Taras Zhovtenko - Unpacking the Authoritarian Toolkit of Propaganda that Russia Exports to the World

Summary

El guion de este video trata sobre la amenaza continuada de la desinformación y la guerra de información que impacta la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales. Se discute cómo la desinformación puede socavar los procesos democráticos y cómo la IA exponencial y el interferencia rusa están aumentando. El entrevistado, Tas, un experto en seguridad nacional y analista de amenazas híbridas, explora la evolución de las operaciones de información y psicología, y cómo Rusia ha adaptado estas tácticas en su guerra híbrida, destacando la importancia de la resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la propaganda.

Takeaways

• 🌍 La desinformación sigue siendo una amenaza para la soberanía de Ucrania y también está dirigida a las democracias occidentales y a los aliados de Ucrania en todo el mundo.
• ⚔️ La guerra de información agresiva amenaza la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter a su influencia.
• 🗳️ Se observa la influencia indebida en los resultados electorales y la toma de decisiones de los votantes, socavando los procesos democráticos, lo cual es especialmente importante en el contexto de las numerosas elecciones de 2024.
• 🧩 La introducción de fakes creados por inteligencia artificial exponencial y el aumento en la interferencia rusa representan nuevos desafíos en la lucha contra la desinformación.
• 🎓 Tas jaena, con un doctorado en Seguridad Nacional y miembro del consejo consultivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Ucrania, es un experto en áreas como las operaciones de información, las amenazas híbridas y la seguridad internacional.
• 🔍 La distinción entre operaciones de información (IOPs) y operaciones psicológicas (PSYOPs) se ha vuelto menos clara con el tiempo, y ambas se han integrado en el concepto de guerra centrada en la red (NCW).
• 🌐 La guerra centrada en la red se basa en tres pilares: la integración de IOPs y PSYOPs, la influencia en la guerra convencional y la unificación de todas las unidades militares en una red de información.
• 📡 La información y la tecnología de la información han cambiado la forma en que se llevan a cabo las operaciones de información y psicología, requiriendo una adaptación a las nuevas formas de comunicación y la creciente disponibilidad de información.
• 🤹 La estrategia híbrida de Rusia, observada en Crimea y Ucrania, aprovecha las debilidades de las sociedades democráticas y utiliza una variedad de tácticas para sembrar la desconfianza y la incertidumbre.
• 💡 La propaganda rusa moderna no busca convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias específicas, sino más bien sembrar la desconfianza y la incredulidad en las instituciones y en el sistema democrático.
• 🛡️ La resistencia social e institucional es clave para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información y propaganda, fortaleciendo los valores y creencias preexistentes en las sociedades democráticas.

Q & A

¿Qué amenaza representa la desinformación para la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales?

La desinformación es una amenaza para la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales porque se utiliza en la guerra de información agresiva, lo que puede amenazar la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter a su influencia.

¿Cómo afectó la guerra de información en las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos?

La guerra de información influenció las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos al tener un impacto indebido en las decisiones de los votantes, pudiendo socavar los procesos democráticos y alterar los resultados electorales.

¿Qué es IOPS y qué relación tiene con las operaciones de información de EE. UU. en Afganistán y Irak?

IOPS, o operaciones de información, se refiere a actividades planificadas y dirigidas para influir en la información y la infraestructura de información del oponente. El investigador Tas Jaena estudió estas operaciones durante las campañas militares de EE. UU. en Afganistán en 2001 y 2002, e Irak en 2003, y su evolución hacia el concepto de guerra centrada en la red.

¿Qué es la guerra centrada en la red y cómo se relaciona con las operaciones de información y psicológicas?

La guerra centrada en la red es un concepto que surge en los años 2000 y se basa en la fusión de operaciones de información (IOPS) y operaciones psicológicas (SCOPS), influyendo tanto en la infraestructura de información como en la percepción colectiva de la sociedad y el liderazgo político o militar del oponente.

¿Cómo influye la tecnología de la información y la comunicación en la guerra de la información moderna?

La tecnología de la información y la comunicación ha permitido que la información se difunda rápidamente y esté disponible para un público más amplio, lo que ha llevado a la fusión de las operaciones de información y psicológicas y ha dado lugar a la guerra centrada en la red, donde la información es un elemento clave para influir en la percepción y decisiones.

¿Qué es la guerra hibrida y cómo se relaciona con el concepto de la guerra centrada en la red?

La guerra hibrida es un enfoque que utiliza una variedad de tácticas, incluyendo la guerra centrada en la red, para influir en el oponente. Se basa en el análisis de errores cometidos por otros, como EE. UU. en Irak, y el desarrollo de estrategias que aprovechan las debilidades del adversario, como lo hizo Rusia en Crimea en 2014.

¿Cómo describe Tas Jaena la evolución de la propaganda rusa en el siglo XXI y su enfoque en la desconfianza?

Tas Jaena describe que la propaganda rusa moderna se centra en sembrar desconfianza en las instituciones democráticas, líderes políticos y procesos electorales, en lugar de intentar convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias específicas. Esto se logra a través de la difusión de teorías de la conspiración y la manipulación de la información en redes sociales y otros medios.

¿Por qué es importante la construcción de resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información?

La resiliencia social e institucional es crucial para absorber el impacto negativo de la desinformación y propaganda, reequilibrar la sociedad y las instituciones políticas y de seguridad, y neutralizar la influencia destructiva al reforzar las visiones del mundo y los conjuntos de creencias preexistentes en las sociedades democráticas.

¿Cómo se diferencia la propaganda interna en Rusia de la propaganda externa en occidente?

La propaganda interna en Rusia y la propaganda externa en occidente utilizan el mismo conjunto de herramientas, pero con narrativas diferentes adaptadas a las sociedades y audiencias objetivo. Mientras que en Rusia se promueve la desconfianza en todas las fuentes de información excepto las oficiales del estado, en occidente se abordan diferentes audiencias con mensajes y argumentaciones específicas.

¿Cómo ha cambiado el enfoque de los servicios de inteligencia rusos para adaptarse a la realidad de la información moderna y las redes sociales?

Los servicios de inteligencia rusos han adaptado su enfoque al trabajar a través de redes sociales y aplicaciones de mensajería, buscando tener 'agentes de influencia' en lugar de agentes tradicionales. Esto permite una colaboración más fluida y menos detectable, aprovechando la percepción y la predisposición de individuos en la sociedad occidental para amplificar sus mensajes.

¿Por qué es fundamental ser proactivo en la lucha contra la propaganda y la desinformación en lugar de solo desenmascarar las mentiras?

Ser proactivo en la lucha contra la propaganda y la desinformación es fundamental porque deja a los agresores sin tiempo ni recursos para planificar estrategias ofensivas adicionales. Al tener su propia agenda de información e imponerla a la sociedad y servicios de inteligencia rusos, se les dificulta tener éxito en la construcción de nuevas estrategias ofensivas contra el occidente.

Outlines

00:00

😨 Amenaza de la desinformación y guerra de información

El primer párrafo aborda la persistencia de la desinformación como una amenaza para la soberanía de Ucrania y para las democracias occidentales y sus aliados. Se discute cómo la guerra de información agresiva puede socavar la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter. Se menciona la interferencia en las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos y la posibilidad de que afecte los resultados electorales y el proceso democrático. Además, se presenta el podcast 'Silicon Curtain', enfocado en la tecnología y la seguridad, y se da la bienvenida a Tas jaena, un experto en seguridad nacional y en la lucha contra las amenazas híbridas, que se presenta con su trayectoria y áreas de especialización.

05:01

🤖 La evolución de las Operaciones de Información y Psicológicas

En el segundo párrafo, se profundiza en las definiciones de Operaciones de Información (IOP) y Operaciones Psicológicas (OP), así como en su evolución hacia la Guerra Centrada en la Red (NCW). Se discute cómo la IOP se enfoca en influir en la infraestructura y el procesamiento de información del adversario, mientras que la OP busca cambiar la percepción colectiva o individual dentro de la sociedad y liderazgo del oponente. La NCW se presenta como un concepto que surge en los años 2000, integrando la IOP y la OP y enfatizando la importancia de la información y los medios en la planificación y ejecución de operaciones militares.

10:03

🔍 Análisis de la Guerra Híbrida y la Operación en Crimea

El tercer párrafo explora el concepto de Guerra Híbrida, ilustrado con la operación en Crimea en 2014 como un ejemplo de aplicación exitosa de la NCW. Se comparan las tácticas utilizadas por Rusia con las fallidas por EE. UU. en Irak, destacando la importancia de la percepción y la manipulación de la información. Se menciona el uso de 'hombres verdes' como una táctica de la 'herramienta híbrida' de Rusia, así como la disposición de Rusia para mentir como instrumento de política exterior, en contraste con las democracias occidentales que suelen ser menos propensas a la desinformación.

15:06

📢 Propaganda y disidencia en la era de las redes sociales

El cuarto párrafo analiza cómo la propaganda en el siglo XXI y el uso de Internet y las redes sociales han cambiado la forma en que se lleva a cabo la desinformación. Se argumenta que la nueva propaganda no busca convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias, sino más bien sembrar la desconfianza y la incredulidad en las instituciones democráticas y los procesos electorales. Además, se describe cómo la propaganda rusa utiliza técnicas de teoría de la conspiración para moldear gradualmente la percepción de la audiencia en su favor.

20:07

🌐 Estrategias de Guerra de Información Híbrida

El quinto párrafo examina las estrategias no lineales de la Guerra de Información Híbrida, donde se pueden tomar acciones en cualquier momento sin seguir un algoritmo lineal. Se discute cómo la repetición de mensajes, como las amenazas nucleares, se ajusta a esta estrategia y cómo la propaganda rusa explota las debilidades de las sociedades democráticas. Se enfatiza la necesidad de construir resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información y resaltar las creencias y valores existentes en las sociedades democráticas.

25:08

🎯 Diferencias entre propaganda interna y externa rusa

En el sexto párrafo, se discuten las similitudes y diferencias entre la propaganda interna y externa de Rusia, destacando que, aunque se utiliza el mismo conjunto de herramientas, las narrativas varían según el público objetivo. Se describe cómo la población rusa ha sido inmersa en una cultura de desconfianza hacia la información objetiva, a excepción de las fuentes oficiales del estado. Además, se señala cómo la propaganda rusa se dirige a diferentes estratos de la sociedad occidental, adaptando su mensaje y su lenguaje para cada audiencia.

30:09

🤝 La necesidad de una contraofensiva en la Guerra de Información

El séptimo párrafo enfatiza la importancia de una contraofensiva en la Guerra de Información para contrarrestar las tácticas de propaganda rusas. Se argumenta que la defensa total y la exposición de las mentiras de la propaganda no es una estrategia ganadora, sino que debe haber una ofensiva para dejar a Rusia sin tiempo ni recursos para planificar estrategias ofensivas adicionales. Se sugiere que una agenda informativa activa puede desviar a Rusia de sus esfuerzos de construcción de narrativas propagandísticas en contra de las democracias occidentales.

35:12

🕵️♂️ La evolución de los métodos de inteligencia rusa en occidente

El octavo párrafo explora cómo los servicios de inteligencia rusos han evolucionado sus métodos para adaptarse a las tecnologías de comunicación y las redes sociales modernas. Se señala que, a diferencia de la Guerra Fría, no es necesario reclutar y gestionar agentes de forma clásica, sino que se trabaja con 'agentes de influencia' que pueden no ser conscientes de su asociación con la inteligencia rusa. Esta estrategia permite una amplia difusión de mensajes a través de la amplificación en redes sociales y la utilización de plataformas de mensajería para comunicarse y posiblemente reclutar a personas dentro de las sociedades occidentales.

🤔 Conclusión y oportunidades futuras de exploración

El último párrafo resalta la fascinación del entrevistador por los temas tratados y la esperanza de explorar en detalle las metodologías de propaganda rusa y las soluciones que Ucrania está desarrollando para contrarrestar la Guerra de Información. Se menciona el trabajo en herramientas analíticas y de alfabetización mediática para afrontar los desafíos de la desinformación y se agradece a Tas jaena por su participación en el podcast.

Keywords

💡Desinformación

La desinformación se refiere a la difusión intencional de información falsa o distorsionada con el objetivo de engañar o influir en las percepciones públicas. En el video, se destaca cómo la desinformación amenaza la soberanía ucraniana y se dirige a las democracias occidentales, ejemplificada en la interferencia rusa en las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos.

💡Guerra de información

Es un tipo de conflicto que utiliza tácticas de desinformación y manipulación para socavar la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social. En el contexto del video, la guerra de información es una herramienta utilizada por Rusia para intentar desestabilizar o coercer a otros estados, como se menciona en la introducción del podcast.

💡Elecciones de 2024

El script menciona un gran número de elecciones que se llevarán a cabo en 2024, sugiriendo que estos eventos son oportunidades clave para la interferencia y el impacto indebido en los procesos democráticos, como se ha visto en el pasado con la influencia de la IA y la interferencia rusa.

💡AI exponencial

La inteligencia artificial exponencial se refiere a la creación de contenidos falsos utilizando tecnologías avanzadas de IA. En el video, se preocupa por el aumento en la generación de 'fakes' creados por la IA, que pueden ser utilizados para manipular la opinión pública durante las elecciones.

💡IOPS

IOPS es un acrónimo para 'Information Operations', que se define como actividades planificadas y orientadas a influir en la información y la infraestructura de información de un adversario. En el video, se discute cómo la evolución de la guerra de información ha transformado el concepto de IOPS en una parte integral de la guerra centrada en la red.

💡PSICOOPS

PSICOOPS, o 'Psychological Operations', se enfoca en influir en la percepción colectiva o individual dentro de la sociedad, el liderazgo político o militar de un adversario. En el script, se contrasta con IOPS y se muestra cómo ambas se han fusionado en la guerra de información moderna.

💡Guerra centrada en la red

La guerra centrada en la red es un concepto que surge en la década de 2000 y se basa en la integración de IOPS y PSICOOPS, así como en la influencia de la tecnología de la información en la estrategia militar. El video destaca cómo esta táctica fue implementada eficazmente por Rusia en Crimea, a diferencia de los Estados Unidos en Irak.

💡Híbrido

El término 'híbrido' en el contexto del video se refiere a la guerra híbrida, una estrategia que combina tácticas convencionales de guerra con otras formas de lucha, como la desinformación y la subversión. Se menciona cómo Rusia ha adaptado y perfeccionado esta táctica, aprendiendo de los errores de otros.

💡Resiliencia social e institucional

La resiliencia social e institucional implica fortalecer a las sociedades y sistemas políticos para absorber y contrarrestar la influencia negativa de la desinformación. El video sugiere que construir esta resiliencia es crucial para proteger las democracias de la guerra de información.

💡Agentes de influencia

Los agentes de influencia son individuos que, aunque no necesariamente conscientes de estar vinculados a los servicios de inteligencia de Rusia, pueden ser utilizados para difundir y放大 ciertos mensajes o narrativas. El script destaca cómo la inteligencia rusa ha adaptado su enfoque en Occidente, utilizando más la influencia a través de las redes sociales y la tecnología de comunicación.

Highlights

Disinformation poses a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and targets Western democracies, impacting information security and social stability.

Russian information warfare has evolved from separate terms of IOPS and SCOPS into the concept of network-centric warfare.

The 2016 US elections demonstrated the potential of information warfare to influence voter decisions and democratic processes.

The introduction of exponential AI and fake content, along with Russian interference, is a growing concern in the 2024 elections.

Tas jaena's expertise in IOPS, SCOPS, and hybrid threats offers insight into the evolving nature of information warfare.

Information operations aim to influence an opponent's information and infrastructure, while psychological operations target perception.

The development of ICT has led to a merging of information and psychological operations due to the widespread availability of information.

Network-centric warfare prioritizes information and media domains over physical warfare outcomes.

The US military's failure to implement network-centric warfare concepts in Afghanistan and Iraq contrasts with Russia's successful application in Crimea.

Russian intelligence learned from US mistakes and developed their own hybrid warfare strategies.

Russian propaganda focuses on sowing disbelief and utilizing existing societal issues to manipulate perceptions.

The nonlinear nature of hybrid warfare means strategies can change dynamically without following a set algorithm.

Russian propaganda's advantage lies in its willingness to lie as a key instrument of foreign policy.

Building social and institutional resilience is crucial to counter the negative impact of disinformation.

Russian domestic and external propaganda use the same toolkit but with different narratives tailored to the target audience.

Russian intelligence now relies more on agents of influence and social media networks rather than traditional agent recruitment.

Active measures from the KGB heritage are part of Russia's hybrid toolkit for influencing public opinion both internally and externally.

The key to countering information warfare is to be proactive and impose one's own information agenda on the adversary.

Transcripts

disinformation continues to be a threat

to Ukrainian sovereignty and is also

targeted at Western democracies and

allies of Ukraine around the world

aggressive information Warfare threatens

information security and social

stability especially in states which

Russia seeks to destabilize or coers

into supporting it we saw it in the 2016

US elections and it can potentially

threaten the results of voting Place

undue influence on voters decisions and

undermine Democratic processes this is

more important than ever because in 2024

we are seeing a huge number of Elections

take place and we're starting to see the

introduction of exponential AI created

fakes and of course a huge uptick in

Russian interference welcome to Silicon

curtain podcast please like subscribe uh

definitely comment on the materials that

really helps them forming YouTube it

helps new people to discover are

fantastic

guests also check out the validated

Ukrainian Charities that appear in the

description of the video Tas jaena has a

PHD in National Security and is on the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

public Advisory board he is a researcher

and analyst in the area of iops scops

hybrid threats deformation and

International Security and Tas I hope I

pronounced your name correctly if not

please do tell us the correct

pronunciation uh this is the perfectly

welcome pronunciation thank you very

much Jonathan good good well first of

all let's dive into what you do and your

areas of expertise because I know what

cops is I'm not so sure what iops is and

of course everyone has their own

different um terminology around these

things as well as gry Zone hybrid

Warfare and all this kind of stuff so

could you could you lay out your

definitions of this ecosystem

uh uh thank you very much uh so this

sphere of uh my practical and academic

interest has been vital for me for uh

more than 20 years actually already and

uh uh my uh PhD research which I've

passed in 2010 was closely connected to

information operations and psychological

operations of the uh US Army which were

conducted during their military

campaigns in Afghanistan in 2001 and

2002 and in Iraq in 2003 so uh uh

eventually I was

um found laying the foundation of my

research based on uh us uh Department of

Defense operational doctrines which

regulated information operation

psychological operations and uh uh

actually I've uh seen this evolution of

uh information Warfare transcending from

separate uh terms of iops and scops and

merging them into one uh newly founded

concept of network Centric Warfare which

became relevant in early 2000s so to

start with definitions uh when we speak

about information operations uh we

basically uh think of uh our uh targeted

and planned activities to influence uh

the uh information and information

infrastructure which our opponent owns

and and which our opponents utilizes uh

to his benefit so we either uh change or

erase or modify the information uh which

our opponent uses within his information

framework or we try to um somehow

disturb his uh information

infrastructure and to make it useless uh

to his own information demands if we

speak about so this is purely about

information and uh basically processing

the information the uh hardware and

software uh of this process and

influencing in these very spheres if we

speak about psychological operation

these are the activities which we craft

specifically to uh influence uh

individual or uh Collective perception

of the target audiences within our

opponents Society political or military

leadership so this is not about uh uh

technical modifying of information or

interfering with information

infrastructure this is about

disseminating specially crafted

information messages to uh try to um

make people uh think or percept uh their

reality in the way they

uh did not plan before our

interference uh so this is basically the

this divided concept uh was um uh kind

of a mainstream uh in pursuing uh

information Warfare in the uh '90s uh

but with the development of uh

information and communic Technologies

with the development of the uh worldwide

net and other Regional and Global

Network systems uh and with the spread

of information and with this with the uh

spread of information sources and with

information be becoming widely aailable

uh these separate concepts of

information and separate psychological

operations they kind of begin to merge

up because uh when we speak about um

influencing the information

that our opponent uses uh we also uh

keep must keep in mind that this

information uh is utilized by the end

user or end users and the uh changed

information also changes the mindset of

the person who reads who digests this

information so basically if we speak

about the spread of uh the information

sources the uh uh developing This Global

Information uh infrastru structure

within the uh uh on the planetary scale

on the global scale let's say uh there

is practically there virually is no

difference between the information

operations and psychological operations

because once we uh change or modify the

information our opponent uses uh then

the uh second effect is that this

modification influences the people who

read this modified information and uh

this modified information influences

them mindset their way of thinking their

perception of uh different objects in

reality so in this way uh these two uh

concepts of information operations and

psychological operations they started to

merge up and uh eventually in early

2000s uh uh this merging up ended in uh

creating a New Concept which was called

the network Centric Warfare uh it is

based on uh three uh uh very uh

Innovative pillars the first pillar is

actually the thing we've already

discussed so this there is no

distinction and there is no difference

between iops and scops so whenever you

try to modify or change information or

information infrastructure which your

opponent uses uh the uh second eff is

that you are changing the mindset of the

people who are perceptive this

information and or who use the

information

infrastructure uh the second pillar of

the NCW concept is that um

uh it uh greatly influences the uh

conventional Warfare uh so when military

commanders are planning their operations

uh both on tactical operational or

strategic level uh they must keep in

mind that the uh well this is a victory

to be reached is going to be reached not

in the physical domain but in the

information or in the media domain so

actually it doesn't matter uh what

happens on the battlefield uh but it

matters greatly what happens uh around

these events in the information sphere

in the uh in the media context in social

media in general uh so the first

priority of uh military strategy becomes

not uh paying too much attention to

physical domain of the Warfare uh as to

paying uh much more attention to uh

information and media domain of the

Warfare and the third uh pillar of the

NCW concept uh was that uh due to

development of the ICT uh the

information has to become uh kind of a

glue which uh has to merge all um

components of the

uh national uh uh military so there are

all military units uh on all levels of

uh uh on sea on air or on the land they

have to be United within one Information

Network they have to have uh equal

access to the information which is

gathered by different Military

Intelligence assets and civilian

intelligence assets this information is

updated uh live 247 and uh each

commander on each level has access to

the whole amount of information and in

this way the planning and execution of

military operations then essentially the

information psychological operations uh

becomes much more efficient so uh the

United States tried to launch this

concept within their uh their military

campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq but

eventually they failed to uh put into

practice all three pillars of of this

concept and they had to put a pose on

the concept in general itself but

uh several people in Moscow and

specifically in Kremlin were observing

carefully what Americans were doing

specifically in Iraq and uh uh they

analyzed uh the mistakes which were made

by us commanders and

uh essentially the analysis of those

mistakes LED Russian intelligence

military agencies to uh develop their

own concept of hybrid Warfare because uh

what we have seen in February 2014 in

Crimea uh in Ukraine uh was actually the

network Centric Warfare operation uh

done the right way uh I will here I will

just put one one practical example of

how how did it work with the the

Russians and how did how it didn't work

with the American troops in your Iraq uh

when the US commanders were sending

their uh SEAL Teams uh to search for

illegal uh ammunition weapons uh or

explosives in Baghdad for example or in

any other civilian Iraq Iraqi City uh so

these raids were actually conducted by

the uh regular SE teams and uh then the

US uh Regional command was trying to put

up uh some positive Med coverage uh

telling people of the amount of the

explosives and illegal ammunition and

weapons which were found uh and

eventually saying that the terrorist

Acts were prevented and the civilian

lives were saved so essentially it was a

positive message sent to the Target

audiences but nevertheless Target

audiences never reacted positively on

these messages and they were always

saying that US military has always

violating the rights of the civilian

population they are not doing things

right and so

uh but the uh us uh commanders they

didn't take into account one slight

thing which Uh Russian intelligence

analysts obviously have thought of very

great importance because if the US

commanders while uh before sending uh

those sealed teams to uh search for

weapons and uh uh and ammunition if they

took off all the ID patches uh from the

uniform of the SEAL Teams uh uh they

would uh create alog together another

information and media situation so the

public uh the journalist uh local

government they in Iraq they simply

wouldn't do what happens and they would

come for answers to the US commanders

who would already have the answers and

these answers would be listened to and

they would be percepted by the target

audience by the Iraqi civilians and

their leadership uh so this was the

mistake which Russians corrected and

this is how they came up with the uh

concept of this uh unknown green men in

Crimea but and this is only one of this

hybrid toolkit which Russia widely

utilizes not only in Ukraine but also

tries to U impose this tool kit onto uh

different uh different other targets and

these hybrid scenarios they are Al also

evolving and this is something I am very

keen on tracking and analyzing like on

the spot now Russia of course has an

Advantage here because we talk about

these techniques but there's a

fundamental Foundation to this and this

is the willingness to lie not just

selectively but lie ubiquitously and lie

as a key instrument of foreign policy

that is not how Western democracies work

you know um often if they are caught out

in a lie it's extremely

negative um and counter propaganda

really kind of gets to work on that uh

certainly Russia propaganda does Russia

however seems to deploy the you know

pkin facade kind of strategy which is

that nothing is true and everything can

be manipulated There's No Limit there's

no standard there's no red lines nothing

everything is up there everything is a

weapon does this give them a distinct

advantage in this kind of hybrid

space you're absolutely right and uh we

must understand that Russian military

and intelligence units they uh utilize

any weaknesses they can found in any

Democratic nation in uh any uh

Democratic

Society and they utilize uh any uh

inside domestic problems uh any

contradictions which already exist

within the target Society uh they

actually they they are not so much

trying to invent something uh out of the

scratch so some problems which actually

do not exist but they take the already

existing problems and they are twisting

them Beyond uh uh any recognition and in

this way they really have no red lines

and in this way we must understand one

fundamental thing of how Russian

propaganda works in the 21st century in

the era of social media networks and in

the era of Internet 2.0 and we are

already transitioning to the internet 3

.0 with artificial intelligence tools uh

iming all those uh information uh

toolkit that and communication toate we

are already utilizing and so uh in this

way uh in this uh uh highly intense

information environment uh the the

classic propaganda cannot work like for

example it had worked during the times

of the Cold War when you essentially had

a few uh information sources which would

which were easily controlled you could

control your own information environment

by cutting out all other foreign sources

and um denying any access of your

audience to those foreign sources and

this way uh you could really persuade

large masses of people uh in uh certain

uh ideological or World viw strategic uh

uh strategic perception things uh but uh

eventually in um modern information

world uh it's a very hard and

practically impossible task to uh

persuade your audience in in a very

certain in very certain things in very

certain uh set of beliefs because they

always can find alternative sources of

information you simply cannot control

the process uh but uh in a way uh this

new information landscape uh shaped the

priorities of the new propaganda

2.0 and uh this new propaganda which

Russia widely

utilizes uh focuses not on uh persuading

the audience in the uh something which

is essentially foreign to this audience

uh but the new propaganda uh Works in

dissuading audience in sowing

disbelief uh the new propaganda seeks to

uh uh make people uh stop believing in

uh uh in the system they live uh in the

society they live uh stop believing in

Democratic Institution Stop Believing

their political leaders Stop Believing

their neighbors Stop Believing actually

the election processes and in this total

disbelief it's much easier to uh impose

any uh additional propaganda narratives

but again uh Russian hybrid interference

utilizes uh well less direct approach

here because uh after this first phase

when you are showing disbelief in the

target audience you then impose uh hints

on uh the their new beliefs uh shaped up

for example in conspiracy theory so it's

not that you directly impose the already

uh uh created picture of the new beliefs

on your audience you are doing it step

by step uh just so that your audience uh

uh did not notice what's happening

because this is the key so they uh don't

uh have to find the moment uh when they

realize they are being manipulated so

you have to do it in a very subversive

way and so uh you are showing disbelief

uh you are try you are starting to feel

this disbelief vacue with various

conspiracy theories and then based on

those conspiracy theories which are to

some extent reflected not only by well

the uh low quality media sources but

they are also uh picked up by uh

politicians like we are seeing for

example in the uh Trump's

surrounding uh in in in the United

States in this presidential election

process uh and uh after you have all

those uh conspiracy the theory sketches

uh on place then you are uh putting up

one by one arguments uh which in in in

way you are trying to shape their

perception of your audience uh well to

your favor but again this is not kind of

um algorithm this is not kind of lineer

strategy as uh the classic propaganda of

used to work because hybrid strategy and

hybrid approach uh due to all those uh

very Dynamic circumstances which we have

already mentioned uh hybrid strategy is

uh completely nonlinear uh so it's again

it's a mistake to see um well hybrid

aggression or hybrid operation as a

number of algorithm uh steps algorithmic

steps which you take for example you

take step one to then to NE to next take

your step two and then to go to move to

step three three four five and so on uh

in hybrid strategy you can take uh uh

for example step one and then move to

step five then you can return to step

three and then you can advance to step

number 10 and you have all the toolkit

on your table and again there is no

algorithm on uh which stage do you use

uh which toolkit so you take the current

situation you take the current

circumstances you analyze it you see uh

what your priorities are to and as of

now and uh you pick up uh any approach

you pick up any tool any key any tool or

uh any set of tools which all

are Beyond you uh which which all yeah

which all are uh before you on the table

and then you uh address the situation

and you try to influence the situation

uh then again when tomorrow comes you

have another set of circumstances and uh

if you can see that your yesterday's uh

uh set of tools could actually help you

the next day then you do it so uh this

is the kind of solving the mystery of

Med who uh always likes to text

something about nuclear megadon nuclear

World War 3 and so on uh doing it

actually several times a month and uh

well it it might it might create uh

perception that this is that well uh

it's a kind of a lunacy to repeat all

the same things without uh anything

being actually done but uh it perfectly

fits into this hybrid nonlinear approach

so if for example uh Kremlin analysts uh

think that uh such kind of a nuclear

blackmail uh can uh put can influence

the situation uh in their favor today

and right now so they are putting this

kind of a this nuclear blackmail out uh

if for example they think that this this

very nuclear blackmail can uh influence

the situation in their favor tomorrow or

the day after tomorrow they would repeat

it without any hint of

uh of disbelief or something like that

or uh without hesitation uh so this is

how uh hybrid strategy works and this is

how uh Russian propaganda works right

now so uh it's um uh

uh highly uh threatening because it it

exploits all the weaknesses of the

Democratic societies and uh on the other

hand it uh it targets practically all

the audiences with one simple message

you cannot trust anyone you cannot trust

your government you cannot uh trust your

media you cannot trust your uh neighbors

you go citizens uh uh your elected

representatives and so on and uh this is

the uh the most dangerous way the

propaganda can work and uh the only uh

way out of this situation is actually

trying to build the uh social resilience

and institutional resilience which also

is a very important thing uh in trying

to uh well somehow compensate for uh

this uh destructive information

influence to uh uh rebalance itself to

rebalance Society to rebalance political

and security institutions uh to uh

absorb this negative impact of such kind

of information and then to neutralize it

uh by uh well stressing the uh already

existing uh World Views and already

existing set of beliefs of the audience

and of the nations of democratic

societies and is there a really major

difference between the mechanics of

domestic internal Russian propaganda and

external propaganda or is it more a

question of the same toolkit but with

different

narratives uh it's uh it's the second

option it's the practically more or less

same toolkit but with very different

narratives uh it's also part of a uh KGB

former

KGB Heritage which was called active

measures or Activa in Russian uh so

actually the second part of Russian

hybrid toolkit aside of the American

Network Centric Warfare concept is this

KGB Heritage of active measures and this

Heritage it uh consists of of uh uh

different means and instruments of

influencing public opinion uh not only

abroad but also

inside Uh Russian State and uh uh

clearly uh these instruments they work

differently uh outside and inside

Russian borders because it all uh

depends on how the target Society uh

reacts to these instruments and how it

how it reacts to the information uh

which you impose on them by on on the

Audience by these instruments so if we

speak about the specifics of Russian

audience perception of

information uh so during at least during

last 20 years Uh Russian citizens uh

were gradually accustomed to the thought

uh that uh there is simply not such

thing as objective uh information and

there is no s such thing as objective

truth neither in Russian Federation nor

uh

specifically nor in the western world uh

so in this way uh the Kremlin had tried

to develop the kind of anti-propaganda

immunity of the Russian population

because again the same concept has has

been applied to uh Russian citizens you

cannot believe uh anything you are said

but except if uh the source of

information is uh Russian political

leadership uh political or military

leadership or uh the official Russian in

information or media source so this is

the only case where you can believe the

information you are hearing or uh you

are seeing well this a kind of a

uh stretch to um former Russian

propaganda Heritage when again uh Soviet

Union didn't have any other information

sources except the ones that were owned

by state that were run by state and that

were controlled by the state if we speak

about how Russia utilizes the same

approaches on Western audiences so uh

there are two very specific things to

keep in mind first of all uh Russia

tries to communicate to very different

audiences in the west so it it tries to

talk not only to political leaders uh to

opposition leaders to well leaders of

public opinion in Western democracies

but um Russian propaganda addresses uh

the uh lowest classes of uh Western

societies so it lives viritual

uh no target audience uh uninfluenced by

this systematic propaganda and within uh

communicating with each audience Uh

Russian propaganda has its own so-called

language uh it's not a linguistic term

but it's a term of the uh terms they are

using the logic they are using uh the

message is always the same but the

argumentation and the terminology uh and

the logic of delivering this message is

always unique for each target audience

uh which Russian propaganda is

addressing so this is a very systematic

work uh and uh it doesn't mean that

Russia seeks to uh have success on all

the levels of employing this uh toolkit

so uh Russians are just pitching uh the

uh right uh the right input into uh any

certain Society or into any certain

Western democracy if they find it on the

highest level so be it if they find it

the lowest levels of the society again

uh this is this is

of an issue of no concern and um the

only thing uh to uh be effective in uh

in this kind of warfare because it

actually is Warfare uh is to be uh

active on the battlefield because uh if

uh Ukraine or if uh the Western world uh

chooses an option to uh go to Total

Defense and uh just uncovering fakes

saying that Russian propaganda is

constantly lying trying to show those

lies and to uh somehow explore them uh

before the public eyes uh this is the uh

no win strategy because uh it gives uh

uh Russian Federation and gives Putin's

regime uh a chance to Simply increase uh

its own propaganda in numbers uh if we

can uncover for example uh

500 fake news per month uh then we're

hinting Russians then that if they

increase the number of fake news up to

1,000 we would be drowning in those fake

news uh so uh as I always saying to uh

my students and to to my audiences when

I am lecturing on information Warfare

that information Warfare is like a

street fight so who hits first wins but

if you are going uh defensive uh this is

a no- win situation you simply cannot

win theight right if you are not hitting

back uh so this is again another key to

understanding what Russians are doing in

using their hybrid toolkit and their uh

information and psychological uh

instruments of influence and uh how to

effectively counter it so uh we must be

more active in uh hitting Russians in

the information and psychological way uh

and uh uh this would give us uh several

benefits so the first benefit we are uh

uh this is precisely the language which

Putin's regime understand so they

understand show not the demonstration of

of strength but they understand uh when

this strength is applied directly

against them so this is the only

argument which goes directly into uh

Russian political and Military

leadership leadership's mind and uh the

other thing is that by being active in

this information Warfare against

Russians uh we are simply leaving them

no time no resources and no intellectual

power to uh plan for other information

offensive strategies against the West uh

so we must uh uh have our own agenda

information agenda imposed on Russian uh

society and imposed on Russian uh

military and intelligence services and

in this way we leave them no chance in

being successful in constructing uh more

uh and new offensive strategies against

the West because they would have to deal

uh and to react uh on what we are doing

and on what we are imposing against them

so this is the key to victory in this

highly intensive information Warfare as

it is of the moment and the last

question I think that we that we'll have

time for is does this mode of operation

and especially Russian uh sort of hybrid

informational Warfare does it also

require them for it to really work does

it require them for the for them to seed

assets and agents in the West to have

client journalists academics useful

idiots do they need people voices from

within the system to be amplifying and

distributing their propaganda

narratives uh yes of course uh although

this work is uh much easier for Russian

intelligence Services right now because

they are utilizing uh social media

networks they are utilizing what

networks Within These social media to

amplify the messages that they were they

are sending to Western audiences but

nevertheless they really actually need

uh people in place uh they actually need

people who will uh try to magnify the

information and psychological effect of

the messages delivered through uh social

media networks uh but uh one thing uh

here is one thing which is uh uh very

drastically in contrast uh with the uh

the the previous uh I'd say cold war

experience of um Russian intelligence

Services because we all know that uh

mostly if we speak about those people

who are working in favor of uh uh

Putin's regime and uh uh Russian

aggressive politics right now in the

western democracies those are the people

who are uh to some extent directly or

indirectly associated with Russian

intelligence Services uh but unlike uh

the situation which was during the Cold

War when the Russian intelligence had to

actually recruit those people and run

them as agents uh physically run them as

agents because again we are talking

about the uh information exchange and we

are talking about the information

Communications Technologies and the

evolution which we have already uh

already mentioned today uh so right now

uh Russian intelligence Services they

practically don't need uh recruiting and

running agents in a classic way like

they did in the west like they did

during the Cold War uh because it's a

it's kind of a robust operations right

now uh we are already seeing that um

Western C Counter Intelligence services

are actively reacting towards uh what

Russian intelligence is trying to do uh

in uh Western European societies and

nations in Great Britain in the United

States and so on and uh Western count

Counter Intelligence agencies they are

simply uh rooting out all those uh uh

Russian agent networks within the

country and then dropping them out of uh

out of the Border uh but uh Russian

intelligence uh tried to uh adapt its

approaches uh within this new

information reality and they are more

working with through uh social media

they are working through uh popular

messages such as telegram WhatsApp and

so on the closed groups there to

communicate with the uh people whom they

try either to recruit or uh to ask for

favors and uh uh one fundamental shift

which uh makes Russian intelligence work

in the west today very unlike to uh what

it used to be during the Cold War is

that uh Russians are right now they are

trying not so much to recruit and run

agents uh but to uh have the so-called

uh agents on off influence uh in in the

western societies so this is the term

which does not uh require the classic

Recruitment and classic run running of

the agent so the person might might even

not know that he or she is associated

with Russian intelligence but

nevertheless due to his or her own

perceptions uh he or she that person

might might be used to uh sporadically

so it's not a systematic work but if you

have enough those agents of influence

you would have a systematic result uh to

sporadically deliver uh certain

information messages to amplify what's

being said by Russian intelligence in

the social media by uh journalists and

so on and so this all like a mosaic it

gets into the Strategic uh picture of

how Russian intelligence is uh viewing

its work right now today in the western

democracies and how it utilizes all the

ICT instruments and all the Hy toolkit

it has in hand uh to proceed with these

strategic goals well Tas this is

absolutely fascinating there are so many

areas that I'd like to explore in more

detail we're out of time in today's

episode but I very much hope that we get

the chance to maybe unpick certain areas

of Russian propaganda methodology and

start to explore the ecosystem in which

Ukraine is placing a a playing a very

active part which is developing

solutions to that both in terms of media

literacy but also software and

analytical tools to be able to counter

this information Warfare but for now

teras thank you so much

andavo I'm Slava thank you very much