Boeing: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO)

LastWeekTonight
7 Mar 202432:36

Summary

TLDRUn vol Alaskan Airlines a suscité la peur des passagers lorsque une porte s'est ouverte en vol, révélant des lacunes de sécurité. L'incident a mis en lumière les problèmes de Boeing, notamment les réductions de coûts, les retards de production et les problèmes de sécurité liés au 737 Max. Les enquêtes ont révélé un manque de transparence et une culture axée sur les profits plutôt que sur la sécurité, menant à des mesures de sécurité insuffisantes et à la mort de passagers. La pression des familles des victimes et des autorités a conduit à une législation pour renforcer la régulation et la sécurité, mais des questions demeurent sur la capacité de Boeing à changer.

Takeaways

  • 🛫 Un vol Alaskan Airlines a été perturbateur lorsqu'une porte s'est détachée, soulignant les inquiétudes de sécurité des passagers.
  • 🚁 L'incident survenu peu après le décollage a été jugé par les experts comme principalement dû à la chance.
  • 🔩 Le vol en question était effectué avec un avion Boeing 737 Max, un modèle récent livré par le constructeur.
  • 📌 Boeing a rapidement pris la responsabilité de l'incident, mais les détails précis de ce qui s'est passé restent flous.
  • 🛬 Suite à cet incident, l'FAA a ordonné la mise au sol de tous les Boeing 737 Max dotés de portes à bouchon jusqu'à nouvel ordre.
  • 🔍 Des problèmes de sécurité récurrents chez Boeing ont été révélés, y compris des incendies à bord et deux catastrophes aériennes majeures.
  • 📈 La pression pour augmenter la valeur des actions a influencé la culture d'entreprise de Boeing, menant à une priorité de profits au détriment de la sécurité.
  • 🏢 La fusion de Boeing avec McDonnell Douglas a conduit à une culture plus axée sur les coûts et la concurrence, influençant négativement la qualité des produits.
  • 🚫 Les problèmes de communication et de coordination entre les sous-traitants ont causé des retards et des problèmes de qualité dans la production du 787 Dreamliner.
  • ✈️ Le 737 Max a été lancé rapidement pour rivaliser avec Airbus, mais des décisions courtesightedes ont compromis la sécurité du modèle.
  • 🔧 Le système MCAS (Manœuvring Characteristics Augmentation System) a été ajouté au 737 Max sans que les pilotes ne soient informés de son existence ou de son fonctionnement.

Q & A

  • Quelle a été l'expérience terrifiante d'un passager sur un avion d'Alaska Airlines?

    -Un passager, Garrett Cunningham, a vécu une expérience terrifiante lorsqu'une partie de l'avion a été emportée par un écoulement d'air, révélant un trou dans le côté de l'avion.

  • Quels sont les dangers potentiels liés à l'incident avec l'avion d'Alaska Airlines?

    -Si quelqu'un était assis à la fenêtre avec sa ceinture dénouée, il aurait pu être aspiré hors de l'avion. De plus, si l'incident s'était produit à une altitude de croisière, les blessures auraient pu être catastrophiques.

  • Quelle a été la réaction de Boeing après l'accident de l'avion d'Alaska Airlines?

    -Le PDG de Boeing, Dave Calhoun, a pris la responsabilité, mais a eu une réponse étrange lorsqu'on lui a demandé comment un avion non sécurisé a pu décoller.

  • Quels ont été les résultats de l'enquête préliminaire sur l'accident de l'avion d'Alaska Airlines?

    -Quatre vis qui devraient maintenir le bouchon de la porte en place étaient manquantes, et lors de l'inspection des autres avions Max 9 de Alaska, des vis lâches ont été découvertes.

  • Quelle a été la décision de la FAA suite à l'accident?

    -La FAA a annoncé que tous les Boeing 737 Max avec une porte bouchonneraient mis au sol jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient été inspectés.

  • Quelle est l'histoire de Boeing et comment sa réputation a-t-elle évolué?

    -Fondée en 1916 par William Boeing, la compagnie a construit près de 100 000 avions pour les forces alliées et a été connue pour sa qualité et son excellence. Cependant, des incidents récents et des décisions douteuses ont entaché sa réputation.

  • Quelle a été l'influence de la fusion de Boeing avec McDonald Douglas?

    -La fusion a mené à une culture plus axée sur les profits et la concurrence, avec une gestion plus agressive et une orientation vers les actions qui a affecté la sécurité et la qualité des avions.

  • Quels ont été les problèmes rencontrés lors de la production du 787 Dreamliner?

    -La production a été marquée par des coupes budgétaires, une sous-traitance excessive et des problèmes de communication entre les fournisseurs, ce qui a entraîné des retards et des problèmes de qualité.

  • Quelles ont été les conséquences des décisions de Boeing concernant le 737 Max?

    -Le 737 Max a été impliqué dans deux accidents mortels, en raison d'un système de sécurité défectueux appelé MCAS, qui n'a pas été correctement communiqué aux pilotes.

  • Quelle a été la réaction de la FAA suite aux accidents du 737 Max?

    -La FAA a grondé le 737 Max pendant près de deux ans et a exigé des changements significatifs pour améliorer la sécurité du modèle avant de le réintroduire en service.

  • Quelles sont les implications de la décision de la FAA de donner à Boeing 90 jours pour élaborer un plan de sécurité?

    -La décision souligne l'importance de la sécurité et la nécessité de changement au sein de Boeing. Cependant, il reste à voir si ces changements seront efficaces et si la compagnie sera en mesure de restaurer la confiance des consommateurs.

Outlines

00:00

Planes and Panic: The Alaskan Airlines Incident

The main story discusses a terrifying incident on an Alaskan Airlines flight where a door plug was lost during the trip from Portland to Ontario, California. Passengers experienced a rush of air and saw part of the plane missing. The flight landed safely, but experts noted that the outcome was largely due to luck. The incident raised questions about the safety of the aircraft, a Boeing 737 Max, which was relatively new. Boeing's CEO, Dave Calhoun, acknowledged responsibility but provided an unclear explanation about the term 'quality Escape.' The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all Boeing 737 Max planes with plug doors for inspection, revealing a broader issue with Boeing's safety standards.

05:01

The Decline of Boeing's Reputation

This paragraph delves into Boeing's historical reputation for quality and safety, highlighting its founder William Boeing's commitment to excellence. It contrasts this with recent events, including a merger with McDonnell Douglas, which brought a more profit-driven culture. The shift in culture is attributed to a stock buyback program and a move of headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. The Dreamliner's production issues and the outsourcing strategy are discussed, revealing a focus on stock prices over safety and quality. The paragraph also touches on the 787 Dreamliner's delays and safety concerns, leading to a damaged reputation.

10:01

The 737 Max Disaster

The narrative continues with the 737 Max, Boeing's response to Airbus's A320 Neo. The rush to market, cost-cutting measures, and the resulting safety issues are detailed. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is introduced as a flawed system that could be triggered by a single sensor. The paragraph describes the two fatal crashes of the 737 Max, the first by Lion Air and the second by Ethiopian Airlines, and the subsequent grounding of the model. It criticizes Boeing's lack of transparency about MCAS and the FAA's reliance on Boeing's own assessments of safety.

15:02

Aftermath and Accountability

The aftermath of the 737 Max crashes is examined, with Boeing's initial promises of a quick software fix and continued stock buybacks despite safety concerns. The FAA's role in the oversight of Boeing's planes is scrutinized, revealing a system of self-regulation that allowed Boeing to certify its own aircraft. The paragraph discusses the congressional investigation into Boeing's practices, revealing damning internal communications and a culture that prioritized profits over safety. It ends with a call for change within Boeing's leadership and a more transparent approach to safety.

20:02

Boeing's Future and Public Trust

The final paragraph addresses Boeing's current challenges and the need for fundamental change within the company. It mentions the FAA's new demands for safety plans and Boeing's response under CEO Dave Calhoun. The paragraph also touches on the public's growing awareness of Boeing's issues, as evidenced by the ability to exclude specific Boeing models from flight searches on booking sites. It concludes with a call for Boeing to live up to its reputation for quality, safety, and trust, and to advertise itself more accurately.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Alaskan Airlines

Alaskan Airlines est une compagnie aérienne mentionnée dans le script pour un incident où une porte de l'avion a été perdue pendant le vol. Cela illustre les dangers potentiels de la navigation aérienne, même si elle est considérée comme la forme de transport en masse la plus sûre. L'incident a causé de la peur et des blessures parmi les passagers, soulignant l'importance de la sécurité dans l'industrie aérienne.

💡Boeing

Boeing est une entreprise aéronautique américaine qui a été fondée par William Boeing en 1916 et est connue pour avoir construit près de 100 000 avions pour les forces alliées. Dans le script, Boeing est critiquée pour une série d'incidents récents, y compris des incendies à bord et des crashs attribués à des défauts dans les avions de la compagnie. L'entreprise est également mise en lumière pour ses pratiques de gestion axées sur les coûts et les profits, au détriment de la sécurité.

💡737 Max

Le 737 Max est un modèle d'avion commercial développé par Boeing. Il est mentionné dans le script comme étant impliqué dans deux crashs tragiques qui ont eu lieu en 2018 et 2019, causant la mort de 346 personnes. Ces incidents ont révélé des problèmes de conception et de sécurité liés au système de vol MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), qui a été activé de manière erronée, provoquant la perte de contrôle des avions.

💡MCAS

MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) est un système de vol automatique installé sur le 737 Max de Boeing. Il a été conçu pour empêcher l'avion de s'envoler en tête levée, ce qui pourrait entraîner un crash. Cependant, le script révèle que ce système avait un défaut fatal : il pouvait être activé par un seul capteur, ce qui a conduit à la perte de contrôle des avions lors des crashs du Lion Air et de l' Ethiopian Airlines. Boeing n'a pas informé les pilotes et les régulateurs de l'existence de ce système, ce qui a été critiqué comme un grave manquement de transparence et de responsabilité.

💡FAA

La Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) est l'agence gouvernementale américaine responsable de la réglementation et de la supervision de la navigation aérienne. Dans le script, l'FAA est critiquée pour sa supervision insuffisante de Boeing, notamment pour avoir confié à l'entreprise la responsabilité de certifier la sécurité de ses propres avions. Cela a conduit à des lacunes dans la sécurité et à la perte de vies humaines.

💡Safety Culture

La culture de la sécurité fait référence à l'importance accordée à la prévention des accidents et à la protection de la vie humaine dans une entreprise. Dans le script, il est mentionné que Boeing avait autrefois une réputation de culture axée sur la qualité et la sécurité, mais que cela a changé avec le temps, en particulier après la fusion avec McDonnell Douglas. La culture de profit a pris le pas sur la sécurité, ce qui a eu des conséquences désastreuses.

💡Stock Buybacks

Les rachats d'actions (stock buybacks) sont des transactions où une entreprise achète ses propres actions sur le marché. Dans le script, Boeing est critiquée pour avoir acheté massivement ses propres actions, ce qui a augmenté le prix des actions mais a également révélé une priorité accordée aux profits plutôt qu'à la sécurité et à la qualité des produits.

💡Outsourcing

L'externalisation (outsourcing) est la pratique d'une entreprise qui confie certaines de ses activités à des tiers. Boeing a externalisé la production de certaines parties de ses avions, ce qui a mené à des problèmes de qualité et de communication, comme mentionné dans le script pour le Dreamliner. Cela a compliqué la gestion de la qualité et la sécurité des avions.

💡737 Max Grounding

Le 737 Max a été interdit de vol (grounding) par la FAA après les deux crashs. Cela signifie que tous les avions de ce modèle ont été retirés des opérations commerciales pour des inspections et des modifications de sécurité. Le grounding a été un mesure de précaution pour s'assurer que les problèmes de sécurité étaient résolus avant de permettre aux avions de reprendre le vol.

💡Whistleblowers

Les lanceurs d'alerte (whistleblowers) sont des individus qui révèlent des informations confidentielles sur des activités potentiellement illégales ou dangereuses au public. Dans le script, des lanceurs d'alerte au sein de Boeing ont exprimé leurs préoccupations concernant les pratiques de l'entreprise et ont appelé à un changement de leadership pour améliorer la sécurité et la culture de l'entreprise.

💡Corporate Culture

La culture d'entreprise fait référence à l'ensemble des valeurs, des normes et des comportements qui guident les actions des employés et la gestion de l'entreprise. Dans le script, la culture d'entreprise de Boeing est critiquée pour être devenue axée sur les profits plutôt que sur la qualité et la sécurité, ce qui a eu des conséquences néfastes pour la sécurité des avions et la confiance du public.

Highlights

Alaskan Airlines plane lost a door plug during flight, causing panic among passengers.

The incident occurred on a flight from Portland to Ontario, California.

Garrett Cunningham described the experience as one of the most frightening of his life.

The flight landed safely with only a few injuries, but experts say it was mostly luck.

The plane was almost new, delivered by Boeing just two months earlier.

Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun took responsibility but had an odd response when pressed for details.

The FAA grounded all Boeing 737 Max planes with plug doors until inspected.

Boeing has a history of safety issues, including fires and crashes blamed on flawed planes.

The FAA gave Boeing 90 days to come up with a plan to address safety issues.

Boeing's reputation for quality and craftsmanship has been tarnished by recent incidents.

Boeing merged with McDonald Douglas, which had a poor reputation for commercial airliners.

The McDonald Douglas culture, profit-driven and cutthroat, became dominant after the merger.

Boeing moved its corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, distancing from the commercial plane design and production.

Boeing's stock buyback program and focus on stock prices over plane safety raised concerns.

The 787 Dreamliner production was plagued by issues due to outsourcing and cost-cutting measures.

The 737 Max was rushed into production to compete with Airbus's A320 Neo, leading to design and safety compromises.

The MCAS system on the 737 Max was not properly disclosed to pilots, leading to two fatal crashes.

Boeing's internal messages revealed employees mocking the FAA and the company's safety practices.

The FAA relied heavily on Boeing employees to vouch for the 737 Max's safety, indicating a conflict of interest.

Boeing's self-regulation and pressure to meet schedules and keep costs down contributed to safety issues.

Congress passed legislation to roll back some of Boeing's self-oversight capabilities.

Boeing whistleblowers suggest the company won't change until there's new leadership.

Booking sites now allow customers to exclude specific Boeing models from their flight search.

Boeing's reputation is at risk, and the company needs to fundamentally change its culture and priorities.

Transcripts

play00:04

our main story tonight concerns

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airplanes the place you go to say I'll

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get some reading done before watching

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Nine episodes of The Office you've

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already seen and landing in Tucson

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planes make many of us nervous even

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though commercial air travel is the

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safest form of mass transportation but

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accidents do happen and there was one

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recently that got a lot of attention

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passengers are sharing their terrifying

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experience on board an Alaskan Airlines

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plane that lost a door plug during

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flights what was supposed to be a short

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trip from Portland to Ontario California

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for Garrett Cunningham turned out to be

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one of the most frightening experiences

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of his life a gush of of air I look to

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my left and part of the plane is gone my

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brain couldn't compute what I was

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looking at yeah of course it couldn't

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our minds filter out things that

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shouldn't make sense mine for instance

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refuses to acknowledge that tomatoes are

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fruits or that the shoe Bill isn't

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extinct does that really look like

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something that should exist at the same

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time as the iPad I think not now

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thankfully that flight landed safely

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with only a few injuries but experts say

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that that was mostly luck for one thing

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if someone had been sitting in the

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window seat with their seat belt off

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they could have been sucked out of the

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plane and second this happened just

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after takeoff but if they'd been at

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cruising altitude injuries might have

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been catastrophic and that plane was

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almost new it had been delivered by the

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manufacturer Boeing around 2 months

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earlier and that's too soon for a

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sneaker to fall apart let alone a

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multi-million dollar aircraft now Boeing

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CEO Dave Calhoun was quick to take

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responsibility saying Boeing is

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accountable but when pressed on exactly

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what had taken place had an odd response

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how did an unsafe airplane fly in the

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first

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place because a quality Escape

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occurred can you qu Escape occur what is

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a quality

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Escape I think that's the description of

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what people are finding in their

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inspections um uh anything that could

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potentially contribute to an accident

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what quality didn't escape a part of the

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plane did that's a terrible answer when

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you asked how an unsafe plane flew in

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the first place we need more information

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than essentially the plane was unsafe

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yeah everybody knows that there's a

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hole in the side of it and the

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exact nature of the Escape is pretty

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alarming given that according to the

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preliminary investigation four bolts

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that were supposed to keep the door plug

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in place were missing and when Alaska

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checked their other max9 planes they

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found loose bolts on many of them the

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next day the FAA announced that every

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Boeing 7379 Max with a plug door would

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be grounded until they were inspected

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which is a bit of a relief and honestly

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kind of a fun image i' like to imagine

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Stern FAA inspectors going up to each

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plane and saying you are grounded Missy

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no inflight TV for a month and yes

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planes are girls cuz think about it they

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always have snacks and constantly say

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leaving right now and then don't move

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for another 15

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minutes case closed it's beginning to

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feel like this might be a much broader

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issue within Boeing because it comes on

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the heels of a years long string of

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alarming incidents from fires on board

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to a pair of massive crashes that were

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blamed on flawed Boeing planes and just

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this week the FAA issued a stunning

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order to the company the Federal

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Aviation Administration gave Boeing 90

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days now to come up with a plan to

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address safety issues this comes after a

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report released on Monday found

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employees did not understand their role

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in safety and they feared retaliation

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for raising safety related concerns uh

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those are big problems when you've got a

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factory that is making Jets yeah of

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course although to be fair workers being

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unable to raise safety concerns is a big

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problem in a factory that makes anything

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no one wants grocery stores selling

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Captain Crunch oops all rat poison and

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all of this is striking for a company

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that genuinely used to be seen as one of

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the greatest in America and that's still

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one of the country's largest exporters

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so if a company this big and this

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important seems to be this troubled

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tonight let's talk about Boeing and

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let's start with the fact the Boeing

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used to be synonymous with quality and

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craftsmanship it was founded by William

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Boeing in 1916 and over the years it

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built nearly 100,000 planes for the

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Allied Forces the first stage of the

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Satin five rocket and Air Force One but

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they're best known for revolutionizing

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commercial aviation in 1967 Boeing

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introduced the 737 have made over 10,000

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of them since and the company's success

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rests heavily on its well-earned

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reputation for excellence like in this

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video from an annual shareholder meeting

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the first step in making a difference is

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believing you can we make the impossible

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happen on a regular basis so it can be

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done you you just have to think of a new

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way to do it let's just do it right

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whatever it is quality safety

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environment do it right and make it

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something that you can be proud of I

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wanted to develop products that had a

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global reach and a global

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impact and I'm doing it

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[Music]

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now I mean that sounds pretty good we do

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the impossible great love the impossible

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let's just do it right yes let's Wrong

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Feels Like a bad way to do it I want to

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develop a globally impactful product and

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I did good for you you're a little too

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close to the camera but in general I am

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on board in fact Boe had such a great

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reputation for safety among Pilots there

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was even a common saying if it ain't Boe

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I ain't going which the company put on

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T-shirts lanyards and mugs that you can

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still buy on their website all perfect

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gifts for someone who loves branded

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merch and does not love following the

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news and that Stellar reputation has

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been credited to the company's engineer

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centered open culture William Boeing

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himself once said after noticing some

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shoddy workmanship on his production

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line that he would close up shop rather

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than send out work of this kind and one

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project leader in the 80s and early 90s

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is remembered for saying no secrets and

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the only thing that will make me rip off

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your head and down your neck is

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withholding information and I'm sorry

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but that should be the mug you want a

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shift merch that's how you do it but

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it's pretty clear that we're a long way

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from that culture today and most

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observers will trace the shift back to

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this pivotal event a major announcement

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today in the world of Aviation Boeing

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and McDonald Douglas today announced

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they would joined together to form the

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world's largest aircraft manufacturer

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this is I believe a an historic

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moment in aviation and

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Aerospace yeah the sky boys got business

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married Boeing merged with McDonald

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Douglas who were primarily known for

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military planes and had a lousy

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reputation for commercial airliners most

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notably the dc10 which had multiple

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accidents resulting in over 1100

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passenger fatalities and look was

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merging with the McDonald Douglas

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Aerospace Manufacturing Corporation SL

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murder Emporium that Boeing CEO's worst

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decision probably not because he also

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and this is true married his first

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cousin so the last decision I'd ask this

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guy to make is who it's a good idea to

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couple up

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with and while Boeing was the acquirer

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in the partnership it soon became clear

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that the McDonald Douglas culture which

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was much more Cutthroat and profit

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driven was going to become dominant

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early on the McDonald Douglas management

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team even gave their Boeing counterparts

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a plaque featuring an Economist magazine

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cover about the challenges of corporate

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merges which sounds benign until you see

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that the actual cover was this picture

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of two camels and McDonald

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Douglas exec added the line who's on top

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and setting aside the weirdness of

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gifting your co-workers camel porn it

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begs the the question what was going on

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at the economist back

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then spare a thought for the employee

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who dreamt of doing business journalism

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only to find themselves digging through

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photos of horned up camel banging

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in the

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dirt a year after the merger was

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finalized boing announced a new stock

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buyback program taking company money

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that could have gone to making planes

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and using it to inflate stock prices

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instead and even mechanics at the

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company noticed the culture shift there

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is a m major campaign launched called

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Share value and the idea was that they

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wanted everybody to be aware of the

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stock price and they wanted everybody

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working together to increase the stock

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value even the technical meetings

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everything revolved around boing stock

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prices yeah that's not reassuring

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because that's not where you want their

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priorities focused no wants to get on a

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plane and he good afternoon this is your

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captain speaking we had a few technical

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problems but our maintenance crew is has

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assured us that the stock price is still

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holding strong so let's get this big

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metal tube full of you and your loved

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ones up into the sky shall we and the

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culture change was solidified by the

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decision to relocate the corporate

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headquarters from Seattle where their

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commercial planes were actually designed

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and built 2,000 miles away to Chicago

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because as their CEO put it when the

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headquarters is located in proximity to

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a principal business the Corporate

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Center is inevitably drawn into

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day-to-day business operations and yeah

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it should be you're essentially saying

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hey we're going to be making big

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business decisions over here so we don't

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need to be bothered with you nerds and

play09:37

you're keeping planes in the air

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now CEO Phil conit soon left

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the company amid a Contracting Scandal

play09:44

and was replaced by Harry Stoner the

play09:46

former CEO of McDonald Douglas he was an

play09:49

aggressive Cost Cutter who pushed

play09:51

boing's management to play tougher with

play09:53

its Workforce and to introduce the

play09:54

slogan less family more team which

play09:57

frankly would have been great advice for

play09:59

Phil Condit when he was choosing a

play10:01

romantic partner less Family Phil you

play10:04

want to be a team but like not one

play10:06

that's related by

play10:08

blood but the problems with the whole

play10:10

stock price first approach soon became

play10:12

apparent during the production of the

play10:14

787 Dreamliner it was a new lighter

play10:17

plane the Boeing announced in 2004 but

play10:20

Stone Cipher drastically cut the R&D

play10:23

budget you know the money for creating

play10:25

the plane even as the company authorized

play10:27

large stock BuyBacks and dividends for

play10:29

investors under his plans the Dreamliner

play10:32

would be de developed for less than half

play10:34

of what their previous new plane had

play10:36

cost Bo also sought savings by

play10:38

Outsourcing production to about 50

play10:41

suppliers each of whom was responsible

play10:43

for managing its own subcontractor so

play10:45

basically the plan was for boing to

play10:47

create the plane the same way someone

play10:49

creates a gingerbread house from a kit

play10:52

essentially assembling a bunch of pieces

play10:54

other people made leading to a finished

play10:56

product that structurally speaking was

play10:57

always going to be a mess and

play11:01

years later Boeing itself produced a

play11:04

promotional video that admitted that

play11:05

plan was a

play11:07

Fasco executing a project of such

play11:10

complexity proved to be more than some

play11:12

suppliers could

play11:14

handle wrinkles were found in the

play11:17

composite skins from one supplier

play11:20

Fasteners were incorrectly secured on

play11:22

sections of the tail there were gaps

play11:25

between units that were supposed to fit

play11:27

tightly together we had our partners and

play11:29

then they had Partners who had partners

play11:32

and the different cultures and the

play11:34

communication uh was very challenging

play11:37

and added a lot of complexity you know

play11:39

it's never a great sign when you're

play11:41

talking about the manufacturing process

play11:42

for a plane the same way a doomed open

play11:45

thropple talks about their private life

play11:47

we had our partners and then they had

play11:49

Partners who had partners and

play11:50

communication was very challenging and

play11:52

added a lot of complexity and long story

play11:54

short now we all have

play11:57

chlamidia and on top of that Stone

play11:59

Cipher was forced to resign in the wake

play12:01

of an affair with a Boeing VP and was

play12:03

replaced by the company's third CEO in

play12:05

as many years Jim McNerney who if

play12:07

anything accelerated the cost cutting

play12:09

but despite all the setbacks from

play12:12

Outsourcing Boeing managed to roll out

play12:14

the dream liner on time in an elaborate

play12:16

ceremony in 2007 except there was one

play12:20

small catch we were all inside the

play12:22

factory with artificial lighting big

play12:24

stage Tom brocca huge

play12:27

screens

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then they open the doors of this giant

play12:33

assembly Bay and en rolls this beautiful

play12:36

beautiful aircraft we learned that the

play12:39

whole thing was a

play12:42

sham beautiful isn't it absolutely

play12:46

beautiful I realized the doors were made

play12:48

of plywood this plan that we were

play12:51

admiring was completely a shell inside

play12:54

what I realized walking around it is

play12:56

that you could you know look up in the

play12:58

wheel well and you could see daylight

play13:00

wow what a historic moment so exciting

play13:03

to see the unveiling of the first

play13:05

airplane made entirely out of plywood

play13:07

and lies the plane was supposed to take

play13:10

its first test flight within two months

play13:12

of that launch but unsurprisingly that

play13:14

didn't happen in fact the Dreamliner

play13:16

didn't carry commercial passengers for

play13:18

years finally delivering planes three

play13:20

years late and $25 billion over budget

play13:24

and almost immediately there were

play13:26

problems multiple planes had fires on

play13:28

board including two in Boston and Japan

play13:31

within 9 days of each other which

play13:32

investigations link to a defective

play13:34

battery made by a subcontractor that

play13:37

Boeing had never audited so the FAA

play13:39

grounded the Dreamliner the first time

play13:42

it had grounded an airplane model since

play13:44

the mcdonal Douglas dc10 in 1979 again

play13:48

making it pretty clear that the wrong

play13:49

attitude had prevailed after the merger

play13:52

basically the wrong camel came out on

play13:55

top and investigations revealed that

play13:58

even people people building the

play13:59

Dreamliner were worried about its safety

play14:01

in 2014 aler released hidden camera

play14:04

footage of a worker at a Dreamliner

play14:06

plant asking fellow employees a pretty

play14:09

pointed question did you fly one um no

play14:14

you won't fly on

play14:15

one did you fly on one of these

play14:20

planes did you fly on one of

play14:23

these probably not I would one of these

play14:26

ples you wouldn't why wouldn't you huh

play14:29

why wouldn't you because I see the

play14:31

quality vide going down around here did

play14:35

you fly one of these yeah it's sketchy

play14:37

sketchy I probably would but I mean I a

play14:40

death

play14:42

too it's

play14:44

true out of 15 workers he asked 10 said

play14:48

they wouldn't fly on that plane and

play14:50

honestly that last guy is almost worse

play14:53

because if I had to pick between a plane

play14:54

that two-thirds of workers refuse to get

play14:56

on and one that would only be ridden by

play14:58

death wish Dave I'd pick the former

play15:02

every time but while the Dreamliner had

play15:04

its problems at least it never had a

play15:06

fatal accident but that cannot be said

play15:09

for Boeing's next plane the 737 Max in

play15:12

2011 as Boeing was rolling out the

play15:15

Dreamliner its main competitor Airbus

play15:17

was unveiling the A320 Neo a fuel

play15:20

efficient update of their already

play15:22

popular A320 planes and it was a wild

play15:25

success Boeing caught completely off

play15:27

guard quickly announced a new fuel

play15:29

efficient plane it hadn't even

play15:31

engineered yet the 737 Max they wanted

play15:34

to get it out of the door as quickly and

play15:35

as cheaply as possible McNerney even had

play15:38

a catchphrase More For Less which became

play15:41

the company's driving theme as it

play15:43

embarked on the Max and all the while

play15:45

under McNerney and his successor as CEO

play15:48

Dennis mullenberg boing continued to

play15:50

sign off on massive stock BuyBacks from

play15:52

2014 to 2018 Boeing diverted 92% of its

play15:57

operating cash flow to dividends and

play15:59

share BuyBacks to benefit investors far

play16:03

exceeding the money that it spent on R&D

play16:05

for new planes workers on the production

play16:08

line for the max described a process

play16:10

that valued speed over safety and one a

play16:13

military veteran worried that Corners

play16:15

were being cut what words would you use

play16:18

to describe that Factory at that point

play16:21

dangerous um unnecessary Tak an

play16:24

unnecessary risk he says he urged the

play16:26

Boeing manager to shut down the factory

play16:28

for a few weeks to straighten things out

play16:30

and what was his reaction to that and he

play16:32

said um you know we can't shut down and

play16:35

and then I kind of got mad and said you

play16:36

know I've seen military operations shut

play16:39

down for a lot less what was his reply

play16:41

to that something I'll never forget he

play16:43

said um he said well the military is not

play16:46

a profit Mak

play16:47

organization wow what a response because

play16:50

in a way you're right the military isn't

play16:53

a profit-driven culture but they do have

play16:55

pretty famously a very high appetite for

play16:57

death and dest ruction so if someone who

play17:00

worked there is going who slow down a

play17:02

bit that seems like something that

play17:03

should give you pause so the max was

play17:06

rushed through design and production and

play17:08

with tragic consequences on October 29th

play17:11

2018 a Lion Air flight Bound for

play17:13

Indonesia carrying 189 people including

play17:15

three children disappeared from radar

play17:17

just minutes after takeoff and was found

play17:19

to have crashed into the water no one on

play17:22

board survived investigations later

play17:24

revealed that the plane's safety had

play17:25

been compromised by a series of

play17:27

shortsighted decisions Boeing had made

play17:30

starting with the fact that to save

play17:32

money Boeing decided it wasn't going to

play17:34

build a new plane it was just going to

play17:35

rapidly modify its existing 737 model

play17:39

giving it new much bigger engines but

play17:42

that brought some significant

play17:44

complications because these engines are

play17:46

bigger they had to be positioned further

play17:49

forward and higher up on the wings and

play17:52

so Boeing was worried about the plane

play17:55

getting into uh too much of a nose up

play17:59

and then the plane could

play18:02

stall so if it starts to pitch up mcast

play18:06

was designed to help the pilot level the

play18:08

plane out yeah they added a system

play18:11

called mcass or maneuvering

play18:13

characteristics augmentation system very

play18:15

basically when the plane came close to a

play18:18

situation in which it might stall mcass

play18:20

would in technical terms swivel the

play18:22

horizontal tail fin to lift the tail up

play18:25

and push the nose down or in

play18:27

non-technical terms make the go face

play18:29

down ass up but there was a fatal flaw

play18:32

mcass which again could push a plane's

play18:36

nose down on its own could be activated

play18:39

by a single sensor the angle of AAG

play18:42

sensors protruded out of either side the

play18:44

fuselage near the

play18:47

cockpit if a happy birthday myar balloon

play18:50

gets stuck on that vein it becomes

play18:55

unreliable but believe it or not we hit

play18:57

balloons we hit H Birds uh and all of

play19:00

these things uh are not

play19:04

uncommon it's true the whole system

play19:07

could be compromised by a balloon a

play19:10

testament to how problematic it is to

play19:11

use a single sensor and yet another

play19:14

reason to hate balloons think about it

play19:16

they're exhausting to inflate they scare

play19:18

the out of you when they pop and

play19:19

uninflated they just look like a pile of

play19:21

clown condoms balloons are terrible but

play19:25

it gets worse cuz Boeing didn't tell

play19:28

Pilots about mcass cuz remember they

play19:31

decided to market the plane 2 Airlines

play19:33

as a money saver and a massive selling

play19:35

point was that the max wouldn't require

play19:37

Pilots to be retrained in a flight

play19:40

simulator that that's a pretty big

play19:41

expense for an airline as it takes

play19:44

Pilots out of the air for multiple days

play19:46

Boeing was worried that if they

play19:47

emphasized mcass as something new it

play19:50

might require more training so it told

play19:52

Airlines and Regulators that the max was

play19:54

so similar to the old 737 simulator

play19:57

training wouldn't be necessary and that

play20:00

is something even the mother of one of

play20:02

the Lion Air Pilots whose flight crashed

play20:04

thought was a bit weird at the time I

play20:07

said you haven't had a simulator

play20:08

training how can you go for Max and it

play20:11

is a more powerful engine so without a

play20:14

simulator how will you manage he said

play20:16

mom I've been given round training they

play20:19

have given me a training on iPad I said

play20:22

what an iPad that is wild it is bad

play20:26

enough that iPads are replacing half the

play20:28

staff at Panera

play20:30

breit it is worse when they're replacing

play20:32

practical training for dangerous jobs

play20:35

Boeing gave Pilots a 2hour iPad training

play20:38

course that never once mentioned mcass

play20:40

what's more it wasn't in the manual at

play20:42

all unless you count the glossery which

play20:44

defined the term but didn't explain what

play20:46

it did and it turned out that a faulty

play20:49

mcast activation was what had doomed

play20:51

that Lion Air flight and when American

play20:53

Airlines Pilots met with Boeing

play20:55

Executives after the crash and angrily

play20:57

pointed out no no one had been told

play20:58

about mcast the answer they got was

play21:01

ridiculous these guys didn't even know

play21:03

the damn system was on the airplane nor

play21:05

did anybody else we try not to overload

play21:07

the crews with information it's

play21:09

unnecessary I would think that there

play21:11

would be a priority on putting things

play21:13

explanations of things that could kill

play21:15

you

play21:17

exactly how is information about a

play21:19

system that could crash the plane

play21:21

unnecessary it's not all Froot Loops are

play21:23

the same flavor or identical twins don't

play21:26

have the same fingerprints or if you

play21:27

give a mirror to a dolphin they'll

play21:29

admire their own genitals all of that is

play21:32

good information but unnecessary for a

play21:34

pilot to know but we put some software

play21:37

on the plane that might try and murder

play21:39

you feels important in the aftermath of

play21:42

the crash Boeing told us airline pilot

play21:44

that they'd have a software fix for

play21:46

mcass ready within about 6 weeks and the

play21:49

max was allowed to keep flying but they

play21:52

didn't the only thing they accomplished

play21:54

in those six weeks were and you're never

play21:56

going to believe this authoriz ing a

play21:58

record $20 billion of stock BuyBacks so

play22:02

clearly they were concerned about safety

play22:04

specifically the safety of their

play22:06

stock price and so a little over four

play22:09

months after the crash while Boeing was

play22:11

still working on its six week software

play22:13

fix Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 a 737

play22:17

maxjet crashed after mcass activated

play22:19

erroneously again killing everyone on

play22:22

board and by that point those Pilots

play22:25

knew what mcass was but they still

play22:27

weren't able to correct its erroneous

play22:29

activation in time 3 days later the FAA

play22:32

finally grounded the max but only after

play22:35

all these countries had first it was

play22:37

grounded for almost two years until

play22:39

Boeing developed ways to make mcass less

play22:41

error prone and easier to override and a

play22:44

damning congressional investigation

play22:46

later revealed internal messages showing

play22:47

that Boeing knew how dangerous mcass was

play22:50

throughout the plane's development in

play22:52

2012 one of Boeing's own test pilots had

play22:55

failed to recover from mcass activating

play22:57

in a flight s simulator a situation that

play22:58

he described as catastrophic and some of

play23:01

the messages between Boeing Employees

play23:03

were damning hundreds of emails and

play23:06

instant messages show employees mocking

play23:09

the FAA the company and problems with

play23:11

the airplane one writing this airplane

play23:13

is designed by clowns who in turn are

play23:16

supervised by

play23:18

monkeys that's pretty bad although part

play23:21

of me wish is that he kept going there

play23:23

they're designed by clowns who are

play23:24

supervised by monkeys who report to

play23:26

caffeinated toddlers who overseen by a

play23:28

bunch of floppy puppies were monitored

play23:30

by a wasted bachelorette party whose

play23:32

boss is just a large inflatable

play23:34

tubean so at this point you might

play23:37

reasonbly be asking where the are

play23:38

The Regulators should the FAA have

play23:41

caught this before people died and given

play23:43

that the answer to that is definitely

play23:45

yes what happened well the agency relied

play23:48

heavily on Boeing Employees to vouch for

play23:51

the Maxi safety because they lacked the

play23:53

ability to effectively analyze much of

play23:56

what Boeing shared about their new plane

play23:58

one employee even said he thought a

play24:00

presentation for Regulators was like

play24:02

dogs watching TV because they didn't

play24:04

understand what they were seeing and I

play24:06

really hope that's not true I hope dogs

play24:09

do understand what they're watching on

play24:11

TV otherwise I did those deep Dives on

play24:13

squirrels breathing out of a up

play24:15

little nose and poodle anuses for no

play24:18

reason at all and incredibly much of the

play24:22

oversight was being done by Boeing

play24:24

itself for five decades uh manufacturers

play24:27

like Boeing were allowed to use what

play24:29

they call FAA designated inspectors

play24:31

first to certify that the planes were

play24:33

airworthy in the beginning and then on

play24:34

the assembly line to inspect each plane

play24:36

as it went down went down the line

play24:37

here's the problem those FAA inspectors

play24:40

were employed by Boeing there's a

play24:43

conflict of interest there of course

play24:45

there is Boeing was paying Boeing

play24:48

Employees to regulate Boeing it's the

play24:50

most incestuous relationship we've seen

play24:52

in this story so far which is saying

play24:54

something cuz remember this guy was

play24:56

his first cousin

play24:59

and while this system of self-regulation

play25:01

has been in place for decades it was

play25:03

supercharged from 2005 onwards after

play25:05

Boeing successfully lobbied to reduce

play25:07

government oversight of airplane designs

play25:09

basically allowing it to regulate itself

play25:11

even more and unsurprisingly several of

play25:14

these Boeing employed representatives of

play25:16

the FAA have said they faced heavy

play25:19

pressure from managers to limit safety

play25:21

analysis and testing so the company

play25:23

could meet its schedule and keep down

play25:25

costs at every point along the way the

play25:28

FAA either delegated responsibility to

play25:30

Boeing or gave them the benefit of the

play25:32

doubt which hopefully they will never do

play25:35

again because Boeing like so many

play25:37

American companies seems to be coasting

play25:39

on a reputation it built up over decades

play25:42

even as it squanders it quarter by

play25:44

quarter and if you're thinking hey John

play25:45

don't you work for a Prestige company

play25:47

that got taken over and had the name Max

play25:49

slapped on its signature product hey I

play25:51

don't know what you're talking about the

play25:52

situation is completely

play25:55

different new business daddy is so mad

play25:57

at us all the time so what now well the

play26:02

truth is Boeing's not going out of

play26:04

business anytime soon it's one of just

play26:06

two major commercial airplane

play26:08

manufacturers in the world so we don't

play26:10

need them to disappear we need them to

play26:12

get better the key question is can they

play26:15

fundamentally change well thanks in part

play26:17

to pressure from the families who lost

play26:19

loved ones in those crashes Congress did

play26:21

passed by partisan legislation rolling

play26:23

back some of Boeing's ability to oversee

play26:26

its own planes and it's encouraging that

play26:27

the FAA is now insisting Boeing come up

play26:29

with a plan to address safety in 90 days

play26:32

though we'll see what that brings and

play26:34

Boeing will say it knows that it's made

play26:37

mistakes in the past but that under the

play26:38

leadership of their CEO Dave Calhoun You

play26:41

Know M quality Escape they are

play26:44

approaching the challenges they

play26:46

currently face with a new spirit of

play26:48

accountability and complete transparency

play26:50

but it's really hard to trust that given

play26:52

that Calhoun served on Boeing's board

play26:54

since 2009 through many of the worst

play26:57

decisions you've seen tonight and

play26:59

there's also the fact that 737 Max 8 and

play27:02

9 planes are still flying despite an FAA

play27:05

directive last August highlighting a

play27:07

serious new issue warning that if pilots

play27:10

on the max used an engine anti-icing

play27:12

system what One Pilot described to us as

play27:14

the equivalent of a car's back

play27:16

windshield defogger in dry air for more

play27:19

than 5 minutes it could shatter the

play27:21

engine's housing causing a hazard to

play27:24

window passengers decompression and

play27:26

potential loss of control of the

play27:27

airplane and while Calhoun claims he's

play27:30

very confident they'll have a fix which

play27:32

is such great news in the meantime

play27:35

Boeing is asking Pilots once more to be

play27:38

the last line of defense one that we

play27:40

spoke to even sent us a photo of this

play27:42

Post-It note he uses in his cockpit to

play27:45

remind him to turn off the anti-icing

play27:47

system along with an iPhone timer and

play27:50

that is too much pressure for a

play27:52

Post-It note they shouldn't be the last

play27:55

line of defense against plane crashes

play27:57

they should be the the last line of

play27:58

defense against Sheila from marketing

play28:00

eating your chabani out of the work

play28:02

fridge Boeing whistleblowers who want

play28:05

this company to get better have

play28:07

repeatedly said it won't change until it

play28:09

has new leadership and Boeing may not be

play28:12

able to Coast on its reputation much

play28:14

longer as demonstrated by the fact that

play28:15

on booking sites like kayak you can use

play28:18

this menu to select specific Boeing

play28:20

models and exclude them from your flight

play28:23

search they've actually moved that

play28:25

filter up the page following a spike in

play28:28

usage and you know things are bad when

play28:31

the general public is getting this

play28:32

knowledgeable about specific play models

play28:36

look it is pretty clear something has to

play28:38

change at Boeing and it has to be at the

play28:41

top of that company because if you are

play28:43

truly too big to fail that should mean

play28:46

that you are big enough to spend the

play28:48

time and resources required to fix the

play28:50

culture that you have destroyed and in

play28:53

the meantime the very least you can do

play28:54

is advertise the kind of company you are

play28:57

in a much more accurate

play29:00

way at Boeing we make the impossible

play29:03

happen on a regular basis at Boeing we

play29:06

take pride in our work at Boeing

play29:09

we sorry can can you back the uh camera

play29:12

up a little bit really

play29:16

close at Boeing we I'm sorry it's ve it

play29:19

feels very

play29:21

tight at Boeing we believe the first

play29:23

step in making a difference is believing

play29:25

you can and I'm not talking about any

play29:27

difference I'm talking about a positive

play29:29

difference in share price the share

play29:32

price needs to go up and stay up like

play29:35

our planes do almost all of the time

play29:37

since it's founding Boeing's been built

play29:39

on quality safety and trust and then we

play29:43

thought let's try something new I joined

play29:47

Boeing because I wanted to invent things

play29:49

no one ever dreamed of and they told me

play29:51

if I wanted to do that what I needed was

play29:53

to invent a time machine to

play29:56

1992 I did tell him that and I think the

play29:59

joke landed like our planes do almost

play30:02

all of the time whatever it is we do at

play30:04

Boeing let's do it right or let's do it

play30:08

close enough to right that no one can

play30:09

tell the difference from the outside and

play30:11

then everyone will just keep their mouth

play30:13

shut the engineers don't always agree

play30:16

with our business decisions and we

play30:18

encourage them to speak up and when they

play30:20

do I usually say what I can't hear you

play30:23

our offices are so far from

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Seattle airplane design is about

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Precision Care attention to detail and

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then someone telling you to work so

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quickly you make the whole thing

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vulnerable to a balloon we like

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to cultivate a profit-driven philosophy

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here at Boeing and we've got the camel

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porn to prove it who's on top we are

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look man I'm doing what I can I try to

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report everything I see to the FAA see

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that there's a boat missing here so I'm

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going to report

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it at Boeing we oh hold on on get a

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text yeah yeah wait you work for the FAA

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yeah I do the faa's job but I actually

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work for Boeing it's super allowed it's

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super allowed oh apparently there's a

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bolt missing it's fine do you even know

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how many bolts there are on an airplane

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too many you lose one or two that's

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surrounding error the boys on the

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factory floor call me Usain cuz I'm all

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about the ball

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also because I work really fast like

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scary fast like people should be scared

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about how fast I work is it okay if I

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take these home quality is at the

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Forefront of everything we do at Boeing

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and sometimes it's so far in front that

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it escapes whoops quality come back get

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back here

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you I'm not sure I'd want to get on one

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of these planes oh I definitely wouldn't

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get own

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one I I would yeah but that's different

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because you have the a Death Wish thing

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yeah the the Death Wish thing mhm we're

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Bo and we're focused on the important

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things raising stock prices increasing

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stock prices making stock prices bigger

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or elevating stock prices delivering

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value to shareholders at any and all

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human

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cost boing we went to business school

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get on our

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[Applause]

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plane

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Tags associés
Boeing SafetyCorporate CultureAirline Incidents737 MaxFAA OversightStock BuybacksQuality ControlAviation IndustryRegulatory FailureWhistleblowersAccountability