that no
he is the anti-idealog
he says it is
anti-ideological exactly for the reason
that he rejects
any
ideal or correct or right or moral law
and he is the one that
can see lawful what it is
and his critics are
may be referring to some
imminent value transcendental value and
they are the ideologues not him he's the
scientist
and he is not trying to prescribe
any existing or hypothetical future
social order he's not interested in
doing that
he is just
doing the careful
scientists work
of describing reality as he sees it
around him
but yes that's it for chapter three
Lawrence science
I hope
that was quite a big chapter I hope it
made it a bit simpler to digest
thank you and see you next time for
chapter five
Voir Plus de Vidéos Connexes
Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law Ch.2
Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law Ch.1
Interview Benoit Frydman - Partie 1
La Pologne s'affranchit du droit de l'UE [hiérarchie des normes #1]
Le TEMPS existe-t-il vraiment ? | Philippe Guillemant
Les Privilèges (généraux, mobiliers et immobiliers) : [Droit des sûretés]
5.0 / 5 (0 votes)