How to Fix the FATAL FLAW in iPhone's New Security Feature

ThioJoe
25 Jan 202410:36

Summary

TLDRThe video discusses iPhone's new Stolen Device Protection feature and a potential flaw where protections don't apply at 'familiar locations.' The host recommends enabling the feature but disabling Significant Locations to prevent thieves from bypassing protections if they obtain your passcode. Additional tips are provided to further secure your device like using longer, alphanumeric passcodes and limiting lock screen access.

Takeaways

  • 😀 iPhone's new Stolen Device Protection is important but has a flaw allowing thieves to bypass it at familiar locations
  • 😮‍💨 Thieves can take over your entire Apple account just by getting your iPhone passcode
  • 😠 They can change your Apple ID password, device passwords, Face ID, and set their own recovery key
  • 😥 This locks you out of your account and encrypted cloud data even if you get it back
  • 😌 The new protections require Face ID or Touch ID for many actions unless at a familiar location
  • 😕 The flaw is it uses your Significant Locations to determine familiar places with no visibility
  • 🤔 Turning off Significant Locations disables the familiar location exemption to be safe
  • 😁 Still change passcode to alphanumeric and long, and hide it when entering in public
  • 😉 Disable Allow Access When Locked options to prevent unlocked access
  • 😃 Overall the protections help but disable locations and take precautions for full security

Q & A

  • What is the new 'Stolen Device Protection' feature in iOS 17.3?

    -It is a feature that requires Face ID or Touch ID, not just the passcode, for certain critical actions like changing your Apple ID password. It adds extra protection against thieves accessing your data if they get your passcode.

  • What is the potential flaw with the Stolen Device Protection feature?

    -The protections don't apply at 'familiar locations', which are determined automatically and you have no control over. So if your phone is stolen at a familiar place like a cafe you go to often, the thief could bypass Face ID.

  • How can you fix this flaw with Stolen Device Protection?

    -You can turn off the 'Significant Locations' feature, which is what determines familiar locations. This will make the protections apply everywhere.

  • Even with Stolen Device Protection, how can a thief take over your Apple account?

    -If they obtain your 6-digit passcode by watching you type it in, they can change your Apple ID password, reset Face ID, and more. The passcode overrides everything.

  • What should you do to better protect your passcode?

    -Use a long, alphanumeric passcode that is harder to guess. Be very careful and discreet when entering your passcode in public.

  • If a thief gets your passcode, what is the worst thing they can do?

    -They can set a recovery key, which encrypts your iCloud data. Even if you get your account back, you may not be able to access your data again.

  • How does the 1 hour delay security measure work?

    -For very critical actions like changing your Apple ID password, it requires Face ID plus an additional step of waiting 1 hour and doing Face ID again.

  • What can you do if a thief gets your passcode and you catch it quickly?

    -Log into Find My on another device and erase your phone remotely before they are able to bypass protections.

  • How would you disable Stolen Device Protection if you couldn't use Face ID?

    -You would have to turn Significant Locations back on and wait for a location to become familiar again to bypass Face ID.

  • What other settings can you change to protect a locked phone?

    -Disable Allow Access When Locked for things like Control Center. This prevents unauthorized access to key functions.

Outlines

00:00

📱 Enabling iPhone's New Stolen Device Protection Feature

The paragraph explains the new Stolen Device Protection feature in iOS 17.3, which requires Face ID or Touch ID to perform critical actions on the iPhone when locked. It provides protection even if someone obtains your passcode. However, a flaw allows thieves to bypass protections at "familiar locations." The solution is to disable the Significant Locations feature.

05:00

📍 Flaw: Thieves Can Bypass Protections at Familiar Locations

The paragraph explains how the Stolen Device protections don't apply at familiar locations determined by the Significant Locations feature. Since you can't control or even see these familiar locations, a thief could bypass protections if they steal your phone from somewhere you frequently visit.

10:06

🛡️ Tips to Further Protect Your iPhone from Theft

The paragraph provides additional tips to protect your iPhone even if a thief obtains your passcode, including: using a long alphanumeric passcode, being careful when entering passcode in public, disabling Allow Access When Locked features like Control Center, and choosing your level of paranoia.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Stolen Device Protection

This is a new security feature in iOS 17.3 that requires Face ID or Touch ID, instead of just a passcode, for certain critical actions like changing account passwords. It adds extra protection in case someone gets access to your passcode. The video explains how to enable it and why it's important.

💡Passcode

The 6-digit or 4-digit code used to unlock iPhones. The video warns that if a thief gets this code, they can take over your entire Apple account and lock you out. The passcode allows bypassing Face ID, which is why the new Stolen Device Protection requires biometrics for critical actions.

💡Familiar locations

A key concept in the new protections. They don't apply when the iPhone senses it is at a 'familiar location'. But the video finds a flaw - you can't see or control what locations it considers familiar, yet a thief potentially could after stealing your passcode.

💡Significant locations

The iPhone setting that determines 'familiar locations'. The video advises turning this off so thieves can't bypass protections by making locations familiar. But it notes downsides, like if you break Face ID.

💡Recovery key

An important account security measure that can be circumvented if a thief gets your passcode. They can reset the recovery key to lock you out. The video warns it allows thieves to encrypt your iCloud data in a way you can't recover it.

💡Erase

If your iPhone is stolen, the video advises using Find My on another device to remotely erase it. This can help secure data if protections are bypassed. But thieves can also disable Find My with a passcode, making it a race against time.

💡Face ID

Your iPhone's facial recognition system. The new protections require this instead of a passcode for critical actions. But the video notes thieves can still bypass it once locations become 'familiar'. Face ID breaking is also a risk if you disable significant locations.

💡Alphanumeric passcode

Instead of a 4- or 6-digit numeric passcode, the video recommends a longer alphanumeric one, e.g. with letters. This makes it much harder for thieves to steal your passcode by watching you type it in.

💡Control Center access

The video recommends disabling Control Center access on the lock screen. This stops thieves from putting your iPhone in Airplane Mode or disabling Bluetooth before Find My erases it.

💡Awareness

Being conscious of passcode security when in public. The video warns thieves can record people typing in codes. Staying alert to this possibility and hiding your passcode can deter theft.

Highlights

The new Stolen Device Protection feature requires Face ID or Touch ID, not just the passcode, for critical actions.

With just the 6-digit passcode, a thief can take over your entire Apple account and iCloud data.

Thieves can trick you into entering your passcode instead of using Face ID by pretending the phone is asking for it.

With the passcode, thieves can change your Apple ID password, Face ID, and set a recovery key to encrypt your data.

The new protections don't apply at 'familiar locations', which you can't see or control.

Disable Significant Locations to remove the 'familiar locations' weakness.

Clear your location history too, or a thief could re-enable Significant Locations.

Theoretically, a thief could wait for a location to become familiar again to bypass protections.

Use Find My to erase your device if stolen before a location becomes familiar again.

Use a long, alphanumeric passcode and enter it discreetly in public.

Disable 'Allow Access When Locked' features like Control Center to limit unlocked access.

If Face ID fails, you'd have to re-enable Significant Locations and wait for a familiar location.

Reduce the chances a thief can see your passcode to better protect yourself.

Choose your level of paranoia based on your risk tolerance.

Enable Stolen Device Protection, use a better passcode, and disable Significant Locations.

Transcripts

play00:00

Even though iPhone's new "Stolen Device  Protection" feature is awesome, and if you haven't  

play00:04

enabled it, I'll explain why you must later, I  have discovered what I consider a potentially  

play00:10

fatal flaw that can completely nullify its  protections. But you can easily fix it. So in this  

play00:16

video, I'll go over how and why to enable the new  Stolen Device Protection feature, because it is  

play00:20

not enabled by default, then go over the problem  with it and how to fix that. Because otherwise,  

play00:25

a thief can literally take over your entire Apple  account in a way you cannot recover it. I'll get  

play00:32

into the details later, but the short of it is  that the new extra protections don't apply at  

play00:37

"familiar locations," which you have no control  over and you can't even see what they are. All you  

play00:43

can see is the most recent place from a feature  called "Significant Locations", which it pulls  

play00:48

from. And for me, it apparently even included some  place I had only been to once for a few hours this  

play00:54

past weekend, with no way to know after what  threshold places become "familiar." So imagine  

play01:00

you're at your favorite cafe for lunch or your  favorite bar where it is most likely to be stolen  

play01:06

anyway. Well, congratulations, all that protection  could be gone and you would have no idea. Now I  

play01:11

don't want to be one of "those" YouTubers, so I'll  tell you the solution right away now. But I highly  

play01:16

suggest you stick around because even after you do  this and a thief gets your passcode, theoretically  

play01:22

they could eventually get past the protections. So  I'll give some other tips on how to better protect  

play01:28

yourself later. Anyway, after you enable stolen  device protection, what you could do is simply  

play01:32

disable the Significant Locations feature in iOS  altogether. That's what it uses. Just be aware if  

play01:39

Face ID breaks for you, then you might be screwed  for a while, but I'll discuss that later. And of  

play01:44

course, if you do use the Significant Locations  feature, then you would have to consider the  

play01:48

trade-off of disabling it. But again, even with  that, there are some things you can do I'll go  

play01:53

over it later. Anyway, into the bulk of the video.  First of all, if you haven't already, I highly  

play01:57

recommend you do enable this new feature, which  requires you to update to the latest iOS 17.3  

play02:03

update that just came out. Then in the settings,  go to Face ID and Passcode, then look for Stolen  

play02:08

Device Protection and "Turn on Protection." What  this feature basically does is it requires Face  

play02:14

ID or Touch ID, not your iPhone passcode, to be  used for certain critical actions on your phone.  

play02:21

But again, it's only at familiar locations. That  part is the big problem, in my opinion. Anyway,  

play02:26

for even more important actions, like literally  changing your Apple account password, in addition  

play02:31

to Face ID, it requires a one hour delay before  doing Face ID again. And why is this so important?  

play02:38

Well, maybe you didn't even realize that even if  you have all the best security practices set up on  

play02:43

your Apple account, including having a recovery  key and a super long Apple ID account password,  

play02:49

all of that can be nullified if a thief manages  to get your flimsy 6-digit, or God forbid, 4-digit  

play02:57

phone passcode, which is way easier than you  think. With those 6 digits on one of your devices,  

play03:03

they can literally take over your entire Apple  account. They can do everything from changing your  

play03:09

Apple ID password, your device password, resetting  Face ID to their own face, and the worst one is  

play03:16

they can even set a recovery key, which encrypts  all your cloud data using that key. Then even if  

play03:22

you get your account back, which is not a given,  you cannot access any of your photos and stuff or  

play03:28

anything. Oh and yes, even if you have a recovery  key, they can change that too. And they can also  

play03:34

even access all your keychain data with all your  web logins. It would be devastating. Last year,  

play03:39

the Wall Street Journal did a story where they  interviewed a thief who got caught and convicted  

play03:44

for stealing a bunch of iPhones, and he talked  about how the thefts work. Turns out it's pretty  

play03:49

easy to trick people into unlocking their phone  with the passcode instead of biometrics and just  

play03:55

watching them enter it. You might be thinking,  "Well, who types in their password anymore anyway?  

play03:59

You just use Face ID." But the thief explained how  as one strategy, he would often ask people to use  

play04:05

their phone and then accidentally lock the phone  where it requires the passcode, which you can do  

play04:11

by just holding the power and volume buttons. Then  he'd say something like, "Oh, it's asking for a  

play04:15

passcode", and people unsuspectingly type it in  while he watches. After that, he can even give the  

play04:21

phone back and steal it later while they aren't  paying attention. And with the passcode, literally  

play04:27

within seconds, he can take over their entire  account. They have the process memorized. And yes,  

play04:31

in many cases, they do go as far as to set a  recovery key as part of this process. And it's  

play04:36

not even like you can use the Find My feature,  because you can turn that off with the passcode  

play04:41

too. Now at this point, you're probably thinking  that with the new stolen device protection,  

play04:46

you should be protected, right? Because even if  they watch you type in your passcode, they can't  

play04:51

change anything important without using Face ID.  And for the really important stuff, there's that  

play04:55

additional hour delay after which they need to  do the Face ID again. So it's not even like they  

play05:00

can just hold the phone up to your face and run  away. But here's the big flaw I see. As I've said,  

play05:06

by default, the stolen device protections don't  apply when at a familiar location. Apple does  

play05:12

not say how it determines what these are, other  than it uses the "Significant Locations" feature.  

play05:18

When you go into the settings menu for that,  which is located under Privacy and Security,  

play05:23

Location Services, System Services, Significant  Locations, it will only show you a summary of  

play05:29

these significant locations, but won't even show  you what they are. Only the most recent one and  

play05:35

how many there are. For me, the most recent one  was a place I had visited once for only a few  

play05:40

hours this weekend. I had never been there before.  And I saw some people on Twitter showing how they  

play05:45

had hundreds of these "Significant Locations"  apparently saved in there. Now to be fair,  

play05:51

I doubt that every single significant location  counts as a familiar location, but there's no way  

play05:56

to be sure. And even if not, you can't know what  it does consider familiar. I can totally imagine  

play06:03

it marking someone's favorite hangout spot as  familiar, which simply by the fact that it's  

play06:08

a place they frequent, is one of the most likely  locations they'll have their phone stolen in the  

play06:13

first place. So because I can't control this, I'm  not taking any chances. I turned off significant  

play06:19

locations altogether, which does fix this  weakness. Because as you can see before, when it  

play06:24

is at a familiar location, whatever that is, you  can just bypass all the stolen protections with  

play06:30

a passcode. You can see here while at home, when  trying to turn off stolen device protection, after  

play06:36

failing Face ID, it just asks for a passcode,  without even the security delay. But after turning  

play06:41

off significant locations, now it doesn't allow  the use of the passcode and does require Face  

play06:47

ID. And on top of that, it also has that security  delay. Now, another thing to note is that if you  

play06:53

disable significant locations, you'll also want  to be sure to clear your location history from the  

play06:59

same menu, because if you don't, the thief could  just re-enable it using your passcode, even with  

play07:06

the stolen device protection. It doesn't require  Face ID for that. Though in a minute, I'll go  

play07:10

over some additional ways to bolster your security  in regards to that. Anyway, now with significant  

play07:16

locations disabled, you can see that even  when doing one of the lesser critical actions,  

play07:21

like viewing an Apple Card virtual number, if you  fail Face ID, you don't get an option to type in a  

play07:27

passcode. And for the more critical actions, like  disabling stolen device protection itself, even if  

play07:33

you pass the Face ID, it still requires that one  hour delay, after which you have to do it again.  

play07:39

But realize that because they can still re-enable  the significant locations feature, theoretically,  

play07:45

that could allow them to just wait until some  location becomes considered familiar, then they  

play07:52

can bypass all the stolen protections again. Now,  hopefully it takes a long time for some location  

play07:57

to be considered familiar, and that Apple wouldn't  consider someplace you visit once as familiar. But  

play08:04

again, we wouldn't know the threshold, even  if not. Anyway, assuming that it does take a  

play08:09

while for that to happen, in that case, you should  have more than enough time to log in to Find My on  

play08:15

another device, and mark the phone to be erased.  And you probably would want to erase it, because I  

play08:21

think they can just disable the lost mode with the  passcode too. Oh, and if you're wondering how you  

play08:25

might disable the stolen device protection if you  yourself can't use Face ID or Touch ID for some  

play08:30

reason, well that's the neat part. You don't.  As far as I know at least. I've never had that  

play08:35

happen, but I guess you too would just have to  turn on the significant locations feature again,  

play08:41

and wait for something to become familiar. Though,  in the meantime, you could still use the rest of  

play08:47

your phone. Okay, now with all that in mind, there  are still some things you can do to most likely  

play08:52

fully protect yourself, even from some of the  theoretical workarounds I mentioned. And for the  

play08:56

most part, that's just to reduce the likelihood a  thief could spy on your passcode. So first of all,  

play09:02

get rid of that numerical passcode, and set up  an alphanumeric passcode, and make it long. I've  

play09:08

done this for the past year, and it's not as  inconvenient as you might imagine. You rarely  

play09:12

have to type it in anyway, like a couple times  a week maybe. Then the other thing is to just be  

play09:17

super aware and careful if you ever have to enter  your passcode in public. The thief in that other  

play09:22

video report said that he would literally record  people entering their passcode to use later. So if  

play09:27

the thief watching from afar sees that you have a  long alphanumeric passcode, and you hold it close  

play09:33

while covering it and entering it, they probably  won't even bother targeting you anymore. Next,  

play09:38

another tip I suggest is that in the  settings under "Face ID and Passcode",  

play09:43

turn off most of the stuff under "Allow access  when locked", especially the Control Center.  

play09:49

This won't help if they know your passcode, but if  they don't, they won't be able to just swipe down  

play09:54

the control center and enable airplane mode and  disable Bluetooth to hide from Find My, which is  

play10:00

something thieves do. Here's what I have disabled,  and this basically prevents anyone, thief or not,  

play10:05

from being able to really do anything significant  on my phone while it is locked. So hopefully all  

play10:11

of you now have a better idea of how to better  protect your iPhone, and you can basically choose  

play10:16

your level of paranoia. If you enjoyed this video,  be sure to give it a big giant thumbs up for the  

play10:20

YouTube algorithm, and if you want to subscribe,  I try to make videos about twice a week,  

play10:24

usually Wednesday and Saturday. If you want to  keep watching, the next video I'd recommend is  

play10:27

where I talk about a lot of computer mistakes that  people make, so you won't have to do that anymore.  

play10:32

So I'll put that link right there. Thanks so much  for watching, and I'll see you in the next one.