Why The Treaty of Versailles Was Such A Shock For Germany? (Documentary)

Summary

In June 1919, the Paris Peace Conference reached a pivotal moment as the Treaty of Versailles was presented to Germany, aiming to conclude World War I and establish a new world order. The 'Big Four' Allies—United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy—had divergent goals, with France seeking security, Britain maintaining balance, and the US advocating for the League of Nations. Germany, expecting leniency based on Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points, was instead confronted with severe terms including territorial losses, disarmament, and reparations. The treaty's signing on June 28th marked a fragile peace, with critics like John Maynard Keynes foreseeing economic turmoil, while others debated its role in later sparking World War II.

Takeaways

• 🎬 The episode is sponsored by Patreon and YouTube supporters, emphasizing the community's role in the show's creation.
• 📈 The host clarifies that despite the support, they are not financially overwhelmed, highlighting the reality of running a history channel.
• 🔍 The episode dives into the intricacies of the Paris Peace Conference in June 1919, focusing on the Treaty of Versailles and its implications.
• 🤝 The 'Big Four' Allied leaders had to quickly reach a consensus on peace terms to prevent the spread of Bolshevism and maintain unity.
• 🇫🇷 France sought security and economic compensation, desiring a weakened Germany to prevent future conflicts.
• 🇬🇧 Britain aimed to maintain its empire's strength and balance of power in Europe, wary of a potentially too-powerful France.
• 🗽 The US prioritized economic recovery for Germany and the establishment of the League of Nations as a security instrument.
• 📜 The Treaty of Versailles was detailed and extensive, with 440 clauses covering territorial losses, disarmament, and reparations for Germany.
• 🚫 Germany faced significant territorial losses, disarmament, and was held responsible for the war, which was a point of contention.
• ⏳ The German delegation had limited time to respond to the treaty terms, leading to internal debates and eventual acceptance under duress.
• 🌍 The treaty's signing on June 28, 1919, marked a fragile peace, with many fearing its long-term consequences for Europe's stability.

Q & A

What was the main challenge faced by the Allies during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919?

The main challenge was to create a peace settlement that would prevent future wars, ensure Germany was punished and could not start another war, and maintain unity among the Allies while addressing their differing priorities and concerns.

Why was France particularly focused on security in the post-war negotiations?

France had suffered significant economic destruction and loss of life during the war, and had been invaded twice by Germany in the past 50 years. This history made security a top priority for France in the negotiations.

What were the British aims during the Paris Peace Conference?

The British aims included maintaining the strength of their empire, ensuring a balance of power in Europe, preventing Germany from becoming too weak or too strong, and ensuring Germany would not be an imperial and commercial competitor as it had been before 1914.

How did the United States view the role of the League of Nations in the post-war settlement?

The United States, particularly President Wilson, saw the League of Nations as a key instrument for maintaining peace and security, not just for France but for the world in general.

What was the German delegation's expectation regarding the peace terms?

The German delegation expected that the peace would be based on the 14 Points and the diplomatic notes from the fall of 1918. They assumed there would be negotiations and sought the mildest possible terms while maintaining Germany's potential as a Great Power.

Why was the presentation of the Treaty of Versailles to Germany considered humiliating?

The presentation was considered humiliating because it was detailed and very long, with 440 separate sections, reflecting the improvisation and compromising that had gone into the settlement. Germany was not allowed to negotiate verbally but only respond in writing, and the terms were seen as overly punitive.

What were the main terms of the Treaty of Versailles that caused discontent among Germans?

The main terms causing discontent included territorial losses, large-scale disarmament, heavy reparations, and the war guilt clause (Article 231), which placed the blame for the war on Germany.

How did the German public and government initially react to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

The German public and government were largely unhappy with the treaty, viewing it as a betrayal of the armistice agreement and a death sentence for Germany. There were demonstrations and strong opposition to the terms, especially the war guilt clause and territorial losses.

What were the consequences if Germany refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles?

If Germany refused to sign the treaty, the Allies had made it clear that they would invade, and there was a risk of the country being broken up or facing even more severe terms.

What was the final decision of Germany regarding the Treaty of Versailles, and how did the signing take place?

Germany ultimately decided to accept the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, with the signing taking place in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919. The signing was a brief and highly orchestrated event, intended to be as humiliating as possible for Germany.

What were some of the immediate and long-term concerns regarding the Treaty of Versailles?

Immediate concerns included the harshness of the terms and the potential for instability in Europe. Long-term concerns revolved around the treaty's role in setting the stage for World War II, the enforcement of its terms, and the broader impact on international relations and the balance of power.

Outlines

00:00

🎥 Introduction to The Great War's Patreon Support

The episode begins with an acknowledgment of the show's supporters on Patreon and YouTube, emphasizing their crucial role in the production of the series. The host humorously contrasts the reality of their modest budget with the imagined luxury of bathing in Patreon cash. The episode's focus is set on the historical events of June 1919, particularly the Paris Peace Conference, where the Treaty of Versailles was to be signed. The host, Jesse Alexander, invites viewers to explore the intricacies of the treaty and its implications on world history.

05:03

🏰 The Paris Peace Conference and the Big Four's Dilemma

This segment delves into the complexities of the Paris Peace Conference, highlighting the challenges faced by the 'Big Four' Allied leaders—United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Each had distinct priorities: France sought security and retribution, Britain aimed to maintain a balance of power, the US advocated for economic recovery and the League of Nations, and Italy had its own set of demands. The episode outlines the Allies' common goals of punishing Germany, ensuring reparations, and preventing future aggression, while also detailing the significant disagreements among them on how to achieve these objectives.

10:05

📜 The Presentation of the Treaty of Versailles to Germany

The narrative shifts to the German delegation's arrival in Paris and their initial reception, which was designed to impress upon them the devastation caused by the war. The Germans, led by Foreign Minister Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau, were presented with the Treaty of Versailles' terms without opportunity for verbal negotiation. Brockdorff-Rantzau's defiant response, denying Germany's responsibility for the war and advocating for peace based on President Wilson's 14 Points, was met with disapproval from the Allies. The episode then provides an overview of the treaty's extensive条款, which included the establishment of the League of Nations, territorial losses for Germany, disarmament, and reparations.

15:06

🚨 Germany's Reaction to the Treaty and the Allies' Ultimatum

This section discusses the profound shock and outrage in Germany following the revelation of the Treaty of Versailles' terms. The German public and leadership viewed the treaty as a betrayal and a death sentence for their nation. The episode describes the intense debates within the German government, with some advocating for rejection of the treaty and others urging acceptance to avoid further conflict. Germany's counter-proposals were largely dismissed by the Allies, who issued an ultimatum demanding full acceptance of the terms. The episode captures the desperation and division within Germany as it faced the prospect of renewed war.

20:07

✒️ The Signing of the Treaty of Versailles and Its Aftermath

The final segment describes the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, a symbolically charged location given its historical significance. The episode recounts the ceremony's theatrical and emotional nature, highlighting the sense of humiliation imposed on Germany. It also reflects on the mixed feelings among the Allies and the broader implications of the treaty. The episode concludes with a discussion of the treaty's legacy, including its role in shaping the interwar period and the debate among historians about its impact on the lead-up to World War II.

25:08

🌟 Conclusion and Reflections on the Post-War Order

In the concluding segment, the host, Jesse Alexander, summarizes the episode's key points and reflects on the broader context of the post-World War I peace process. The episode underscores the fragility and incompleteness of the peace, the challenges faced by the League of Nations, and the numerous unresolved issues that lingered after the treaty's signing. It also invites viewers to join The Great War Aftershow for further discussion and exploration of the topic, emphasizing the ongoing relevance of these historical events.

Keywords

💡Patreon

Patreon is a crowdfunding platform where creators are supported by their audience, or patrons, through monthly payments. In the context of the video, Patreon supporters are acknowledged as essential to the production of the show, highlighting the direct impact of their contributions on the creation and continuation of the series. The script mentions Patreon as a platform where viewers can support the show financially, which is crucial for its existence and quality.

💡Paris Peace Conference

The Paris Peace Conference was a meeting held in Paris after World War I, where the terms of peace were negotiated among the victorious Allies and the defeated Central Powers. The conference is central to the video's theme as it sets the stage for the discussion of the Treaty of Versailles. The script describes the conference as a pivotal moment in history, where decisions were made that would shape the post-war world order.

💡Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles was the peace treaty signed on June 28, 1919, that marked the official end of World War I between Germany and the Allied Powers. It is a key concept in the video as it is the main focus of the historical analysis. The script details the terms of the treaty, the reactions to it, and its historical significance, emphasizing its role in establishing a new world order and the controversies surrounding it.

💡Big Four

The term 'Big Four' refers to the leaders of the four principal Allied powers during the Paris Peace Conference: the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy. In the video, the Big Four are central to understanding the dynamics of the peace negotiations and the differing priorities each nation brought to the table, which influenced the final terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

💡Bolshevism

Bolshevism is the ideology associated with the Bolshevik Party, which was a faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party that seized power in Russia during the October Revolution of 1917. In the script, Bolshevism is mentioned as a potential threat that the Allies wanted to prevent from spreading, which influenced their decisions regarding the treatment of Germany post-war.

💡Reparations

Reparations refer to the compensation payments that the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to make to the Allied nations for the damages caused during World War I. The concept is integral to the video's discussion of the treaty's terms, illustrating the economic burden placed on Germany and contributing to the narrative of perceived unfairness in the peace settlement.

💡Disarmament

Disarmament, as discussed in the video, refers to the requirement imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles to significantly reduce its military capabilities, including limiting its army size and prohibiting certain types of weaponry. This term is crucial for understanding the security implications of the treaty and the long-term impact on Germany's military and political status.

💡League of Nations

The League of Nations was an international organization proposed by President Woodrow Wilson as part of the peace settlement after World War I, intended to prevent future wars through collective security and diplomacy. The script mentions the League of Nations as a key component of the new world order envisioned by the Allies, reflecting the idealistic hopes for international cooperation and peace.

💡War Guilt Clause

The 'War Guilt Clause', officially Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, assigned responsibility for the war to Germany and its allies, making it liable for reparations. This clause is highlighted in the video as a contentious element of the treaty that fueled German resentment and is often cited in discussions about the treaty's fairness and consequences.

💡Self-Determination

Self-determination is the principle that nations have the right to govern themselves, which was a key tenet of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the video, self-determination is discussed in the context of the peace negotiations, where it influenced decisions about the redrawing of national borders and the establishment of new states, reflecting the ideal of allowing people to decide their own political fate.

💡Armistice

An armistice is a temporary suspension of hostilities, in this case, the one that ended the fighting in World War I between the Allies and Germany on November 11, 1918. The script refers to the period after the armistice as a time of uncertainty and negotiation, leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the formal end of the war.

Highlights

The show's existence is credited to Patreon and YouTube supporters since 2015.

Creators are regular guys working for a start-up, not bathing in Patreon cash.

YouTube's advertising policies are ineffective for war history channels.

Each episode involves 100 hours of work to ensure an in-depth and unbiased historical view.

Supporters are part of a community where they can suggest topics and ask questions.

A Discord server has been opened for live chats after every episode.

The Paris Peace Conference in June 1919 aimed to end the war and establish a new world order.

The Big Four Allied leaders presented peace terms to Germany, excluding the defeated powers from negotiations.

Allies agreed on punishing Germany, but had differences on the extent of punishment.

France sought security and to weaken Germany, while Britain aimed to maintain European balance of power.

The US wanted Germany's economic recovery and the League of Nations as a security instrument.

Germany assumed peace would be based on the 14 Points, aiming to maintain Great Power status.

The Treaty of Versailles was detailed with 440 sections, reflecting improvisation and compromise.

Germany faced territorial losses, disarmament, reparations, and exclusion from the League of Nations.

Article 231, the war guilt clause, justified reparations but was seen as a moral condemnation by Germany.

The German response to the treaty was one of shock and outrage, viewing it as a betrayal.

The Allies were mostly unwilling to compromise, with only minor changes to the treaty.

Germany ultimately accepted the treaty to avoid invasion, signing on June 28th, 1919.

The treaty signing was a highly emotional and theatrical event, a break from traditional diplomacy.

Post-treaty, there were fears about Europe's future, with some seeing it as too harsh and others as too lenient.

Historians have debated the treaty's role in World War Two, with recent views suggesting it was the least bad compromise.

The treaty's enforcement and subsequent policy decisions are considered more problematic than the treaty itself.

The signing marked the beginning of the search for a post-war order, not the end.

Transcripts

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Now, on to the show.

It’s June 1919 and moment of truth has come at the Paris Peace Conference.

The Allies have given the peace terms to Germany.

If they sign, the Treaty of Versailles will bring an end to the war in the West and forge

a new world order.

But if they don’t, no one knows what will happen next.

Hi, I’m Jesse Alexander and welcome to the Great War.

By June 1919, after months of meetings and negotiations amongst the victors and notably

not the defeated powers, the Peace Conference in Paris was ready to bring to a close to

the war between Germany and the Western Allies and establish a new order in Europe.

Now before we jump into to the infamous Treaty of Versailles, a quick reminder that if you

want to learn more about the start of the conference and the Italian crisis, you can

check out our February and April episodes.

So, by early May, the Big Four Allied leaders at the Peace Conference were ready to present

the terms of peace to the Germans and the German delegation had arrived in Paris.

To understand what happens next, let’s start by asking ourselves what went into the making

of the treaty and who wanted what from the peace.

All four of the Allies – the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy – knew they

had to act fast: without a peace settlement, no one was sure how long Allied unity would

last, and Bolshevism might take hold in other countries as it had in Russia and Hungary

and almost had in parts of Germany.

The Allies’ military strength was also ebbing away as they demobilized their armies – by

June 1919 they only had 39 divisions available, down from 198 at the time of the armistice

(Macmillan 169).

They had to act while they still had enough military might.

The Big Four did agree on some basics: Germany should be punished, should pay, and should

be prevented from starting another war.

But there were serious differences among them on how to achieve these goals.

The French priority was security.

France had suffered enormous economic destruction and loss of life during the war, and had now

been invaded twice by Germany in the past 50 years.

They wanted to continue the alliance with the US and Great Britain, to be compensated

for the cost of the war, and they wanted Germany to be as weak as possible.

Prime Minister Clemenceau was firm but open to compromise on the details, but General

Foch and President Poincare were much more hawkish.

Now the British aims in Paris were to maintain the strength of their empire and a balance

of power in Europe.

They didn’t want Germany to be so weak that it would go Bolshevik, but they didn’t want

France to get too strong either.

As Lord Curzon put it: “I am seriously afraid, that the Great Power from whom we have the

most to fear in the future is France.”

(Sharp, 202).

The British also wanted to make sure that Germany would not be an imperial and commercial

competitor as it had been before 1914, though they did hope it would remain a market for

British goods (Sharp 203).

The US also wanted Germany to recover economically, as they considered free trade a cornerstone

of a stable peace.

But the Americans also had their own set of priorities.

They felt the League of Nations should be the instrument for the security of France,

and the world in general.

(Macmillan 182) Wilson’s advisor Colonel House was confident in the League as a guarantee

for security: “…if after establishing the League, we are so stupid as to let Germany

train and arm a large army and again become a menace to the world, we would deserve the

fate which such folly would bring upon us.”

(Macmillan 182) As for the Germans, they assumed that there

would be negotiations with the allies and that the peace would be based on the 14 points

and the diplomatic notes between Germany and the United States in the fall of 1918.

The 180-man German delegation that travelled to Paris was led by Foreign Minister Graf

von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had served the Kaiser during the war but also had good relations

with the ruling Social Democrats.

He wanted to get the mildest possible terms for Germany and maintain the country’s potential

for Great Power status.

(Leonhard 951).

Now that we have an idea of the competing interests of each of the powers, let’s take

a look at the terms the Germans were given when they got to Paris.

Block Germans get terms, allied publics learn Actually the politics of the peace began before

the Germans got to Paris, while they were still on the train.

The French forced the train to take a slow route through the most devastated regions

of the war zone, to bring home the full impact to the German delegates.

Once they arrived, they were put into the same hotel in which the Prussians stayed after

the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, and were basically kept under house arrest, ostensibly

to protect them from French mobs.

The very day they arrived, May 7th, the Germans met with the Allies to receive the terms.

This was the first face-to-face contact between the warring parties since 1914 – legally

they were still at war after the armistice.

Clemenceau gave a very short speech, in which he accused Germany of bringing about the war

and informed the Germans there would not be any verbal negotiations.

They could respond, but only in writing.

Then it was Brockdorff-Rantzau’s turn.

He had two different speeches with him, one softer and one more defiant.

He chose the defiant version.

He admitted Germany’s defeat but denied German responsibility for the war and insisted

on a peace based on the 14 Points and the diplomatic notes, which he felt was a binding

agreement.

He also spoke of the ongoing naval blockade and reminded the Allies of “The hundreds

of thousands of non-combatants who have died since the armistice of November 11th, murdered

as the result of cold calculation after our opponents had achieved victory.

Think of that when you speak of guilt and atonement.”

(Leonhard 964) The Count’s emotional tone did not win him any friends among the Allies.

Wilson remarked during the session: “This is the most tactless speech I have ever heard.

The Germans are a stupid people.

They always do the wrong thing.”

(Macmillan 494)

Now the terms had been handed over, and the Germans would have to respond, so let’s

take a look at the treaty itself.

The treaty Clemenceau had given the Germans was much different than traditional peace

deals.

It was very long and very detailed – in all there were 440 separate sections.

This reflected the improvisation and compromising that had gone into the settlement, but also

the extension of total war thinking in terms of bureaucratic and scientific planning and

control (Leonhard 986).

So what exactly were the 440 clauses of the Treaty say?

There are too many to cover in one episode, but here are the parts of the treaty that

would drive the events to come.

The very first section laid out the foundation and objectives of the League of Nations, which

was meant to solve disputes between states and prevent future war – basically, to be

the foundation of the new world order.

Germany, however, was not allowed to join the League until the Allies gave their permission.

Germany was to suffer territorial losses amounting to 13% of its land and 10% of its population,

though these were mostly non-ethnic Germans.

(Gerwarth 199).

Alsace was returned to France, small strips of land would go to Belgium and Lithuania,

and several provinces were to be lost to Poland, including the mining region of Upper Silesia.

Coal-rich Saarland and Schleswig would be allowed to vote on their fate.

Germany was also to lose its colonies in Africa and the Pacific to Britain, France, Belgium

and Japan.

Germany was to be disarmed.

Its army was limited to 100,000 volunteers, and its navy to 15,000.

Tanks, subs, aircraft, poison gas, and large warships were forbidden.

In fact, the High Seas Fleet was to be given to the Allies.

In addition, the Rhineland was to be demilitarized and occupied by Allied forces for years to

come.

The French had argued for it to be made into a separate country controlled by the Allies,

but the British and Americans had opposed the idea.

And Germany would have to pay, both in cash and in kind.

The merchant fleet, 40 million tonnes of coal and 50% of chemical stocks and other resources

would go to the allies.

(Leonhard 975).

Billions of marks in reparations were also planned, to compensate the allies for war

damages and veterans’ pensions.

The amount of money to be paid was only to be finalized at a later date.

Now, in order to justify the reparations, the Allies included article 231, which would

become known as the war guilt clause.

The article referred to “the responsibility of Germany for causing all the loss and damage

to which (the Allies) and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the

war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”

This clause was inserted as a pragmatic measure to allow reparations to be demanded, not as

an explicit moral condemnation – though of course most in the Allied countries did

hold Germany morally responsible.

(Prost/Winter, 34).

The Germans, as we will soon see, read it differently.

So those were the terms of the peace: exclusion from the League of Nations, territorial losses,

reparations and responsibility for the war.

The revelation of what the peacemakers had proposed came as a shock to many on both sides.

One thing was clear: nearly everyone in Germany was unhappy with the treaty.

The long months since the November had turned into a sort of armistice period dreamland,

as one historian has called it (Leonhard 969).

The Germans had underestimated the hurt and hate that still lingered in Paris and did

not expect the terms they had just received, which many viewed as a betrayal of the armistice

agreement and a death sentence for Germany.

The war was still largely understood as defensive, and the stab in the back legend was already

influential: that the German Army was “unbeaten in the field” but lost the war because of

the betrayal by the home front.

Basically, the reactions amounted to a continuation of the war by other means.

(Macmillan 475) Brockdorff-Rantzau was aghast, remarking “This

fat volume was quite unnecessary.

They could have expressed the whole thing more simply in one clause: l’Allemagne renonce

à son existence - Germany renounces its existence.”

(Macmillan 475).

Demonstrations broke out across the country.

The Berliner Tageblatt newspaper wrote that the treaty was “A document of the oldest

type of subjugation politics, far removed from the ideas of the league of nations, without

the least hint of a new spirit, substituting force for justice.”

(Leonhard 972) Businessman and art historian Oskar Münsterberg

wrote in his diary “Where are all the flowery speeches about humanity and justice?

Where are Wilson’s points, which we and the enemy recognized as the basis for the

armistice?

Was everything just a trick?

Is there no justice, no trust anymore?”

(Leonhard 946) Social Democratic Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann

gave a fiery speech, saying „…German tribes…we belong together!...We are one flesh and one

blood, and whomsoever tries to separate us cuts into the living body of the German nation

with a murderous knife…Today we must save the life, the naked and poor life, of our

country and people, as everyone feels a strangling hand on his throat.”

(Scheidemann) Now you might not be surprised Germany was

unhappy with the treaty.

But even on the Allied side, because of the complexity of the treaty and the limited information

given to the press, many saw it only now in its entirety for the first time.

One of the most prominent critics was South African Jan Smuts.

He wrote: “There will be terrible disappointment, when the peoples realise that we have not

made a Wilsonian peace, that we have not kept our promises to the world and not kept faith

with the public.”

(Leonhard 984) Some members of the American delegation were so disgusted with the terms

they resigned, as did British economist John Maynard Keynes a few weeks later.

Others felt little sympathy for the Germans, given the draconian peace treaties they had

imposed on Russia and Romania just a year earlier.

Though the Germans were outraged and some on the Allied side were disappointed, the

Big Four had endorsed the treaty and the Germans now had just a few weeks to respond.

German deliberations and counter offers The German dilemma was not an easy one – if

they accepted, the new order and the republic would be tied to defeat and humiliation.

If they refused, no one knew what would happen – the Allies might invade, or the country

might even be broken up.

Brockdorff-Rantzau’s strategy was to mobilize public opinion against the treaty and appeal

to the internationalist left outside Germany.

He hoped that with enough pressure from their own public the Allied governments might agree

to negotiate directly with the Germans.

If he could not achieve that, he favoured rejecting the treaty, as did Scheidemann.

Cabinet Minister Matthias Erzberger, who had signed the armistice in November, feared the

consequences of refusal more than the terms of the treaty and urged acceptance.

On May 29 the German answer finally came, after days of heated debate in Berlin.

Their proposal was to keep the country’s 1914 borders except where people voted to

leave with a two thirds majority (Leonhard 1002), which likely meant the loss of only

Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and Posen.

They would disarm and pay a one-time lump sum of reparations, could join the League

of Nations immediately, and the occupation of the Rhineland would be limited to six months

rather than 15 years (Stevenson 523-524).

Crucially, they rejected responsibility for the war and put the blame on Russia (Leonhard

1003).

This was an admission that Germans would have to make concessions to avoid a worst-case

scenario.

The members of the delegation issued a statement: “The enemy governments can only be forced

(to negotiate) if on our side there are such clear and broad concessions that those governments

cannot justify…the use of force against us to their own people – and if they took

such a step they would place themselves in the wrong and not us.”

(Leonhard 998) But the Germans miscalculated.

They overestimated the possibilities open to them in the highly charged emotional situation

still dominated by Franco-German animosity (Leonhard 999).

Brockdorff-Rantzau’s righteous tone made it nearly impossible to approach the problems

from a pragmatic point of view, and since the two sides never negotiated face to face,

the opportunity for traditional relationships and compromises between diplomats just didn’t

exist.

Each side interpreted the smallest gestures or words according to assumptions fuelled

by years of war, suffering and propaganda (Leonhard 985).

Brockdorff-Rantzau was basically repeating wartime propaganda when he told the government:

“[I] hope and believe, that if we can hold out for two more months, we can achieve an

acceptable peace.”

(Leonhard 1000).

So, by the end of May the German response was in Allied hands.

They had mostly accepted disarmament and reparations but rejected war guilt and most territorial

losses.

As for the Allies, they were not in a compromising mood.

After almost five years of war and destruction and months of painful negotiations and compromises,

major changes to the treaty were quite unlikely, and the tone of the German note angered many.

In fact, even as the Germans debated their response, the Allied Supreme Commander, Marshall

Foch, had begun to draw up plans for a full-scale invasion in case Germany refused to sign.

The British were the only ones who wanted modifications, and Lloyd George went so far

as to threaten to withdraw British support for the treaty if nothing was done.

Wilson was furious, and accused him of having no principles (Macmillan 480).

In the end, the only changes made were a vote on the future of Upper Silesia and a slightly

more favourable plan for Germany’s future admission to the League of Nations (Deperchin

Peace Conf 945).

Clemenceau still refused to negotiate face to face.

The Allies sent their response and an ultimatum on June 16.

The tone was harsh, and went even further in blaming Germany for the war – unlike

the pragmatic article 231, Germany’s guilt was indeed being framed in moral terms: “The

war which broke out on August 1st 1914 is the greatest crime against humanity and against

the freedom of nations ever committed by a nation that calls itself civilized” (Leonhard

1010).

“The behaviour of Germany is nearly unparalleled in human history.

The terrible responsibility that burdens her…that at least seven million dead lie buried in

Europe, while more than 20 million of the living bear witness through their wounds and

suffering to Germany’s desire to quench its thirst for tyranny through war.”

(Leonhard 1010).

The note made clear that Germany must accept the terms or the Allies would invade.

In Berlin, the government was plunged into crisis in the face of a looming invasion.

Brockdorff-Rantzau and the peace delegation were for refusal.

The delegation recommended to government: “The conditions of peace are still unbearable,

for Germany cannot accept them and continue to live with honour as a nation.”

(Macmillan 483).

At a meeting of top generals and Defence Minister Gustav Noske, most generals wanted to fight,

except for General Groener, who felt the civilians wouldn’t be able to hold out – another

echo of the stab in the back myth (Leonhard 1014).

Chancellor Scheidemann was opposed to signing, but others, led by Minister Erzberger, were

convinced an immediate peace was the only chance for Germany to avoid a Bolshevik revolution

or Allied invasion and achieve stability.

Deadlocked, the government resigned June 20, followed by Brockdorff-Rantzau, who blamed

Erzberger also in stab-in-the-back style: “I was close to the objective, but the criminal

Erzberger ruined everything” (Leonhard 1016).

The German High Seas Fleet, interned at Scapa Flow in Scotland, scuttled its ships rather

than give them to the British, an event that we will have a closer look at this summer.

A new government was formed under Gustav Bauer, which informed the Allies they would accept

the terms except for the war guilt clause and the proviso for war crimes trials, since

they were questions of German honour.

But the Allies refused and gave the Germans 24 hours to fully accept.

Bauer realized there was no choice: the German government accepted the terms just hours before

hostilities were to have been renewed.

The signing took place June 28th, the 5th anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination

that set off the war.

The treaty was to be signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the palace of Versailles, the very

place where the German Empire had been created in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War.

For Wilson advisor Colonel House: “The whole affair was elaborately staged and made as

humiliating to the enemy as it well could be.”

(Gerwarth 199) The emotional and theatrical nature of the ceremony was a clear a break

with the sober and rational diplomatic culture of the past (Leonhard 1034).

Under the eyes of more than 1000 onlookers, Foreign Minister Hermann Müller and Transport

Minister Johannes Bell signed for Germany, followed by the Allied delegates, except for

China, who refused to sign since the Shantung peninsula had been given to Japan.

Less than one hour after it began, the ceremony was over when Clemenceau said simply: “La

séance est levée.

The session is over”.

So, the peace had finally been signed and Paris celebrated the end of the war with Germany

with a massive parade on July 14.

But, even amongst those who had made the peace, many feared for the future of Europe.

Some, particularly in the British Empire and the US, felt the treaty was simply too harsh.

South African Jan Smuts wrote to Wilson: “This treaty breathes a poisonous spirit of revenge,

which may yet scorch the fair face – not of a corner of Europe, but of Europe.”

(Sharp, 204).

British diplomat Harold Nicolson recalled his disappointment in 1933: “We came to

Paris convinced that the new order was about to be established; we left it convinced that

the old order had merely fouled the new.”

(Sharp, 213) Keynes would publish the most famous critique of the treaty that December,

“The Economic Consequences of the Peace”, in which he predicted economic ruin brought

on by reparations.

For others, like Ferdinand Foch, whose son and son in law had been killed in the war,

the problem with the treaty was that it was too weak.

He said that “Wilhelm II lost the war [but] Clemenceau lost the peace.”

(Macmillan 486) and famously predicted “This is not Peace.

It is an armistice for twenty years.”

(Sharp, 200) The architects of the peace were hopeful.

Clemenceau placed his hopes in his fellow Frenchmen when he told the Parliament: “The

treaty will be what you make of it.”

(Stevenson 529) President Wilson, unsurprisingly, put his faith in a higher power.

As he left Paris he wrote to his wife: “Well, little girl, it is finished, and, as no one

is satisfied, it makes me hope we have made a just peace; but it is all in the lap of

the gods.”

(Macmillan 497) German Chancellor Gustav Bauer reflected the

feelings of many Germans when he told parliament “I will believe to my last breath that this

attempt at dishonouring us will one day dishonour its creators, and that in this global tragedy

it is not our honour that has been taken but theirs.”

(Leonhard 1017).

Contemporary fears of another war turned out to be justified, but historians still argue

about the treaty and its role in the road to 1939.

For decades, the most popular interpretation of Versailles, and you’re probably familiar

with this one, was that it was too harsh and led directly to World War Two twenty years

later – just as Foch had predicted.

Historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote of the settlement that: “It was doomed from the start, and

another war was therefore practically certain.”

(Hobsbawm, 34), and he even went on to argue that Versailles caused the Yugoslav civil

war and the ethnic wars in the post-Soviet countries: “The national conflicts tearing

the continent apart in the 1990s were the chickens of Versailles coming home to roost.”

(Hobsbawm, 31).

But in recent years historians have re-assessed the treaty a little bit differently.

Even though mistakes were made, many now think that the peace was the best that could be

achieved under the circumstances, especially given the lack of unity among the allies.

The French need for security, the British focus on their empire, and the US belief in

self-determination simply could not form the basis for a stable world order (Prost/Winter

52).

Jay Winter and Antoine Prost have written that it was the “least bad compromise available

at that difficult time” (Prost/Winter 51).

Some other scholars have argued the treaty was not as harsh as commonly believed.

According to new research, Germany could in fact pay the reparations (Prost/Winter 51)

but chose not to.

Even after its losses in territory, Germany was still largest country in Europe west of

Russia, its industrial base was still intact, and it had survived as a single state.

Germany was now surrounded on the east by smaller, weaker powers it could influence

or threaten, no longer shared a common border with Russia, and its main enemy, France, was

severely weakened.

In the words of Margaret Macmillan, “The picture of a Germany crushed by a vindictive

peace cannot be sustained.”

(Macmillan 492).

As for the question whether the treaty led to World War Two, many scholars now argue

that it was the enforcement of the treaty after 1919 that is more problematic than the

treaty itself.

There were in fact, few provisions for its enforcement.

If the treaty was not enforced and twenty years of policy decisions by all the powers

led to another war in 1939, this cannot be blamed purely on the terms of the treaty of

1919 (Macmillan 493 and 499, Stevenson 503).

As David Stevenson has written: “The Treaty could have stopped another bloodbath if it

had been upheld.”

(Stevenson 529) And even though Hitler later used resentment against the treaty as an effective

propaganda tool, his goals in starting the Second World War went very far beyond revising

or even overturning the settlement itself, so it can hardly be said to have caused the

war (Macmillan 499).

No matter what the immediate or long-term reactions to the peace may have been, the

fact was that after more than four years of unprecedented bloodshed peace had indeed come

to western Europe.

But the peace was at best fragile, and at worst incomplete.

The US was slowly moving towards isolation, leaving only France and Britain to uphold

an order opposed by a resentful Germany, Bolshevik Russia, and the other defeated Central Powers.

In fact, peace with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottomans still had to be made, a process

that would last another four years.

In the meantime, there were a host of open questions: Russia, Central European borders,

the middle east, China and Japan, the possibility of more Bolshevik revolutions, and the 30

million Europeans now living as ethnic minorities in the new order.

At the same time the League of Nations represented an attempt at a new spirit in international

relations, including mechanisms for international labour standards, peaceful dispute resolution

and minority protections.

In the words of historian Jörn Leonhard: “The signing of the treaty marked the beginning,

not the end, of the search for a post-war order” (Leonhard 1049)

As usual, you can find all our sources for this episode in the video description.

Don’t forget that The Great War Aftershow is premiering right now when this video was

uploaded, available to all our supporters you can find out more at patreon.com/thegreatwar

or in the video description.

I’m Jesse Alexander and this is The Great War 1919, a production of Real Time History

and the only Youtube history channel that makes a just peace with its enemies.