The Dumb Ox Speaks: Aquinas and Boethius on Personhood

Summary

The script discusses Aquinas's nuanced understanding of the concept of personhood, contrasting it with Boethius’s classical definition of a person as an individual substance of rational nature. It explores the historical and theological context of the term, especially within Christian doctrines like the Trinity and the hypostatic union. Aquinas shifts the focus from substance to subsistence, viewing a person as a unique spiritual subsistent that is incommunicable and irreducible, aligning his perspective more closely with theological distinctions. This view bridges classical philosophy with contemporary personalist and phenomenological approaches.

Takeaways

• 📜 Aquinas appears to align with previous philosophical positions, but he makes crucial contributions to the concept of 'personhood.'
• 🤔 Boethius' classical definition of a person as an 'individual substance of rational nature' is foundational, but Aquinas subtly diverges from it.
• 🎭 The notion of 'person' originated from the Greek theater and evolved through Roman legal distinctions and theological discourse.
• ⛪ The 4th-century Greek Church Fathers introduced 'person' (hypostasis) in theological debates about the Trinity and Christ's dual nature.
• 🕊️ Aquinas initially followed Boethius' definition but expanded it by emphasizing that a person is a 'self-subsisting being of rational nature.'
• 💡 Aquinas shifted from the term 'substance' to 'subsistence,' indicating a deeper metaphysical distinction between essence and existence.
• 🧠 For Aquinas, personhood signifies more than a rational nature—it points to a mode of existence, emphasizing individuality and incommunicability.
• 📖 This metaphysical view allows Aquinas to align personhood with theological notions, especially concerning Christ's dual nature and the Trinity.
• 👤 The person, according to Aquinas, cannot be transferred or assumed by another, making it a unique, irreducible reality.
• 🔍 Aquinas’ understanding bridges ancient, patristic, and contemporary views on personhood, connecting classical philosophy with modern phenomenology.

Q & A

What is Aquinas' stance on the definition of a person as proposed by Boëthius?

Aquinas initially appears to endorse Boëthius' definition of a person as an 'individual substance of a rational nature,' but upon closer examination, he diverges by emphasizing the unique metaphysical distinction between essence and existence in his understanding of personhood.

How did the concept of 'person' evolve from its origins in Greek theater and Roman law to theological discussions?

Originally, 'person' (prosopon) came from Greek theater, and later in Roman law, it distinguished individuals with rights. By the 4th century, Greek Church Fathers used 'person' (hypostasis) to explore theological mysteries, such as the dual nature of Jesus Christ and the Trinity.

What problem did the Greek Church Fathers face when defining 'person' in theological terms?

The Greek Church Fathers grappled with understanding how Jesus Christ could be both divine and human simultaneously and how God could be one entity yet consist of three distinct persons.

How did the Cappadocian Fathers contribute to the concept of 'person' in Christian theology?

The Cappadocian Fathers introduced 'hypostasis' to describe 'person' as an individual, subsistent being, distinct from 'nature,' allowing them to differentiate between God's unified nature and the three distinct persons of the Trinity.

How does Aquinas' notion of 'person' differ from Boëthius' definition?

While Boëthius’ definition focuses on personhood as a 'rational nature,' Aquinas expands this to include a unique 'mode of existence,' emphasizing a self-subsistent, spiritual reality that goes beyond just rationality.

Why does Aquinas prefer the term 'subsistence' over 'substance' when discussing personhood?

Aquinas moves from 'substance' to 'subsistence' because he views the person as a 'spiritual subsistent,' a reality with a unique mode of being that cannot be defined solely by nature, marking a deeper metaphysical approach.

What role does the essence-existence distinction play in Aquinas' view of personhood?

Aquinas' distinction between essence (what a thing is) and existence (that it is) is central to his understanding of personhood, allowing him to view the person as a unique, non-transferable being with a mode of existence that transcends nature alone.

How does Aquinas' view of personhood differ from the traditional scholastic definitions influenced by Aristotle?

Traditional definitions, based on Aristotle, focus on substance categories. Aquinas, however, argues that personhood cannot be reduced to substance and nature alone; it embodies a distinct existence beyond shared human nature.

What does Aquinas mean when he describes personhood as 'incommunicable'?

Aquinas believes personhood is incommunicable, meaning it is unique and non-transferable. Unlike nature, which can be shared among individuals (e.g., all humans share 'humanity'), a person's identity cannot be shared or assumed by another.

How does Aquinas' understanding of personhood potentially bridge theological and contemporary philosophical views on the self?

Aquinas’ concept of personhood resonates with contemporary ideas like Heidegger's Dasein, suggesting an intrinsic relation-oriented existence that mirrors both theological insights and modern existential perspectives on individuality.