Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law Ch.3

Undisciplined Reading Series
7 Feb 202317:12

Summary

TLDRDans ce chapitre, Kelson explore la relation entre le droit et la science, en contrastant avec son traitement plus bref du droit et de la moralité. Il distingue entre une théorie statique, qui se concentre sur les normes, et une théorie dynamique, qui s'intéresse à la création et l'application des normes. Kelson explique que le droit est un système auto-référentiel, s'autocréant et s'autopérennisant. Il souligne la différence entre la causalité en sciences naturelles et l'imputation en sciences sociales, argumentant que le droit relève de cette dernière. Enfin, il critique le réalisme américain et défend sa théorie pure comme étant anti-idéologique.

Takeaways

  • 📚 Kelsen établit une distinction entre la théorie statique et dynamique du droit : la première se concentre sur le comportement régulé par des normes, la seconde sur le processus de création et d'application des normes.
  • ⚖️ La loi se régule elle-même avec des règles qui déterminent comment interpréter, créer ou abroger des lois, créant un système auto-référentiel.
  • 🔬 Kelsen met en contraste le droit et la science, en notant que la loi fonctionne par imputation, alors que la science naturelle fonctionne par causalité.
  • 🧠 L'imputation implique une projection humaine, reliant des événements par ce qui devrait se produire plutôt que par des lois naturelles strictes.
  • 🌍 Selon Kelsen, la nature a été inventée par la société lorsque la causalité a été découverte, remplaçant des explications basées sur des imputations morales.
  • 🔄 Contrairement à la causalité, qui est infinie dans le monde naturel, l'imputation dans le droit exige une fin logique où la responsabilité s'arrête.
  • 🧑‍⚖️ Kelsen critique le réalisme juridique américain pour avoir tenté de prédire les décisions judiciaires sur la base de la causalité plutôt que de l'imputation.
  • 🎯 Kelsen défend sa théorie pure du droit comme étant non idéologique, affirmant que ses critiques projettent des valeurs idéologiques ou morales.
  • 🔍 La science du droit, selon Kelsen, se limite à décrire objectivement la réalité juridique, sans prescrire un ordre social moral ou idéal.
  • ⏳ L'imputation diffère de la causalité car elle nécessite une fin, ce qui permet au droit de tenir quelqu'un responsable, définissant ainsi la liberté.

Q & A

  • Quelle est la distinction que Kelsen fait entre la théorie statique et la théorie dynamique du droit ?

    -Kelsen distingue la théorie statique du droit, qui se concentre sur le comportement régulé par les normes (les actes), de la théorie dynamique, qui porte sur le processus d'évolution et d'application des normes elles-mêmes.

  • Pourquoi Kelsen consacre-t-il plus de temps à la relation entre le droit et la science qu'à celle entre le droit et la morale ?

    -Kelsen semble considérer la relation entre le droit et la science comme plus complexe et nécessitant davantage de clarification que la relation entre le droit et la morale, c'est pourquoi il y consacre un chapitre plus long.

  • Comment Kelsen décrit-il la particularité du droit concernant sa propre création et application ?

    -Kelsen explique que le droit a la particularité de réguler sa propre création et application, ce qui en fait un système autoréférentiel ou autopoiétique.

  • Qu'est-ce que Kelsen entend par 'règles de droit' et en quoi cela diffère-t-il de 'l'État de droit' ?

    -Les 'règles de droit' selon Kelsen sont des normes que le droit applique à lui-même (comme les règles sur la création ou l'interprétation des lois), tandis que 'l'État de droit' fait référence au principe selon lequel les lois doivent gouverner une nation.

  • Quelle est la différence entre la causalité et l'imputation selon Kelsen dans le domaine du droit ?

    -La causalité se réfère à une relation de cause à effet dans les sciences naturelles, tandis que l'imputation, propre au droit, implique une décision humaine qui lie des événements selon ce qui 'devrait' se produire, plutôt que ce qui 'se produit nécessairement'.

  • Comment Kelsen explique-t-il l'évolution de l'humanité de l'imputation à la causalité ?

    -Kelsen suggère que les sociétés primitives expliquaient les événements naturels par l'imputation (une interprétation morale ou religieuse), tandis que l'avènement de la science moderne a introduit la causalité, permettant d'expliquer les phénomènes naturels par des lois physiques plutôt que des jugements moraux.

  • Pourquoi Kelsen critique-t-il le réalisme américain en droit ?

    -Kelsen critique le réalisme américain parce qu'il tente de prédire les décisions judiciaires en se basant sur la causalité, alors que Kelsen affirme que le droit repose sur l'imputation, et non sur des relations causales directes.

  • Quelle est la définition de la liberté selon Kelsen dans le contexte de l'imputation ?

    -Pour Kelsen, la liberté consiste non seulement à faire ce que l'on veut, mais surtout à accepter la responsabilité d'être le dernier maillon de la chaîne d'imputation, c'est-à-dire d'assumer les conséquences légales de ses actes.

  • Comment Kelsen défend-il sa théorie pure du droit contre les accusations d'idéologie ?

    -Kelsen rejette les accusations d'idéologie en affirmant que sa théorie est anti-idéologique précisément parce qu'elle ne prescrit aucune loi morale ou idéal social. Il se considère comme un scientifique qui décrit le droit tel qu'il est, sans s'engager dans des jugements de valeur.

  • Quelle est la différence fondamentale entre la science naturelle et le droit, selon Kelsen ?

    -Selon Kelsen, la science naturelle repose sur des relations de causalité, tandis que le droit repose sur des relations d'imputation, où les normes indiquent ce qui 'devrait' se produire (un lien normatif) plutôt que ce qui 'doit' nécessairement se produire (un lien causal).

Outlines

00:00

📘 Introduction to Law and Science in Kelsen's Theory

Dans ce paragraphe, l'auteur discute des distinctions faites par Kelsen entre la loi et la science, ainsi que de l'accent mis sur la relation entre la loi et la morale dans les théories positivistes. Kelsen s'intéresse particulièrement à la distinction entre une théorie statique de la loi (basée sur les normes existantes) et une théorie dynamique (basée sur l'évolution des normes). Il mentionne également le concept d'auto-régulation de la loi, où elle crée et applique ses propres normes.

05:03

🔍 La Science Juridique et Son Objectif Descriptif

L'auteur explique que, selon Kelsen, la science juridique ne cherche pas à prescrire des comportements mais à décrire le système juridique. Ce système se construit à partir d'observations sociales qui sont interprétées comme des normes juridiques. La science juridique décrit simplement ces normes, comme on décrit des lois naturelles, bien que Kelsen distingue les sciences sociales (basées sur l'imputation) des sciences naturelles (basées sur la causalité).

10:03

🌩️ L'imputation dans les Sociétés Primitives

Ce paragraphe aborde la manière dont les sociétés primitives expliquaient les phénomènes naturels à travers l'imputation plutôt que la causalité. Lorsque des désastres naturels se produisaient, les individus ne cherchaient pas à en comprendre la cause physique mais imputaient une responsabilité morale, pensant que ces événements étaient des punitions divines ou naturelles pour leurs actions. Kelsen fait le lien avec l'animisme et les religions anciennes.

15:03

⚖️ Imputation, Responsabilité et Liberté

Kelsen développe l'idée selon laquelle l'imputation nécessite un point final, contrairement à la causalité qui peut s'étendre indéfiniment. Il associe cette notion à la responsabilité et à la liberté, expliquant que la liberté implique de pouvoir être tenu responsable en dernier ressort. En termes juridiques, cela signifie accepter les sanctions légales pour ses actes, ce qui marque la fin de la chaîne d'imputation.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Positivisme juridique

Le positivisme juridique est une théorie du droit qui affirme que le droit est un ensemble de règles créées par des institutions humaines, sans lien nécessaire avec la morale. Dans la vidéo, Kelson est présenté comme un représentant de cette approche, notamment en distinguant le droit de la morale, ce qu’il fait rapidement dans le deuxième chapitre.

💡Norme

Une norme est une règle qui régit le comportement humain, et dans le contexte juridique, elle définit ce qui est permis, obligatoire ou interdit. Kelson discute de la manière dont le droit est constitué de normes qui régulent les actes humains, et il établit une distinction entre une théorie statique (qui se concentre sur les comportements régis par ces normes) et une théorie dynamique (qui s'intéresse à la création et à l'application des normes).

💡Théorie statique du droit

La théorie statique du droit, selon Kelson, se focalise sur l'ensemble des normes valides qui régulent les comportements. Cela signifie qu'elle étudie les actes humains à travers le prisme des normes qui les encadrent, sans examiner le processus par lequel ces normes sont créées ou modifiées. C'est une approche axée sur l'observation des règles en place à un moment donné.

💡Théorie dynamique du droit

La théorie dynamique du droit s'intéresse au processus de création, d'application et de modification des normes juridiques. Kelson met l'accent sur cette dynamique dans la troisième partie de son travail, en décrivant comment les normes évoluent et s'ajustent dans la société, contrairement à une approche statique qui se contente de décrire les normes en vigueur.

💡Auto-référence du droit

L'auto-référence du droit, ou autopoïèse, est l'idée que le droit régule sa propre création et son application. Kelson décrit comment le système juridique se perpétue et se régule lui-même, créant ainsi une boucle fermée où les normes juridiques régissent à la fois les comportements externes et internes (par exemple, les règles sur la création de lois).

💡Causalité

La causalité dans les sciences naturelles est la relation où un événement (A) cause un autre événement (B). Kelson utilise cette notion pour comparer les sciences naturelles et sociales, affirmant que bien que le comportement humain puisse être lié à des causes, le droit repose aussi sur une autre logique, celle de l'imputation. Il critique l'idée que le droit fonctionne de manière strictement causale.

💡Imputation

L'imputation, selon Kelson, est un processus distinct de la causalité, propre aux sciences sociales et au droit. Elle repose sur l'idée qu'un lien normatif peut être établi entre deux événements (A et B) non pas par une loi naturelle de cause à effet, mais par une décision humaine ou une obligation normative. Cela permet d'expliquer les comportements dans le droit en termes de ce qui devrait arriver (le 'doit'), et non de ce qui va forcément arriver.

💡Validité

La validité dans le droit, d’après Kelson, fait référence à la force d’une norme juridique, ou sa capacité à être appliquée et respectée dans la société. Une norme n’a pas de lien causal direct avec les événements qu’elle régit (par exemple, un crime ne conduit pas immédiatement à une peine), mais elle maintient sa validité en tant qu’obligation morale et sociale que les événements suivent un certain ordre.

💡Réalisme juridique américain

Le réalisme juridique américain est une école de pensée qui soutient que le droit est moins une science rigide et plus un ensemble de décisions humaines, souvent prévisibles en fonction des juges et des circonstances. Kelson critique cette approche, affirmant qu'elle réduit le droit à une sorte de prédiction des décisions de justice, sans tenir compte de l’imputation normative qui distingue le droit d’un processus strictement causal.

💡Liberté

Kelson définit la liberté non seulement comme la capacité de faire ce que l'on veut, mais aussi comme l'acceptation de la responsabilité liée à l’imputation. Il décrit la liberté comme l'obligation d'accepter les conséquences légales de ses actes, ce qui fait d'une personne la dernière instance dans la chaîne d’imputation des responsabilités.

Highlights

Kelson emphasizes the distinction between a static theory of law, which focuses on behavior regulated by norms, and a dynamic theory, which focuses on the norms themselves.

The law is a self-regulating system that creates and applies its own norms, a concept Kelson refers to as the rules of law, not to be confused with the rule of law.

Kelson introduces the idea that law has a self-referencing system, where it not only applies to external acts but also has norms that apply to its own processes, such as creating, interpreting, and repealing laws.

Kelson compares natural science, which works through causality, with social sciences, particularly law, which operates through imputation.

Imputation in law links acts through norms with an 'ought' rather than a strict causal 'if-then' relationship, highlighting the difference between legal and natural causality.

The idea of imputation reflects a human decision-making process where responsibility and judgment come into play, unlike the deterministic nature of causality in the natural sciences.

Kelson speculates that primitive societies explained natural phenomena through imputation rather than causality, attributing events to moral or spiritual forces.

He argues that the shift from imputation to causality was a key development during the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, which led to the 'discovery' of nature as we know it.

Despite the advances in scientific thought, Kelson acknowledges that causality in modern science is often governed by probability rather than strict laws, reflecting a more complex view of natural relationships.

Kelson criticizes American legal realism for attempting to predict court decisions based on past cases, arguing that this confuses legal imputation with causal prediction.

According to Kelson, imputation in law requires a logical endpoint or responsibility, unlike causation, which can continue indefinitely without a clear conclusion.

Kelson connects the concept of legal imputation with the idea of freedom, suggesting that freedom entails responsibility for one's actions as the final instance of imputation.

He defends his pure theory of law as being anti-ideological, rejecting any notion of moral or correct laws, positioning himself as a scientist merely describing legal reality.

Kelson emphasizes that his theory is not interested in prescribing social order or ideal laws, but solely in the scientific description of the legal system as it exists.

The chapter focuses on the broader relationship between law and science, with Kelson drawing key distinctions between legal theory, social sciences, and natural sciences, emphasizing the unique role of imputation in law.

Transcripts

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foreign

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[Music]

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theory of law we saw in the first

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chapter Kelson laid the groundwork for

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where he goes with his theory

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in the second chapter

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he

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got to what is

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often most talked about when we talk

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about

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positivist legal theories talks about

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law and morality and we saw in quite a

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fairly short chapter right

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he doesn't spend that much time making

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his case there

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but now in the third chapter it's a

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significantly longer chapter than the

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second one

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he talks about law and science

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so

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I'm assuming

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that this is for calcin

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a more important distinction and a more

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important topic than that of law

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morality or at least the question that

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is more complex perhaps that requires

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more clarification

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I think it's interesting

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that he spends This Much Time on Law and

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science

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rather than law and morality right it

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seems to be a greater concern for him so

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we know from chapter one that he says

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that the science of law

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is concerned with the law

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manifested through

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norms

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applied to human acts

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he he says okay legal Acts

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that are relevant to the law

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again he starts with a distinction he

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talks about a static theory of Law and a

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dynamic theory of law

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one at rest one in motion a static

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theory of law according to Carlson is

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one that focuses on the behavior that is

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regulated by norms we could say the acts

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a dynamic Theory

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is one that focuses on the Norms

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themselves that are regulating

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like we said in the previous chapter

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that I'm making certain human acts more

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probable than others so in a static

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Theory the object of study would be

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the system of valid Norms in a dynamic

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Theory the object

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is

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the process of how these Norms are

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developed and being applied so not just

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this Corpus of

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a system of norms

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but how it's changing dynamically Kelson

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has an interesting quote early in the

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chapter

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where he says that

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it is a most significant peculiarity of

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law

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that it regulates its own creation and

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application

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today I would call that or at least

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since the 1980s we could call that the

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autopoiesis of the law

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or the self-reference of the law but

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okay Carlson didn't have that word at

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his disposal but he's already

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recognizing

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this self-creating nature of the legal

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system this kind of closed

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or semi-closed Loop that it's

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perpetuating itself in and he says

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what's also worth noting is that law

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doesn't only have norms

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that apply externally to itself to

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society or to human beings

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but that it also has Norms that apply to

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itself

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for example how to interpret how to

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create a new law how to get rid of a law

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so

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the law has

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law for itself this is what Carlson

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calls the rules of law

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not to be confused with the rule of law

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so he tries to

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answer how this happens how does this

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self-regulating self-perpetuating system

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with its own secondary

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rules of law

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come into being

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and he goes back all the way to for

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this he says that

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using

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the epistemology of that

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the law creates its own object

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through observing itself as a whole

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meaning that

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the law or the legal system

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sees different things happening in

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society and sees them as related and

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pulls them together under this category

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that it calls law

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and it it sees a hole or a system there

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he says this is a purely epistemological

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move

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these connections are not

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obvious in a certain sense but they're

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they're constructed socially right

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much like

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looking at the chaos that surrounds us

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and calling that nature for example you

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know just as Nature has been invented by

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Society so

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the

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singular coherence of the law has been

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created by society and the purpose of

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legal science as we know by now is not

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in prescribing it

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drawing on morals or whatever

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utility I don't know it

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only has the purpose of describing the

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legal system this is what legal science

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has to do description and we have

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descriptions of the law everywhere he

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says

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you know the law is for example the

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penal code

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and a description of that is your

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criminal law textbook so you have

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first order and second order observation

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there already

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so anyway returning to Natural Science

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Kelson puts

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the Natural Sciences and the social

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sciences at odds with each other and law

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Falls within the category of the social

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sciences

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so he says that Natural Science

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Works through causality

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if a then B happens or if you have B

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then you know a was behind it these are

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the laws of nature so to speak

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and he says that human behavior in human

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society can also

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be linked through causality right the

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social sciences and

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the Natural Sciences are perhaps not

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that different he says that causality is

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always there

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but the social sciences law

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has a second quality apart from

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causation

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namely imputation

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so if you have a and b you can connect a

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and b through causation or through

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imputation which I think you can already

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get a sense that it implies

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a human decision being made a projection

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and a decision linking these two things

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but the difference between these links

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if causational Natural Sciences says a

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then B what the law does it doesn't use

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then

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it uses ought

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if a

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b or

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to happen

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so the connection

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between A and B is different

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a norm is not

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a scientific or natural law

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that B has to logically follow a

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it's a command and ought to

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and sometimes B doesn't happen

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and that's where validity comes into

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play how valid is that Norm really if it

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doesn't happen

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every single time

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it's not a causal link

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it's a description that connects amb

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that make it socially logical

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for B to follow a if you

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commit a crime

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a

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you don't blink your eyes and suddenly

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you're in prison B right there's a lot

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that has to be happening between it's

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not a direct causal connection

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may look like it but

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it's not it's

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imputed there's a lot of

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social things that have to happen in

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between a lot of communication that has

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to happen in between a and b

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and it ought to happen but it's not

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taken for granted

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Carlson goes on an interesting detour in

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this chapter two again talking about

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primitive man

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I don't like the term but let's

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take it within the

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historical context that Kelson was

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writing this in

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but

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he says that

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primitive man probably did not he's

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speculating here of course but he says

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that it did not explain nature

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through causality

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but

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rather through imputation what does this

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mean it means that when something

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happened in nature let's say a natural

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disaster of some sort

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humans at that time

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didn't have natural causal laws to

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explain why that happened the way we

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would now

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but they would impute

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a value a judgment

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on the disaster happening right so if

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your town was hit by a disaster

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the question wasn't

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what happened what caused this the

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question was who caused this what did we

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do wrong to cause this there's a sense

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of moral value judgment taking place you

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know the idea that nature is punishing

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you somehow he connects us with the idea

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of animism or animistic religions the

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idea that

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nature and humans have this relationship

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kind of like

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what people have in between them where

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if you treat nature badly it comes to

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take revenge on you or something like

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that or the spirits they take revenge on

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you and he says if anything was a

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breakthrough

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in the Scientific Revolution or the

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enlightenment it was

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the invention of causality moving from

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imputation

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to causation and then through this he

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makes a

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Kind of a Funny observation

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he says that it's not that we had nature

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and later Society was invented but that

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the whole world including nature

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was

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Society first

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relationships

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governed linked through norms and

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imputation

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and that with science

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the natural world was invented nature

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was discovered through

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causality when causality was discovered

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nature came to the fore

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and Carlson is aware enough that he says

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that causation is also

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not taken that seriously within the

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philosophy of science even when he wrote

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this book already you know that science

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does not work on strict laws but that

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probability is what governs

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natural relationships if I can call it

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that so using this term causation the

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whole time

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is is fine as long as we keep in mind

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that this is already

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something

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linked multi-probability than certainty

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on another detour he also takes some

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time to criticize American realism

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the

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realist School of legal Theory and he

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says that the problem is with American

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realism is that it

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tries to somehow predict Court decisions

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and he criticizes this because he says

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you know it's taking the pass on the

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future A and B and trying to connect it

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with causality

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and he says that no it's not causality

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it's still an imputation

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the court decision is still an ought to

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it's not a natural consequence

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and I think although I don't think he

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says that explicitly he probably would

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also if we remember chapter one he would

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also

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I suppose criticize American realists

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for confusing a pure theory of law with

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political or sociological theories of

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law so while

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a realist approach can have

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some power descriptive or predictive

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power

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um it's not rooted

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within the law itself it's rooted in

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other disciplines

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so in this distinction between causation

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and imputation you know Carlson also

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says that

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another important difference between

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them and which is necessary for the law

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to work

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causation never has an end point right

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we know that

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you have a then B then C and D

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the physical world is always Dynamic

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always

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having Domino effects

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forever

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there's no end point to causation

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whereas with imputation on the other

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hand

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there has to be a logical end or you

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can't to take it in the other direction

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you can't regress infinitely when we

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blame someone you know you can always

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pass the buck

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to something else

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with imputation

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that chain has to stop somewhere The

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Buck has to stop somewhere and someone

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has to take responsibility

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and this Carlson says by the way is the

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definition of freedom

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it's yes being able to do what you want

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but

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the responsibility of

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being the last instance of imputation

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you know you have the responsibility for

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that and you have to take the legal

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sanction

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or whatever

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finally Carlson ends the chapter by

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defending his pure Theory again

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he says that he's been accused of

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being ideological in his theory and he

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says that no

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he is the anti-idealog

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he says it is

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anti-ideological exactly for the reason

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that he rejects

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any

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ideal or correct or right or moral law

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and he is the one that

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can see lawful what it is

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and his critics are

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may be referring to some

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imminent value transcendental value and

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they are the ideologues not him he's the

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scientist

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and he is not trying to prescribe

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any existing or hypothetical future

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social order he's not interested in

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doing that

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he is just

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doing the careful

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scientists work

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of describing reality as he sees it

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around him

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but yes that's it for chapter three

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Lawrence science

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I hope

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that was quite a big chapter I hope it

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made it a bit simpler to digest

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thank you and see you next time for

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chapter five

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関連タグ
Théorie juridiqueDroit et moraleKelsonCausalitéImputationSciences naturellesSciences socialesRéalisme américainNormes juridiquesÉpistémologie
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