Hearing, Pettersen v Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, 2020 192
Summary
TLDRThis script depicts a court hearing involving William Patterson, who is representing himself, and attorney Eric Jones, representing the law firm Monahan, Safar and Duchamp. Patterson claims the firm breached a compensation agreement and wrongfully terminated him after he threatened legal action. Jones argues Patterson resigned, was paid fairly, and bases his entire case on one conversation lacking requisite specificity for legal claims. The justices question both sides about elements of contractual disputes versus matters of public policy interest, probing the strength of arguments.
Takeaways
- 😀 Patterson argues there was a breach of a compensation promise and wrongful termination
- 😕 Patterson claims a statement by Monahan affirmed his proposed compensation plan
- 🤔 The court questions if there was a definitive compensation promise made
- 🧐 Patterson states he was terminated, while Jones claims he resigned
- 😮 Patterson argues the Vermont Constitution supports a wrongful termination claim
- 🤨 Jones states Patterson's claims lack evidence of reliance or intent
- 😐 Jones argues Patterson's aspirations concerned future events that never occurred
- 😀 Patterson states statutes show a public policy against retaliation
- 🤔 The court questions if dissatisfaction with pay is enough for a claim
- 🤨 Jones argues the dispute is contractual and does not implicate public policy
Q & A
What is the central issue in the case being discussed?
-The central issue is an alleged breach of a compensation promise made by the law firm to Patterson during salary negotiations in 2016.
What did attorney Monahan specifically say to Patterson regarding his compensation proposal?
-According to Patterson, Monahan said 'Yes, that's reasonable' in response to Patterson's 5-year partnership track and $100,000 salary proposal.
Does Patterson claim there was a written contract regarding the alleged compensation promise?
-No, Patterson acknowledges there was no written contract, only a verbal affirmation of his proposal by Monahan.
What is Patterson's key argument regarding his wrongful termination claim?
-Patterson argues that his termination after raising the prospect of legal claims over the compensation dispute violates public policy protections for employees.
What is the defense's main counterargument regarding the wrongful termination claim?
-The defense argues that Patterson resigned and was not actually terminated, so there is no wrongful termination.
What does the defense say is the only evidence supporting Patterson's claims?
-The defense says the conversation between Patterson and Monahan is the sole factual basis for all of Patterson's claims.
How does the defense characterize Monahan's alleged statement to Patterson?
-The defense argues it was merely an expression of opinion or aspiration, not an actual promise.
What does the defense say about Patterson's job search activities?
-They argue that Patterson was continually looking for other jobs, showing he did not rely on or was not induced to stay by anything the firm said.
What argument does the defense make regarding the timeline of events?
-They note Patterson quit after 2 years, before the alleged 5-year trajectory to partnership, so he cannot claim damages about what might have happened years in the future.
How does the defense counter Patterson's public policy arguments?
-They say private contractual disputes do not implicate public policy interests absent some collateral public impact, which they argue is not present here.
Outlines
😀 Opening statements from plaintiff and defense
The plaintiff William Patterson, representing himself, provides an opening statement summarizing the key issues of alleged breach of compensation promise and wrongful termination after raising prospect of legal claims. The defense argues the case rests on an unremarkable conversation about career aspirations, which cannot support any claims, and that Patterson resigned and was not terminated.
😟 Discussion on whether there was a clear promise made
There is back and forth questioning over whether there was actually a definitive promise made regarding the alleged compensation plan, with Patterson arguing there was while the judges question the lack of specifics or parameters around the supposed promise.
😀 Patterson shifts focus to wrongful termination arguments
Patterson skips past further questions on the promise issue to focus the remainder of his time on arguments around wrongful termination and violation of public policy, citing additional support from the Vermont constitution regarding protection of legal remedies.
😐 The defense responds to claims
The defense argues that the case rests on an unremarkable conversation that cannot support any claims, there was no detrimental reliance or evidence of intent for fraud, Patterson resigned and was not terminated, there are no implications of public policy, and the court should affirm dismissal.
😀 The defense provides more details against the claims
Going through each claim, the defense argues there was no definite promise to support promissory estoppel, no evidence of reliance or substantial change in position, no evidence of fraudulent intent, Patterson was paid fairly so no unjust enrichment, and he resigned rather than being wrongfully terminated.
😟 Further debate over wrongful termination
There is continued back and forth over whether Patterson's actions amounted to resignation rather than wrongful termination, with the defense arguing his actions clearly established resignation while Patterson disputes that characterization.
😀 Final rebuttal from Patterson
In his final rebuttal, Patterson argues that retaliation protections in other statutes support finding a common law public policy exception, and that it would economically benefit employers and employees.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡lawsuit
💡appellate court
💡promissory estoppel
💡wrongful termination
💡unjust enrichment
💡fraud
💡at-will employment
💡retaliation
💡resignation
💡severance
Highlights
The case involves an alleged breach of compensation promise and resulting termination after raising legal claims
A promise is a manifestation of intent to act or refrain from acting in a specified way to justify understanding a commitment was made
Monahan asked what compensation Patterson was requesting, and Patterson proposed a specific, definite compensation plan
Patterson argues Monahan saying the proposal was reasonable was an affirmation of the compensation plan
Patterson acknowledges the employment remained at-will without just cause termination requirements despite the alleged promise
Patterson was terminated via a letter after raising the prospect of legal claims
The Vermont Constitution provides remedies freely and without purchase, indicating protection beyond just monetary losses
Age discrimination violated public policy before becoming statute; losing legal claim rights could similarly violate public policy
Appellate counsel argues Patterson's statement of career aspirations was not a definite promise but mere opinion
Counsel argues Patterson actively sought other jobs and only stayed due to lack of better offers, not reliance on alleged promise
Counsel argues Patterson inflicted his own harm by quitting after 2 years instead of waiting 5 years to see if aspirations were met
Uniform protection from retaliation in statutes and common law decreases chilling effect and encourages economic efficiency
Without protection, employees fear enforcing agreements, decreasing willingness to contract with employers
Patterson argues the alleged promise changed the at-will nature of his employment
Monahan stated Patterson could have earned partnership in the future based on past negotiations
Transcripts
good morning your honors
the matter before the court this morning
is the case entitled
william patterson the monahan safar
and duchamp docket number
20-192 appellate
william patterson is self-represented
representing the opelini
monahan safar and duchamp is eric david
jones
okay thank you very much mr pettison can
you hear me
yes your honor thank you all right
please go ahead
good morning your honors it's an honor
to speak before you today
attorney william patterson representing
myself
pro saying the case may please the court
this case involves an alleged breach of
compensation promise
and a resulting termination after the
prospect of legal claims
was raised this argument
today will briefly address the first
element of promissory estoppel
and thereafter will attempt to focus
the majority of the time on the issue of
public policy termination
as it appears to be the most
important legal issue in the case
regarding each of these issues i will
attempt to provide
some additional arguments not discussed
within the briefs
regarding promissory estoppel a promise
is defined as a manifestation of intent
to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way
so as to justify a promisee
and understanding a commitment has been
made
that is exactly what occurred in this
case
the alleged promise in this case is a
statement
made by defendant's managing partner
attorney monahan
two plaintiff during salary negotiations
in 2016. it's worth noting these
individuals had engaged in prior
negotiations
in which plaintiff had requested
additional compensation
and in which attorney monahan had
declined but had communicated
plaintiff had an opportunity to earn
partnership in the future
with the firm during the meeting in
question
plaintiff approached attorney monahan
and communicated
he was still uncomfortable with the
level of his compensation
and was unwilling to remain employed
with the firm
unless a more specific compensation plan
was reached
importantly attorney monahan then asked
plaintiff
what he was requesting plaintiff
then proposed a compensation plan
as set forth in the briefs that was both
specific
and definite in nature
your original compensation plan was in
writing was it not
um that's a great question your honor
the uh there were there were no
um in i suppose my view
there were no employment contracts
written there was
a letter of hire that
set forth the salary generally
but there were no written contracts as
to any compensation
plan um in my view
and so having said that there was
something in writing about your original
compensation
why didn't you request something in
writing here
thanks for the question your honor um
another great question
the uh thought that comes most
quickly to mind is that once you
hear something that's a good answer you
don't try to change anything thereafter
i i received what i perceived to be
an acknowledgement and an affirmation
of the compensation plan that i had
proposed
and i did not want to
uh rock the boat anymore after i
received what i had asked for
well um mr patterson the the what you
received was
a confirmation that what you were asking
for was reasonable
isn't that what you got
the uh that is what
defense argues your honor um do you say
he
different than that yes your honor uh
i i interpret uh i believe
the exact words were yes that's
reasonable
after the compensation plan was proposed
i believe a reasonable interpretation of
that is yes
that's reasonable means yes that
the proposal is reasonable
and i believe a reasonable jury could
find that
when that's being proposed
and attorney monahan knows plaintiff has
said he needs a specific plan in order
to remain employed with the firm
when he says yes that proposal is
reasonable
that's an affirmation of the plan you
you spent
a lot of time in your brief talking
about how you
interpreted this statement but one of
the claims that you have here
on appeal is a fraud claim that requires
intentional misrepresentation
i don't understand how you can on the
one hand say
this is all we should look at this is
how you
interpret it when a fraud claim requires
intentional misrepresentation
understood your honor
the way i would most quickly address
that
question i think would just be to say
that
a promise um under promissory couple
does not require
intent at the time by the promise or
not to follow through with the promise
the promissor can
make a promise that he or she really
intends to make good on
and then later by happenstance
accidentally
break it and that's promissory estoppel
the difference
simply is the intent at the time the
promise is made
under intentional misrepresentation
there needs to be sufficient evidence
that at the time the promise was made
the promissor did not intend to make
good on the promise
so do you say that there was a
definitive statement or a promise that
was made specifically or just this is an
option for you definitive promise your
honor
and the specific language would be yes
that's reasonable the affirmation of the
compensation plan during that meeting
with what parameters though if you a
five-year partnership track with a
thousand dollar salary was that based on
anything
including like bringing clients into the
firm
or anything at all regarding um what
your contributions would be to the firm
i had previously been told that i did
not
need to bring in clients in order to
obtain partnership
um but the specific parameters of the
compensation plan were simply that my
performance up to that point
which had been deemed satisfactory uh
would continue
that as long as my good performance
continued this is
what the trajectory would be good
performance in your work product a quick
performance in your
billable hours i think that was very
much
in the employer's discretion um
however it was a standard oftentimes
contracts
have compensation plans that don't even
have a performance
metric so i think this is similar to
many contracts and agreements in that
respect
are you disputing that you are an at
will employee
um he uh i don't think this
created any uh just cause
termination requirement your honor so i
don't think that this promise would
change the at will nature of the
employment
on that issue i know i'm sorry we're
jumping at you with all these questions
you said you wanted to talk about
wrongful
termination the public policy issues but
i'm having a hard time finding in the
record
anything to support your notion that
there was
a statement to you you're fired you're
done
um i know you didn't file a motion
of of contested facts or
uncontested facts and so as i understood
it the trial court
said that it would just look at any
documents that might establish
facts but what what is the evidence that
you're saying
indicates that you were fired are you
suggesting someone actually said you're
fired leave today pack up your stuff
uh yes your honor i believe that
uh that will be in my statement of facts
um
which is printed case 220
through 232 uh and 233
and the termination should be set forth
therein there was a
a letter that was provided that that
stated if i was not quitting i was
terminated
um and there was also a statement made
by attorney
monahan in a meeting with myself and the
partners
to that same effect
thank you
i i suppose i will um skip to
um the unjust
uh excuse me termination and violation
of public policy
and focus the remainder of my time on
that
if there are any other questions at this
time
the brief set forth
certain arguments on the policy i will
just today provide additional arguments
um in in support of the public policy at
issue
first the vermont constitution chapter 1
article 4
states and i'm paraphrasing
that every person within the state shall
have remedy and recourse under the laws
freely and without being obliged to
purchase it
and there's a comma between freely and
without being obliged to purchase it
which indicates freely means more than
just without being required to pay money
otherwise it would be a redundant clause
so it freely means more than the loss of
money
it should certainly include a loss of
one's employment
as that's one of the greatest economic
costs
a citizen can suffer
mr sorry
mr pettison uh don't we require
a showing of cruel or shocking
conduct in order to agree with you
that's the boynton case and in
2014 2019 somewhere in there
um your honor i uh i certainly that
sounds correct
um i trust your honor is correct i would
submit that that connotation often has a
personal nature to it so i think it's
just
a little bit difficult to to expand that
to public policy issues but
in general the age discrimination for
example that this court found was
volatile of public policy before it was
a statute
that is similar in this respect and the
fact that it affects many people
and a large scope and i would argue the
loss of
the ability to freely bring legal claims
is indeed rising to that level of
unjustness
so mr patterson can i ask you a question
you
um as i understand it are now have a law
practice yourself
is that right that's correct your honor
um
and let's say that your business grows
and you
someday hire an associate um is it
your position that if you had an
associate
and the associates uh you know uh
counsel um i don't like the way things
are run around here i'm bringing a
lawsuit against you
that you would not as the employer have
the ability to discharge that person at
that point
um great question your honor i think
the standard would simply be what it is
for uh
other claims similarly which is
a termination could still occur for any
other reason just not retaliation
so any non-legitimate any legitimate
non-retaliatory reason
would be fair for termination
under as an employee it will that it has
to be um
some justification for the uh for the
termination
uh and employee at will there there
needs to be no justification your honor
so it would be any
legitimate non-retaliatory reason and i
suppose you're right it could be
this would be different maybe it would
be just any reason just not retaliation
that's a great point
at this time i would reserve the rest of
my time if um if i may
all right okay we'll turn to the uh
the appellate council for the appellate
please introduce yourself identify your
client and then proceed
thank you mr chief justice it may please
the court i'm eric jones and i represent
monahan safar duchamp plc llc the
appellate in this case
the trial court got it right the trial
court properly granted summary judgment
um for several reasons first of all
despite
mr pedersen's failure to completely
comply with rule 56 the court did
consider
all evidence submitted by both parties
um
second reviewing the evidence submitted
by both parties the court properly found
that there was no dispute of material
fact and that is not even the
appellate's
palance argument on appeal and applying
established legal principles the court
found that the firm was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on each of
the four claims
asserted and this court should affirm
at its core this case is a simple
compensation dispute
and the entire case rests upon
a single otherwise unremarkable
conversation between mr patterson and
his supervisor
attorney brian monaghan in this
conversation
which uh was many in which mr patterson
complained about his compensation
mr patterson did express his hopes and
aspirations
for his career future at the firm
according to him he explained that he
thought
a reasonable trajectory for himself
would be one in which after five years
he would be a partner earning a hundred
thousand dollars a year
and according to the plaintiff or the
appellant um
attorney monahan responded by saying i
think that's reason
that's it there really is no more to
this case that is the entire factual
foundation of mr pedersen's claims
that these facts completely fail to
support a single cause of action
mr patterson points to nothing that is
action
now i'll focus on the details in a
moment but at the outset
i submit to the court that the four
claims of penalties asserts fail
for the following reasons the promissory
unstoppable case and the fraud claim
with the exception of
the fact that fraud requires a showing
of actual fraudulent intent has a much
higher bar
they're both essentially the same claim
which is that mr pedersen believes
that he was induced to stay at the firm
by a representation that mr monaghan
made
but both claims fail at the outset
because
the statement that mr pettison
attributes to mr monaghan was
clearly a mere expression of judgment
opinion
aspiration that cannot support a cause
of action as a matter of law
second of all mr patterson did not rely
to his detriment
on a single thing anybody at the firm
did or said
it's about his entire career at the firm
he was always looking for the exit door
the only reason he didn't leave was
because he didn't get a better offer
but he didn't stay because of any
inducement by what mr
mr monaghan supposedly said finally
the uh with regard to these two claims
the alleged statement concerns a state
of facts
five years in the future we will never
know whether or not mr patterson ever
would have met his aspirations
because he quit three years before these
events were supposed to have happened
so he can't quit after only two years
and then run to a court seeking a remedy
for some trajectory about what should
have happened three years from now
with regard to the unjust enrichment
claim frankly that can be dismissed in
short order
mr patterson was compensated very well
for his services
and on top of his originally agreed upon
salary he received pay raises
13 000 bonuses he cannot claim there's
an injustice here
and then finally with regard to the
public policy claim
uh first of all mr patterson the facts
demonstrate
he resigned his job um
and in fact there is no evidence in the
record that anybody said
you're fired uh he quit the firm
documented his resignation in a letter
which alternatively said to the extent
you didn't quit you are here by
tremendous but
there was no uh grand statement as he
mentioned
um more importantly there is no
public interest implicated by this case
this case is the epitome
of private contractual disputes between
two parties that does not um
implicate any uh public policy
whatsoever
now um i i did want to very briefly
touch on a procedural issue in the case
which was that
in response to our motion for summary
judgment where we properly supported the
motion with a statement of material
undisputed facts
uh mr patterson did not respond at all
to that statement
he just ignored it um so i mean
literally the facts presented by the
firm were
undisputed um and
the court properly deemed the facts
undisputed but
this is not any kind of gotcha type of
procedural argument because the court
did nevertheless explicitly state in its
opinion
that it considered record evidence
submitted by the appellant
and i don't think the court limited its
consideration to just documents i think
the court
considered any kind of record material
submitted
um but the court did not account for the
conclusion statements
other than uh it creating a housekeeping
issue
for the trial court on what was or
wasn't contested
um did the lack of compliance with rule
56 play any part in the outcome here
um no other than the highlight that the
facts really are not disputed and does
there's nothing that warrants a jury
resolution in this case factually
and that being said i will move on to
the legal merits of the case
um with regard to promise sorry estoppel
it is as mr patterson mentioned
an essential element that there be a
specific indefinite
promise there is nothing in the record
in this case that shows
that the firm made a specific or
definite promise
um there was nothing promissory at all
uh
there was simply an expression of
judgment that mr monaghan
felt mr patterson's hopes were
reasonable
um that's not promissory it's it's not
an inducement it's not a
misrepresentation
um so we we submit that
that is simply um it's as a matter of
law inadequate to float the claim
uh but also i want to get back to what i
mentioned in my introduction which is
that
there is no evidence whatsoever of
detrimental reliance
you know the record actually shows that
mr patterson is actively
engaged in a job search for the two
years he was working so he did not
refrain from continuing to seek other
opportunities
um his his statement of facts refers to
a plan
he had that but for the job that
monaghan safar duchamp he
might have looked for jobs out of state
but the materials he cites in his
statement do not refer to a plan at all
there was no plan to leave the state to
the contrary the only evidence of mr
patterson's career plan was to return to
vermont
he was a vermonter who came back after a
clerkship in nevada
to return to vermont for to work
that's the only plan we have in the in
the record with regard to what his
career
plan was going to be um
more importantly after he quit in early
2018
there's no evidence that he actually
looked for work out of state
the alternative to working at the firm
was he set up his own law firm here in
vermont
where he has stayed ever since so um his
self-serving statement that
he might have looked for jobs out of
state is again wholly inadequate to
support
a claim of detrimental reliance which
under this court's rulings requires a
substantial and material change in
position
we contend that the appellant has no
evidence whatsoever
that he materially or substantially
changed his position with regard to
anything
um with regard to the fraud claim um
i i want you to go back to justice
carroll's question
about doesn't that require showing a
fraudulent intent
yes um and there's no evidence anywhere
on the record
in this case of fraudulent intent um
not to mention the fact that fraud would
also require a showing by
clear and compelling evidence so he
fails not only for
insufficiency and evidence but also
could not possibly meet that standard of
proof
um there's there simply was no
representation of fact much less a
misrepresentation of that
and again like with the promissory
estoppel claims uh there's no evidence
of detrimental reliance
that would be necessary for a fraud
count um and furthermore
uh again he he inflicted his own harm
to the extent his aspiration for was
something that could happen five years
in the future
and he himself quit uh after only two
with regard to the unjust enrichment
count um
frankly i don't understand it i never
did
mr pedersen was paid handsomely and
clearly at market rates
for his services he started at 55 000
a year he was earning 70 in the second
year of his employment
um that is a a solid compensation
package
uh here in vermont for his services so
to suggest that somehow
the circumstances here um
are so inequitable and so unjust that an
additional award is just
untenable mr jones can you conceive of
any possibility
of an unjust enrichment claim from an
associate
uh to a law firm where
something would occur that would allow
that type of cause of action to occur
not when services that are being
provided by the associate are within
within the scope of services
contemplated by the parties with
the job um and by that i mean there's a
um there's a case that i believe mr
patterson cited
uh it wasn't in a law firm setting but i
think the principles would apply
but the employee actually was asked to
do something above and beyond
wholly different from what they were
originally hired to do
expected additional compensation for the
additional services but that's not the
facts of this case
an associate attorney who was brought on
to provide
uh associate assistance to the firm's
partners um
who only does that scope of work and
know more than what was contemplated by
the parties uh
then in fact compensated as agreed
then no i can't i don't think there can
be an unjust enrichment
case in that situation
moreover mr patterson's argument at one
point
it sounds like he's quite literally
saying that receipts that are earned by
the firm on his time
that exceed the salary he was paid is
somehow money that he's entitled to
under an
unjust enrichment plan theory
um you know clearly that's not how law
firms work that's not capitalism that's
not the law
[Music]
and then finally with regard to the
public policy count
the claim is essentially wrongful
termination
but we submit mr patterson was not
terminated
he resigned now i know he says i didn't
intend to resign
in a self-serving argument before this
court but the facts are the facts
and the undisputed facts in this case
are that he decided after getting
a raise in march 2018 that he was
sufficiently insulted
and he had to leave he then contacted
representatives of westlaw and lexus to
set
up his own accounts telling the
representatives that he
was exploring opening his own firm he
then set out to copy
client files off the firm's uh client
um data service
systems he then also copied all of his
emails
all of his calendars and his contact
information for his entire time at the
firm
um he then issued written notice to the
firm in which he said i must now
find a job at another firm later that
day in a meeting with the partners when
asked whether there's
anything that could be done for him to
stay he said there is no way
i can stay and he confirmed that he was
looking for other work
those undisputed facts clearly
established that he had resigned
this position that he took the steps to
end the employment
having resigned he doesn't then get to
decide
i'll leave when i find another job the
firm has
every right to say well you're resigning
we accept your resignation and we accept
it as of today
and that is not wrongful termination
even if
as part of that resignation notice the
appellant as in this case
suggests a severance payment and offers
in exchange for the severance payment
for release of claims
that does not implicate public interest
um even if he had uh
been fired rather than resign are you
conceding
by your argument that that would be
wrongful at that point
not at all you know i'm simply
establishing that the facts in this case
we don't even get the public policy
because he did resign
but even if you know this was a
determination
you know he were to say i think i have
these claims against you and the firm
were to have said
well in that case you're fired that does
not violate public policy
now it could it could bother a public
policy if he had certain information
that would
um be detrimental to the firm on the way
they were
doing something uh that was retaliatory
i mean that is a possibility fair point
there's a category of claims that
are specifically protected you know like
the claim you just mentioned there or
discrimination claims under the fair
employment practices act which
explicitly as a matter of statute say
that
you cannot be retaliated against first
certain claims under the statute
but from a common law claim to
compensation
which is this case i would say no
and in fact the prior cases from this
court
uh suggest as much two examples of
cake of cases where the court found that
it was merely
private contractual rights at issue were
assertions to vacation pay or sick pay
uh before there was a statute um those
claims were found to be
not implicated threats of making those
claims were found to be um not
enough to support public policy um
refusal to sign a non-compete agreement
was
private and contractual not public
policy to
arise the level of public policy there
needs to be some
collateral public interest um for
in the whistleblower example you just
gave justice cohen that would be an
example of a collateral public interest
that's also in play or for example the
case
with this uh wrap up your argument
i see that i'm out of time and i
apologize uh i i will conclude
uh but for these reasons and the reason
stated in our brief we believe this
court should affirm the trial court
thank you thank you very much how much
time do we have please
propellant has one minute and 30 seconds
remaining
all right council
thank you your honor uh again i will
rely on my briefs
for most claims and i will attempt to
focus the remainder of my time on the
public policy issue
i will speak quickly and just try to get
out some additional arguments for the
court's consideration
the vermont fair employment practices
act and other statutes
i have retaliation provisions long
standing in the state
and not only does this show the public
policy it also
would be bolstered if a common law
exception were also found because the
uniformity would help employees better
understand
that they had protection under the law
and this would decrease the chilling
effect not only in the
common law but also the statutes helping
those statutes have more effect
additionally the economic considerations
also lean towards this public policy as
if employees feel more able to
enforce agreements with their
employation they will be more willing to
enter into agreements for those
employees
and that will increase the economic
efficiency of the employer employee
relationship
do you have any cases does that or i
mean isn't that
um determinated for for not getting paid
what you think you're worth
or you leave because you're not getting
paid for what you're worth
isn't that a sufficient basis under any
circumstance
where it's not retaliatory other than
the fact that you're dissatisfied with
the compensation package
um if i understand your honors question
correctly
um the my argument on the policy is
simply that
um an employee is fearful
for termination it is going to be less
will less willing to
enforce any agreement they enter into
with an employer
for fear of losing their jobs so if
there's an exception under public policy
then employees will be more willing to
enter into agreements with their
employers because they will feel they
can
enforce those agreements
thank you thank you your honor thank you
both for your arguments
please call the conclusion of the
hearing the next hearing for the court
is scheduled for 2pm this afternoon
thanks thanks to both of you thank you
bye thanks
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