Peter Pomerantsev - Lessons from WWII in Fighting Propaganda Using Black Disinformation Techniques.

Summary

El transcript de una conversación sobre la propaganda negra y su uso en la guerra, con Peter Pomerantsev, experto en desinformación y propaganda rusa. Se discute la estrategia de información durante el conflicto y cómo la propaganda puede influir en la identidad y el comportamiento de las personas, destacando la experiencia de Sefton Delmer en la Segunda Guerra Mundial y su enfoque único en la lucha contra el totalitarismo.

Takeaways

• 🚫 La lucha contra las mentiras propagandísticas con más mentiras raramente funciona y corre el riesgo de erosionar la confianza y debilitar tu causa.
• 💡 Existe un papel para la llamada 'desinformación negra' en tiempos de guerra, donde la difusión intencional de información falsa o engañosa puede ser altamente efectiva como parte de una operación militar.
• 📚 Peter Pomerantsev es un periodista, autor y productor de televisión británico nacido en la Unión Soviética, conocido por sus dos libros sobre la desinformación y propaganda rusas.
• 📖 Su tercer libro, 'Cómo Ganar una Guerra de Información', se centra en los propagandistas que intentaron superar a Hitler y utiliza la Segunda Guerra Mundial para reflexionar sobre lecciones aplicables al presente.
• 🌐 La propaganda y la desinformación están estrechamente relacionadas con la influencia de la lengua y la cultura en la identidad y el comportamiento humano.
• 🎭 Sefton Delmer, un personaje clave en el libro de Pomerantsev, fue un innovador en el uso de la propaganda contra los nazis, utilizando técnicas que exploraban la identidad y el papel de la propaganda en la formación de la misma.
• 🔍 Delmer creía que la propaganda no manipulaba a las personas tanto como legitimaba sus aspectos más oscuros, y que la propaganda satisfacía roles emocionalmente gratificantes.
• 💥 La propaganda puede absolver a las personas de la responsabilidad y de su individualidad, integrándolas en una masa colectiva que sigue y apoya la narrativa del régimen totalitario.
• 🛑 La desinformación y la propaganda pueden ser herramientas delicadas y efectivas en situaciones de conflicto, pero requieren una comprensión profunda de la psicología humana y la cultura del enemigo.
• 🔄 El éxito de la propaganda y la desinformación depende en gran medida de la capacidad de capturar y guiar las tendencias existentes, en lugar de simplemente transmitir información.
• 🌟 El trabajo de Delmer durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial demuestra que una estrategia de propaganda bien ejecutada puede tener un impacto significativo en la moral y la cohesión de un enemigo.

Q & A

¿Qué es la desinformación negra y cómo se utiliza en tiempos de guerra?

La desinformación negra es la difusión deliberada de información falsa o engañosa con el propósito de deceive, manipular o socavar a un adversario durante la guerra o conflictos. Se utiliza como táctica para obtener una ventaja estratégica, sembrando confusión y desestabilizando al enemigo.

¿Quién es Peter Pomerantsev y cuál es su experiencia en el área de desinformación y propaganda?

Peter Pomerantsev es un periodista, autor y productor de televisión nacido en la Unión Soviética y radicado en el Reino Unido. Ha escrito dos libros sobre la desinformación y propaganda rusas y es experto en el área. Su tercer libro, titulado 'Cómo ganar una guerra de información', se centra en los propagandistas que intentaron vencer a Hitler.

¿Qué se discute en el libro de Peter Pomerantsev sobre la propaganda y la identidad?

En el libro, Pomerantsev explora cómo la propaganda afecta nuestra identidad y cómo las personas pueden ser influenciadas por el lenguaje y la cultura. Argumenta que la propaganda no simplemente manipula a las personas, sino que legitima sus aspectos más oscuros y proporciona roles emocionalmente satisfactorios para actuar, especialmente en tiempos de confusión.

¿Cómo es la relación entre la propaganda y la corrupción en la estrategia de desinformación?

La propaganda puede ser utilizada para fomentar la corrupción con el objetivo de socavar la economía y el sistema de un adversario. En el caso de la Alemania nazi, la propaganda fue usada para exhortar a la corrupción con la finalidad de debilitar la economía y el control nazi. En la actualidad, se puede observar que la corrupción también puede ser un punto debil para los regímenes autoritarios.

¿Qué es la técnica de 'empujar la propaganda un paso más lejos' y cómo funciona?

La técnica de 'empujar la propaganda un paso más lejos' consiste en exagerar y distorsionar la propaganda enemiga de tal manera que los receptores se den cuenta de su naturaleza falsa y fabricada. Esto puede llevar a una conciencia shock o una sensación de que la propaganda es una actuación, lo que eventualmente puede resultar en una comprensión crítica de la propaganda y un distanciamiento emocional de ella.

¿Cuál es la importancia de la autenticidad en la desinformación y cómo se logra?

La autenticidad es crucial en la desinformación para hacer que el mensaje sea creíble y efectivo. Se logra a través del uso de detalles precisos y específicos sobre la vida diaria de los soldados y civiles, obtenidos a través de entrevistas con prisioneros de guerra y otras fuentes de inteligencia. Estos detalles convierten al mensajer en una fuente confiable en los ojos de los receptores.

¿Qué rol juegan las emociones en la desinformación y cómo se manejan?

Las emociones son fundamentales en la desinformación, ya que la propaganda efectiva captura y maneja emociones fuertes para influir en la conducta y la percepción de los individuos. La desinformación debe competir en el mismo espacio emocional que la propaganda enemiga, utilizando emociones similares para desafiar el dominio de la propaganda enemiga y crear un espacio para la reflexión y la toma de decisiones independientes.

¿Qué es la estrategia de 'revelar la actuación' en la desinformación?

La estrategia de 'revelar la actuación' consiste en hacer que los receptores de la propaganda se den cuentan de que el lenguaje y la retórica utilizadas por sus líderes o el régimen son en realidad una actuación y no una expresión genuina de sentimientos. Esto puede desenmascarar la propaganda y hacer que las personas comiencen a cuestionar su autenticidad y credibilidad.

¿Cómo se utiliza la tecnología para la desinformación y cómo se compara con las tácticas modernas?

La tecnología, como la radio en el pasado y las redes sociales en la actualidad, se utiliza para propagar mensajes de desinformación de manera efectiva y a gran escala. Las tácticas modernas de desinformación pueden verse reflejadas en las estrategias utilizadas en el pasado, donde se busca crear nuevas identidades y comunidades a través de nuevos medios de comunicación, y se busca aprovechar la credulidad y la falta de escepticismo en las primeras etapas de estas tecnologías.

¿Qué se puede aprender de la experiencia de Sefton Delmer en la desinformación?

La experiencia de Sefton Delmer muestra la importancia de entender la psicología humana y la identidad para crear una desinformación efectiva. También destaca la necesidad de competir en el mismo espacio emocional que la propaganda enemiga, proporcionar detalles auténticos para ganar credibilidad y utilizar la tecnología para llegar a un público amplio. Además, su enfoque en cambiar el comportamiento y devolver la agencia a los individuos puede ser una lección valiosa para la desinformación moderna.

¿Qué se puede inferir sobre la resistencia a la desinformación en la sociedad actual?

La resistencia a la desinformación en la sociedad actual puede ser desafiante debido a la polarización política y la creencia en conspiraciones, que a menudo se alimentan con una falta de sentido de agencia. Para contrarrestar esto, se necesita una estrategia de desinformación que fomente la sensación de agencia y la capacidad de tomar decisiones independientes, a la vez que proporciona información veraz y confiable.

Outlines

00:00

🗣️ La Guerra de la Información y la Propaganda Negra

Este párrafo discute el uso de la desinformación intencional, conocida como propaganda negra, en situaciones de guerra. Se menciona la eficacia de estas campañas de información para engañar, manipular o debilitar al enemigo durante el conflicto. Se hace referencia a la entrevista con Peter Pomerantsev, un periodista, autor y productor de televisión británico de origen soviético, experto en desinformación y propaganda rusas. Pomerantsev ha escrito libros sobre estos temas y su último se titula 'Cómo Ganar una Guerra de Información', centrándose en los propagandistas que intentaron superar a Hitler. La conversación destaca la actualidad de la lucha contra la desinformación rusa y la propaganda actual, así como la perspectiva de Pomerantsev sobre cómo derrotar la desinformación en el presente.

05:01

👦 La Infancia de Sefton Delmer y su Experiencia en la Primera Guerra Mundial

Este segmento relata la historia de Sefton Delmer, quien, como niño en una escuela alemana durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, experimentó el entusiasmo bélico y la propaganda. A pesar de ser un estudiante británico en un país enemigo, Delmer se sumergió en la fervor de la guerra, lo que más tarde lo llevó a cuestionar su identidad y papel. Su comprensión de la propaganda radica en cómo esta afecta nuestra identidad y cómo nos proporciona roles emocionalmente satisfactorios para actuar, especialmente en tiempos de confusión. La historia de Delmer se utiliza para ilustrar cómo la propaganda puede influir en la conducta y la identidad de las personas.

10:04

🧐 Erich Fromm y la Evasión de la Libertad en el Totalitarismo

Este párrafo explora la obra de Erich Fromm, un psicoanalista y crítico cultural alemán que escribió durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Fromm argumentaba que los sistemas totalitarios permitían a las personas escapar de la responsabilidad y de su sentido de sí mismas, lo cual es un gran desafío. Se discute cómo el régimen nazi y otros totalitarios promulgaban la idea de que el individuo debía fusionarse con la masa, dejando de lado su individualidad y su agencia, y cómo la propaganda nazi buscaba eliminar la era del individuo. Delmer, consciente de esto, trabajó para inspirar la individualidad de los alemanes a pesar de la comprensión de que las personas necesitan comunidad y pertenencia a un grupo.

15:04

🔍 Encontrando la Brecha en la Propaganda: Valores y Corrupción

Este segmento aborda la estrategia de encontrar vulnerabilidades en la propaganda del enemigo, como la discrepancia entre los valores y la práctica de la corrupción y el nepotismo. Se menciona cómo la propaganda nazi y la de Alexei Navalny en Rusia utilizaron el lenguaje para separar al partido político de la población, etiquetándolos de manera efectiva. Sin embargo, mientras que Navalny buscaba generar indignación y acción contra la corrupción, Delmer quería fomentarla para debilitar la economía nazi. La propaganda rusa actual también se ha enfocado en desmoralizar a los aliados y desviar recursos de Ucrania, mostrando cómo las tácticas de propaganda pueden cambiar con el tiempo y los objetivos.

20:06

🌪️ La Ola de la Sociedad y la Lucha contra la Propaganda

Este párrafo discute cómo la propaganda puede influir en las tendencias sociales y políticas, como la creciente postura hawkish en Europa y el aislacionismo en Estados Unidos. Se sugiere que la propaganda puede ser efectiva cuando se alinea con una tendencia existente y la guía en una dirección específica. Se destaca la importancia de responder adecuadamente a la propaganda y cómo la resistencia a la corrupción y la promoción de la libertad y la democracia pueden ser claves para contrarrestar la influencia de la propaganda negativa.

25:06

📻 La Innovación de la Propaganda y el Poder de las Nuevas Tecnologías

Este segmento reflexiona sobre cómo las nuevas tecnologías, como la radio en el siglo XX y las redes sociales en la era actual, han cambiado la forma en que la propaganda se presenta y es recibida. Se destaca la similitud entre la esperanza inicial de que la radio uniera al mundo y el optimismo inicial sobre las redes sociales, y cómo ambas han sido utilizadas para fines autoritarios y para crear nuevas identidades y comunidades. Se menciona la experiencia de Sefton Delmer con la radio y cómo utilizó la innovación para influir en la opinión pública nazi, lo que tiene paralelos con la forma en que las redes sociales están siendo utilizadas hoy en día para propagar ideas y movilizar a las masas.

30:07

🎭 La Estrategia de Delmer para Romper la Influencia Nazi

Este párrafo describe la estrategia de Delmer para socavar la propaganda nazi mediante la creación de contenido de radio que competía en el mismo espacio emocional que el propaganda nazi, pero con una扭曲 que exponía su falsidad. Delmer utilizó personajes y situaciones que iban más allá de la propaganda nazi en términos de extremo y emocionalidad, y luego gradualmente introdujo información veraz y detallada sobre la vida real de los soldados y civiles, creando una comunidad donde los alemanes podían escuchar y procesar la realidad lejos del control nazi. Este enfoque permitió a los alemanes distanciarse de la propaganda y comenzar a actuar en su propio interés, lo que a su vez debilitaba el control de Hitler sobre su pueblo.

35:10

🚀 Ian Fleming y la Implementación de la Estrategia de Delmer

Este segmento narra cómo Ian Fleming, conocido por ser el creador de James Bond, fue instrumental en el apoyo y la implementación de la estrategia de Delmer. A pesar de que la propaganda de Delmer incluía elementos controvertidos como pornografía, Fleming, trabajando en la Armada, reconoció su potencial para socavar la moral de los submarinistas alemanes. Con el apoyo y los recursos proporcionados por Fleming, Delmer pudo expandir su enfoque para abordar a un público más amplio, incluyendo a los civiles alemanes que buscaban la verdad sobre la guerra. La sección también reflexiona sobre la necesidad de adaptarse a nuevas tácticas de guerra en el siglo 21, reconociendo que se requiere una nueva doctrina y herramientas para lidiar con la competencia de poder en la era de la información.

Keywords

💡Propaganda negra

La 'propaganda negra' se refiere a la difusión intencional de información falsa o engañosa durante un conflicto bélico con el objetivo de desestabilizar al enemigo. En el video, se discute cómo esta táctica puede ser eficaz en operaciones militares, contrastando con la lucha contra la desinformación en tiempos de paz.

💡Desinformación

La 'desinformación' es la distribución deliberada de información incorrecta o engañosa con el propósito de manipular la opinión pública o los eventos. En el contexto del video, la desinformación es un instrumento utilizado en la guerra de información, aunque su efectividad y ética se debaten.

💡Credibilidad

La 'credibilidad' se refiere a la percepción de confiabilidad y veracidad de una fuente de información o una persona. En el video, se destaca que luchar contra la propaganda con más propaganda puede erosionar la credibilidad y debilitar la causa propia.

💡Guerra de información

La 'guerra de información' es un conflicto que involucra el uso de medios de comunicación y tecnologías de información para influir en la opinión pública, desestabilizar o manipular a un enemigo. En el video, se discute cómo la propaganda negra y la desinformación son herramientas utilizadas en esta guerra.

💡Sefton Delmer

Sefton Delmer fue un periodista británico que se convirtió en experto en el uso de la propaganda negra durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Su trabajo en la guerra de información incluyó la creación de estaciones de radio que difundían información distorsionada para socavar la moral de los nazis.

💡Identidad

La 'identidad' hace referencia a la percepción que una persona tiene de sí misma y cómo se ve a sí misma en relación con el mundo que la rodea. En el video, se discute cómo la propaganda puede influir en la identidad de los individuos, haciéndolos actuar de acuerdo con roles que les son emocionalmente satisfactorios.

💡Teatro de identidad

El 'teatro de identidad' se refiere a la idea de que las personas actúan en diferentes roles sociales basados en las expectativas y las normas culturales, y que la propaganda puede ser usada para influir en cómo se ven a sí mismas y en su comportamiento. En el video, se sugiere que la propaganda puede ser efectiva al ofrecer roles que las personas encuentran emocionalmente satisfactoriosos.

💡Rusia

Rusia es un país mencionado en el video como un ejemplo de un estado que ha utilizado la desinformación y la propaganda para influir en la opinión pública, tanto dentro del país como en el extranjero. Se discute la situación actual en Rusia y cómo la propaganda rusa se ha comparado con la de la era nazi.

💡Totalitarismo

El 'totalitarismo' es un sistema político en el que el gobierno tiene el control total de todos los aspectos de la vida pública y privada de los ciudadanos. En el video, se discute cómo el totalitarismo puede utilizar la propaganda para someter y manipular a la población, eliminando la individualidad y fomentando la conformidad.

💡Corrupción

La 'corrupción' se refiere a la conducta ilegal o inapropiada por la que se busca un beneficio personal o político a expensas de la moralidad y la ética. En el video, se discute cómo la propaganda puede utilizar la corrupción como un medio para debilitar a un régimen, alentando a los ciudadanos a actuar en su propio interés en lugar de en el interés del estado.

💡Autonomía

La 'autonomía' es el estado de actuar o tomar decisiones sin interferencia externa. En el video, se discute cómo la propaganda puede robar la autonomía de las personas, haciéndolas actuar según roles y scripts preestablecidos, y cómo es importante fomentar la autonomía para contrarrestar el control totalitario.

💡Teoría de la propaganda

La 'teoría de la propaganda' se refiere a los conceptos y frameworks utilizados para entender cómo la propaganda influye en la opinión pública y el comportamiento humano. En el video, se exploran varias teorías, incluida la idea de que la propaganda puede ser usada para liberar o legitimar aspectos de la naturaleza humana.

Highlights

The discussion emphasizes the ineffectiveness of fighting propagandistic lies with more lies, as it erodes trust and credibility.

Black disinformation, the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, can be effective in military operations and warfare.

Information campaigns aim to deceive, manipulate, or undermine adversaries during conflicts, used as a tactic to gain strategic advantage.

Peter Pomerantsev, a Soviet-born British journalist, author, and TV producer, is an expert on Russian disinformation and propaganda.

Pomerantsev's book 'How to Win an Information War' focuses on propagandists who attempted to outwit Hitler, drawing parallels to present-day information wars.

Propaganda's influence on identity is profound, with individuals performing roles that are emotionally satisfying and can legitimize darker aspects of human nature.

Sefton Delmer, a British student in a German boarding school during WWI, witnessed the triumphalism and the effects of propaganda on collective identity.

Delmer's work in WWII involved broadcasting media that aimed to push Nazi propaganda into the ridiculous, making listeners question its authenticity.

The importance of not preaching to one's own echo chamber and instead competing on the same emotional level as the propaganda is highlighted.

Propaganda can absolve individuals of responsibility and individuality, making them conform to the interests of the propagandist.

The role of propaganda in convincing individuals that monstrous acts are moral or patriotic, and how it can corrupt otherwise morally sound behavior.

The use of new media technologies, like radio during WWII and social media today, to create and proliferate new group identities and loyalties.

The potential of new media to be used for both democratic and authoritarian purposes, as seen with the early stages of radio and the current digital revolution.

The concept of 'wedges' in propaganda, exploiting areas of disagreement or corruption to drive a rift within the opponent's behavior.

The strategic use of corruption as a war tactic, as seen in the encouragement of Nazi corruption to hobble their economy.

The importance of understanding the emotional and performative aspects of propaganda to effectively counteract its influence.

The need for a new approach to political and information warfare in the 21st century, including the development of new doctrines and institutions.

Transcripts

Fighting propagandistic lies with more lies rarely works and runs the risk of eroding

trust in your credibility and undermining your cause.

However, there is a role for so-called black disinformation in wartime.

This deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information can be highly

effective as part of a military operation.

Information campaigns with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or undermine an

adversary during warfare or conflicts, as a tactic, is used to gain strategic advantage

by sowing confusion and destabilizing the enemy.

Today, I'm going to be talking about some classic examples of this, and some of the

characters that are deeply immersed in this kind of black propaganda with Peter

Pomerantsev, who has become an expert in this area.

Peter is a Soviet born British journalist, author and TV producer.

He's written two books about Russian disinformation and propaganda, and he has a

third here, which is absolutely fantastic.

I highly recommend people read that and it is called How to Win an Information War, and

it focuses on the propagandists who attempted to outwit Hitler.

Peter, welcome back to the channel.

Thank you for having me.

It is very timely because we are in the midst of another information war, whether we

realize that or not.

In Russia. I think in many of the reviews of your book, and indeed in the book itself, you

do draw parallels to the present day.

Now, I have to ask, was this a sort of labor of love, or do you feel that this is a book

that has huge topical relevance, where we are at and may help in the struggle to

counter Russian disinformation and propaganda?

So look, my point of view is always going to be about the present, that I'm not a

historian. I'm interested in what we do today.

Um, and my books have always been sort of indivisible from my, my, my work at Johns

Hopkins University now and other places, trying to understand how do we defeat, um,

disinformation. So I've never really, you know, and and whether it's a labor of love, I

mean, the reason I'm fascinated by propaganda is not for academic reasons.

It's because at a fundamental level, um, I'm very sensitized to the way we are influenced

by language, by culture, um, for various reasons that I explore partly in this book.

And, and also, you know, I've seen close up several countries that I've lived in,

families torn apart by, by these things.

This is not an abstract sort of conversation for me.

So love or hate but but definitely passion.

Uh, it's definitely not a just an exercise in, in historiography.

So, um, that that's, that's and the book.

Yes. The book is 20% the present day, 80% in the past.

It's constantly jumping between the Second World War and the killing fields of eastern

Ukraine and essentially thinking what out of the lessons of World War Two could we use

today?

And the book starts with an extraordinary description of Sefton Delmer, who found

himself as a schoolboy in the First World War in a German boarding school.

The only British student in the school, and firsthand witnessed the triumphalism.

Uh, dare I say you can put a label on there, the sort of, uh, maybe even bloodlust, you

could call it, but this incredible sense of, uh, you know, a country at war that is in

everyone is engulfed in that sort of, you know, triumphant sort of feeling.

We know the First World War, uh, did turn into the sort of quagmire that it did, and

those feelings of triumphalism quickly disappeared.

Is there a parallel to say, maybe not so much the full scale war where Putin tried to

downplay things, but certainly the taking of Crimea, uh, seemed to release that similar

triumphalism that people may have witnessed at the start of the First World War.

Yes. I mean, it's interesting because, um, uh, um, both the start of the First World War

and the start of the Second World War, um, you know, there's there's very different

reactions, aren't there? Uh, so the start of the First World War, there is quite a lot of

enthusiasm. And Thelma describes it in great detail.

And and you're right, people enjoy.

War and winning wars.

They prefer to be given the feeling that there's not much blood involved.

And a lot of propaganda is about kind of like minimizing the sense of blood and

maximizing the sense of.

Glory. Um.

And Delma has a very unromantic view of human nature.

He thinks that propaganda releases things that were always there.

He doesn't believe people are.

Sort of manipulated so much as have their darker selves legitimized.

Um, so.

Yeah. Uh, but what he's very good at noting is that people have different selves.

So the same people who are tubthumping.

You can go at one moment, can then almost put on a different mask and be these skeptics

making these sarcastic jokes about the war.

And he noticed that in himself he is a Brit bullied in his German school.

He's ten years old when the First World War begins.

Beaten up and picked on the way you'd expect.

An enemy school child to be.

And then he has these remarkably sort of honest descriptions where he talks about.

How he's caught up in the enthusiasm of the war.

How he enjoys singing the war propaganda and marching along with the other kids.

And he says, asking himself, like, who am I?

Who is the real me?

And one of the reasons I find him so fascinating is that even though he goes on to

do all these sort of dirty, innovative, amoral, sometimes incredibly moral things

during the war. His understanding of propaganda is rooted in.

The way propaganda affects our identity.

And I suppose his his idea.

Is that what propaganda does is give people.

Satisfying roles to perform.

Satisfying because they're emotionally satisfying.

Satisfying is because they can give you a sense of who you are and a confusing time.

So it's a very performance driven understanding of propaganda.

It's not about disinformation or cognition.

Um. It's about identity and a very theatrical idea of identity that he has.

And I think today that feels so relevant when.

Online were constantly performing our political cells.

You know, you have to go to a rally to get involved in a kind of online mob liking,

retweeting, saying the same things all the time, feeling that we're actually expressing

our individuality, but actually we're just copying each other.

Delmore would have loved all of that.

If anything, we now have, you know, through.

Online dynamics, these kind of snapshots of how people transform.

In a very deeply imitative way, because for him, it's people are imitating each other.

In these moments.

While all the time maybe thinking that they're being very individual, very, very

individualized. And his theory of propaganda is that we never stop acting any social role,

any social interaction, any learning of a language.

Entailed the putting on of some sort of costume.

The question is, are we putting on that costume in that role?

And then allowing the proper goodness to be in charge.

Or do we put on a costume?

And I've always loved this English phrase to act yourself and being in charge, both in

terms of our interests and our personalities of the performance.

And he would say, I think that the propagandists.

You know, the catch is they give you satisfying roles to perform, but they're

doing it in their interests.

And he sort of always encouraging people in his work, which we'll explore to say, yes,

you're going to be playing, you can play a different role.

Um. You don't have to be the Aryan, the Volksgenossen, the SS man.

You can be the family man, the soldier who has a different set of roles and loyalties.

The Catholic, the good Catholic, you know.

So he's always pulling people into their other selves and their other identities and

their other loyalties. So I thought, I mean, that was one of the reasons I decided to

write the book. When I realized that he had a sense of what propaganda is, which feels

very current today, which I could relate to in many ways.

And that was one of the two reasons why I decided to write the book.

And one thing I struggle with, which I think the book has certainly helped me try to to to

find a path through this and that is struggling to understand people who think of

themselves as moral but who commit heinous, immoral acts and propaganda has that dual

role, doesn't it? Um, in the way you've described it there?

It can convince someone who perhaps wants to behave in a moral fashion that the monstrous

acts they're being asked to perform are actually moral, are a form of loyalty to the

state, are whatever.

So on the one hand, it's corrupting people whose behavior in other circumstances may be

different in a different moral framework, with people exhorting them to behave in a

different way. But then there's another type of person who may have a better sense of what

is right and what is wrong.

But these propagandistic roles allow them to, uh, absolve themselves of responsibility,

allow themselves to fall into a pattern, and in some cases, at the extreme ends may be

even revel in the immorality that they're asking to, being asked to perform because

they still have a sense of the innate wrongness of it, but are being absolved from,

you know, that framework of behaviors which formerly they would have perhaps been held

to.

Um, yeah, I think I think propaganda can definitely.

And often aims to absolve people of.

The way to responsibility and to a certain extent of individuality as well.

I mean, somebody who wrote about this a lot was Erich Fromm, who was a sort of German

psychoanalyst, psychoanalyst and and cultural critic writing this, you know.

He was in Colombia during the Second World War.

He was exiled. He writes his law.

He's got a famous book, escape from freedom, um, where he describes it as that a

totalitarian system allow people to escape from responsibility, from a sense of

yourself. Um, which is very hard because you have to take all these burdens and all these

decisions and, and confront your own death and all these kind of things.

Um, and allowed you to kind of like.

Hide away in.

Well, everybody's doing it, so it's okay at the very banal level.

But but which was also given up of your, of your agency, um, and Nazi propaganda talked

about this quite openly, by the way.

I mean, so Goebbels always said that the aim is to end the era of the individual.

The individual is meant to morph with the mass, with the folk that was, you know, and

all their mass spectacles.

I mean, just think of the visual side of Nazi propaganda.

It's all about subsuming the individual in the mass.

And then your individuality is sort of.

Merged with the ferries.

You know who's the one individual that that is celebrated?

Um, you are the Führer and he is you sort of thing.

So. So that was that kind of theory.

And Delmar in the Second World War is very, very conscious of that.

And his aim is to always inspire people's individuality, um, while always understanding

that people need community.

You know, he's he's not you know, he's when he does his second World War work.

He never frames it around kind of heroism.

And it's all about, uh, do things in your own interests because everybody's doing them

in their own interests as well.

Sort of. Take, um.

Don't be afraid to be an individual.

Everybody is actually doing.

It would sort of be his framing.

He was very aware that exhorting people to rebel, to stand up to this totalitarian

regime was not going to work with a lot of people, because most people are conformist at

best, or actually enjoying the Nazi propaganda.

That's right. And some people are benefiting, of course.

I mean, it would have been, uh, quite the same people who may have been aware that this

is this is not good, but if it wins, will go along with it.

They're benefiting financially.

The, the system, um, the industrial base, even elements of society are changed so that

conformism pays and non-conformism doesn't.

I mean, at the very least, you're going to lose your job or your status, your position

in society. At worst, you're going to start being punished for your individualistic

behavior. We see the same thing in Russia now in the totalitarian slide.

Yes, definitely. Definitely.

But that's also I'd say, uh.

Uh, um.

That's also.

Um, strange.

That could also be a vulnerability, because if it stops being in your interest, does that

mean you do something else?

I mean, very simply, you know, Russian soldiers are being sent in the meat into the

meat grinder. The Ukrainians do all sorts of communication exercises to go.

Look, you're dying for Putin.

Do you really want this?

I mean, that's the very basic level with a fair amount of success.

I mean, not a huge amount of surrenders, but quite a lot.

Comparatively to to other complex.

Um. So the Nazis were actually was very frustrated.

When they saw people doing Nazi things for the wrong and for the wrong reasons.

Well, not all of them. Heydrich was, for example, sort of the gruesome, you know.

About one of the architects of the Holocaust. He was a true believer.

And, you know, when he saw how people were reporting on their neighbors for not being

Nazi enough, but just so they could get their flat, basically a lot of this happened.

There's a lot of denunciations, a culture of denunciation, but usually done for

self-interest. And he get really frustrated.

He's like, they're doing this for the wrong reason.

They're meant to denounce each other for Nazi reasons, not for self-interest.

This is bad.

Um, and del was always playing on this.

So yes, clearly we see Putin scrambling to set up a new.

System of self-interest and loyalty, you know.

And the Russian system has always been about that.

It's always been about like, if you want to get on, you've got to play along.

Um, and scrambling to do that.

Um, you know, I'd say that's a potential vulnerability as well, you know, because what

happens when that self-interest starts to stumble?

So there's two key things I got out of the book, two key wedges.

And I think the both the propagandist and the anti propagandist is looking for wedges

in their opponent's behaviour.

Areas of disagreement one would seem to be based on values, and that is to look at the

innate conflict between the Prussian aristocratic military class and the Nazi

party, the sort of brash, uh, violent, amoral, uh, sort of group.

Um, and that's a split in society that he could perhaps drive a wedge through.

The other one, as you say, is, um, is corruption, nepotism, this kind of area which

affects individuals lives, um, that has a curious, uh, parallel, of course, in the

naval strategy, whereas in this instance, naval didn't go after the system as such, but

went after those who are abusing or taking advantage of the system.

One might label it slightly more superficial, but can we draw parallels in

those strategies?

So there are parallels and then very, very big differences.

So the similarity is in the use of language.

So Dilma and Navalny were very aware that you had to label the Nazis or Putin's.

Political party United Russia in a certain way to separate them from the rest of the

population. So.

Delma came up with the word the party community, the party commune.

And he's constantly a lot of his media is about the party commune and how.

Which means Nazi officials are doing things in their own corrupt interests and don't care

about everyone else.

Navalny called them the party of crooks and thieves.

Very, very successful bits of branding.

Um, doing exactly that.

Creating a rift.

However, the huge difference is.

Navalny would do stories about corruption of Russian officials in order to make people

feel outraged.

And to want to do something about it to stamp out corruption.

Delmar wants the absolute opposite.

Delmar wants to encourage corruption because that will hobble the Nazi economy.

So when he's doing outrage when his the hosts of his show are.

Sort of. Being outraged by Nazi corruption.

His aim is to get Germans to be more corrupt.

Germans are meant to go well. If they're doing it, I'm going to do it.

And frankly, I think that's a better war tactic.

I mean, what has saved Ukraine several times in this war has been Russian corruption.

You don't want less of it. We want more of it.

Um, I mean, most famously, the money that was meant to go, I mean, the double irony is

just almost too much. The money that, you know, the Kremlin gave to the FSB to corrupt

Ukrainians was used in a corrupt way by the Russian FSB for themselves.

So there's so many levels there.

Um, so we want more corruption in Russia.

We don't want less corruption in Russia.

No. The one thing we don't want is the system working efficiently.

Um, so.

Going less corruption in the West so that we can, you know, fence off and close Russia's

routes. And tendrils across the world.

That's what we really want to stop.

But inside of Russia, it's been a bit of a boon.

So, um, so the very big difference in that sense.

So Delmar is not interested in starting some sort of revolutionary movement in Germany.

He starts broadcasting to Germany in 1941.

Um, he thinks it's way past the time when it was possible to inspire any positive

political developments in Germany.

His aim is sort of destructive.

Essentially, he wants to sort of undermine.

Nazi propaganda. That's his aim to get under its skin and start to pull it apart.

And this analogy, of course, in Russian propaganda, which, you know, has changed a

little bit during the war and their internal propaganda is trying to exhort people to take

action, whereas before it was really primarily focused on inaction.

But when it focuses on the West, almost the point of all Russian external propaganda is

to try and dissuade allies from being united, organized, um, funding Ukraine,

coming up with armaments.

Almost everything is pointed towards, uh, defunding D, supporting Ukraine with, of

course, very mixed results.

I mean, one can't say it's an entire failure because of what's been going on and the

delays in the EU and the blockages we see in the, in the US as well, not entirely

unsuccessful, but at the same time, in the long view, do you do you think there's some

similarity in that destructive propaganda?

And is it likely to achieve its goals in the long run?

It all depends on us.

It's such a good. I mean, it depends on how we respond.

Um. Propaganda can, can delay, distract, dismay, undermine.

But at the end of the day, it's successful when it captures a kind of a wave and steers

it in its own direction.

I'm still unsure which way the wave is going.

I mean, at the moment we see.

A lot of the wave in Europe, turning towards more hawkishness, towards an understanding

that we need to produce our own defence capacities, that this is a long terme threat,

that Putin is not a man you can do business with.

So if anything, the wave is in the other direction.

The problem is the wave is going very slowly, and by this time next year or by by

by autumn, really, we may be in a very hardest position where it's just too late.

Um, in America, the wave is going in the other direction.

America the wave is going towards greater isolationism and an abandonment of the

America that we have known the last.

Well, century. 60 years.

Definitely. So?

So they're going with the grain of things.

I mean, it's quite ominous because Russia's dream, of course, is the break up of America

or the point where it just becomes ungovernable.

And as we will prepare for the election and its consequences, the conversation that

everybody's having in America or everybody, the the conversation that some in America are

having are very seriously about how this.

The project becomes ungovernable, how the states just start doing kind of their own

thing. And even if they formally, they're still part of one union.

Essentially, it stops functioning in many ways as one, certainly for any kind of

serious political will.

And we always used to laugh at Russia.

I mean, they've always been trying to do like tech independent Texas movements.

Now it feels that they were actually they understood something quite fundamental about

America's vulnerabilities.

It had always been, I think Obama's great worry that the danger for America isn't so

much a dictator, you know, which is what everybody obsesses over, but it's somebody

who gets into power who is so.

Untenable for many people that they just start to split off.

And let's say a certain type of wannabe autocrat gets into power.

You could see some states just going, well, we're not going to be part of this.

And that won't be a smooth journey.

You know, legally it'll be a very complicated journey.

But this compromise of America depends on so many.

So much goodwill to make it work.

Um, that it seems that Russia's dream of America, which is.

Incapable of decision making in action is is on its way.

And so did Russia. Cause that?

Of course not.

It's about like effective propaganda sees the trend and then makes sure the trend goes

in its direction. Um.

And, you know, some trends are going in their direction.

And also utilizes, I guess, technology, because if we go back to Safford and Delmar,

um, he's using the relatively new medium of radio, and we'll go into the detail in a

minute, because I find it extraordinary how he managed to intersperse into the broadcasts

the fine details of daily life, to convince people that that was an authentic voice, that

that was coming from inside the establishment rather than from the outside.

And that's an extraordinary thing to pull off.

But it's also through a novel medium.

So people's critical judgment and framework, the culture of cynicism around broadcast

material, um, tends to be lower.

It hasn't evolved in the early stages of technology.

Aren't we also going through that same process with digital media at this point?

Um, the fragmentation, the gullibility in many senses that we see exhibited and then

turning into this political divisiveness you've described is perhaps because we're in

the early stages of this digital revolution.

Yes. I mean, without a doubt.

And that's, I think, one of the reasons why the book or delma's experiences feel

relevant. I mean, what were people going through in the first half of 20th century

with these new media is similar to what we're going through now.

First a dream.

All that radio would bring the world together.

There's these lovely poems and and paeans written.

How radio, a bit like social media would end all wars because people would speak to each

other and understand each other.

I mean, just as we had the sort of, you know, rose tinted view of social media when

it emerged this time of the Arab Spring, you know, this idea that it would just bring

people together in a great way and suddenly it gets we see the dark side and how it can

be misused by authoritarian figures.

Stalin. Hit.

Uh, Father Coughlin was a very interesting.

Version of that in the US, a kind of anti-Semitic priests.

Who was the first shock jock, essentially.

Um. And that was the that was with radio.

And obviously we see the same thing with online world.

First, it seems like a a democratic tool.

And very quickly we see that it can be used for the opposite.

And now it's largely used for the opposite.

So that's um, in that sense, a lot of similarities and the way that new mediums.

Allow for the creation of new identities.

You know. Just like then we see media being used as a way to kind of proliferate new

versions of yourself.

And add new group identities, you know, new loyalties.

The Nazis produce something called the symphony.

Which is a very sort of like a cheap radio, basically.

And they sold it.

A very affordable prices and Germans became the most.

Radio listening nation in Europe that was very conscious.

They wanted to take Hitler's rallies and put them in your living room.

And they saw it as a way of creating a unified identity.

They actually did a lot of radio innovation.

They essentially helped invent the sort of the call in show.

They had these shows, which were music shows, and people would call in, tell a

story, or write in, tell a story, and have a song dedicated to them, which was another way

of bringing people into a kind of communal experience.

And of course, with social media, I think we don't have to think very hard to notice how

it's creating new conspiratorial communities, new political communities, new

religious communities which undermine the old bonds.

The Nazis were basically saying, forget the church, forget your regional loyalties even.

I mean, the army was very hard for them.

You know, that was always a hard one.

But even the army, they were trying to forget, you know, let's make this a Nazi army

with mixed, mixed, mixed success.

And, you know, social media is doing that as well.

Like forget all your other things.

You're now a member of QAnon, or you're now a Proud boy, or you're now one of these

online movements that is now your who you are.

In that sense, I've been interviewing or trying to interview people who are experts in

weaning people off cults and deconditioning, and there seems to be some sort of, uh, sort

of relevance to that in this modern, um, phenomenon.

Uh, it also tells us that it's incredibly hard, you know, even working one on one, it's

not an easy process to wean individuals out of that.

And some do not want to be because their entire identity is is bound up in that.

Um, how did Sefton Delmer think that he could break apart these bonds?

How did he go about sort of trying to find the weak spots, not just in sort of

communities on a macro level, but, you know, individuals and their belief systems and

their loyalties to, say, the Nazi regime.

So so he never sat down and summarised all his ideas in a grand theory.

I think during the war nobody had time.

And then after the war he moved on to other things.

You can write about this for a long time.

Also, I just never think they systematized everything into one theory.

They were just experimenting all the time.

But having gone over his memoirs, having gone over the declassified archives, and

that's all down to a historian called Lee Richards, who does amazing work unearthing

the archive, which has the sort of daily brainstorms and correspondence.

And most importantly, you know, Sefton Delmer, one should note, was running dozens

of radio stations broadcasting into Nazi Germany during the war.

Having gone over the transcripts of a lot of the German ones, which are the ones we're

most interested in. I begin to see a pattern.

I kind of almost an algorithm that's implicit in his work.

But this is very much me kind of making sense of a body of work and saying, okay,

this is what this is what repeats.

Firstly, what doesn't work?

He doesn't think that.

Liberals preaching into their own echo chamber works.

So he had done some work with the BBC German service and thought it wasn't doing a good

job. He thought it was just.

Emigres talking to one another.

Liberals talking to one another.

Absolutely pointless.

If you want to reach these massive people who are enjoying the Nazi performance.

So that's very important because we're kind of in the same place today.

Where a lot of pro-democracy media thinks that preaching, giving people the facts,

talking down to them will somehow penetrate the emotional.

Power of.

All this authoritarian propaganda that we see around us.

So number one, don't do that.

That's very important because most most of the British counter propaganda was doing

that. So his first thing was like, don't do that.

It's already a big thing.

Not what not to do is already a big thing.

Now to get into.

The Nazi.

Bubble.

Number one.

You've got to compete on the same space of visceral emotion.

So he sets up radio stations.

There are full of these furious, often far right, further right than the Nazis.

Let me rephrase that. Not further.

Right. In terms of.

How can we describe what they are?

That's a good point. Let me. They're not further right than the Nazis.

They're a different sort of right to the Nazis.

They're representatives of military racism rather than Nazi racism, you know.

But pretty vile is what I'm saying.

Not not nice people.

Um, I'm not sure you can be further right than the Nazis.

So, like, a different type of writer?

Well, I don't know. I once shared a, uh, lift in a comment where someone was a member of

the Ldpr Zhirinovsky's party.

He got thrown out for extremism, and I didn't believe that was possible.

So, yeah, sometimes it is possible to be more extreme than the extremist.

Well, okay.

But what I mean is these were not liberals preaching to two things.

These were these were created characters at the start of his career who were

articulating. A level of anger.

That was in his own words.

Smearing the Nazis themselves with a.

A layer of filth as thick as they'd covered the juice.

He was re-engineering Nazi propaganda back at them.

And in doing that, what he was doing was was taking away the monopoly over strong emotions

that the Nazis had.

So that's stage one.

You've got to be on that territory.

If you're not, you're not going to get anywhere near that.

You've got to dive into the same operating theatre of anger and desire that the other

side is working on. But his aim was not to create.

A parallel movement.

So again, Navalny was very good at that.

Navalny was stoking anger, resentment, envy, often quite negative feelings, very powerful

ones. But a Navalny wanted to wants to create a movement.

Dilma does not want to create a movement.

He's doing something actually the opposite of that.

And this is where it starts to get interesting, because I think so far these are

things that almost everybody is aware of.

Just nobody does it well.

So when he's presenting.

His radio content to the King of England in 1941.

He describes what he's doing as pushing Nazi propaganda just one step further into the

ridiculous. Where it starts to hurt the Nazis themselves.

He doesn't mean satire.

The shows weren't meant to be satirical.

You were meant to listen to them seriously.

They're probably laughing, but they weren't.

He wasn't just taking the Mickey out of Nazi propaganda.

He was doing something much more subtle.

He was exaggerating it.

And distorting it in such a way that people would be, in a sense.

Made conscious or shocked into understanding how fake and fabricated it is.

Now, this is a very subtle moment and it's worth dwelling on.

I think we saw them similar.

I don't know if. How many of your viewers saw this.

So this event after the state of the Union speech in America, when Katie Britt, the

senator from Alabama.

He was going to do them, like the pro Trump speech after the after the Biden speech.

And she did it in such a hammy way.

A little bit too emotional, a little bit too breathless.

That everybody, and most importantly.

Trump followers were stunned and like, what the hell is this?

And for a moment, and she did this by accident.

She was just overreacting.

She revealed.

To what extent this whole language and rhetoric in her case of Trump politics.

Is actually a performance because it claims to be genuine.

It claims to be. This is the true feelings.

This is our feelings about the border.

The way she was talking about the border was slightly off, and it made you realize to what

extent the whole thing is empty and something of an act.

I mean, if we're going to get into pretentious dramatic theory, I mean, it's

what people like Brecht mean by in effect.

And we've got to understand.

That Delma was spent the 20s completely immersed in the world of cabaret.

So these ideas would have been all around him.

He was living in Berlin in the 20s as a reporter, so I don't I there's no way he

writes about Brecht in some of his historical work.

There's no way he didn't know about these ideas because everybody was talking about

him. And he had a lot of people from the German cabaret scene working on his radios.

They are the ones playing these different characters.

So. It's very subtle.

I mean, it's like if you go back to social media, it's that moment when you look over

your tweets, which you should never do from a year ago.

Your Facebook posts, which were delivered with such passion and vigor, and you look

back and you go, I sounds so fake.

I sound so as if I'm acting.

I thought that was me.

So you're looking for this in this sort of distancing effect?

The next thing though.

So it's break the Nazi monopoly on emotion.

Get the space in between people and the roles they've been performing.

And once you've created that space.

You can start.

Inserting. Truth in a different type of community.

So the reason I decided to write the book was when I realized that from 43 onwards,

Delmar switched from doing a sort of deceptive media where he was creating

characters essentially to actually a very interesting arrangement where he was

broadcasting media that was British disguised as Nazi.

But people listening to it were meant to know it was British disguised as Nazis, and they

were meant to know the British knew he was creating a safe space for people to listen

to. Content. But it was full within this sort of masquerade.

The content was the most successful.

Content was true.

He set up this vast data gathering exercise.

About the lives of soldiers on the front through interviews with POWs.

Listening to recordings of POWs talking to each other in POW camps.

When they weren't aware of it.

This was British intelligence was doing this all the time.

Um. Opening letters of Nazi officials to their relatives.

Newspaper cuttings, um reports from partisans who would tell them the littlest

details about like which.

Very awesome corrupt Nazi officer brought themselves or what?

Venereal disease the local prostitute had in Calais that everybody was sleeping with.

And by having this incredible detail about lives of soldiers and civilians.

Which you then broadcast in incredible detail.

He would welcome people.

Into. A world where now they've got a bit distance from Nazi propaganda, they could

start to think about their own self-interest. Now, here was a station that

was. Giving details about their lives that seem to care about them, even though they

knew it was the British behind it that could provide them information that was useful.

So people could start acting in their own self-interest, not in the Nazis.

So in his case, that means disobeying Nazi orders.

Um. The, you know, disobeying Nazi orders.

Uh, defecting, surrendering or just generally being, like, an inefficient member

of the fold. You know, to break that bond between the leader and the people.

You know, that can be many things today.

If we're talking about a dictatorship, you know, to get people to stop contributing to

the dictators slush fund, you know, or if you're talking about a soldiers, it's more

obvious what you want to stop doing.

But he was very interested in behavioural change.

You know, he wanted to. Change the emotional structure to lead to a point where people

could start acting in their own interests and, in a weird way, express their

individuality again.

All the time, giving them a new group to be part of.

So never saying go and be a rebel by yourself, but saying kind of like all

soldiers are sabotaging their boats.

You know, you never say you go sabotage your boat.

You just go. There's a lot of boat sabotage going on.

There's another report of boat sabotage in Calais.

This is what they did.

Isn't it terrible?

Um. Would be the way he presents it.

So that's kind of the arc, you know, from understanding.

The emotional and performative grip the Nazis had through to people being able to act

in their own self-interest.

Which was always again, coming back to this idea was also a form of theater.

You know, he was always aware that even when you're yourself, you're still performing in

some way, but you're the one who decides why you're doing it and to what end.

But he was giving people back agency to use today's sort of fluffy media talk.

You know, his media was designed to get you at the end, to start acting independently

again. You know, it wasn't just.

Trying to convince you that democracy good, fascism bad, is trying to get you to act

democratic, I'd say.

So that was kind of the arc that he was working through.

And I look at Counter-propaganda today and there are elements of this that I've seen in

my various research.

You know, people believe conspiracy theories when they don't have a sense of agency.

You know, we're very aware of things like engagement, media and all these sort of

clever things being devised at Cuny in New York could be ways to counterbalance that.

So it's interesting, like people who today think about what to do about these issues,

we're aware of these questions.

But the people doing that would never put it next to.

You know, aggressive, smutty, funny porn, which is what Delmar did.

He put it all together.

From the visceral anger.

There was a lot of porn in his shows.

I should mention to those so inclined.

To water? Not sure, but, um.

Historical interest only.

Historical interest. So he was doing the whole thing from like.

From visceral anger and smutt through to.

Recovering your agency as a Democratic citizen and putting it into one into one

package. Um.

And in that sense, I mean.

I don't know. I think that was really something quite.

Quite remarkable in what he did.

Because coming back to the start of our meandering conversation or my meandering, my

meanders, it did start with this visceral and very personal understanding about why

propaganda was attractive in the first place.

And that to sort of close off is, is actually extraordinary, because you talk about a vast

amount of time and resources in wartime where these things are an absolute premium.

It can imagine within any bureaucracy, whether it's military, administrative.

You have to fight pretty hard to make your case to do something, as I would assume is

expensive as this.

Um, and it's quite a wild kind of approach.

Um, how did he get it through?

And, you know, we see similar things in, uh, you know, the code breakers as well.

You see extraordinary characters coming to the surface and sort of being allowed to do

their thing in a way which often would go counter to the fairly sort of stuffy

verticals that you might find within the military and and so on.

So, I mean, the two words that allowed him to do this was actually Ian Fleming.

So there is a point when Delmer is almost shut down because, you know, he's essentially

broadcasting pornography in the King's, you know, for the King's coin.

And, and exactly.

That is like there's an official finds out about this, one of one of a very, very senior

official, Sir Stafford Cripps, and he storms into Eden's office and says, if this is the

way we're going to win the war, I'd rather we'd not win it.

But when Delmar is at a low ebb, the person who sees potential in his first show, because

he starts off with one radio station and ends up being head of special operations,

running dozens of them.

In dozens of them. If you accumulate over the whole time, they're constantly opening

and shutting down. But, you know, he becomes a big boss by D-Day.

But he starts with somebody doing something very experimental on the fringes.

And the person who sees potential in this and gives them and empowers him is Ian

Fleming at the Admiralty.

Um, they've known each other for a while.

They've been to Moscow together.

They've had various adventures together.

And Fleming basically says what you're doing is going to be really useful for us.

We need to undermine the morale of submarine boats.

It's the it's the it's the, you know, one of the really important moments in the submarine

wars. And he's like, look, we need to find a way to influencing submarine.

Sailors, a submarine sailor, is that right?

Submarine men. Submarine men and.

Women. Submariners.

Submariners. There you go.

Influence submariners. So? So he's alright.

So look what you'll do.

I mean, he sees a very, very precise need for it.

And it's the Admiralty who give enable him give him a ton of money, intelligence, which

is even more important and kind of clear aims.

You know, it's not like.

We want you need you to do this.

They had very, very definitive asks.

Um. Down to, you know.

You know, they needed his help in very specific battles to sort of, you know.

Demoralize or confuse the enemy, but Dalbir immediately says.

Sure will do something for the submariners, but his vision right from the start is, you

know, we want do we want to do something for everyone?

So even though a lot of his bigger stations are military stations.

Where there's a show aimed at submariners.

He always saw the bigger picture.

He was like, actually, German civilians will want to listen to this to find out what's

really going on in the front. So he's never doing.

He's actually always his his, his, his actually vision.

Of the audience is actually quite broad usually.

And yet specific in the sense that he's going for people who are.

Not the hardcore Nazis.

He knows he won't get to them.

Not the kind of hardcore rebels he doesn't.

They don't need. Listen to the BBC already.

He's going for people who are part of the group conformist going along, but have some

level of discomfort with what's happening, some sort of gripe, which look, I mean,

looking at the sociology, which I quote of Russia at the moment, that's going to be the

biggest group as well. You're not going to get to the 10% crazies.

You're not going to get to the 15% who are genuinely in love with Putin.

What you're looking at is that 40% who are like going along with things, acquiescing,

but have resentments and doubts.

That's what no one's trying to actually talk to them in Russia.

And Delman felt nobody was trying to talk to them in Germany.

Um, so he's not they're not even though that his stations are often.

You know, they were officially, you know, the the station of the armed forces.

He was always thinking about the bigger community.

Also, everyone had a relative in the armed forces, so it was quite personal for people.

Yeah. Um, so yeah.

So, so Ian Fleming is the simple answer is what made it possible.

And fascinating to see what what came after that.

I can't think of any equivalents.

And I know you have to have have to run off, but I can't think of too many equivalents in

the current one, except perhaps the interviews of Zolkin.

But that is a different purpose that's trying to immunize the Ukrainian population

by allowing them to hear Ukrainian p.o.w.s in their own words, and the sheer nonsense

many of them come up with as to why they're there, why they're fighting, that's a

slightly different that's sort of almost like an anti-propaganda, an antidote to to

propaganda. Um, but I guess we don't consider ourselves at war with Russia.

Russia may consider themselves at war with us.

We're perhaps not even thinking about such grand schemes as Delmas.

Um, look, in the 21st century.

It's going to be really quite a way into it.

But look, I think now it's not.

I think sort of everybody now agrees we're in an era of great power competition.

You know, there's a slew of books about to come out about this.

So I think mentally we've grasped that, oh, this is going to be a knife fight of the 21st

century. It's not going to be like the Cold War.

It's going to be different. There's going to be both integration and competition, which is

going to be dirty, nasty, full of spy crafts, cyber craft and information craft.

And the other side have built up.

Political warfare capacities.

It's not just about Ukraine.

It's about how we compete in the 21st century.

We're going to have to relearn the art of political warfare.

I mean, Delmer was part of the political warfare executive.

We're going to have to learn relearn the art of economic warfare.

That's just the world that we're entering.

So we're going to have to find out what our rules are, what our doctrine is.

We're not going to do the same thing as the other side do.

I think Dilma has some provocations about how we might approach this, but it means

being effects driven.

It means thinking about winning.

It's not what journalism should do.

Journalism has to do what journalism does, and God bless it.

This is not that. This is something that is has a huge informational component, but whose

aim is to win. And.

We don't know. We even struggle to have a language for it.

I mean, sometimes this is where Stratcom gets bundled into.

And that's us approaching the reality that we need to get to.

I like the old time political warfare.

I don't see why we can't use it.

Um. But you're right, for any of this to happen, there is a watershed moment where we

go. Were not the kind of wall we've known before.

There have been many types of wall.

You don't want to use the word war.

Use one of hypercompetition sharp power.

Let's find a word for it that we're all comfortable with.

But to compete.

We need new doctrines, new institutions, new tools, almost new professions.

And, um, I think we're getting there.

I think I think the mind.

Of nations and states has understood the challenge, but the body is yet to react.

We still don't have like.

Like who's meant to be doing this as a real question.

Like whose job is this?

I'm not. It's not media's job, by the way.

This is media does something else, which is very important.

This is something different.

Um.

So.

You know, I think we're going to have to unearth the lessons, good and bad, of what

Delmar did or what we learned in the Cold War.

And we're going to try to understand what we need today.

And that's that's the connection to marketing.

Test and learn.

Try stuff, break stuff.

Fail. Thank you so much.

My pleasure.

Huge pleasure. Great speaking to you.

Bye bye.