The Danger of Popcorn Polymer: Incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant
Summary
TLDROn November 27, 2019, a catastrophic explosion at TPC Group's chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, released flammable butadiene, causing extensive damage and injuries. The incident resulted from uncontrolled popcorn polymer formation in a 'dead leg' of piping, highlighting the need for better hazard recognition and control measures. The Chemical Safety Board's investigation identified key safety issues, including the lack of effective procedures to manage dead legs and popcorn polymer, and the absence of remotely operated emergency isolation valves, underscoring the importance of robust safety practices in the petrochemical industry.
Takeaways
- 🔥 On November 27, 2019, a catastrophic incident occurred at the TPC Group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, involving the release of highly flammable butadiene.
- 💥 The explosion was felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in significant damage to the facility, nearby homes, and businesses, as well as injuries to workers and the public.
- 🚨 The incident was caused by the accumulation of popcorn polymer, a known hazard, which was poorly managed and controlled within the facility.
- 🏭 TPC is a petrochemical manufacturing company that produces butadiene, a highly reactive chemical used in the production of synthetic rubber and other products.
- 🚧 The primary pump in the butadiene unit was shut down for maintenance, creating a 'dead leg' in the piping system, which allowed popcorn polymer to accumulate over 114 days.
- 🚨 The lack of proper procedures to identify and control dead legs in high-purity butadiene service contributed to the disaster.
- 🔍 The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation identified four key safety issues: dead leg identification and control, process hazard analysis, action item implementation, and control and prevention of popcorn polymer.
- 📚 Existing industry guidance on managing popcorn polymer formation was found to be insufficient, leading to gaps in understanding and preventing such incidents.
- 🛠️ The CSB recommended that TPC develop and implement a process to identify and control or eliminate dead legs in high-purity butadiene service.
- 🚫 TPC failed to effectively control or prevent the buildup of popcorn polymer, despite experiencing its formation previously and conducting operational trials.
- 🛑 The lack of remotely operated emergency isolation valves in the butadiene process meant that the release could not be stopped quickly, exacerbating the incident's severity.
Q & A
What incident occurred at the TPC group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas on November 27, 2019?
-A release of highly flammable butadiene led to a series of explosions that could be felt up to 30 miles away, causing the destruction of a portion of the TPC facility, damage to nearby homes and businesses, and mandatory evacuations within a four-mile radius.
What is butadiene and why is it significant in the TPC incident?
-Butadiene is a highly reactive chemical used as a building block in the production of various products, most commonly synthetic rubber. Its improper management can lead to serious hazards, such as the formation of popcorn polymer, which was a key factor in the TPC incident.
What is a 'dead leg' in the context of chemical plant operations?
-A 'dead leg' refers to an area of piping that is open to the process but does not have any material flowing through it. It can lead to the accumulation of substances like popcorn polymer, posing a significant hazard.
What happened on August 4th, 2019, that contributed to the TPC incident?
-A worker shut down a primary pump during a routine operation, which later failed to restart and was sent for repair. This created a significant dead leg, leading to the formation and accumulation of popcorn polymer over the next 114 days.
What was the immediate cause of the explosion at the TPC facility on November 27th?
-Excessive popcorn polymer buildup caused the dead leg piping to suddenly rupture, releasing approximately six thousand gallons of liquid butadiene, which vaporized and formed a flammable cloud that ignited, causing the explosion.
What were the four key safety issues identified by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in their investigation of the TPC incident?
-The four key safety issues were: 1) Dead leg identification and control, 2) Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) action item implementation, 3) Control and prevention of popcorn polymer, and 4) The use of remotely operated emergency isolation valves.
Why was the primary pump's repair initially prioritized but later changed to routine?
-The repair was initially prioritized due to its importance in the butadiene production process. However, the presence of a spare pump led to a reassessment, changing the urgency and allowing a dead leg to exist for an extended period.
What recommendation did the CSB make to TPC Group regarding dead legs in high purity butadiene service?
-The CSB recommended that TPC Group develop and implement a process to identify, control, or eliminate dead legs in high purity butadiene service to prevent similar incidents.
What was the status of the PHA recommendation from 2016 regarding equipment out of service for maintenance?
-The PHA recommendation from 2016, which suggested flushing lines monthly when equipment is out of service, was accepted by TPC management but was never implemented, contributing to the popcorn polymer buildup.
What steps did TPC take prior to the incident that may have contributed to the popcorn polymer formation?
-TPC began a series of operational trials in April 2019, which included removing a problematic piece of equipment and reducing the amount of popcorn polymer inhibitor in the production stream, leading to increased popcorn polymer formation.
What was the role of the American Chemistry Council's butadiene product stewardship guidance manual in the TPC incident?
-The manual provided general information on popcorn polymer but lacked specific guidance on the potential consequences of dead legs and how to identify, control, or prevent them, which the CSB believes could have helped prevent the incident.
What was the final outcome of the fires caused by the initial explosion at the TPC facility?
-The fires burned for over a month, and it was not until January 4th, 2020, that the TPC incident command confirmed all fires were finally out.
Outlines
🔥 Catastrophic Explosion at TPC Group Chemical Plant
On November 27, 2019, the TPC Group's chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, experienced a series of explosions caused by the release of highly flammable butadiene. The blasts were felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in the destruction of a portion of the TPC facility, damage to nearby homes and businesses, and mandatory evacuations within a four-mile radius. The incident was traced back to the formation of popcorn polymer within poorly managed equipment, highlighting gaps in industry guidance on managing such hazards. The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation revealed that a primary pump failure and subsequent use of a spare pump led to the formation of a 'dead leg' in the piping system, where the popcorn polymer accumulated over 114 days. The lack of recognition of this hazard and failure to implement safety recommendations from a 2016 process hazard analysis contributed to the catastrophic event that disrupted life in the local community and the facility itself.
🚨 Inadequate Dead Leg Management and Safety Protocols
The TPC Port Neches facility had a procedure in place to minimize popcorn polymer formation in high-purity butadiene service, which involved running spare pumps to circulate material through idle piping. However, this procedure failed to address the potential for a dead leg to form if the primary pump was out of service for an extended period, as occurred prior to the incident. Despite the initial urgency to repair the primary pump, it was downgraded to a routine task, leading to a 114-day dead leg that allowed dangerous levels of popcorn polymer to accumulate. The CSB found that TPC did not effectively control or prevent popcorn polymer buildup, even after experiencing increased formation in April 2019. Operational trials, including the removal of problematic equipment and changes in inhibitor injection, exacerbated the issue. Despite recognizing the need for an unscheduled shutdown to address the buildup and improve safety standards, TPC delayed this until 2020, which was too late. The CSB recommended that TPC develop a process to identify and control or eliminate dead legs and urged the American Chemistry Council to revise its guidance manual to include specific guidance on this issue.
🛠️ Safety Gaps in Popcorn Polymer Control and Emergency Isolation
The CSB identified several safety issues at TPC, including the lack of effective control and prevention measures for popcorn polymer buildup. Despite a history of experiencing such issues, TPC did not take adequate steps to address them. The decision to delay a necessary shutdown for cleanup and improvements led to serious operational problems. The CSB also found a gap in the American Chemistry Council's butadiene product stewardship guidance manual, which did not provide conditions justifying a shutdown for cleaning. The CSB recommended revisions to the manual to include guidance on identifying excessive popcorn polymer and mitigation strategies. Additionally, the CSB highlighted the absence of remotely operated emergency isolation valves in the butadiene process, which could have minimized the initial vapor cloud and subsequent explosions. The lack of such valves meant that process releases could not be stopped from a safe location, contributing to the severity of the incident. The CSB recommended that facilities handling large quantities of butadiene implement robust policies for popcorn polymer control and equip their processes with remotely operated emergency isolation valves to prevent similar incidents.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡TPC Group
💡Butadiene
💡Popcorn Polymer
💡Dead Leg
💡Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
💡Mandatory Evacuation
💡Chemical Safety Board (CSB)
💡Remotely Operated Emergency Isolation Valves
💡Product Stewardship Guidance Manual
💡Incident Command
Highlights
On November 27, 2019, a highly flammable butadiene release led to a series of explosions at the TPC Group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas.
The explosions were felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in the mandatory evacuation of residents within a four-mile radius.
The incident was caused by poorly managed popcorn polymer growth inside equipment, leading to a catastrophic event.
Gaps in industry guidance on popcorn polymer management contributed to the incident.
TPC is a petrochemical manufacturing company with facilities along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana.
Butadiene, a highly reactive chemical, is commonly used to produce synthetic rubber.
A primary pump failure and subsequent use of a spare pump created a significant dead leg, allowing popcorn polymer to accumulate.
The CSB found that TPC did not recognize the hazard created by the dead leg over 114 days.
On November 27, excessive popcorn polymer buildup caused equipment to rupture, releasing butadiene and forming a flammable cloud.
The initial explosion injured workers and caused extensive damage to the facility and nearby structures.
Fires at the facility burned for over a month before being extinguished on January 4th, 2020.
The CSB investigation identified four key safety issues that contributed to the incident.
Dead leg identification and control were inadequate, leading to the formation of popcorn polymer.
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) recommendations were not implemented, contributing to the incident.
TPC failed to effectively control or prevent popcorn polymer buildup despite experiencing it previously.
The American Chemistry Council's guidance manual lacked information on managing dead legs in butadiene units.
Remotely operated emergency isolation valves were not in place, which could have mitigated the incident's severity.
The CSB's recommendations aim to help facilities better control popcorn polymer and prevent similar incidents.
Transcripts
foreign
November 27 2019 the TPC group chemical
plant in Port Neches Texas
a release of Highly flammable butadiene
series of explosions that could be felt
up to 30 miles away the blast destroyed
a portion of the TPC facility damaged
nearby homes and businesses and prompted
a mandatory evacuation of residents
living within four miles of the plant
several workers and members of the
public reported injuries and fires
burned at the facility for over a month
the incident at TPC was the result of a
known Hazard where popcorn polymer grew
and formed inside equipment that was
poorly managed and controlled at the
facility
gaps in Industry good guidance on the
management of popcorn polymer formation
played a role the result was a
catastrophic incident that disrupted
life at the facility as well as the
local community
foreign
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TPC is a petrochemical manufacturing
company with several facilities along
the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana at
the time of the incident the company
produced butadiene at its portnectius
plant you butadiene is used as a
building block in the production of a
wide range of products but is most
commonly used to produce synthetic
rubber it is a highly reactive chemical
which is not properly managed can lead
to Serious hazards for instance in the
presence of oxygen High Purity butadiene
can undergo reactions to form a solid
substance known as popcorn polymer if
popcorn polymer accumulates and grows
inside Process Equipment it can lead to
very high pressure and ultimately cause
the equipment to rupture
on August 4th 2019 a worker performed a
routine operation in tpc's butadiene
unit
as part of that operation the workers
shut down a primary pump that was part
of the butadiene production process
when the worker tried to restart the
pump it would not operate
the primary pump was sent for repair and
remained out of service from that date
forward a spare pump was used to
continue operations
the inoperable pump created a
significant dead leg which is an area of
piping that is open to the process but
does not have any material flowing
through it the csb determined that over
the next 114 days popcorn polymer began
to form and accumulate within the Dead
Lake but the csb could not find evidence
that anyone at TPC recognized the hazard
created by the deadline at 12 54 am on
November 27th excessive popcorn polymer
buildup caused the dead leg piping to
suddenly rupture
approximately six thousand gallons of
liquid primarily composed of butadiene
emptied through the ruptured piping in
less than a minute the liquid vaporized
upon release to the atmosphere forming a
flammable Cloud three nearby workers
were startled by the rupture they
immediately recognized the danger and
quickly departed as the vapor Cloud grew
in just two minutes the flammable Vapor
cloud found an ignition source and
exploded
the resulting pressure wave destroyed
parts of the facility and injured two
TPC employees and a security contractor
the blast damaged nearby homes and
buildings and was reportedly felt up to
30 miles away local officials stated
five residents reported minor injuries
at least two additional explosions
occurred following the initial blast
some of the piping damaged by those
explosions could not be isolated as a
result flammable processed fluid
continued to escape from ruptured
equipment and smaller contained fires
burned for more than a month
at 1009 am on January 4th 2020 the TPC
incident command confirmed that all
fires were finally out
the chemical safety board launched an
investigation into the incident at TPC
and found four key safety issues
contributed to the incident they are
dead leg identification and Control
process Hazard analysis action item
implementation control and prevention of
popcorn polymer and remotely operated
emergency isolation valves
the first safety issue is dead leg
identification and control the TPC Port
Neches facility had an operating
procedure in place called Dead legs in
high Purity butadiene service that was
intended to minimize the formation of
popcorn polymer the procedure called for
running spare pumps within the unit
twice per month in order to circulate
material through piping that was
connected to the pumps and was otherwise
out of service forming a deadly the
procedure did not however identify the
potential for a dead leg to form if the
primary pump was out of service for an
extended amount of time which is what
happened in the months leading to the
incident
therefore the procedure did not specify
ways to mitigate the hazard of popcorn
polymer formation should the primary
pump be offline and the csb found that
although repair of the primary pump was
initially prioritized as urgent it was
soon changed to routine due to the
existence of the spare pump this led to
a dead leg that existed for at least 114
days
allowing dangerous levels of popcorn
polymer to form and grow
at tpc's procedures specifically
identified the potential for a dead leg
to form when the primary pump was
offline Personnel may have taken action
to prevent accumulation of popcorn
polymer such as prioritizing repair of
the pump purging the piping or adding
popcorn polymer inhibitor to the dead
leg
instead TPC appeared to consider the
offline pump as a threat to maintaining
unit operation not as a threat to
process safety and the result was the
destruction of the unit
in its final report the csb made a
recommendation to TPC group to develop
and Implement a process to identify and
control or eliminate dead legs in high
Purity butadiene service
addition the csb identified gaps in
Industry guidance around the issue of
dead legs in butadiene units a guidance
document developed by the American
chemistry Council called the butadiene
product stewardship guidance manual is
designed to provide general information
to companies that may handle or store
butadiene while the manual gives a
general overview of popcorn polymer it
does not contain any information on the
potential consequences of dead legs or
how companies should identify control or
prevent deadly
the csb believes that such additional
guidance could have helped to prevent
this incident and could help prevent
similar incidents in the future
as a result the csb made a
recommendation to the American chemistry
Council to revise its butadiene product
stewardship guidance manual to include
guidance on identifying and controlling
or eliminating deadlinks in high Purity
butadiene service the second safety
issue identified by the csb is process
Hazard analysis action item
implementation
the csb reviewed two process Hazard
analyzes or phas that focused on tpc's
butadiene process
one of them the PHA performed in 2016
the hazard of popcorn polymer
accumulation causing low or no flow was
identified
the PHA team made a recommendation to
TPC to assure that when equipment is out
of service for maintenance the lines are
still flushed monthly TPC management
accepted this recommendation and
assigned a due date for implementation
in December 2016 almost three years
before the incident
but the csb found that the
recommendation was never implemented
at TPC implemented the 2016
recommendation for personnel to
regularly flush piping Associated
without a service equipment the
dangerous buildup of popcorn polymer
that led to this incident could have
been prevented
bird safety issue is control and
prevention of popcorn polymer the CSV
found that TPC did not take steps to
effectively control or prevent the
buildup of popcorn polymer despite a
history of experiencing popcorn polymer
formation at its facility for instance
prior to the incident in April 2019 TPC
began a series of operational trials
including removing a piece of equipment
considered problematic from service TPC
also reduced the amount of popcorn
polymer inhibitor that was injected into
the production stream and used new
injection equipment
soon after the trials commenced TPC
experienced increased popcorn polymer
formation within the process evidence of
popcorn polymer formation was noticed by
TPC employees as early as May and June
but in the meantime TPC continued
operating its butadiene unit and did not
halt the trials that may have
contributed to the problem and the
facility continued to experience popcorn
polymer and Equipment plugging in the
butadiene process which led to Serious
operational problems within the
butadiene unit after the extensive
popcorn polymer plugging TPC employees
considered shutting down the unit for an
unscheduled mini outage to clean up the
polymer and make necessary modifications
and improvements to bring the unit up to
best practice standards but after
clearing several popcorn polymer
blockages TPC ultimately decided to
delay this shutdown until 2020 when it
was too late
popcorn polymer excursions are highly
hazardous events if there are any
process vulnerabilities like unknown
dead legs popcorn polymer can cause
equipment ruptures leading to explosions
and fires butadiene facilities should
develop robust policies aimed at
preventing and controlling popcorn
polymer facilities should also develop
policies to shut down units and
investigate popcorn polymer formation
when it is observed at TPC had such
policies in place this incident could
have been avoided
the csb also found an additional Gap in
the acc's butadiene product stewardship
guidance manual the manual did not
specify conditions it could justify
shutting down and cleaning a butadiene
unit as a result the csb recommended
that the American chemistry Council
revise the manual to provide guidance to
help companies identify what should be
considered excessive or dangerous
amounts of popcorn polymer in a unit and
provide mitigation strategies that
operators should take when dangerous
amounts of popcorn polymer are
identified to control or eliminate the
hazard finally the fourth safety issue
identified by the csb is remotely
operated emergency isolation valves
at TPC the butadiene process was not
adequately equipped with remotely
operated emergency isolation valves
designed to stop process releases
remotely from a safe location had the
butadiene process been equipped with
remotely operated emergency isolation
valves it is possible that the process
speed Upstream of the release could have
been stopped shortly after the release
began minimizing the size of the initial
Vapor cloud and explosion additionally
any secondary releases caused by the
first explosion could have been stopped
early in the incident that step could
have prevented some of the subsequent
explosions and fires minimizing the
damage caused by the incident instead
the unit was primarily equipped with
manual and locally controlled emergency
block valves and these could not be
safely accessed during the incident
meaning equipment could not be isolated
as a result severe explosions caused one
process Tower to propel through the air
and land within the facility and other
processed Towers to fall within the unit
fires burned for more than a month and
led to the ultimate destruction of the
unit manual and locally controlled
valves are not reliable in a
catastrophic incident since often these
valves cannot be safely accessed
companies that handle large amounts of
flammable or toxic material should
furnish equipment with remotely operated
emergency isolation valves so that
potential releases can be stopped from a
safe location
we believe our final report and
recommendations will help facilities
that handle and store large quantities
of butadiene better control popcorn
polymer within their processes
doing so can prevent another terrible
incident like the one that occurred at
TPC
thank you for watching the csb safety
video
for more information please visit
csv.gov
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