Fast-Tracked Failure: The Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse

Summary

The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1981 was a catastrophic event that resulted in over 100 deaths and over 200 injuries due to structural failure. The tragedy was caused by design changes, miscommunications, and a rush to complete construction. The incident led to significant legal consequences for engineers and firms involved, as well as reforms in building codes and safety regulations. The Hyatt Regency was later renovated, and a memorial was established to honor the victims.

Takeaways

• 🏢 The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, was a catastrophic structural failure that occurred in 1981, resulting in over 100 deaths.
• 🕺 The Hyatt Regency was a popular venue for tea dances, which attracted large crowds, including the night of the collapse when approximately 1,500 to 2,000 people were present.
• 🔍 The initial design for the walkways was altered late in the construction process, changing from single support rods to a double hanger rod and box beam connection, which was a critical factor in the collapse.
• 👷‍♂️ Fast-tracked construction, miscommunications, and a lack of redundancy in design contributed to the disaster, reflecting a culture of prioritizing speed over safety.
• 🚨 The National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now NIST) conducted a comprehensive investigation, which included interviews, lab studies, and physical simulations, to determine the cause of the collapse.
• 🏥 The response to the disaster involved immediate action from local fire and police departments, with over 100 first responders on the scene by the end of the night.
• 📊 The NBS investigation concluded that the design change, which reduced the load-bearing capacity of the walkways, was the primary cause of the collapse.
• 🏗️ The construction industry's culture at the time, which often dismissed the importance of peer reviews and quality control, played a significant role in the tragedy.
• 📜 Legal and professional consequences followed, with engineers losing their licenses and firms going bankrupt, highlighting the severity of the negligence involved.
• 🏛️ The Hyatt Regency underwent renovations, removing the suspended walkways and installing a wider, safer deck supported by columns, reflecting lessons learned from the disaster.

Q & A

What was the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?

The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse was a structural failure that occurred on July 17, 1981, in Kansas City, Missouri, resulting in the tragic loss of 114 lives and injuring over 200 people when two walkways in the hotel's atrium collapsed during a crowded event.

What was the primary cause of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?

The primary cause of the collapse was a design flaw in the walkways' support system. The original design was altered late in the construction process, changing the support from three pairs of single rods to a double hanger rod system that was unable to support the weight of the walkways and the people on them.

What was the role of fast-tracked construction in the disaster?

Fast-tracked construction played a significant role in the disaster by prioritizing speed over quality and safety, leading to miscommunications, design changes without proper review, and a lack of quality control and peer reviews, which ultimately contributed to the structural failure.

What was the impact of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse on the community?

The impact was profound, with the tragedy affecting the entire community of Kansas City. The incident led to trauma counseling for survivors and first responders, and it was said that nearly everyone in the city had some connection to someone involved in the tragedy.

What were the immediate rescue efforts after the collapse?

The immediate rescue efforts involved the Kansas City Fire Department and police department, with over 100 firefighters, EMTs, doctors, and nurses on scene by 7:52 p.m. They worked through the night to rescue, recover, and provide medical assistance to the victims, using equipment like forklifts and a heavy crane that arrived later.

What was the role of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in the aftermath of the collapse?

The NBS conducted a comprehensive 10-month investigation into the cause of the collapse. They analyzed the walkway spans, supporting rods, photographic evidence, and testimonies. They also conducted lab studies, mockup tests, and physical simulations to determine the structural failure's root cause.

What were the legal consequences for the engineers and companies involved in the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?

In 1984, civil charges were brought against the project engineer, Jack Gillum, the engineer of record, and the GCE firm by the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors. Several engineers lost their licenses, and firms went bankrupt as a result of the hearings. Legal suits and insurance claims amounted to billions of dollars.

How did the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse lead to changes in construction practices and regulations?

The disaster led to significant reforms in construction practices and regulations, including the implementation of stricter safety standards, the enforcement of quality control processes, and the requirement for peer reviews. It also highlighted the need for a culture of accountability in the construction industry.

What memorial exists to commemorate the victims of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?

The Skywalk Memorial Plaza was established adjacent to the Northeast of the former Hyatt Regency site. It features a memorial with the names of the victims prominently displayed to honor their memory.

What changes were made to the Hyatt Regency atrium after the collapse?

Renovations to the atrium removed the remaining suspended third-floor walkway and constructed a single, much wider deck at the second floor level supported by massive columns, completely doing away with the previous walkway designs.

Outlines

00:00

🏢 Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse

The Hyatt Regency in Kansas City, Missouri, experienced a catastrophic walkway collapse in 1981 due to design flaws and miscommunications during construction. The event resulted in over 100 deaths and numerous injuries during a crowded tea dance event. The atrium, designed with four-story high walkways, was a popular spot for social gatherings. The tragedy occurred when the topmost walkway and the one below it collapsed, crushing people below. The aftermath involved a massive rescue effort, with first responders facing the gruesome task of recovering victims amidst water and electrical hazards. The incident highlighted the need for better construction oversight and the importance of understanding the psychological impact on rescuers, as PTSD was not well recognized at the time.

05:00

🏗️ Construction and Design Flaws

The Hyatt Regency was part of the Crown Center redevelopment project, aimed at revitalizing downtown Kansas City. The hotel featured a unique four-story atrium with walkways connecting different parts of the building. The construction process was marked by fast-tracking, which led to oversights and design changes. The original design called for single support rods for the walkways, but these were changed to a double hanger rod system at the request of the contractor, Haven Steel. This change, along with other construction missteps, resulted in a structure that could not support the weight it was designed to bear. The incident also occurred against a backdrop of similar construction failures, indicating a broader issue with the industry's approach to safety and quality control.

10:02

🔍 Investigation and Aftermath

Following the collapse, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) conducted a thorough investigation, which included analyzing the walkway spans, supporting rods, and other evidence. The NBS found that the design changes had significantly reduced the walkways' load-bearing capacity. The investigation revealed a lack of communication, poor management of responsibility, and a disregard for safety regulations. The trial that followed saw engineers and firms held accountable, with some losing their licenses and firms facing bankruptcy. The tragedy led to significant changes in building codes, insurance claims, and a reevaluation of construction practices, emphasizing the need for a culture of accountability and public safety.

15:03

📜 Legal Consequences and Memorial

The legal proceedings that ensued after the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse resulted in civil charges against key engineers and the engineering firm GCE. The charges included gross negligence, incompetence, and misconduct. The trial led to the revocation of licenses for several engineers and had a profound impact on the engineering industry, prompting reforms in safety regulations and construction practices. The hotel underwent renovations, removing the problematic walkway design. A memorial was established to honor the victims of the tragedy, ensuring that their memory serves as a reminder of the importance of safety and responsibility in construction.

Keywords

💡Hyatt Regency walkway collapse

The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse refers to a catastrophic structural failure that occurred in 1981 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, resulting in the tragic loss of over 100 lives. This event is central to the video's theme as it explores the causes and consequences of this disaster, highlighting the importance of structural integrity and safety in construction.

💡Fast-tracked construction

Fast-tracked construction is a term used to describe a construction process that is accelerated to complete a project as quickly as possible, often at the expense of thoroughness in design review and quality control. In the context of the video, this approach is identified as a significant factor contributing to the structural failure of the walkways, emphasizing the need for a balance between speed and safety.

💡Design changes

Design changes refer to modifications made to the original architectural or engineering plans during the construction process. The video discusses how certain design changes, such as the alteration of support rod configurations, played a critical role in the failure of the walkways. These changes were made without adequate review or consideration of their impact on structural integrity.

💡Miscommunications

Miscommunications denote the failure to convey or understand information accurately among the parties involved in a project. The video script points out that miscommunications between engineers, contractors, and inspectors contributed to the collapse by leading to oversights in the construction process and a lack of accountability.

💡Structural failure

Structural failure is the inability of a constructed object to support its intended loads, leading to partial or complete collapse. The video's main theme revolves around the structural failure of the Hyatt Regency walkways, examining the technical and human factors that led to this devastating event.

💡National Bureau of Standards (NBS)

The National Bureau of Standards, now known as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a U.S. government agency responsible for standards and technology research. In the video, NBS is mentioned as the investigative body that conducted a thorough analysis of the walkway collapse, contributing to the understanding of what went wrong and how to prevent similar disasters.

💡Crown Center

Crown Center is an 85-acre complex in Kansas City that includes the Hyatt Regency Hotel where the tragedy occurred. The video discusses the history and significance of Crown Center as a major urban development project, providing context for the Hyatt Regency's role within the larger complex.

💡Tea dances

Tea dances were popular social events held at the Hyatt Regency, attracting large crowds to the hotel's atrium. The video uses tea dances as a backdrop to the tragedy, illustrating the bustling atmosphere and the number of people affected by the walkway collapse.

💡Investigation and trial

The investigation and trial refer to the legal and technical processes that followed the collapse to determine responsibility and implement changes to prevent future incidents. The video details the extensive efforts to understand the causes of the disaster and the legal consequences faced by the involved parties, highlighting the importance of accountability in engineering and construction.

💡Quality control

Quality control is the process of ensuring that products or services meet certain standards of quality. In the video, the lack of quality control measures during the construction of the Hyatt Regency walkways is highlighted as a contributing factor to the collapse, underscoring the necessity of rigorous inspection and adherence to safety standards.

💡Accountability

Accountability is the obligation to accept responsibility for one's actions or decisions. The video emphasizes the importance of a culture of accountability in the construction industry, where engineers, contractors, and inspectors are held responsible for adhering to safety standards and ethical practices to prevent disasters like the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse.

Highlights

The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, was a preventable structural failure that resulted in over 100 deaths.

The tragedy occurred during a tea dance event, which was a popular social gathering attracting a large crowd.

The walkways collapsed due to a design flaw that changed from single support rods to a double hanger rod system.

The initial design was barely capable of supporting the expected loads, even before the change.

The construction was fast-tracked, prioritizing speed over safety and quality control.

The investigation by the National Bureau of Standards highlighted the lack of redundancy in the design and construction.

The walkways were constructed with minimal capacity to resist their own weight, let alone additional loads from people.

The tragedy led to significant trauma for survivors and first responders, occurring before PTSD was well understood.

The Hyatt Regency was part of the Crown Center redevelopment project, aimed at revitalizing downtown Kansas City.

The collapse was influenced by a culture that prioritized schedule and cost over proper engineering calculations.

The investigation revealed miscommunications and a lack of peer review or design quality control during construction.

The walkway design was changed late in the construction process without proper review or calculation.

The tragedy prompted legal actions, insurance claims, and policy reforms, including changes in engineering practices.

The aftermath included a 26-week investigative trial and a shift in the culture of accountability in the construction industry.

The hotel underwent renovations, removing the suspended walkway design and replacing it with a safer structure.

A memorial was established to honor the victims of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse.

Transcripts

in 1981 design changes miscommunications

and a culture of fast-tracked

construction led to the Hyatt Regency

walkway collapse a tragic and

preventable structural failure in Kansas

City Missouri that claimed over 100

innocent

[Music]

lives

[Music]

it was just we were standing there and

all of a sudden it was on top of us

people praying and people calling for

help and it was so uh crowded there at

the edge of the dance for from watching

the dance contest that no one had a

chance to run away from

it the Crown Center an 85 acre location

of fountains public parks high-rise

hotels retail and more has long been a

primary destination in the downtown

Kansas City area the tea dances of the

time period were big band Big Draw

events attracting large crowds from

20-somethings to seniors at the Hyatt

Crown Center in Kansas City every Friday

partygoers would arrive in the late

afternoon dining drinking and dancing

the evening away held in the Hyatt's

four-story Grand Atrium the majority of

seating the evenings band The main Dance

Floor dining and activities all

centralized on the first floor with the

surrounding second through fourth floors

used mostly for those spectating

lounging or dancing away from the main

crowd with the Terrace balconies and

three Skywalk style walkways offering

impressive verticality and easy access

to equally impressive views overlooking

the party below these tea dances filled

the massive Atrium making it a lively

happy bustling place to dance your cares

away and Usher in the

weekend almost exactly 1 year after the

Hyatt location's July 1980 grand opening

the tea dance crowd on Friday July 17th

1981 by 1900 hours had reached the size

of roughly 1,500 to 2,000 with dozens

occupying the walkways

above and just as the band returned from

their break to pick the music back up at

7:05 the topmost walkway on the fourth

floor the one holding the second floor

walkway ripped loose from its support

rods at first making a loud pop heard by

some then instantly and simultaneously

sending both walkways crashing to the

floor below pancaking each other in the

process the third floor walkway

remaining unaffected and still in

place the collapse created such an

unimaginably gruesome scene that it

would haunt survivors and Rescuers for

the rest of their

lives the sheer force of these

collapsing walkways experienced by those

both on and under underneath rendered

many victims nearly unrecognizable or

largely unrecoverable causing such a

great deal of trauma to those First

Responders and survivors and all this in

the days before PTSD was well understood

that when attempting to ascertain the

approximate number of occupants on the

walkways at time of collapse

investigators like the National Bureau

of standards would in a rare move for

such an agency later utilize only local

press interviews afterwards for

eyewitness accounts stating this

investigation did not include any

organized effort to interview or solicit

eyewitness accounts of the collapse not

because of Any unwillingness to

cooperate but primarily because of great

difficulty in recalling And discussing

the

event the National Bureau of Standards

or NBS now known as the National

Institute of Standards and technology or

nist chose to forego this portion of the

investigation concluding that a rough

estimate of 63 persons total occupied

the second and fourth floor walkways at

the time of

collapse amidst the chaos and confusion

water was pouring into and filling the

atrium floor putting trapped victims at

further risk blasting out from High

Press sprinkler pipes ripped apart when

the walkways fell made all the more

perilous by live arcing electrical wires

now strewn about for the same

reason rescue would be carried out all

through the night the Kansas City Fire

Department and police department within

the first moments then by 7:52 p.m.

after calls for additional assistance

100 plus firefighters EMTs doctors and

nurses would be on scene working in

whatever way they could to rescue

recover determine needs for triage and

attempt to comfort those still alive

trapped in the rubble in addition to

forklifts and other equipment already on

scene by 10:30 p.m. a heavy crane would

arrive and be on standby it wasn't until

just after 3:00 a.m. however when the

first large section could be lifted span

u89 after which at 4:30 a.m. the final

Survivor would be pulled from the debris

at 6:00 a.m. the next span to be lifted

u78 revealed and confirmed Grim

expectations 31 victims crushed and

lifeless

Beneath The Rescuers First Responders

their coordination decisive action and

bravery in the face of such unimaginable

circumstances was legendary and has been

well recognized over the years in total

after investigations hospitalizations

and victim identifications it was

determined that over 200 were injured

and 114 Souls were

lost named for Hallmark's crown logo and

opened in 1971 Kansas City's Crown

Center would be founded by Hallmark

cards Incorporated intended to transform

this area of downtown from deteriorating

parking lots and dilapidated buildings

to one of the area's main attractions

through an urban renewal project of

vertical ality in retail residential

office and event space along with top

hotels outdoor public parks water

features and more and thus the Crown

Center Redevelopment Corporation was

also

formed in 1976 Crown would commission

Structural Engineering consultation and

design duties to GCE International

Incorporated and Structural Engineering

Services to pbnd DML Architects and

planners Incorporated for the upcoming

700 50 room 45 story Hyatt Hotel the

general contractor would be Eldridge

Construction Company who would in turn

subcontract much of this work out to

Haven Steel company the primary

subcontracted portion being the

four-story atrium Lobby connecting the

north highrise with the South function

and guest Recreation Wing by Spring of

1978 construction was underway on the

hayatt and like many similar projects in

other booming US cities of this era fast

tracking the process from start to

finish would be a primary goal for many

parties

involved in the early months of 1979

much back and forth took place though

between GCE the Consulting Engineers and

contractor Haven steel regarding the

hm's walkways drawings revised in an

overall plan of single support rods for

the fourth and second floor walkways

done away with at the request of Haven

Steel in favor of a double hanger Rod

box beam Connection in which to suspend

each walkway these revisions would

receive the approval of engineering firm

GCE specifically engineer of record Jack

D gillum's personal stamp of

approval in October of 1979 however with

construction of the atrium well underway

a 2,700 plus squ ft portion of the

atrium's roof collapsed fortunately

causing no injuries but still drawing

the attention of inspectors and prompted

Crown development to bring on an

independent engineering firm firm seden

pagee to investigate the

incident this investigative firm though

would only seek to determine cause of

the roof collapse their scope of work

not including any sort of design review

analysis of engineering revisions nor

any other portion of the atrium under

construction and just a month later in

November 1979 the owners and Architects

gave assurances of the entire atriums

quote overall

safety noteworthy and causing related

concern around the same time just a few

months prior in that same year the roof

of Kansas City's keer Arena had

collapsed fortunately while unoccupied

and with lack of injury but largely due

to the time period's overarching

phenomenon of fast-tracked construction

a lack of redundancy in the roof trusses

and underestimation in the Gathering of

roof collected rainwater ironically just

one day prior a convention for the

American Institute of Architects was

held just half a mile away from the keer

arena a prominent institution that had

bestowed their honor award upon the

arena in 1976 considering it quote one

of the finest buildings in the

nation also notable was in January of

1978 the Hartford Civic Center's roof

collapsed just 6 hours after the Ukon

verse UMass men's college basketball

game in Hartford Connecticut luckily

with no injuries a tragedy narrowly

avoided this major collapse was first

blamed on rooftop snow but investigators

found it to be glaringly due to

miscommunications of responsibility

during construction disparities between

original design versus actual

construction and a specific lack of any

peerreview or design Quality Control

process all of which proving to be yet

another case of fast trct construction

that due to such pathetically

underestimated loads investigators

discovered the Hartford Civic Center's

roof had been bowing and beginning to

fail even since the first days of

construction work would continue on the

atrium at the Hyatt fast forward to July

of 1980 with construction now complete

the hayatt Regency Hotel and its Grand

Atrium were now ready for

guests Kansas City was shook by this

incident to its core trauma counseling

the sights sounds and even smells

Rescuers dealt with and there were so

many lost that it was said Citywide

nearly everyone had some sort of

connection to someone involved with or

lost in this tragedy

between July 21st and August 13th

recovery operations of the walkway spans

and their supporting rods would commence

lifting them with straps and cross beams

to be relocated to a secure warehouse

nearby for storage and controlled

analysis by NBS investigators engineers

and

scientists this along with kmc's

videotape photographic evidence gathered

prior to debris removal testimony and

investigation of key parties

comprehensive lab studies combined with

mockup and physical simulation testing

and The Limited eyewitness accounts it

was a near 10-month Long investigative

process with nbs's final report being

issued in May of

1982 Then followed up by a more than

2-year long trial process that will

cover in this video

shortly widely known is that the failure

was ultimately down to poor design and

the supporting rods revisions late in

the process changing the second and

fourth floor portion from three pairs of

single rods suspended from the ceiling

to three pairs suspending the fourth

floor segment and a second set of rods

offset to the inside of the Box beams

the Second Story walkway suspended in

the same

fashion in the original designs the

upper not only carries the load of the

four floor

walkway with the single Rod transferring

the load

uniformly the second floor at the bottom

of the rod would work on the same

principle now with the revised design

however the lower nut on the fourth

floor's box beam connection carries the

weight of the fourth floor and second

floor walkways combined as if to be one

unit like trying to pull a large stalled

vehicle with a rope one team all grabs

hold of a single rope spanning the

length of the team but the other is only

allowed the person in front to grab the

Rope attached to the vehicle the rest

required to pull a separate rope

attached via harness to the leader whose

grip must now compensate for the pulling

action of the entire team behind as

well the leader may be able to maintain

grip briefly like the walkways holding

their own weight for a time but his grip

will quickly become the weak point like

the end of the Box

beams the box beam would split at the

welds and the downward force would pull

it around the uppermost rods nut

fastened below the box beam and thus all

that remained suspended from the ceiling

where the walkways fell were those three

pairs of rods with their nuts still

attached box beam hanger Rod connection

9u was considered by the NBS as first to

give way stating there was also evidence

to support the bottom weld having

already given way sometime prior to the

spectators gathering on the walkways

oscillations were also observed

According to some eyewitness accounts

initiated by dancing Spectators however

NBS investigators found this to be

negligible and not directly additive

stating walking or dancing on the

walkways would not have been significant

in comparison to the static

loads rarely is a single party or a

point of failure if ever to blame though

the breakdowns in communication the

group think fragile egos prioritization

of schedule or cost over propop

calculations mismanagement of

responsibility chains of failure like

these are where you'll find your true

need for more awareness the part of the

process where big fragile egos say no

keep prying eyes away is where the light

needs to be Shine the brightest to

affect any real change before all the

technical designs new policies

procedures and proper follow-through can

even be effective as we've seen in so

many of these videos now there has to be

parties involved that care about public

safety and doing the right thing to

begin with when those who have the

authority over others can dismiss out of

hand updated processes like peer reviews

quality control and safety regulations

what good are the policy changes without

an overall culture of

accountability this H Regency walkway

collapse was the epitome of these

circumstances when atrium construction

resumed after the initial roof collapse

amidst that incident's investigation and

up against a now further delayed

schedule combined this with peer reviews

and overall quality control seen as more

of an inconvenience in the industry's

cultural climate at the time the

walkways have been constructed using

those revised prints the design change

requested by Haven steel because the

fabric fabricator wanted to avoid

threading the entire length of each Rod

one of the reasons given allegedly being

that fully threaded rods of these

lengths were more prone to damage in

handling and construction which I

personally find questionable as being

the only reason it reeks of there being

more to it like cost cutting or

time-saving in addition multiple

requests by Gillum himself and GCE to

have a resident inspector full-time on

site would go unapproved by Crown due to

additional cost

through an exhaustive search by NBS

pouring over various records and

documents though it was discovered that

inspection company general Testing

Laboratories Incorporated had been

brought in for a one-time inspection

during a 3-day period in August of

1979 specifically to inspect the bolted

connections of the hanger rods but that

quote the hanging walkways were

inaccessible due to metal decking or

difficulty of position and that the

connections were not checked by a

calibrated t T wrench no additional

information on the walkways was found in

these reports filed by General Testing

Laboratories with this revised walkway

design from the day of construction they

had only minimal capacity to resist even

their own weight and had virtually no

capacity to resist additional loads

imposed by people also important to note

though was that even the original

designs were later determined to be just

barely capable of holding their expected

loads even if the single contain ous

rods had been used calculations bore out

that their capacity would have been just

60% of what's required by Kansas City

building code at the time the 26 week

long investigative trial that took place

thereafter saw GCE Representatives

denying having ever received calls about

the design changes by Havens denying the

conversations ever took place at all yet

engineer of record Jack Gillum had still

applied his personal stamp his seal of

approval to the design revisions the

implication being that in this

atmosphere of such poor mismanagement of

responsibility it's widely concluded

that approval was given to the change

inexplicably with Zero review in

calculation or design as an engineer

record you take the full responsibility

and that's what I did I sealed the

drawing and that's what where the buck

stopped and that's where will on every

single project in 1984 civil charges

were brought against Daniel M Duncan the

project engineer Jack Gillum engineer of

record along with the rest of the GCE

firm by the Missouri Board for

Architects Professional Engineers and

land

surveyors the charges being gross

negligence incompetence misconduct and

unprofessional conduct in their practice

of engineering several Engineers lost

licenses and firms went bankrupt as a

result of the hearings billions of

dollars in legal suits insurance claims

and City policy reforms also came as a

result by November of 1984 Duncan and

Gillum had been found guilty of their

previous charges and could no longer

practice Engineering in the states of

Missouri and Texas both of which still

went on to practice in other states

though and for their part it's been said

they have had difficulty living with

their

anguish renovations to The Atrium would

still include the second floor Terrace

but the remaining suspended third floor

walkway would be removed and eventually

a single much wider deck was constructed

at the second floor level supported by

massive columns doing away with the

previous walkway designs

entirely the hotel would be bought out

in 2011 becoming the Sheridan at Crown

Center the brand it retains to this

day the Skywalk Memorial Plaza sits

adjacent just to the Northeast with its

features well cared for and list of

names prominent on the main

[Music]

Memorial

[Music]

[Music]

for

[Music]

for