Stories from 2008's Great Recession | 60 Minutes Full Episodes

Full Episodes | 60 Minutes
18 Feb 202351:36

Summary

TLDRThe video script delves into the 2008 financial crisis, focusing on the government's intervention in the banking sector. It discusses the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) role in seizing and managing failed banks, the impact of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, and the subsequent investigation by Anton Valukas. The script also explores the aftermath, including the FDIC's challenges, the government's decision to take an ownership stake in major banks, and the ongoing issues with mortgages and credit defaults. It highlights the concerns of investors and homeowners, the potential for further economic downturn, and the unpredictable future of the financial markets.

Takeaways

  • 🏦 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is responsible for handling unsound banks, often taking them over in secret to prevent panic among depositors.
  • πŸ” The FDIC's operation 'Happy' was featured to show the process of seizing a failing bank, Heritage Community Bank, which had made ruinous bets on real estate.
  • πŸ“ˆ The number of bank failures is increasing, with 25 banks failing in the previous year and projections for more in the current year.
  • πŸ’΅ The FDIC projected losses of 65 billion dollars over five years due to bank closures, which affects their ability to pay for bank failures.
  • πŸ‘₯ The FDIC team consists of various specialists, including accountants and asset specialists, who can effectively manage the transition of a seized bank.
  • 🚫 The FDIC ensures that depositors do not lose any money, even in the event of a bank failure, up to the insured deposit limit of $250,000.
  • πŸ“Š The FDIC is funded by insurance premiums from banks, not taxpayer money, and is backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.
  • πŸ“‰ The failure of Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the world, had a catastrophic impact on the global economy and led to a massive investigation.
  • πŸ€” There is evidence suggesting that Lehman Brothers and its accountants may have engaged in fraudulent activities, but no charges have been brought against them by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
  • 🏒 The SEC's oversight of Lehman Brothers was extensive, with officials working inside the firm, raising questions about why problematic practices were not addressed sooner.
  • πŸ’Ό Bank of America, under the leadership of Ken Lewis, avoided the pitfalls of subprime mortgages and grew to become one of the healthiest banks in the country.

Q & A

  • What is the role of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the banking system?

    -The FDIC is a federal agency that insures deposits in banks, preventing depositors from losing their money in the event of a bank failure. It also takes over unsound banks, often seizing control of them to ensure a smooth transition and protection of depositors' funds.

  • How does the FDIC handle the seizure of a failing bank?

    -The FDIC conducts the seizure of a failing bank discreetly, often at night, to prevent panic among depositors. They involve a team of specialists, including accountants and asset specialists, to manage the bank's operations and ensure that all deposits are accounted for and protected.

  • What was the situation with Citigroup and why were they repeatedly bailed out?

    -Citigroup, like other large financial institutions, faced significant financial distress due to risky bets on real estate and other investments. The government repeatedly bailed out Citigroup to prevent its collapse, which could have had severe repercussions on the entire financial system.

  • How many banks failed in the year prior to the events described in the transcript, and what was the projection for the following year?

    -25 banks failed in the year prior to the events described, and the FDIC expected the number to rise, with 16 already having failed in the current year.

  • What was the projected loss for the FDIC over the next five years due to bank closures?

    -The FDIC projected a loss of 65 billion dollars over the next five years due to bank closures.

  • What happened to the employees of Heritage Community Bank after the FDIC seized it?

    -After the FDIC seized Heritage Community Bank, the employees' pay stopped at 6 pm on the day of the seizure. Their unused vacation time would be paid for by the FDIC, and they essentially became employees of the FDIC at that point.

  • How does the FDIC ensure that customers' savings are safe after a bank failure?

    -The FDIC ensures that customers' savings are safe by taking control of the bank's operations and assets. They also provide insurance coverage up to a certain limit ($250,000 at the time of the transcript), so depositors do not lose any money.

  • What is the process for the FDIC to find a buyer for a seized bank?

    -The FDIC conducts a secret online auction to find a buyer for a seized bank. They receive bids from interested parties and choose the most suitable one to take over the bank's operations.

  • What was the outcome for the customers of Heritage Community Bank after it was seized by the FDIC?

    -After Heritage Community Bank was seized, the FDIC found a buyer, MB Financial, which took over all of Heritage's branches, deposits, customers, and loans. This ensured a seamless transition for the customers and protected their savings.

  • What is the FDIC's stance on the size of financial institutions and the potential need for regulations?

    -The FDIC's Chairman, Sheila Bear, suggested that Congress should consider limiting the size of banks to prevent institutions from becoming so large that their failure poses a systemic risk to the economy and requires taxpayer bailouts.

Outlines

00:00

🏦 FDIC Seizure of Unsound Banks

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is stepping in to seize and manage failing banks to protect depositors' funds. The process, often conducted secretly to avoid panic, is highlighted through the operation 'Happy', where the FDIC takes over Heritage Community Bank. The bank's closure was kept secret from employees until the last moment to prevent a bank run. The FDIC's Sheila Bair discusses the increasing number of bank failures and the projected losses for the next five years. The FDIC team's diverse specialists ensure a smooth transition, and the bank's reopening assures customers that their deposits are safe.

05:02

πŸ“Š The Aftermath of Bank Takeovers

After the FDIC takes control of a failed bank, they manage the bank's website, inventory assets and liabilities, and prepare for business resumption. The FDIC, established in 1933, has never allowed an insured depositor to lose money, currently insuring up to $250,000 per depositor. The FDIC is funded by bank insurance premiums, not taxpayer money. Despite this, customers of the former Heritage Community Bank were initially uncertain about the safety of their funds. The FDIC often finds buyers for seized banks, in this case, MB Financial, which took over all deposits, customers, and loans, with the FDIC covering a significant portion of future loan losses.

10:02

πŸ›οΈ The Lehman Collapse and Its Impact

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the world, had catastrophic effects on the global economy. Anton Valukas was appointed to investigate the bankruptcy, resulting in a 2,200-page report that suggested top Lehman officials and Ernst & Young, the accounting firm, could face charges for misleading practices. The report detailed how Lehman hid billions in debt using an accounting trick called 'repo 105'. Despite evidence of fraud, no prosecutions have occurred, and Lehman's executives have largely avoided repercussions.

15:02

πŸ•΅οΈβ€β™‚οΈ SEC's Role in the Financial Crisis

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is under scrutiny for its failure to act on evidence of Lehman Brothers' fraudulent activities. During Lehman's final months, SEC and Federal Reserve officials were embedded within the firm, aware of its precarious financial state but failing to disclose this to investors. The SEC's inaction and the government regulators' presence inside Lehman during its collapse complicate any potential prosecution. Critics argue that the SEC's failure to protect investors undermines its role as a regulatory body.

20:03

πŸ’Ό Wall Street Executives and the Financial Crisis

Despite the financial crisis, many Wall Street executives have maintained their wealth and status. Former Lehman CEO Richard Fuld runs a consulting business and most of his senior colleagues have found new roles. In contrast, Matthew Lee, the Lehman accountant who raised concerns about the firm's accounting practices, is seeking employment. Critics argue that the complexity of Wall Street's financial instruments makes them incomprehensible to most, and that the government's recent investment in banks is a necessary step to stimulate lending and economic recovery.

25:04

πŸ’Ό Bank of America's Expansion and Strategy

Bank of America, under CEO Ken Lewis, has grown significantly by acquiring leading companies in various banking sectors, such as Countrywide in mortgages and MBNA in credit cards. This strategy has turned it into a nearly three trillion-dollar conglomerate, often referred to as the Walmart of banking. The bank'sζ€»ιƒ¨δ½δΊŽCharlotte, North Carolina, and its growth has contributed to Charlotte becoming a financial powerhouse. Lewis believes that the era of excessive executive compensation is over, and he predicts a return to more regulated capitalism within three to five years.

30:06

🏘️ The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on Housing and Foreclosures

The collapse of the housing bubble has led to a surge in foreclosures and a sharp decline in home prices. Miami-Dade County is particularly hard hit, withε₯₯斯卑 Munoz's company experiencing a high demand for their services in clearing out foreclosed homes. The market is flooded with properties for sale, many of which are bank-owned or in distress. Real estate broker Peter Zalewski, who runs 'Condo Vultures Realty', sees opportunity amidst the downturn, as vultures clean up after the 'killing' in the market.

35:08

πŸ“‰ The Commercial Real Estate and Credit Crisis

The crisis in the mortgage market was just the beginning, with commercial real estate, credit cards, and auto loans expected to follow suit. Investment fund manager Whitney Tilson predicts a second wave of mortgage resets with alta and option arm loans, which could lead to a significant number of defaults and further economic pain. The stock market is seen as forward-looking and currently presents bargain opportunities despite the anticipated bad news ahead.

40:09

πŸ“Š The Overhang of Housing Supply and Economic Outlook

The supply of housing units on the market has grown significantly, indicating that the economic difficulties are far from over. Sean Egan, who runs a credit rating firm, believes it will take several years to work through the oversupply in the housing market. He also warns of impending issues in other areas such as commercial real estate, credit cards, and auto loans. Despite the grim outlook, Tilson and Egan find value in the stock market, which they believe has already priced in the severity of the economic downturn.

Mindmap

Keywords

πŸ’‘Bank Bailouts

Bank Bailouts refer to the emergency financial assistance provided by the government to banks and financial institutions during a crisis to prevent their collapse. In the video's context, it discusses how large financial institutions like Citigroup were repeatedly bailed out using taxpayers' money, which raises questions about fairness and the systemic risk they pose to the economy.

πŸ’‘Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

The FDIC is a U.S. government agency that provides deposit insurance to depositors in banks. It is tasked with the resolution of failed banks to ensure that depositors do not lose their money. The script describes the FDIC's role in seizing and managing the closure of failing banks like Heritage Community Bank, emphasizing its function to protect consumers' deposits up to a certain limit.

πŸ’‘Bank Failures

Bank Failures occur when a bank can no longer meet its obligations to its depositors and is closed by the chartering authority. The video discusses the increasing number of bank failures, with the FDIC projecting significant losses from bank closures, indicating a distressed environment within the banking sector.

πŸ’‘Real Estate Bets

Real Estate Bets in the script refer to the risky investments made by banks in real estate that led to significant losses. Heritage Community Bank, for example, made 'ruinous bets on real estate,' which contributed to its failure, illustrating the risky nature of such investments and their impact on bank stability.

πŸ’‘Insured Deposits

Insured Deposits are bank deposits that are protected by the FDIC up to a certain amount ($250,000 at the time of the script). This means that if a bank fails, the FDIC will ensure that depositors do not lose their insured amount. The script highlights the safety of insured deposits and the FDIC's role in maintaining depositor confidence.

πŸ’‘Repo 105

Repo 105 is an accounting maneuver used by Lehman Brothers to temporarily remove assets from its balance sheet, making the firm appear less leveraged. The script describes how Lehman misused this trick to deceive investors and regulators about its true financial health, which is considered a form of financial deception.

πŸ’‘Systemic Risk

Systemic Risk is the risk that the failure of one financial institution could trigger a series of failures, leading to the collapse of the entire financial system. The video discusses the idea that no bank should be allowed to grow so large that its failure would pose a systemic risk, suggesting regulatory measures to limit bank size.

πŸ’‘Subprime Mortgages

Subprime Mortgages are home loans made to borrowers with blemished or limited credit histories, who typically have a higher risk of defaulting on their loans. The script mentions that the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble was just the start of a larger financial crisis, indicating the role these mortgages played in the economic downturn.

πŸ’‘Alt-A and Option ARM Loans

Alt-A and Option ARM loans are types of mortgages that were considered higher quality than subprime loans but still carried significant risks. The script warns that these loans, which also reset to higher interest rates, are now causing a second wave of defaults and foreclosures, contributing to the ongoing housing crisis.

πŸ’‘Foreclosure

Foreclosure is the legal process by which a lender reclaims a property from a borrower who has defaulted on their mortgage. The video describes the high rate of foreclosures resulting from the resetting of Alt-A and Option ARM loans, which has led to a glut of properties on the market and further depressed home prices.

πŸ’‘Toxic Portfolios

Toxic Portfolios refer to investment portfolios filled with assets that have lost significant value or are expected to lose value, such as the mortgage-backed securities that were heavily tied to subprime loans. The script mentions that Wall Street's most famous investment houses were collapsing under the weight of their toxic portfolios, leading to government intervention and bailouts.

Highlights

The FDIC is seizing several banks secretly at night to prevent panic.

Heritage Community Bank failed due to ruinous bets on real estate.

FDIC agents are specialists in accounting, asset management, and investigations.

FDIC's Sheila Bair discusses the increase in bank failures and the financial distress.

Heritage Community Bank held over 200 million dollars in 12,000 deposits.

The FDIC is prepared to lose 65 billion dollars on bank closures over the next five years.

Bank employees are often unaware of their bank's failing health.

FDIC takes control of bank websites and assures public of deposit safety.

The FDIC insures up to 250,000 dollars per depositor, funded by bank premiums, not taxpayer money.

Sheila Bair suggests Congress should limit the size of banks to prevent future bailouts.

Investor Whitney Tilson predicts a second wave of mortgage defaults from alt-a and option arm loans.

Tilson estimates over 70% of option arms will default.

The SEC had daily oversight of Lehman Brothers yet failed to act on questionable accounting practices.

Former SEC Inspector General David Kotz implies that the SEC's presence at Lehman Brothers complicates prosecution.

Bank of America's strategy of avoiding subprime mortgages has left it in a strong position.

Ken Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, believes the era of excessive financial service compensation is over.

Whitney Tilson sees the stock market as a bargain, despite upcoming financial challenges.

Transcripts

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a lot of people are worried about their

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Bank these days while devastated giants

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like Citigroup get bailed out again and

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again and again many smaller banks are

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failing the federal agency that takes

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over unsound Banks is the Federal

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Deposit Insurance Corporation the same

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people who guarantee that depositors

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won't lose their money most every Friday

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now the FDIC is seizing several Banks

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you haven't seen these takeovers

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happening because they're done secretly

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at night to make sure that there's no

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needless Panic by depositors but last

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week we were given extraordinary access

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to one of these operations because the

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FDIC wants you to see what happens to

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your money when your bank has failed

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they're going to start at one branch

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pull the cash out take it inside the

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bank this is a team of FDIC agents

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preparing to seize a bank outside

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Chicago what we need to do is we need to

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pull the corporate records they've

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checked into this hotel under a

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fictitious name CB and Associates to

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prevent a run on the bank they don't

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want anyone to know who they are or why

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they're here you all know that this is

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for the closing of Heritage Community

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Bank Cheryl Bates and Arthur cook are in

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charge of the operation that has been

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given the code name happy strange

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considering what they're about to do do

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not discuss outside of this room what is

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going on what we're here for they're

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here to seize all five branches of

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Heritage Community Bank a 40 year old

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local bank providing savings student

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loans mortgages and checking but like so

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many others recently Heritage made

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ruinous bets on real estate Sheila bear

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is Chairman of the FDIC how many banks

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failed last year 25. how many do you

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expect to fail this year it's going up

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there have been 16 already now and so

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our loss projections are going up we're

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having to increase premiums on banks to

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address the loss projections going

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forward it's a very distressed

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environment right now I wonder if you

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have a number in mind of how much the

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FDIC is prepared to pay for bank

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failures in 2009. well uh we have we

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make a five-year projection uh that for

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the next five years we had we projected

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we'll lose 65 billion dollars on Bank

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closings 65 billion some of that was

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about to be spent on the imminent

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failure of Heritage Community Bank it

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held 12 000 deposits totaling more than

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200 million dollars

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the FDIC team waited for the last

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customer to leave Cheryl Bates prepared

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to go in what sorts of Specialists do

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you have on this team

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we have accountants we have asset

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Specialists who specialize in loans we

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have people who specialize in just the

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physical facilities and we have a group

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of investigators that come in and do a

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review on the reasons for the bank

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failure really your whole team could

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come in and run the bank yes

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four months ago the FDIC and state of

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Illinois ordered the bank to stop risky

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lending and raise cash but Heritage

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couldn't find new investors the night of

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February 27th no one at the bank knew

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that the end was minutes away

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the FDIC walked into all five branches

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at once the chief executive John saphir

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was told that the bank that was his

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life's work was no longer his

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we waited outside as they delivered the

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news to the employees with Heritage Bank

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your pay stopped at 6 pm

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at 601 you went on a pay which was paid

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by the FDIC unused vacation time you

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will be paid for it you will not lose it

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in that moment operation happy looked

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pretty Grim correct because I would say

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a large majority of the employees don't

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know that the bank is in trouble and

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that it's about to close we want it to

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be as seamless as possible for your

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depositors so no deposit or loses any

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money at all and they reacted somewhat

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with dismay and shock that we were there

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and it's it it is a very trying

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period for them so it is an end to that

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whole chapter of their lives when we

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walk in we are appeared to be the bad

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guy I mean some of those people have

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been there more than 20 years and those

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are the ones who take it the hardest

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because they feel that they have put

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their life into it and now it's no

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longer there make sure that no one comes

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in without FDIC badges the employees now

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work for the FDIC a public notice went

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up and that was the signal to a team of

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nearly 80 people to take over the bank

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they took control of the bank website

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and added a notice that all deposits

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were safe

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then they started an inventory of all

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the assets and liabilities

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what's happening right now we're getting

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the bank personnel

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assigned with their FDIC counterparts

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the accounting people are meeting with

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our accounting managers and then we have

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an investigations group that comes in

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and does a review of the bank they broke

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the news to the media and prepared to

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reopen the bank Saturday morning as

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usual what do you expect from the

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customers I think the customers will

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some of them will come in with a sense

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of of fear fear created the FDIC in 1933

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after the Depression set off panics that

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wiped out even healthy Banks we've been

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around for 75 years nobody's ever lost a

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penny of insured deposits no depositor

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has ever lost a penny since the FDIC

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went into business that's right I've

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been sure deposits that's absolutely

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right which is why you need to make sure

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you below the insured deposit limits but

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no no one's ever lost a penny and the

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insured deposit limit is what right now

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it's 250 000 that's the base limit when

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the FDIC comes in and makes depositors

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whole at a bank that has failed is that

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tax money

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no it is uh it is money from our

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reserves which and we are funded by

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insurance premiums that are assessed on

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banks so no it is not taxpayer money

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EIC chairman Sheila bear is a former

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treasury official and professor of

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Finance who's written children's books

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on the wisdom of saving maybe some of

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the CEOs on Wall Street should have read

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the children's books maybe so

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maybe so bear warned two years ago that

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Bad Mortgages threatened the financial

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system now she's managing the biggest

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bank failures in years including the

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collapse of Washington Mutual and last

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Summer's sudden failure of IndyMac in

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California

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we were told we would get in yeah

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when IndyMac failed you were watching

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these scenes on television of people

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lining up outside the bank like it was

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1932. yes it was what did you think of

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that I think people just forgot that

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Banks do fail and how the FDIC Works

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their money was safe it was safe it was

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probably the safest place in the world

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to have your money because we we were

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operating the institution at that point

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what sort of hit was that on your

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balance sheet I think we ended up to uh

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it was over nine billion dollars for a

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33 billion yes it was very stiff the

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question becomes

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how many times can the FDIC do that at

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what point is the FDIC broke the FDIC is

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backed by the full faith and credit of

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the United States government so if we

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need to we try not to and don't want to

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but if we need to we can borrow from

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treasury to make up for any shortfall so

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the FDIC never goes broke we do go grope

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no we are the government we're back by

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the Full Faith and Grant of the United

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States government but customers at the

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former Heritage Community Bank outside

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Chicago weren't so sure about the safety

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of their money on Saturday morning the

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bank reopened on time and the FDI sees

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Ricky McCullough stood at the front door

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the people who were coming in this

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morning what were they asking you

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can I still write checks can I access my

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safe deposit box can I use my ATM

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machine and to all those questions you

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answered what yes

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customer bill Hess showed up on a

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mission with an empty briefcase he

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intended to leave with all of his money

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we'd be glad to ask any questions for

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you I don't care anymore he said I don't

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care anymore and so I became a little

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concerned so I came inside and one of

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the things that he told me as he opened

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up his briefcase he said well I don't

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have a gun in here so I said well that's

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good account McCullough explained to

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Hess and his wife Audrey that their

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savings were safe so if you have a

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single account that's 250 if you have a

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single account that's 250. so now that's

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500. hess's briefcase was empty when he

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came in

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and empty when he came out we just

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thought we were going to see closed and

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the doors locked yeah you know so how do

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you feel now that you've talked to them

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it's fine

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a shirt yeah a shirt yes for sure yes

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yes you had confidence in the FBI cic

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right yeah now if they can't pay you

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then I won't have confidence in them

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either

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one customer did take most of her money

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out but for many their concern was for

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the bank employees

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hope you all stay and I hope they don't

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let anybody go we're fine you just keep

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coming back to see us there are three

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ways the FDIC takes over a bank

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it can close it and pay off depositors

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run the bank itself or more often it'll

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try to find a buyer we do have bids from

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five different parties a few days before

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the Takeover of Heritage Community Bank

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we were at the FDIC office in Dallas

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where they were holding a Secret online

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auction in hopes of finding a buyer for

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Heritage I wanted to congratulate you

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we've

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chosen to accept one of your three bids

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the winner was MB Financial a nine

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billion dollar Chicago Bank the night of

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the Takeover all of Heritage communities

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branches became MB Banks Mitchell feiger

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is mbceo it's almost as if nothing had

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happened

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uh almost nothing did happen uh it's

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it's the same products it's the same

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Services it's the same people taking

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care of the same customers it was a

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sweet deal for feiger the FDIC paid MB

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Financial 3.5 million dollars MB got all

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of the deposits customers and Loans if

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some of those loans go bad in the future

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the FDIC will pick up at least 80

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percent of the losses we wondered what

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Fieger thinks of the health of banking

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today you have to believe that dozens

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and dozens and dozens of more banks have

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to fail

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but it's okay

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what do you mean it's okay it's okay

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because I think the process is smooth

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depositors are fully protected

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by by an industry-funded FDIC insurance

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um uh and I think that taking out the

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weak players and taking some capacity

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out of the industry is good it's good

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for the industry it's good for the

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survivors it will produce at the end a

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much healthier banking system if you can

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put Heritage Community Bank out of its

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misery

play11:18

why can't you do the same with Citigroup

play11:20

first of all I don't talk about open

play11:22

operating institutions we can only uh

play11:25

deal with the resolution of a bank a

play11:27

federally chartered or state chartered

play11:28

depository institution and these very

play11:32

large institutions that are creating the

play11:34

headlines now these are really very

play11:35

large Financial organizations so they

play11:37

have it's more than a bank it's a broker

play11:39

dealer it's offshore operations it's

play11:41

foreign deposits we noticed that wild

play11:43

giant Banks get bailed out investors in

play11:47

failed Community Banks like Heritage get

play11:50

wiped out Ben Bernanke the chairman of

play11:52

the Federal Reserve says that the system

play11:54

is unfair for smaller Banks and that's

play11:57

just the way it is well I think that's

play12:00

true and going forward I think we need

play12:02

to really review the size of these

play12:04

institutions and whether we should do

play12:06

something about that bear surprised us

play12:08

when she suggested that maybe the mega

play12:10

Banks those bailed out by the taxpayers

play12:13

shouldn't be allowed to exist in the

play12:15

future I think that may be something a

play12:17

Congress needs to think about actually

play12:18

limit how big a bank can be yeah well

play12:22

you know I think taxpayers rightfully

play12:24

should ask

play12:25

that if an institution has become so

play12:27

large that there is no alternative

play12:28

except for the taxpayers to provide

play12:30

support

play12:31

should we allow so many institutions to

play12:33

exceed that kind of threshold the idea

play12:35

would be that no bank would grow so

play12:37

large that it posed a systemic risk to

play12:40

the economy that'd be a very different

play12:42

world it would be a different world

play12:44

because Heritage Community Bank was

play12:47

bought by MB Financial the FDIC didn't

play12:50

have to pay depositors even accounts

play12:52

over the insurance limit were safe for

play12:55

Cheryl Bates it was her fourth closing

play12:57

this year but certainly not her last

play13:00

what do you want people to think when

play13:03

you tell them you're from the FDIC

play13:06

I always want them to think that I'm one

play13:08

of the the good guys and that we want to

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make sure that they get their money back

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should their Bank fail that they are

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going to be okay because the FDIC is

play13:16

there

play13:28

on September 15 2008 Lehman Brothers the

play13:31

fourth largest Investment Bank in the

play13:33

world declared bankruptcy sparking chaos

play13:36

in the financial markets and nearly

play13:38

Bringing Down the global economy

play13:40

it was the largest bankruptcy in history

play13:43

larger than General Motors Washington

play13:45

Mutual Enron and Worldcom combined

play13:49

the federal bankruptcy court appointed

play13:51

Anton velucas a prominent Chicago lawyer

play13:54

and former United States Attorney to

play13:56

conduct an investigation to determine

play13:58

what happened

play14:00

included in the nine volume 2200 page

play14:03

report was the finding that there was

play14:05

enough evidence for a prosecutor to

play14:08

bring a case against top Lehman

play14:09

officials and one of the nation's top

play14:11

accounting firms for misleading

play14:13

government regulators and investors that

play14:16

was two years ago and there have been no

play14:18

prosecutions Anton velucas has never

play14:21

given an interview about his report

play14:22

until now

play14:24

this is the largest bankruptcy in the

play14:26

world what were the effects the effects

play14:28

were the financial disaster that we are

play14:31

living our way through right now and who

play14:33

got hurt everybody got hurt the entire

play14:36

economy has suffered from the fall of

play14:38

Lehman Brothers so the whole world yes

play14:41

the whole world

play14:42

when Lehman Brothers collapsed 26 000

play14:45

employees lost their jobs and millions

play14:48

of investors lost all or almost all of

play14:51

their money triggering a chain reaction

play14:53

that produced the worst financial crisis

play14:55

and economic downturn in 70 years

play14:59

Anton velukas's job was to provide the

play15:02

bankruptcy court with accurate reliable

play15:04

information that the judges could use to

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resolve the claims of creditors picking

play15:09

over Lehman's corpse had you ever done

play15:11

anything like this before I've never

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done anything like Lehman Brothers and I

play15:14

don't think anybody else has ever done

play15:15

anything like Lehman Brothers so your

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job I mean in some ways your job was to

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assess blame our job is to determine

play15:21

what actually happened put the card's

play15:23

face up on the table and let everybody

play15:24

see what the facts truly are velukas's

play15:27

team spent a year and a half

play15:28

interviewing hundreds of former

play15:30

employees and pouring over 34 million

play15:34

documents they told of how Lehman bought

play15:36

up huge amounts of real estate that it

play15:38

couldn't unload when the market went

play15:40

South how it had borrowed 44 dollars for

play15:43

every one it had in the bank to finance

play15:45

the deals and how Lehman Executives

play15:47

manipulated balance sheets and financial

play15:50

reports when investors began losing

play15:52

confidence and competitors closed in did

play15:56

these quarterly reports represent to

play15:58

investor is a fair accurate

play16:02

picture of the company's Financial

play16:03

condition in our opinion they did not I

play16:06

mean isn't that against the law

play16:07

certainly in our opinion was against

play16:09

civil law if you will there were

play16:11

colorable claims that this was a fraud

play16:13

yes my colorable claims for Lucas means

play16:16

there is sufficient evidence for the

play16:18

justice department or the Securities and

play16:20

Exchange Commission to bring charges

play16:22

against top Lehman Executives including

play16:24

CEO Richard fold for overseeing and

play16:27

certifying misleading financial

play16:29

statements and against Lehman's

play16:31

accountant Ernst young for failing to

play16:34

challenge Lehman's numbers they'd fudge

play16:36

the numbers they would move what turned

play16:38

out to be approximately 50 billion

play16:40

dollars of assets from the United States

play16:41

to the United Kingdom just before they

play16:44

printed their financial statements in a

play16:46

week or so after the financial

play16:47

statements had been distributed to the

play16:49

public that 50 billion dollars would

play16:50

reappear here in the United States back

play16:53

on the books in the United States in the

play16:54

next financial statement they would move

play16:56

it overseas again and file the report

play16:59

and then move it back right it sounds

play17:01

like a shell game it was a shell game it

play17:03

was a gimmick Lehman misused an

play17:06

accounting trick called repo 105 to

play17:08

temporarily remove the 50 billion

play17:11

dollars from its ledgers to make it look

play17:13

as though it was reducing its dependency

play17:15

on borrowed money and was drawing down

play17:17

its debt Lehman never told investors or

play17:20

Regulators about it this is really

play17:22

deception to make the company look

play17:24

healthier than it was yes deliberate yes

play17:27

how are you so sure of that because we

play17:30

read the emails in which we observed

play17:33

people saying that they were doing it we

play17:35

interviewed the witnesses who wrote

play17:37

those emails or some of those emails and

play17:39

asked them why they were doing it and

play17:40

they told us they were doing it for

play17:41

purposes of affecting the numbers do you

play17:44

think limit Executives knew that this

play17:46

was wrong for some of them certainly

play17:47

there were concerns being expressed by

play17:49

it at high levels about whether this is

play17:51

appropriate what happens if the street

play17:53

finds out about it so you know there was

play17:54

a concern that there's a real question

play17:57

about whether we can do this or whether

play17:58

this was right or not one of those

play18:00

people was Matthew Lee who had been a

play18:02

senior executive at Lehman and the

play18:04

accountant responsible for its Global

play18:06

balance sheet Lee was one of the first

play18:09

to raise objections inside Lehman about

play18:12

the accounting trick known as repo 105.

play18:14

it sounded like a rat poison repo 105

play18:17

when I first heard it

play18:19

um

play18:20

so I investigated what it was and I

play18:24

didn't like what I saw was there a point

play18:26

in which you saw the accounting

play18:28

principles employed by Lehman Brothers

play18:29

change November 30th 2007 was the end of

play18:33

our fiscal year

play18:35

and I fully expected us you know to make

play18:38

a loss that year like everyone else

play18:41

and when I saw we made money it was a

play18:43

record year in fact I thought that

play18:45

doesn't sound right you knew the markets

play18:48

were doing badly so why wasn't Lehman

play18:49

doing badly and every time I found

play18:51

something and I went to my boss or

play18:52

whoever no response that was 10 months

play18:56

before Lehman Brothers went bankrupt

play18:58

Lee's position required him to sign off

play19:00

on the accuracy of the firm's accounting

play19:02

practices every quarter but in November

play19:04

of 2007 he declined to do it by refusing

play19:08

to sign it you were saying that you

play19:11

didn't believe the numbers correct that

play19:13

this wasn't a fair and accurate

play19:14

representation of the financial

play19:15

condition of Lehman Brothers right

play19:17

something's up here why can't people

play19:19

answer my questions you know why has

play19:21

repo 105 doubled give me an answer

play19:24

uh not you know nothing was said

play19:27

Lee continued to press people for more

play19:29

information but nothing changed in four

play19:32

months before Lehman collapsed he sent

play19:34

this letter to Lehman's top Executives

play19:36

I've been telling you all year I've been

play19:38

banging my head against the wall

play19:41

I'm now putting in writing it says it

play19:43

requires me to bring the attention to

play19:44

management conduct and actions on the

play19:46

part of the firm that I consider to be

play19:48

possibly

play19:50

unethical and unlawful yeah

play19:53

what were you talking about specifically

play19:56

well in that particular letter was

play19:57

General there were so many specifics I

play19:59

could have written laundry lists what

play20:01

kind of a response did you get from this

play20:03

letter it's like throwing a grenade I

play20:05

wanted to wake somebody up at least to

play20:08

address the topics it worked six days

play20:12

after we sent that letter Matthew Lee

play20:14

was downsized let go after 14 years but

play20:17

Lehman Executives couldn't ignore the

play20:19

letter and ask their accountants from

play20:21

Ernst young to interview Matthew Lee and

play20:24

in those interviews we have the notes

play20:26

which are part of the report

play20:29

he says very specifically 50 billion

play20:31

dollars repo transactions moving money

play20:33

off the balance sheet at quarter end so

play20:36

our conclusion was Ernst young certainly

play20:39

knew it as of that time

play20:41

and did nothing with it the Lucas says

play20:43

Ernst young was legally bound to make

play20:46

sure that Lehman's audit committee and

play20:48

its board of directors knew about Lee's

play20:50

allegations of unethical and unlawful

play20:53

accounting practices but they never did

play20:55

did the audit committee know no did the

play20:59

board of directors know no did Dick fold

play21:01

know

play21:03

did Dick vote though well he says no the

play21:07

only place Lehman CEO Richard fold is

play21:09

publicly answered questions about his

play21:11

firm's bankruptcy has been in front of

play21:14

Congress I have absolutely no

play21:15

recollection whatsoever of hearing

play21:18

anything about

play21:19

or seeing documents related to repo 105

play21:23

transactions while I was the CEO of

play21:25

Lehman he said the same thing to me face

play21:27

to face

play21:28

do you believe him there was evidence

play21:30

which would show that that's not

play21:32

accurate the president of Lehman

play21:34

Brothers told us that in fact he had

play21:36

conversations with dick folt about this

play21:38

and documents were shared with him which

play21:39

would reflect the repo 105 transactions

play21:42

and how they were being used Richard

play21:43

fultz view on that was that he has no

play21:45

knowledge of it you have other evidence

play21:47

that he did a jury would have to decide

play21:49

who's telling the truth but so far

play21:51

there's been no jury to hear the

play21:53

evidence

play21:54

despite the Lucas's findings and the

play21:56

supporting documents and testimony to

play21:58

back them up the Securities and Exchange

play22:01

Commission has not brought any charges

play22:03

of any kind against former Lehman

play22:05

executives

play22:07

for the past few months we've made

play22:09

numerous requests to interview the sec's

play22:11

head of enforcement all of those

play22:13

requests have been declined the

play22:15

Securities and Exchange Commission is

play22:18

not brought a case no they have not does

play22:20

that bother you

play22:22

I'm not permitted to be bothered by that

play22:24

I'm you know my job was to set out the

play22:27

facts lay it out they have to make their

play22:29

own prosecutive decisions there is one

play22:31

plausible explanation why the SEC hasn't

play22:34

gone after top Lehman Executives as it

play22:37

turns out some of Lehman's most

play22:39

egregious accounting Shenanigans took

play22:41

place right under the noses of

play22:43

government Regulators how closely was

play22:45

the SEC monitoring Lehman Brothers

play22:47

during this time they were on premises

play22:49

they were talking to the Lehman people

play22:51

daily they officed there it was not

play22:54

widely known at the time but during the

play22:56

last six months of Lehman's existence

play22:58

teams of officials from the SEC and the

play23:01

Federal Reserve took up residence inside

play23:04

the firm to monitor its precarious

play23:06

financial situation they were inside the

play23:09

building when Matthew Lee wrote his

play23:11

letter to Lehman Executives alleging

play23:13

unlawful accounting practices and they

play23:15

were there when the practices took place

play23:17

[Music]

play23:19

valuca says the SEC also knew that

play23:22

Lehman was being less than truthful when

play23:25

it said that it had enough assets to

play23:27

survive the crisis but that and other

play23:29

damaging information was never disclosed

play23:31

to investors who continued to pump

play23:33

billions of dollars into the firm should

play23:36

it have been disclosed absolutely isn't

play23:39

the government the SEC in this case the

play23:41

the people who were supposed to protect

play23:42

the investors yes aren't they charged

play23:44

with informing investors yes why didn't

play23:47

they do it they may not have had the

play23:48

expertise necessary to understand the

play23:50

material they were receiving they were

play23:52

getting the material whether they

play23:53

understood it is another question the

play23:55

very fact that government Regulators

play23:57

were inside the company with access to

play23:59

its books and Records would complicate

play24:02

any prosecution of Lehman officials

play24:04

until four months ago David kotz was the

play24:07

sec's Inspector General over the

play24:10

previous four years he'd issued more

play24:12

than 100 reports about major

play24:13

deficiencies in the way the SEC did its

play24:17

job if the SEC knew about some of these

play24:18

problems at Lehman Brothers and they

play24:20

weren't disclosed

play24:22

doesn't it make it difficult for the SEC

play24:23

enforcement division to come back and

play24:26

bring action against Lehman Brothers

play24:27

they were there they saw it yeah I think

play24:30

that that's definitely an impediment to

play24:32

a potential case and certainly if you go

play24:34

before a jury the defense lawyers can

play24:37

make a big point about the fact that you

play24:39

were there you knew about it why didn't

play24:40

you do anything at the time now you're

play24:42

coming after them in fact former Lehman

play24:44

CEO Richard fold seemed to be trying out

play24:47

that defense when he testified before

play24:49

Congress in 2008. throughout 2008 the

play24:53

SEC and the Federal Reserve conducted

play24:55

regular and at times daily oversight of

play24:58

our business and our balance sheet they

play25:01

saw what we saw in real time let's just

play25:04

assume for a moment that Anton velucas's

play25:06

findings are true I mean isn't this just

play25:09

a free ticket for executives to say well

play25:12

look you know Lima did so and so and

play25:15

nothing happened to them right no I

play25:16

think absolutely that's a serious

play25:18

problem I mean obviously there has been

play25:20

a tremendous financial crisis the people

play25:23

who engaged in proper behavior need to

play25:25

be punished I think it's critical for

play25:27

the SEC to go after not just companies

play25:30

but also individuals where they have the

play25:32

evidence to do so when Lehman's

play25:34

bankruptcy was finally settled there

play25:36

were claims against it for 370 billion

play25:39

the creditors settled for about 20 cents

play25:42

on the dollar

play25:43

former CEO Richard fold now runs a

play25:46

Consulting business in Manhattan he lost

play25:48

most of his fortune and is embroiled in

play25:50

a raft of litigation but is still a

play25:53

wealthy man most of his senior

play25:55

colleagues Ed Lehman have landed on

play25:57

their feet

play25:58

Ernst young Lehman's accounting firm is

play26:00

now being sued by New York state for

play26:02

aiding and abetting a fraud and Matthew

play26:05

Lee the senior accountant who blew the

play26:07

whistle at Lehman is still looking for

play26:09

work unconvinced that much has changed

play26:12

in the world of Finance over the last

play26:14

four years you know the entrepreneurs of

play26:16

Wall Street are continually getting more

play26:18

and more sophisticated and they don't

play26:20

necessarily want Regulators orders

play26:21

Auditors to fully understand what

play26:23

they're doing do you believe the balance

play26:24

sheets of Big Wall Street firms if you

play26:27

read them now these numbers are so big

play26:28

and the financial instruments are so

play26:30

complex that

play26:32

you know nobody stands a chance really

play26:34

of understanding I'd have more fun

play26:37

investing in crap tables in Las Vegas

play26:39

than

play26:40

Wall Street firms

play26:53

banks are supposed to lend money and

play26:55

when they stop as they have in recent

play26:57

months the workings of our entire

play26:59

economy are threatened credit became so

play27:02

Frozen the government had a step in this

play27:04

past week and take an ownership stake in

play27:07

the country's biggest banks on Monday

play27:09

treasury secretary Henry Paulson

play27:11

summoned the CEOs of the nine largest

play27:13

banks to Washington and gave them a

play27:16

massive amount of money so that they

play27:18

would start lending again

play27:20

the largest of the banks is Bank of

play27:22

America now partly owned by the United

play27:25

States of America

play27:27

the head of Bank of America is Ken Lewis

play27:30

he says when he and the others met at

play27:33

the treasury Department it became clear

play27:35

that secretary Paulson's offer was an

play27:38

ultimatum no negotiation was allowed no

play27:41

negotiations no so in other words take

play27:44

it or take it right one of those it said

play27:47

that he told the bankers and you this is

play27:50

your patriotic Duty

play27:53

I don't remember if he used the word but

play27:56

but there was an element to that that

play27:58

this was the right thing for the for the

play28:00

American Financial system

play28:02

and therefore it was the right thing for

play28:04

America did you feel that was that a

play28:06

persuasive line of absolutely I I deeply

play28:09

believe that

play28:10

I think he was right on now explained

play28:13

why it was so important to the

play28:15

government that everybody agreed that

play28:17

the the nine largest banks are all in

play28:20

this if you have a bank in that group

play28:22

that really really needed the capital

play28:24

you don't want to expose that bank in

play28:27

other words stigmatize it so everybody

play28:28

knows that they're not as good as

play28:31

somebody else most of you were just

play28:33

stunned by the amount of money that the

play28:35

government put on the table yeah at

play28:37

least I I was and I think most everybody

play28:39

else was the total was 125 billion

play28:43

dollars of taxpayers money Bank of

play28:45

America Lewis says didn't need the money

play28:48

but got 25 billion anyway do you have

play28:51

any choice in this in other words can

play28:53

you take the money and not lend we

play28:56

wouldn't want to to do it that way

play28:58

because you can make more money lending

play29:00

and so it the intent will be to use it

play29:03

to to grow loans and and to make more

play29:06

net income but under the treasury plan

play29:08

there's no requirement that a bank used

play29:10

the money to lend it could use it to

play29:13

acquire weaker competitors or put it in

play29:16

treasury bills one of the few strings

play29:18

Paulson attached relates to salaries a

play29:22

bank would have to pay more taxes if it

play29:24

paid an executive over five hundred

play29:26

thousand dollars a year

play29:27

one of the bankers in the meeting

play29:29

objected and started arguing with

play29:31

Paulson and that's when Ken Lewis a

play29:34

Critic of excessive executive

play29:35

compensation spoke up I did make the

play29:38

point that we needed to stop talking

play29:40

about executive cop and get on with this

play29:42

because that should not stop the deal

play29:44

actually you're quoted as saying if if

play29:47

this is what's going to stop this you're

play29:49

out of your mind I did use I did use the

play29:52

phrase out of your mind because why

play29:54

because you thought if it got out

play29:55

publicly then know that the importance

play29:57

of this deal getting done versus this

play30:00

these elements of executive comp

play30:03

just out of sync I mean this was so much

play30:05

more important and all of us can can

play30:09

take a little less money with his salary

play30:12

and lucrative stock and options Lewis

play30:14

took home 25 million dollars last year

play30:18

but he's one of the few in the business

play30:19

who can be fired without a golden

play30:22

parachute and he thinks Executives on

play30:24

Wall Street have made too much money I

play30:27

think they were overpaid it's more

play30:30

egregious in financial services than any

play30:32

other industry that I know of we need to

play30:35

cut back compensation in this industry

play30:37

so this is a question everybody wants

play30:40

answered

play30:41

is this socialism have we now

play30:45

sort of stepped taken a huge step away

play30:48

from the kind of freewheeling capitalism

play30:50

that we've known for the last 30 or so

play30:52

years I don't know what we'll call it

play30:54

but it will be different and there will

play30:55

be more regulation the era of the golden

play30:58

era of financial services is over in my

play31:00

opinion but why isn't it socialism if

play31:04

government starts owning

play31:06

Banks and that will not last forever we

play31:09

will we will pay off the preferred stock

play31:11

at some point and come back to not being

play31:14

owned partially by the government can

play31:16

you give us what your sense of how long

play31:18

it's going to take I think somewhere

play31:20

between three and five years we'll pay

play31:21

it off and then and then you go back to

play31:23

uh

play31:24

more toward capitalism it's said that

play31:28

one of the main reasons the bank is

play31:30

doing well is because of your decision

play31:32

not to get into subprime mortgages

play31:34

in uh in 2001 my first year as CEO

play31:38

we decided that we just didn't like the

play31:40

business it was it was too risky and so

play31:43

we decided to get out of it he makes it

play31:45

sound like a routine decision but

play31:47

getting out of most of the financial

play31:48

products that brought Wall Street

play31:50

crashing down was significant and now

play31:53

Lewis runs one of the country's

play31:54

healthiest Banks which just keeps

play31:57

growing we saw the strongest growth in

play31:59

deposits in the third quarter we've ever

play32:01

seen in our history he told us that

play32:03

during this crisis people are taking

play32:05

their money out of other Banks and

play32:07

putting it in his we Bank every other

play32:10

American family you know in America you

play32:12

what we Bank every other American family

play32:14

in the United States no yeah

play32:17

half of the American families does

play32:19

business with us in some form of fashion

play32:22

you mean credit cards auto loans

play32:24

deposits accounts checking half the

play32:26

country

play32:27

the way B of A accomplished this was by

play32:31

buying the number one company in

play32:33

virtually every category of banking for

play32:36

instance it bought Countrywide and

play32:37

mortgages and MBNA in credit cards now

play32:42

it's a nearly three trillion dollar

play32:44

conglomerate the Walmart of banking

play32:48

this is the iconic image of Wall Street

play32:51

600 Wheeler Dealers buying and selling

play32:55

but this is B of A's trading floor and

play32:58

it's 600 miles south of New York

play33:00

the biggest bank in America is

play33:02

headquartered in Charlotte some people

play33:05

don't even know what state Charlotte's

play33:07

in whether it's North or South Carolina

play33:09

am I insulting you no in fact I always

play33:12

say Charlotte North Carolina just so so

play33:14

I don't have to ask a question

play33:16

you have this building this building

play33:19

that building that building then there's

play33:21

one next to us that building not

play33:24

surprisingly B of A seems to own

play33:26

Charlotte and the town grew with the

play33:29

bank

play33:30

Hugh McCall was the bank's CEO before

play33:33

Lewis it started out as a as a

play33:35

relatively small Regional Bank well we

play33:38

didn't like being small I mean there's

play33:40

nothing really attractive about being

play33:41

small

play33:42

he set out to expand the bank's reach

play33:45

from coast to coast and make Charlotte a

play33:48

financial Powerhouse I think we have

play33:51

this sort of Southern Underdog of

play33:52

wanting to be masters of our own fate

play33:54

and not be dependent on

play33:57

Northern Capital when you were growing

play33:59

and you'd go to New York did they not

play34:01

treat you well is is that did they treat

play34:04

you like sort of the country bumpkins

play34:06

and I guess when I was a young man I

play34:09

always felt a little uncomfortable in

play34:10

New York this uncomfortable feeling that

play34:12

they they weren't respecting you did you

play34:15

have it in your head I'm going to

play34:17

conquer New York

play34:19

well that would overstate New York I was

play34:22

more interested in America

play34:24

did you really think that you could

play34:26

overtake Wall Street

play34:28

well have you ever played tennis once

play34:30

you size up the competition and decide

play34:32

whether you can beat him or not hey and

play34:34

you thought you could I thought I could

play34:36

and they did

play34:38

the crowning Victory came last month

play34:40

when wall Street's most famous

play34:42

investment houses were collapsing under

play34:44

the weight of their toxic portfolios and

play34:47

needed rescuing they went had in hand to

play34:50

Charlotte North Carolina

play34:52

everybody thought you were going to buy

play34:54

Lehman Brothers Friday night that was

play34:57

the buzz Monday morning

play35:00

it's not Layman Brothers It's Merrill

play35:02

Lynch what happened between Friday night

play35:05

and Monday morning I had talked to

play35:07

secretary Paulson that that Friday and

play35:11

basically said we didn't think we could

play35:13

do the deal without government

play35:15

assistance with Layman with Lehman that

play35:17

we couldn't do it without some help

play35:19

and then about 10 30 John thain called

play35:23

it was Saturday morning September 13th

play35:26

John thain the CEO of Merrill Lynch was

play35:29

on the line Layman was on its death bed

play35:32

Merrill Lynch was said to be next you

play35:35

always wanted Merrill Edge we've always

play35:36

thought that was the best you were

play35:38

drooling for Maryland we have always

play35:39

thought it was deals of this magnitude

play35:42

take months of due diligence and vetting

play35:45

this deal was thrown together over a

play35:48

weekend with Bank of America spending 50

play35:51

billion dollars to buy one of wall

play35:53

Street's emblematic companies

play35:55

but now B of A is exposed to Merrill

play35:58

Lynch's poisonous Investments and

play36:00

continuing losses the question is did

play36:03

Ken Lewis pay too much some think that

play36:06

we should have waited until Monday and

play36:08

see if they would have gone bankrupt

play36:10

you're saying that if you'd waited they

play36:12

would they might have gone bankrupt some

play36:14

think something we would have gotten it

play36:15

for you know dirt cheap but my point is

play36:18

you would have had a tarnished brand

play36:19

you'd have had chaos you would have had

play36:22

a Court ruling over all of the sale of

play36:24

assets and that that it was worth it to

play36:28

us to pay a more market price so that we

play36:32

could not have that happen

play36:33

so what about Merrell's 17 000 Brokers

play36:37

Lewis has said their salaries are too

play36:39

high is New York going to lose a lot of

play36:41

jobs do you think I don't think a lot I

play36:44

mean obviously we have to we we've got

play36:46

seven billion dollars of call savings to

play36:48

get and so that that means that there

play36:49

will be jobs eliminated seven billion

play36:52

seven billion dollars in Costa oh my God

play36:54

so the government's rescue isn't helping

play36:57

everyone on Wall Street what about Main

play37:00

Street has the lending started did this

play37:03

jump start lending again it should it's

play37:06

only been a few days obviously and it

play37:08

will make a big difference it will we're

play37:10

sitting down with you Wednesday

play37:12

the market is at this moment going down

play37:15

again the Market's going down and what's

play37:17

worrying me is the fact that we had

play37:19

we've gotten the financial system in

play37:21

much much better shape but the economy

play37:23

is still a question mark and and we we

play37:26

are in a recession by any standard other

play37:29

than maybe some technical standard it

play37:31

feels like a recession and we think it's

play37:33

going to take some time before you know

play37:35

it gets better Bank of America is the

play37:37

largest mortgage lender in the country

play37:40

so when do you think the housing

play37:43

problems are going to bottom out our

play37:45

best guess now is that the toward the

play37:48

end of the first half of next year we'll

play37:50

start to see signs either signs of the

play37:53

bottoming or the actual bottoming what

play37:55

about credit card debt is that going to

play37:58

be the next shoe to drop it uh in some

play38:01

ways already is because uh credit card

play38:03

losses have have risen pretty

play38:05

substantially

play38:06

credit card debt and Auto Loan defaults

play38:09

are part of why the bank's third quarter

play38:11

earnings dropped nearly 70 percent Lewis

play38:14

called the situation a damn disaster do

play38:18

you think your job is secure

play38:23

I've not it must I must think that

play38:25

because I don't I don't think about that

play38:27

question it doesn't matter your mind I

play38:29

threw you a Zinger didn't I yeah yeah

play38:31

did you defeat Wall Street

play38:34

now to some degree we're part of it so I

play38:37

don't I don't know that we defeated it

play38:38

but well if you're number one right and

play38:42

if the idea was to compete with New York

play38:44

or Wall Street

play38:46

um you won we have yes we have we have

play38:49

one in that sense

play39:00

when it comes to bailouts of American

play39:02

Business Barney Frank and the Congress

play39:04

may be just getting started nearly 2

play39:07

trillion tax dollars have been shoveled

play39:09

into the hole that Wall Street dug and

play39:11

people wonder where's the bottom

play39:14

it turns out the abyss is deeper than

play39:16

most people think because there is a

play39:18

second mortgage shock heading for the

play39:20

economy in the executive suites of Wall

play39:23

Street in Washington you're beginning to

play39:24

hear alarm about a new wave of mortgages

play39:27

with strange names that are about to

play39:29

become all too familiar if you thought

play39:32

sub-primes were insanely Reckless wait

play39:35

till you hear what's coming

play39:37

what's the future hold well this shows

play39:40

one of the best guides to the danger

play39:41

ahead is Whitney Tilson he's an

play39:43

investment fund manager who's made such

play39:45

a name for himself recently that these

play39:48

investors who manage about 10 billion

play39:50

dollars gathered to hear him last week

play39:53

Tilson saw a year ago that subprime

play39:56

mortgages were just the start we had the

play39:59

greatest asset bubble in history and now

play40:01

that bubble is bursting the single

play40:04

biggest piece of the bubble is the U.S

play40:05

mortgage market and we're probably about

play40:09

halfway through the unwinding and

play40:12

bursting of that bubble halfway it may

play40:14

seem like all the Carnage out there we

play40:16

must be almost finished but there's

play40:18

still a lot of pain to come in terms of

play40:21

write downs and losses that have yet to

play40:23

be recognized in 2007 Tilson teamed up

play40:27

with Amherst Securities an investment

play40:29

firm that specializes in mortgages

play40:31

Amherst had done some Financial

play40:33

detective work analyzing the millions of

play40:36

mortgages that were bundled into those

play40:39

mortgage-backed Securities That Wall

play40:41

Street was peddling it found that the

play40:43

sub-primes loans to the least credit

play40:45

worthy borrowers were defaulting but

play40:48

Amherst also ran the numbers on what

play40:51

were supposed to be higher quality

play40:53

mortgages and they were frankly

play40:55

terrifying as data we'd never seen

play40:56

before and that's what made us realize

play40:59

holy cow things are going to be much

play41:01

worse than anyone anticipates the

play41:03

trouble now is that the insanity didn't

play41:06

end with the subprimes there were two

play41:08

other kinds of exotic mortgages that

play41:10

became popular called altas and option

play41:13

arms the option arms in particular lured

play41:17

borrowers in with ultra low initial

play41:19

interest rates called teaser rates

play41:21

sometimes as low as one percent but

play41:24

after two three or five years those

play41:27

rates reset they went up and so did the

play41:30

monthly payment so a mortgage of say

play41:33

eight hundred dollars a month could

play41:35

easily jump to fifteen hundred dollars

play41:38

now the alt a and option arm loans made

play41:41

back in the Heyday are starting to reset

play41:44

causing the mortgage payments to go up

play41:46

and homeowners to default the defaults

play41:49

right now are are incredibly high at

play41:52

unprecedented levels and there's no

play41:55

evidence that the default rate is

play41:56

tapering off those defaults almost

play41:58

inevitably are leading to foreclosures

play42:00

and homes being auctioned and home

play42:02

prices continuing to fall what you seem

play42:04

to be saying is that there is a very

play42:06

predictable Time Bomb effect here

play42:08

exactly I mean you can look back at what

play42:12

was written in o5 and 07 you can look at

play42:14

the reset dates you can look at the

play42:17

current default rates and it's really

play42:19

very clear and predictable what's going

play42:22

to happen here just look at this

play42:24

projection from the Investment Bank of

play42:26

Credit Suisse these are the billions of

play42:29

dollars in subprime mortgages that reset

play42:32

last year and this year now look at what

play42:35

hasn't hit yet the alt a and option arm

play42:39

resets when homeowners will pay higher

play42:41

interest rates in the next three years

play42:44

we're at the beginning of a second wave

play42:47

how big is the potential damage from the

play42:50

old days compared to what we just saw in

play42:52

the subprimes well the subprime was

play42:54

approaching a trillion the Alta is about

play42:56

a trillion and then you have option arms

play42:59

on top of that that's probably another

play43:01

five to six hundred billion on top of

play43:03

that how many of these option arms would

play43:05

you imagine are going to fail well north

play43:07

of 50 percent my gut would be 70 percent

play43:10

of these option arms will default how do

play43:12

you know that we know it based on

play43:14

current default rates and this is before

play43:17

the reset so people are defaulting even

play43:20

on the the little three percent teaser

play43:22

interest only rates they're being asked

play43:24

to pay today

play43:25

that second wave is coming ashore at a

play43:28

place you might call the repo Riviera

play43:30

Miami-Dade County

play43:33

Oscar Munoz used to sell real estate now

play43:37

his company clears out foreclosed homes

play43:40

the business is just going through the

play43:42

roof for us fortunately for us

play43:44

unfortunately for the poor families who

play43:46

are going through this I wonder do you

play43:47

ever come to houses where the people are

play43:49

still here absolutely that's really a

play43:51

sad situation I'd rather not meet the

play43:53

people why not it's not easy to to come

play43:55

in and move a family out

play43:57

it's it's just our job to do it for the

play43:59

bank it's it's just the nature of of

play44:02

what's going on in the market right now

play44:04

what is going on in the market right now

play44:06

how much work are you getting every day

play44:07

we have 20 30 assignments a day a day

play44:11

just your company just our company and

play44:13

we're one of the few companies right now

play44:15

we're hiring we hire we have to hire

play44:17

people because the demand is is so high

play44:20

people who've been evicted tend to leave

play44:23

stuff behind the next house is usually

play44:25

much smaller Banks hire Munoz to move

play44:28

the possessions out where by law they

play44:30

remain for 24 hours often the neighbors

play44:33

pick through the remains once the homes

play44:36

are empty the hard part starts trying to

play44:38

find buyers in a free fall market Miami

play44:41

real estate broker Peter zalewski talks

play44:44

like a man with a lot of real estate to

play44:46

move we have a hundred and ten thousand

play44:48

properties for sale in South Florida

play44:49

Today 55 000 foreclosures nineteen

play44:52

thousand bank owned properties 68 of the

play44:55

available inventories in some form of

play44:56

distress they need someone to clean it

play44:58

up what's the name of your company it's

play45:00

called condo vultures Realty what does

play45:03

that mean that in times of distress in

play45:05

times of uh downturn there's opportunity

play45:07

and you know vultures are clean up the

play45:09

mess a lot of people seem to think they

play45:10

kill but they don't actually kill they

play45:12

clean the killing in Miami was done by

play45:15

the developers back when it seemed that

play45:17

the party would never end they sold

play45:19

hyper-inflated condos at what amounted

play45:22

to real estate orgies sales parties for

play45:25

invited guests who were armed with

play45:27

option arm and all day loans there were

play45:31

red ropes out outside they had hired

play45:33

cameramen and they had hired

play45:34

photographers to almost set the scene of

play45:36

a Paparazzi they were hiring fake

play45:38

Paparazzi to make the customers feel

play45:40

like they were special you were selling

play45:42

a lifestyle what role did these exotic

play45:44

mortgages play these alt A's and the

play45:46

option arms they were essential they

play45:47

were necessary without the Altair option

play45:49

our mortgage this boom never would have

play45:51

occurred it never would have occurred

play45:53

because without the altez and the option

play45:55

arms many buyers never would have

play45:57

qualified for a loan the banks and the

play45:59

Brokers were getting their money up

play46:01

front in fees so the more they wrote the

play46:04

more they made they stopped checking

play46:06

whether the income was even real they

play46:08

turned to low and no doc loans so-called

play46:10

Liars loans and jokingly referred to as

play46:13

ninja loans no income no job no assets

play46:15

and they were still willing to lend but

play46:17

help me out here how does that make

play46:18

sense for the lender it would seem to be

play46:21

reckless in the extreme it was but the

play46:25

key assumption underlying the

play46:27

willingness to do this was that home

play46:29

prices would keep going up forever and

play46:31

in fact home prices Nationwide had never

play46:33

declined since the Great Depression on

play46:35

the way up everyone wanted in no one

play46:38

expected to feel any pain people like

play46:41

acupuncturist Rula geosmus became real

play46:44

estate speculators how many properties

play46:46

did you buy in this last five year

play46:48

period I believe in the last five year

play46:50

period I bought about six properties and

play46:52

what did you buy them for for

play46:54

Investments she says she put 20 percent

play46:56

down on each now they're all financed

play46:59

with option armed loans what did you

play47:02

understand about the loans well

play47:03

unfortunately I didn't ask too many

play47:05

questions I mean in the old days I would

play47:06

shop around but because of the frenzy

play47:08

and I was so busy looking to buy other

play47:10

properties I didn't really focus on

play47:12

shopping around for mortgage brokers but

play47:14

if you're investing in real estate

play47:16

you're buying multiple properties you

play47:18

should be asking a lot of questions yeah

play47:20

why didn't you ask I was busy I was

play47:23

really busy looking at property all the

play47:25

time all day long did you read the

play47:27

paperwork no I didn't now she's losing

play47:31

money on every property you know that

play47:33

there are people watching this interview

play47:35

who are saying you know she was just

play47:37

foolish

play47:38

she was greedy and foolish she was

play47:40

buying small apartment buildings and

play47:42

wasn't paying enough attention to how

play47:44

they were financed my full-time job is

play47:46

on my acupuncturist so this is just a

play47:48

side thing you're an acupuncturist but

play47:50

you got stuck in real estate yeah

play47:52

geosmith says she was misled and she

play47:55

hopes to renegotiate her loans but many

play47:58

other buyers have simply walked away

play48:00

from their properties this Miami luxury

play48:03

building was a sellout but when we

play48:05

visited a quarter of the condos were in

play48:08

foreclosure what did this place go for

play48:10

this was originally purchased in October

play48:12

of 2006 for 2.4 million dollars 2.4

play48:15

million what's it worth now uh the

play48:17

asking price from the lender is 939 so

play48:20

it lost a million and a half dollars in

play48:22

value in a couple of years since the top

play48:24

two years

play48:25

and there are tough years to come

play48:27

because just like the subprimes the alt

play48:30

a and option arm mortgages were bundled

play48:33

into Wall Street Securities and sold to

play48:36

investors in a nutshell 2009 looks like

play48:38

what to you miserable 2010. minutes are

play48:41

even worse

play48:42

Sean Egan runs a credit rating firm that

play48:45

analyzes corporate debt Fortune Magazine

play48:48

cited Egan as one of six Wall Street

play48:50

Pros who predicted the fall of the

play48:53

financial Giants this next wave of

play48:55

defaults which everyone agrees is

play48:57

inevitably going to happen how Central

play48:59

is that to what happens to the rest of

play49:01

the economy

play49:02

core it's core because housing is such

play49:05

an important part

play49:06

we're not going to get the Housing

play49:09

Industry back on track until we clear

play49:11

out this garbage that's in there that

play49:13

hasn't cleared out yet in fact we

play49:15

haven't seen the bottom it's getting

play49:17

worse what do you think there are some

play49:19

statistics from the National Association

play49:21

of Realtors and they track the the

play49:24

supply of housing units on the market

play49:26

and that's grown from 2.2 million units

play49:30

about three years ago up to 4.5 million

play49:34

units earlier this year so you have you

play49:37

have the massive Supply out there of of

play49:40

units that need to be sold well with the

play49:43

housing Supply increasing that much what

play49:45

does it mean it means that this problem

play49:48

the economic difficulties are not going

play49:51

to be resolved in a short period of time

play49:54

it's not going to take six months it's

play49:55

not going to take 12 months we're

play49:57

looking at probably about three four or

play49:59

five years before this over

play50:02

the supply overhang is worked through in

play50:06

the next four years eight million

play50:08

American families are expected to lose

play50:09

their homes but even after the

play50:12

residential meltdown Whitney Tilson says

play50:15

blows to the financial system will keep

play50:17

coming the same craziness that occurred

play50:20

in the mortgage Market occurred in the

play50:22

commercial real estate markets and

play50:23

that's taking a little longer to to show

play50:25

but but they're going to be big losses

play50:27

there credit cards auto loans you name

play50:29

it so we're maybe halfway through the

play50:31

mortgage bubble but we may only be in

play50:33

the third inning of the overall bursting

play50:35

of this asset bubble does that mean that

play50:37

the stock market is going to continue

play50:38

plunging as we've seen the last several

play50:40

months actually we're the most bullish

play50:43

we've been in 10 years of managing money

play50:45

and the reason is is because the stock

play50:47

market for the first time I can say this

play50:49

in years has finally figured out how bad

play50:51

things are going to be and the stock

play50:53

market is forward-looking and with U.S

play50:55

stocks down nearly 50 percent from their

play50:58

highs we're actually finding Bargains

play51:00

Galore we think Corporate America is on

play51:01

sale

play51:03

the stock market will still have a lot

play51:05

of figuring to do with more troubling

play51:07

news on the horizon The Mortgage Bankers

play51:10

Association says one out of 10 Americans

play51:13

is now behind on their mortgage that's

play51:15

the most since they started keeping

play51:17

records in 1979.

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Related Tags
Bank BailoutsEconomic CrisisMortgage DefaultsFDICSubprime MortgagesFinancial RegulationWall StreetInvestor LossesBankruptcyForeclosures