Powerful Qualities and the Metaphysics of Mind: Towards a Neutral Monism by Alexander Carruth

Summary

This paper presents a version of neutral monism grounded in metaphysical considerations about properties, emphasizing the powerful qualities account. The view suggests that all real properties are both dispositional and qualitative, with no priority given to either. Neutral monism is defined by two central features: a monistic ontology and a neutrality claim between the physical and mental realms. The author explores the relationship between physicality and mentality, challenging traditional divisions in the mind-body debate, and responds to common objections, offering a nuanced framework that avoids collapsing into idealism, physicalism, or dualism.

Takeaways

• 😀 The paper explores a version of neutral monism, focusing on metaphysical considerations regarding the nature of properties.
• 😀 The first section outlines the 'powerful qualities' view of properties, emphasizing the debate between dispositional and categorical (qualitative) properties.
• 😀 The powerful qualities view combines aspects of both dispositional and qualitative properties, proposing that all fundamental properties are both dispositional and qualitative.
• 😀 Properties, according to the powerful qualities view, are unitary, meaning dispositionality and qualitativity are identical and inseparable aspects of a single property.
• 😀 Neutral monism commits to a unified ontology where all fundamental entities are of a single type, which is neutral between the physical and the mental.
• 😀 The division between physical and mental is not ontologically grounded in terms of physical or mental properties, but rather in neutral fundamental properties.
• 😀 The key debate between physicalists and dualists is framed around the relative ontological priority of mental and physical phenomena, but neutral monism challenges this dichotomy.
• 😀 The paper suggests that neutral monism can be flexibly developed in various directions and provides a space for distinguishing between physical and mental properties without collapsing them.
• 😀 The author addresses concerns that neutral monism might collapse into idealism or phenomenalism, clarifying that the powerful qualities view does not solely rely on mentalistic terms.
• 😀 The paper distinguishes the powerful qualities view from panpsychism, suggesting that the former does not imply that all entities possess subjective experiences, only that properties have both dispositional and qualitative natures.

Q & A

What is the central theme of the paper presented in the transcript?

The paper outlines a version of neutral monism motivated by metaphysical considerations concerning the nature of properties, particularly focusing on the powerful qualities account of properties, and its implications for the mind-body debate.

What is the powerful qualities account of properties?

The powerful qualities account proposes that all real properties are both dispositional and qualitative. It argues that these properties cannot be separated, and that dispositionality and qualitativity are ontologically identical to each other, forming a single, unitary entity: the property itself.

How does the paper characterize the division between the physical and the mental?

The paper suggests that neutral monism, particularly the version motivated by the powerful qualities view, holds that fundamental properties are neutral between the physical and the mental. Rather than being defined by either, the properties that make up reality are of a single kind, neither fully physical nor fully mental.

What does neutral monism commit to, according to the transcript?

Neutral monism is committed to a monistic ontology, meaning all fundamental entities are of a single kind. It also holds that these entities are neutral between the physical and mental, and that the mind-body divide cannot be accounted for in terms of physical or mental phenomena alone.

How does the paper define physical and mental properties?

The paper defines a physical property (P) as one that determines causal and structural relations, while a mental property (M) is one that plays a role in causal explanations of behavior or has a qualitative nature that informs an experience.

What objection does the paper address about neutral monism collapsing into idealism?

The paper acknowledges the worry that neutral monism might collapse into idealism or phenomenalism, particularly due to terms like 'pure experience' used by figures like James and Russell. However, the paper argues that neutral monism, particularly the powerful qualities view, does not fall into idealism because it recognizes both dispositional and qualitative features in properties without reducing them to either one.

How does neutral monism relate to the concepts of dispositionality and qualitativity?

Neutral monism, according to the powerful qualities view, holds that properties are both dispositional and qualitative. These two aspects are ontologically identical and cannot be separated. Dispositionality refers to how a property influences behavior, while qualitativity refers to the intrinsic qualitative nature of an object.

What are the implications of the powerful qualities view for the mind-body debate?

The powerful qualities view suggests that the mind-body debate, which typically frames the distinction in terms of physical versus mental properties, needs to be reconsidered. It challenges the assumption that fundamental properties can be fully categorized as physical (P) or mental (M), and instead proposes a neutral stance where the properties are not bound to either category.

What is the relationship between neutral monism and panpsychism?

The paper clarifies that neutral monism based on the powerful qualities account does not imply panpsychism, especially the strong version of panpsychism, which holds that everything has experience. The neutral monist view can accept a distinction between the qualitative nature of things and experiential qualities, which sets it apart from panpsychism.

How does the paper differentiate neutral monism from physicalism and dualism?

The paper explains that neutral monism is not physicalism, as it does not reduce all properties to physical properties (P), nor is it dualism, as it does not separate properties into distinct physical (P) and mental (M) categories. Instead, neutral monism holds that all properties are ontologically neutral, containing both dispositional and qualitative aspects.