Cake or Doughnut Ontology? | Žižek vs. Johnston

Summary

The transcript captures a deep philosophical debate on ontological differences, focusing on the contrasting views of Professor Adrian Johnston and Slavoj Žižek. Johnston critiques Žižek's 'ontological incompleteness' and 'donut model', which links human freedom to quantum physics, suggesting it reduces subjectivity to a return of the primal chaos. Instead, Johnston advocates for a 'layer cake model', emphasizing the distinct emergence of human freedom, separate from archaic metaphysical foundations. The conversation delves into Schelling's influence on Žižek and the challenges of integrating quantum physics with a non-reductive account of human subjectivity.

Takeaways

• 📚 The ongoing debate between Professor S and J revolves around the concept of ontological incompleteness and its implications in understanding reality.
• 🎨 J introduces the idea of a 'layer cake' versus 'donut' ontology, suggesting different ways to conceptualize the relationship between the fundamental and emergent levels of reality.
• 🔬 J's work, starting with 'The Indivisible Remainder,' attempts to integrate German idealism with quantum physics to explore materialism and ontological incompleteness.
• 🌀 Schelling's philosophy, particularly his distinction between 'ground' and 'existence,' is central to J's thought, with the 'ground' representing a chaotic, anarchic basis of reality.
• 🌐 Schelling's 'ground' is seen as the source of human freedom, where moments of autonomy are intrusions of this primordial chaos into the structured reality of 'existence'.
• 🍩 Professor S criticizes this view as a 'donut model,' implying a circular return to the origin at the highest level of emergence, which he finds problematic.
• 🤔 The debate touches on the challenge of reconciling non-reductive accounts of subjectivity with materialism or naturalism, without resorting to reductionism.
• 🧠 The discussion suggests that neurobiology might be a more fruitful area of scientific exploration for understanding subjectivity and mindedness.
• 🔬 J's recent work, including 'Sex and the Failed Absolute,' continues to develop his version of dialectical materialism, engaging with quantum physics in a Schelling-influenced manner.
• 🔮 There is skepticism about the direct link between quantum mechanics and human subjectivity, with the current state of scientific understanding not yet able to substantiate such claims.
• ⏳ The conversation acknowledges the need for patience and ongoing scientific inquiry to potentially validate or refute speculative hypotheses about the connections between quantum physics and human freedom.

Q & A

What is the central debate between Professor S and J regarding ontology?

The central debate revolves around the concept of ontological incompleteness and the metaphorical difference between a 'layer cake' and a 'donut' in their ontological models, which represent different views on the structure and nature of reality.

What is the significance of J's book 'The Indivisible Remainder' in this debate?

It is significant because it was the first time J attempted to combine German idealism with Lukácsian Marxism to engage with quantum physics, introducing the idea of ontological incompleteness and initiating the debate on materialism and subjectivity.

How does Professor S view Schelling's philosophy in relation to the debate?

Professor S sees Schelling's philosophy as crucial to J's version of ontological incompleteness, especially Schelling's distinction between 'ground' and 'existence', which J uses to argue for a return of the repressed ground in instances of human freedom.

What is the 'ground' in Schelling's philosophy as described by Professor S?

In Schelling's philosophy, the 'ground' is a foundational, underlying ontological basis that is unruly, conflict-ridden, and anarchic, in contrast to the 'existence', which is the intelligible reality we inhabit.

How does Professor S critique J's use of Schelling's philosophy in relation to quantum physics?

Professor S critiques J's approach as reductive, suggesting that J is tempted to equate human freedom with a return of quantum indeterminacy within classical reality, which Professor S sees as a shortcut rather than a fully fleshed-out argument.

What does Professor S mean by referring to the 'donut model' in Schelling's philosophy?

The 'donut model' refers to the idea that the highest point of emergence in reality, such as human subjectivity, is a return to the underlying ground, creating a circular, layered structure where the highest and lowest points are connected.

How does Professor S differentiate his view on human freedom from J's interpretation?

Professor S argues for a non-reductive account of human freedom, suggesting that it is distinct and new rather than a resurgence of the most primitive metaphysical basis of existence.

What is the relevance of Hegel's philosophy to the debate between Professor S and J?

Hegel's philosophy is relevant because Professor S uses it to argue against the 'donut model', suggesting that Hegel's account of the emergence of human-mindedness out of nature supports the idea of human freedom being something distinct and new.

What is the role of quantum physics in J's recent work, as mentioned by Professor S?

In J's recent work, quantum physics is used to flesh out a version of dialectical materialism that involves ontological incompleteness, with J engaging in conversations with eminent figures in the field to explore this connection further.

What is Professor S's stance on the speculative hypothesis linking quantum mechanics and human subjectivity?

Professor S maintains a patient 'wait and see' outlook, acknowledging that while such a hypothesis is intriguing, it currently lacks substantiation from scientific research and requires further exploration and evidence.

How does Professor S suggest approaching the study of subjectivity from a scientific perspective?

Professor S suggests starting at the level of neurobiology, which is closest to the study of mindedness, and working out problems from there, rather than relying on speculative hypotheses about quantum mechanics.