Soviet Collapse 2.0 - Putin’s Empire CRUMBLES

Summary

The script discusses the potential collapse of Putin's Russian empire due to internal strife and military missteps. It highlights the 2024 Kursk invasion by Ukraine as a turning point, exposing Russia's vulnerability and undermining Putin's 'strongman' image. The invasion has led to civilian evacuations, a loss of territory, and growing dissent among the Russian people and elite. The script also draws parallels between Putin's leadership and past Soviet leaders, suggesting that his regime may face a similar downfall.

Takeaways

• 🌏 Putin's efforts to expand Russia's territory have led to internal instability and potential civil war.
• 🏳️ Ukraine's unexpected invasion of Kursk Oblast on August 6, 2024, has significantly undermined Russia's image of invincibility.
• 🔄 The Kursk invasion has prompted a Russian evacuation of 200,000 civilians and a scramble to redeploy 500,000 troops.
• 📉 Putin's strongman image is deteriorating as the Kursk invasion exposes his military miscalculations and failures.
• 🏘️ The invasion has resulted in Ukraine claiming control over nearly 500 square miles of Russian territory and capturing 594 Russian prisoners.
• 🤔 The true motives behind Ukraine's invasion of Kursk are complex and may serve as a diversionary tactic to relieve pressure in other conflict areas.
• 🔍 The success of the Kursk invasion has boosted Ukrainian morale and intensified political challenges for Putin.
• 🚨 Putin's public criticism of military leaders highlights internal discord and further weakens his strongman facade.
• 🤝 There is growing discontent among the Russian people and elites due to the war's impact, misinformation, and economic sanctions.
• ⏳ The potential for civil unrest and rebellion against Putin is increasing, with historical parallels to the fall of the Soviet Union.

Q & A

What was the significance of the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea in Putin's expansionist policy?

The 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea were significant actions in Putin's policy of reclaiming territory for Russia, setting off alarm bells and indicating his intentions to expand Russia's borders.

How did the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 continue Putin's pattern of territorial claims?

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a continuation of Putin's efforts to reclaim territory he believed Russia should own, further escalating tensions and signaling a full-scale military action.

What was the unexpected event on August 6, 2024, that served as a catalyst for Russia's potential collapse?

The unexpected event on August 6, 2024, was Ukraine invading the Kursk oblast, an action that defied expectations and marked a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Why did the initial response to the Kursk invasion from Russia involve a claim of repelling the attack when the reality was different?

Russia claimed to have repelled the attack to maintain the appearance of strength and control, but the reality was that Ukrainian forces continued to advance, highlighting a disconnect between the official narrative and the situation on the ground.

What was the strategic goal of Ukraine's invasion of Kursk, and did it achieve it?

The strategic goal of Ukraine's invasion was to act as a diversionary tactic, relieving pressure on the Donbas region. However, it's unclear if this goal was achieved as Russia continued to make gains in the region.

How did the Kursk invasion impact Putin's image as the 'strongman' of Russia?

The Kursk invasion shattered Putin's image as an invincible 'strongman' by demonstrating that Russia could be invaded and that Putin's military was vulnerable, undermining his authoritative and decisive persona.

What was the role of General Oleksandr Syrskyi in the Kursk invasion, and why was he underestimated by Putin?

General Oleksandr Syrskyi played a key role as Ukraine's top military officer, leading the invasion with precision and tactical strikes. He was underestimated by Putin due to his different approach compared to his predecessor, which led to successful Ukrainian advances.

How did the Kursk invasion affect the Russian civilians, and what was Putin's response?

The Kursk invasion led to the evacuation of around 200,000 civilians and showcased Putin's failure to protect his people, further eroding his image as a protector and strongman leader.

What are the potential consequences of the Kursk invasion for Putin's leadership and Russia's political stability?

The Kursk invasion could lead to increased discontent among the Russian people and elite, potentially sparking rebellions or civil war, and ultimately threatening Putin's grip on power and Russia's political stability.

How do the historical patterns of Soviet-era mistakes reflect in Putin's handling of the Ukraine war and the Kursk invasion?

Putin's handling of the Ukraine war and the Kursk invasion mirrors past Soviet-era mistakes, such as underestimating enemies, military miscalculations, and a pattern of failed protection of the Russian people, which could lead to a similar downfall.

Outlines

00:00

🏰 Putin's Empire at Risk: The Kursk Invasion

The paragraph discusses the potential collapse of Putin's Russian empire due to internal strife and military failures. It highlights Putin's efforts to expand Russia's territory, including the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The turning point is described as Ukraine's unexpected invasion of Russia's Kursk oblast on August 6, 2024, which has led to a significant loss of territory and a civilian evacuation, undermining Putin's image as a strong leader. The narrative emphasizes the contrast between Putin's portrayal of Russia as invincible and the reality of military setbacks and the potential for civil unrest.

05:04

📉 The Kursk Debacle: A Blow to Putin's Strongman Image

This section delves into the impact of the Kursk invasion on Putin's leadership and Russia's military reputation. It points out that the initial success of the invasion has boosted Ukrainian morale and created political difficulties for Putin. The paragraph suggests that the invasion has shattered Russia's image of invincibility and discusses Putin's public criticism of his military leaders, which may have inadvertently revealed his own leadership shortcomings. It also raises questions about the loyalty and competence of Russia's military and political elite, hinting at a possible loss of confidence in Putin's decision-making abilities.

10:06

🛑 Patterns of Failure: Putin's Missteps and the Kursk Response

The third paragraph examines Putin's pattern of underestimating his adversaries and mismanaging crises, drawing parallels with historical Soviet failures. It discusses Putin's military miscalculations, such as not reinforcing the border with Ukraine, leading to the easy capture of Russian territory by Ukraine. The paragraph also highlights the lack of intelligence provided to border soldiers and the broader issue of state-controlled media presenting a distorted view of events to maintain Putin's power. It contrasts Putin's strongman image with his actual military and political failures, suggesting that these could lead to a loss of popular support.

15:10

👥 Discontent and Disillusionment: The Russian Response to the Invasion

This paragraph focuses on the reactions of the Russian people and elite to the Kursk invasion and Putin's handling of the crisis. It describes the anger and sense of betrayal felt by those affected by the invasion, as well as the elite's concerns over Western sanctions and asset freezes. The narrative suggests that Putin's inability to protect his people or provide accurate information is leading to a loss of confidence in his leadership. It also raises the possibility of civil unrest, drawing parallels with historical protests that led to the fall of the Soviet Union.

20:15

🔍 The Future of Putin's Rule: Speculation on Political Unrest

The final paragraph speculates on the potential for further insurrection and civil war in Russia, driven by growing discontent with Putin's leadership. It discusses the historical precedent of leaders being ousted by their own people and the possibility that Putin's mistakes could lead to a similar outcome. The paragraph also touches on the potential for Putin to be seen as a modern-day Stalin, with similar militaristic tendencies and a willingness to sacrifice his people for power. It concludes by posing questions to the audience about Putin's future and the possibility of his regime's collapse.

Keywords

💡Empire

An empire refers to a group of nations or territories under a single ruler or government. In the context of the video, the term 'Russian empire' symbolizes Putin's ambition to restore Russia's historical influence and territorial expanse. The script discusses the potential collapse of this empire due to internal strife and military setbacks, particularly referencing the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Kursk invasion as catalysts for this decline.

💡Annexation

Annexation is the act of a country extending or increasing its territory by incorporating another region. The script mentions the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a key event in Putin's expansionist policies, which has contributed to international tensions and the ongoing conflict.

💡Kursk Oblast

Kursk Oblast is a federal subject of Russia. In the video script, it is highlighted as the region invaded by Ukraine, marking a significant military and psychological setback for Russia. The invasion of Kursk Oblast is portrayed as a turning point that challenges Putin's image of invincibility and triggers a potential collapse of his regime.

💡Strongman

A 'strongman' in politics refers to a leader who exercises power with a firm and often authoritarian grip. The script describes Putin's image as a strongman being jeopardized by the failure to protect Russian territory and his inability to effectively respond to the Kursk invasion, undermining his authority and leadership.

💡Civil War

A civil war is a violent conflict between opposing groups within the same country. The script suggests that the internal collapse of Putin's empire could lead to a civil war, drawing parallels to historical instances where empires crumbled from such internal strife.

💡Catalyst

A catalyst is an event or action that triggers a significant change or effect. In the video, the Kursk invasion is described as the catalyst for Russia's potential collapse, illustrating how a single event can have far-reaching consequences.

💡Diversionary Tactic

A diversionary tactic is a military strategy designed to draw the enemy's attention and resources away from the main point of operation. The script speculates that Ukraine's invasion of Kursk might be a diversion to alleviate pressure on the Donbas region, showcasing the complex strategies employed in warfare.

💡Counteroffensive

A counteroffensive is a military action taken to regain lost territory or reverse the enemy's gains. The script mentions an anticipated Russian counteroffensive in Kursk, indicating the ongoing and dynamic nature of the conflict.

💡Underestimation

Underestimation refers to the act of regarding something or someone as less important or capable than they truly are. The script argues that Putin's underestimation of Ukraine's military capabilities, particularly under General Oleksandr Syrskyi, led to strategic blunders and territorial losses.

💡Insurrection

Insurrection is an act of rebellion against an established authority. The script recounts an insurrection attempt by Yevgeny Prigozhin, reflecting internal discord and the fragility of Putin's power.

💡Disinformation

Disinformation is the deliberate spreading of false information to influence public opinion or obscure the truth. The script accuses Putin's regime of a disinformation campaign that misled the Russian public about the threat level of the Kursk invasion, contributing to a lack of preparedness and a sense of betrayal.

Highlights

Putin's Russian empire is facing an internal collapse.

Putin has been trying to expand Russia's territory for over a decade.

The 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea were part of Putin's expansionist policies.

In 2022, Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine's invasion of Kursk oblast on August 6, 2024, was a significant turning point.

Ukrainian forces advanced rapidly into Russian territory, capturing villages and establishing command centers.

Putin's promise of a 'worthy response' to the Kursk invasion has yet to materialize.

Russia was forced to evacuate 200,000 civilians from the Kursk region.

Ukraine now claims to control almost 500 square miles of Russian territory within the Kursk region.

The Kursk invasion has been a major humiliation for Putin, undermining his 'strongman' image.

Zelensky's invasion strategy may be a diversionary tactic to relieve pressure on the Donbas region.

The success of the Kursk invasion serves as a morale booster for Ukraine and a political problem for Putin.

Putin's public criticism of military leaders reflects the shattering of Russia's aura of invincibility.

Putin's military miscalculations have left Russia vulnerable to invasion.

Putin's underestimation of General Oleksandr Syrskyi has led to significant losses in the war.

The Kursk invasion may trigger a civil war in Russia or lead to the collapse of Putin's empire.

Putin's pattern of military failures and mismanagement is reminiscent of Soviet-era leaders.

The growing discontent among the Russian people and elite could lead to rebellion against Putin.

Putin's regime faces challenges from within, including potential insurrections and a loss of confidence.

Strategists suggest that Putin's downfall could come as early as 2025.

Transcripts

Putin’s burgeoning Russian empire is collapsing  from the inside. To the man who has seemingly made  

it his life’s work to turn Russia into what it  used to be, this is a horror story. For more than  

a decade, he has been trying to claim land for his  beloved Russia. The 2008 invasion of Georgia set  

alarm bells ringing. He followed that up with the  2014 annexation of Crimea and, in February 2022,  

he launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine  that continues to this day. He did it all – in  

part – to reclaim territory that he believes  Russia should rightfully own. But all he’s  

achieved is laying the foundation for the collapse  of Russia as we know it as he has left his country  

on the brink of civil war. Putin’s citizens  are turning against him. His position as the  

“strongman” of Russian politics is in serious  jeopardy. And the worst thing about all of this  

for Putin – we’ve seen it all happen before. The  collapse of any empire requires a catalyst. That  

catalyst came on August 6, 2024, when Ukraine  did something nobody believed it would ever  

do – invade the Kursk oblast. Interestingly, the  first news about the Kursk invasion didn’t come  

from Ukraine. It made no grand proclamations of  its intention to take Russian territory. Rather,  

they came from Russia, with the country’s Defense  Ministry announcing that a group of 300 Ukrainian  

soldiers had crossed the border into Kursk at 8 am  on August 6. Those soldiers apparently wore blue  

tape around their arms—making them distinguishable  from their enemies—and were accompanied by a small  

number of tanks and armored vehicles. The initial  attack focused on checkpoints across the border,  

where the few dozen Russian border guards, many of  whom were young conscripts with little experience  

of actual war, were quick to surrender to the  invading Ukrainians. At the time, Russia claimed  

to have repelled the attack. The truth would turn  out to be the exact opposite. Within a day of the  

invasion starting, Ukrainian armored vehicles were  seen racing toward the town of Sudzha, which is  

just six miles from the frontlines. By the third  day, Ukraine’s soldiers had reached Koreveno – a  

small village 13 miles inside the border.  More gains followed. Ukraine kept advancing,  

taking villages along the way. Ten days into the  invasion, Ukraine had taken Sudzha, establishing  

it as a command center from which to coordinate  future attacks. This prompted Putin to promise  

that he would deliver a “worthy response” to the  invasion. That response is yet to come. Instead,  

this initial week and a half of the Kursk invasion  saw Russia being forced to evacuate around 200,000  

civilians from the region while Putin was left  scrambling to pull some of the 500,000 troops  

he had stationed in Ukraine to mount a proper  defense against Ukraine. Fast forward to the end  

of August—the time of writing the script for this  video—and Ukraine now claims to control almost  

500 square miles of Russian territory within  the Kursk region. That’s according to its main  

military commander, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who  also adds that Ukraine has captured 594 Russian  

prisoners so far as part of the operation. For  context, the amount of seized territory is roughly  

the same size as Los Angeles, according to the LA  Times. Further reports, this time from the BBC,  

claim that Ukraine now controls about 100 Russian  settlements within those 500 square miles, each  

of which can now be fortified against the likely  Russian counterattack. The entire invasion has  

been an enormous humiliation for Putin. For the  entire war, he’s set himself up as the “strongman”  

of Russia – a role that many a Russian leader  before him has attempted to play. Authoritative.  

Decisive. Strong enough to do what needs to be  done. This was the image Putin hoped to cultivate,  

and a large part of his success in creating that  image lay in his ability to portray Russia as  

impenetrable. The average Russian citizen wouldn’t  have to worry about the Ukraine war, he could  

argue. The entire conflict would take place in  Ukraine – at no point would war come to Russia’s  

collective doorstep. The Kursk invasion proved  that to be false. And that leads us to a question:  

Why did Ukraine invade Kursk in the first place?  It certainly doesn’t intend to annex the region  

and claim it as part of Ukraine as Putin did  with Crimea back in 2024. Though Ukraine is  

pouring more and more troops into the region, with  Forbes saying it has plans to send 15,000 soldiers  

along with a pair of air assault brigades, those  soldiers aren’t tasked with turning Kursk over to  

Ukrainian hands. The taking of territory in Kursk  does not signify the start of a larger invasion  

that will see Putin’s empire crumble as a result  of him losing the country to invading Ukrainians.  

Zelensky’s intentions are a little more complex  than that. One interpretation is that the Kursk  

invasion is supposed to act as a diversionary  tactic. Ukraine hopes that forcing Russia to  

divert troops to Kursk will relieve pressure  on the beleaguered Donbas region in Ukraine,  

where Putin has focused most of his attacks  in 2024 and where Russia is slowly gaining  

territory. In particular, Zelensky may have hoped  to draw Russian soldiers away from Pokrovsk, which  

Forbes claims is one of Putin’s main objectives  in his Eastern offensive in Ukraine. If that was  

the intention, the invasion may have failed in its  diversionary goal. On August 28, Forbes reported  

that Russia had taken the Ukrainian village of  Novohrodivka, which lies just five miles outside  

of Pokrovsk. Putin is likely setting up for a  renewed offensive and Ukraine’s commitment of  

troops to Kursk could mean that it is less able to  mount a sturdy defense in response. Other motives,  

put forth by Harvard University Ukrainian  Research Institution fellow Paul D’Anieri, seem  

to make more sense. Speaking to the University of  California, Riverside, he points out that it’s not  

clear exactly how the Kursk invasion will affect  the key battles being fought in the Ukraine war.  

However, it serves other purposes. The invasion’s  initial success, he says, “is clearly a big morale  

booster for Ukrainians and a political problem  for Putin and his military leaders.” The latter  

issue is extremely important in terms of why Kursk  could prove to be the catalyst for the collapse of  

modern Russia. As D’Anieri points out, Putin took  the rare step of appearing on Russian television  

to dress down his military leaders in front of the  entire nation. His intention was clear – continue  

to project the strongman image that has served  him so well as Russia’s leader. The problem lies  

in what the Kursk invasion has managed to achieve:  the shattering of Russia’s aura of invincibility.  

Putin’s dressing down of his military leaders  took place while Ukraine was taking more territory  

and thousands of Russians were being evacuated.  Putin can no longer hold himself up as the man to  

protect Russia. Dressing down his military leaders  in public may also prove to be a mistake. After  

all, it raises questions as to why those leaders  were appointed in the first place if they were  

incompetent enough to allow a Ukrainian invasion.  The Russian people may not be able to question  

Putin publicly. But privately, many are likely  starting to doubt the decision-making capabilities  

of their leader. Therein we find what may be  the true motive for the Kursk invasion. Zelensky  

likely knows that Ukraine can’t hold Kursk  forever. Russia will launch a counteroffensive  

at some point. Deputy CIA Director David Cohen  says this is practically an inevitability,  

saying on August 28, “We can be certain that Putin  will mount a counteroffensive to try to reclaim  

that territory.” He notes that it will be a  difficult fight for Russia, especially as Putin’s  

slow response has afforded Ukraine time to build  defensive lines, but the counterattack is coming.  

Unfortunately for Putin, the response may be too  little too late. Ukraine has already achieved one  

of its primary goals of rattling Russia’s faith  in its militaristic leader. The strongman image  

is shattered, not only for the Russian military  as a whole but also for the man who leads it. And,  

if everything goes according to plan for Ukraine,  the Kursk invasion will serve as both the turning  

point in the Ukraine war and the beginning of  the end for Putin. Of course, that brings us  

to an obvious question: How? How could the Kursk  invasion trigger a civil war in Russia or, at the  

very least, lead to the burgeoning empire Putin  is trying to build collapsing? The answer starts  

with something to which we’ve already alluded  – the Kursk invasion showcases Putin’s military  

miscalculations. This starts with his failure to  reinforce Russia’s northern borders with Ukraine,  

as Putin has poured all of his efforts into the  Eastern offensive during 2024. That led to the  

situation we saw on August 6, when Ukraine’s  forces were able to easily overcome Russia’s  

border checkpoints. Putin has assigned recent  Russian conscripts to those checkpoints, none of  

whom had the experience or ability to fight back  against the incoming Ukrainian forces. Worse yet,  

as Retired Russian General Andrei Gurulev,  who is a member of the lower house of Russia’s  

parliament, points out, those border soldiers  had no intelligence. “Regrettably, the group of  

forces protecting the border didn’t have its own  intelligence assets,” he claimed on the Telegram  

messaging app. “No one likes to see the truth in  reports, everybody just wants to hear that all is  

good.” The truth in reports. Those four words  are a reflection of the fact that many in Russia,  

including some in its political circles, recognize  that the information they get from state-owned  

media outlets is tailored to keep Putin in power.  Russia’s leader isn’t telling his people the  

truth about what’s happening in Kursk, but his  attempts to pull the wool over their eyes are  

failing. After all, they can see the evidence with  their own eyes. Russia has lost territory and the  

people of Kursk are being evacuated. All of this  can be traced back to Putin’s military mistakes,  

both in terms of failing to secure the Kursk  border and not providing his troops with the  

intelligence they needed. Putin made another  mistake – he underestimated General Oleksandr  

Syrskyi. Now Ukraine’s top military officer,  Syrskyi commanded Ukraine’s forces in Kharkiv  

in 2022, leading the country to a victory over the  invading Russian forces that played a key role in  

Russia’s failure to secure Kyiv in the early weeks  of the war. Syrskyi is a man who had the call  

sign “snow leopard” and he’s also the man who took  over from General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi after Zelensky  

ousted his former military leader in early 2024.  Putin’s mistake lay in assuming that Syrskyi would  

take the same approach as his predecessor when it  comes to launching attacks against Russian forces.  

In 2023, Zaluzhnyi was the man responsible for  organizing a Ukrainian counteroffensive against  

Russia. That counteroffensive failed, not least  because it was so highly publicized that Russia  

had plenty of time to set up defenses that enabled  them to hold the territory Ukraine hoped to  

retake. Putin got to look like a military genius  in front of his people. The man who organized  

Russia’s military to hold off the biggest  offensive Ukraine was capable of mustering.  

But the reality was that Putin’s success only  came because of Zaluzhnyi’s failings, with  

Syrskyi being a far different beast. Ukraine’s  new military leader is described as an “obsessive  

planner with iron discipline” by Sky News, with  Al Jazeera noting that some in Ukraine call him  

“The Butcher.” He also favors quiet and precise  strikes against his enemies over full-blown and  

well-publicized offensives. We saw this in his  approach to taking on a Putin-backed insurgency in  

Eastern Ukraine back in 2014, during which Russian  security official Dmitry Medvedev described him  

using “tactics that were similar to how this cat  hunts,” in reference to his “snow leopard” call  

sign. So, the warning signs were there. Any  attack arranged by Syrskyi would be extremely  

well-organized and would not involve an all-out  offensive at which body after body is thrown.  

The strikes would be small. Precise. Scattered. In  other words, exactly what we have seen in Kursk as  

Ukraine’s forces conduct tactical strikes against  their Russian opposition by using small groups.  

Putin should have known all of this about Syrskyi.  He’d seen plenty of Syrskyi’s approach on the  

battlefield, yet he underestimated the Ukrainian  military leader and, by extension, underestimated  

Ukraine’s ability to take Russian territory. Here,  we start to see some parallels between Putin and  

his Soviet-era predecessors. After all, Russia has  a history of underestimating its opponents. In the  

1980s, Russia entered Afghanistan believing that  it would be able to quickly destroy the rebels in  

that country and subjugate it under Soviet rule.  The Soviet Union failed. It wound up stuck in a  

quagmire of a war that lasted for almost a decade  and led to the deaths of 15,000 Soviet soldiers.  

Russia was forced to withdraw. Bruce Riedel, who  worked on the CIA’s plan to aid the Afghan rebels  

at the time, points out that Putin seems “to have  underestimated the Ukrainians today,” in the same  

way the Soviet Union underestimated Afghanistan.  Milton Bearden, another CIA operative during the  

Afghanistan war, puts it more pointedly – “In  setting out to reverse history, [Putin] may  

instead be repeating it.” Patterns are starting  to repeat. The Ukraine war, which was meant to be  

over in a matter of weeks, has descended into a  quagmire similar to that seen in Afghanistan in  

the 1980s. Only this time, it’s a quagmire that’s  costing far more Russian lives – 612,390 according  

to Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance and other various  outlets. The Washington Post says that Russia’s  

war in Afghanistan led to the end of the Cold  War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin’s  

underestimation of his Ukrainian enemy may be  taking him—and today’s Russia—down that very same  

path. Underestimating his enemy isn’t the only  way that Putin has undermined his own position.  

The Kursk invasion is just one of several examples  during his reign in which he has failed to protect  

the Russian people. The Conversation published a  piece covering this toward the end of August 2024,  

noting that Kursk is just the latest puncture  hole in Putin’s image of “protector” in a long  

line. It points out that the Ukraine war has  seen multiple Russian towns and cities—including  

Moscow—be subjected to drone attacks by Ukraine.  It also draws parallels between the Kursk invasion  

and another famous “Kursk” incident – the sinking  of the nuclear submarine that bore the oblast’s  

name. On August 12, 2000—around three months  after Putin first became Russia’s president—the  

Kursk submarine experienced an explosion in one  of its torpedo hatches. Most of the submarine’s  

118-member crew died, though 23 survivors managed  to barricade themselves in a compartment of the  

submarine, where they awaited rescue. Here was an  opportunity for Putin to solidify his reputation  

as a protector of the Russian people. Instead, he  delayed. Putin refused foreign help for fear that  

doing so would make him look weak. When Norwegian  divers were eventually allowed to dive into the  

submarine on August 21, the 23 survivors of the  blast were dead. Putin refused to talk about the  

incident, going so far as to not even cancel a  vacation he was taking in Sochi when the crisis  

occurred. A pattern of behavior had been set. On  September 1, 2004, a group of 30 armed militants  

stormed a school in the Russian city of Beslan,  taking 1,000 hostages that included children,  

family members, and teachers. Putin acted a little  quicker this time. He ordered special forces to  

enter the building on September 3. A bloodbath  ensued – the chaotic battle led to hundreds of  

the hostages being killed, including 186 children.  Both survivors and relatives of those killed sued  

the Russian government via the European Court of  Human Rights, alleging that Putin had mishandled  

the entire situation. They won – the court  ruled that Russia’s government had “failed to  

protect the hostages.” What does all of this mean?  More patterns are emerging. Not only does Putin  

regularly underestimate the situations he faces,  but he often makes the wrong decisions. These  

decisions have an impact on the Russian people,  whether those be 23 who die in a submarine because  

he delays or hundreds dying in a school because he  bungles. His mismanagement of the Kursk invasion  

is yet another example of Putin’s failure to  protect his people, and it may be the final straw.  

Again, we see parallels with the Soviet Union in  the sense that, as powerful as a leader may be,  

it’s the people who ultimately control the  fate of their countries. The fall of the  

Soviet Union was precipitated by mass protests,  such as the April 1991 protest in Minsk’s Lenin  

Square and the August 1989 protest featuring two  million people in the Baltic states of Lithuania,  

Latvia, and Estonia. The people were making their  unhappiness with the current regime known. Putin’s  

failure to protect his people—a pattern he has  displayed throughout his leadership—could lead  

to similar situations in today’s Russia. After  all, he’s already having to deal with fury amongst  

those people. On August 17, 2024, The Guardian  published a piece in which it spoke to a Russian  

woman named Lyubov Antipova. The daughter  of elderly parents who live in Zaoleshenka,  

a village in the Kursk region, she claims that  she implored her parents to leave their village  

when she first started hearing rumors about an  invasion. Antipova’s parents didn’t listen. Why  

would they? Putin was in charge and Russia hadn’t  seen any sort of invasion since World War II.  

Then, the photographs started filtering through.  One showed Ukrainian troops standing outside a  

supermarket near the offices of a gas company.  Antipova knew the location well – it was only  

around 150 feet from her parents’ home. “We were  sure the Russian army would protect us,” Antipova  

says. “I’m amazed how quickly the Ukrainian forces  advanced.” Others in Kursk were similarly caught  

off-guard by the invasion. Alexander Zorin, who  is a curator in the city’s archaeology museum,  

says that the reports being given to them were  inaccurate. “Officials’ reports were not scary at  

all: 100 saboteurs went in,” he says. “But then,  it went up to 300, 800, it was impossible to get  

a clear picture.” Zorin would wind up being one of  the 200,000 people who have since been evacuated  

from Kursk. Other Russian citizens have expressed  anger about Putin’s response to the Kursk  

invasion. Speaking to CBC, a Ukrainian soldier who  wishes to be identified by the tagline Wolverine  

said that many of the citizens he encountered have  expressed anger at the authorities. “They speak  

about betrayal from the Russian government. They  did not declare evacuation and immediately turned  

off water and light, so they created unbearable  living conditions,” he claimed. He also provided  

CBC with a short—albeit edited—video that showed  a Russian man complaining about feeling abandoned  

by Russian authorities. Of course, none of these  people mentioned Putin by name. To do so would  

be to invite repercussions. But the message is  clear – Putin is the head of Russia and the man  

who put these authorities in place. Once again,  he had failed to protect his people. What’s more,  

that lack of protection was accompanied by  a constant campaign of disinformation—again,  

much as was seen throughout the entirety of  the Soviet Union’s existence—that led many  

in Kursk to fail to protect themselves because  they didn’t understand the sheer scale of what  

was coming. Putin is on the verge of losing  the support of his people. And that’s not his  

only problem when it comes to his own people. A  strongman politician like Putin relies on support  

from his country’s elite. It’s a “you scratch  our back and we’ll scratch yours” situation,  

in which the elite use their influence to prop up  the leader as long as they feel they’re getting  

something in return. Those elites may also be  turning against Putin. After all, many have been  

affected by the Western sanctions that have been  in place since the beginning of the Ukraine war.  

Oligarchs and officials close to Putin have also  felt the sting of the West freezing their assets.  

In addition to the $300 billion in Russian Central  Bank assets that the West has frozen—and are now  

being used to fund Ukraine—another $30 billion  in assets owned by officials and oligarchs are  

also immobilized. Russia’s elite, though they’ll  never see the war up close, are feeling its pinch  

in their pockets. Many have also been oddly silent  about the war, with few coming out to express full  

support for Putin. A handful even believe that  Russia could lose. In June 2023, Pravda published  

a report—citing a Bloomberg article from the  same month—stating that some of Russia’s elite  

are experiencing a “deepening gloom.” Even the  most optimistic among them believe that the best  

outcome possible now is a “frozen” conflict in  which both countries declare ceasefires without  

actively ending the war. The piece also quotes  Kirill Rogov, a former advisor to Putin who left  

Russia after the invasion began. “They are afraid  to become scapegoats for a meaningless war,” he  

says. “It is really surprising how widespread  among the Russian elite became the idea of  

a chance that Putin won’t win this war.” Bear in  mind these comments came in June 2023. Over a year  

later, and those elites are watching as Putin  has failed to repel an invasion into Russian  

territory. Where does all of this leave Putin when  it comes to his people? It would be inaccurate to  

claim that the general citizens are calling for  the Russian leader’s head. They aren’t, and any  

who would like to would be restricted from doing  so by Putin’s policies anyway. But there’s a clear  

feeling of discontent. The people of Kursk are  angry, not only with the misinformation Putin  

has spread, but his lack of a proper response to  the invasion that once again showcases his pattern  

of failing to take decisive action in service  of his people. Putin also appears to be losing  

the support of at least some of Russia’s elite,  with discontentment growing and an ever-increasing  

feeling that Russia isn’t going to win the Ukraine  war looming over that segment of the population.  

In short, Putin is losing the support of his  people. And as Russia’s own history has shown time  

and again, even an authoritarian strongman leader  is at risk of seeing their empire crumble once the  

people turn against them. The Kursk invasion may  prove to be the catalyst for rebellion against  

Putin. But could such rebellion lead to civil war?  While that may seem like an impossibility on the  

surface, it’s worth remembering that Russia came  very close to experiencing a civil war in June  

2023. That’s when Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former  leader of the Wagner private military group,  

essentially declared an insurrection against  Putin and Russia’s military leaders. Wagner  

had already played a key role in the Ukraine  war, with the brutal group having been involved  

almost from the beginning. German intelligence  claims that Wagner soldiers were involved in the  

massacre of Ukrainian civilians in the Ukrainian  town of Bucha in March 2022, with Ukraine also  

claiming that a trio of Wagner mercenaries  were responsible for capturing, torturing,  

and killing Ukrainian civilians near Kyiv a month  later. By June 2023, Wagner had grown dissatisfied  

with how Putin was leading the war, resulting in  the force—under Prigozhin’s leadership—advancing  

through the city of Rostov on Don to surround  Russia’s southern military headquarters. The  

coup quickly ended, with Prigozhin reversing his  decision very soon after. Still, it showcases  

just how tenuous Putin’s hold on power may be.  If a group like Wagner is able to gain support  

from Russia’s rank-and-file military, according  to The Australian Strategic Policy Institute,  

such insurrections would grow larger and far more  significant. If those rebels gain the support of  

Russia’s people, whose collective confidence in  Putin as a protector and strongman has already  

been shaken, the potential for a civil war that  leads to Putin being ousted will only grow. Add  

to all of this that Putin is making many of the  same mistakes made by the Soviet leaders who came  

before him. We see this in his repeated nuclear  threats toward both Ukraine and nations that have  

supported it during the war. Such threats of  nuclear war were constant during the Cold War,  

though no Soviet leader ever followed up on them.  Putin is doing the same thing – threatening nukes  

without deploying them. Not only do these empty  threats reinforce Ukrainian confidence when  

crossing “red lines” in the war, but they once  again showcase Putin as a man who doesn’t back  

up his words to the Russian people. But perhaps  most damaging to Putin is the potential for his  

people to start seeing him as a mirror image of  Josef Stalin. According to The Hoover Institute,  

Putin mirrors Stalin in many ways. While he  may not have swept up millions in purges,  

Putin has never shied away from getting rid of his  enemies. We need only look at Yevgeny Prigozhin  

for evidence of that – the former Wagner leader  died in August 2023 when his business jet crashed  

over the Tver Oblast. The likely cause of that  explosion was a bomb placed on the plane by a  

Putin-aligned saboteur. Putin also mirrors Stalin  in other ways. Both are militaristic leaders,  

even if Putin doesn’t wear his uniform as Stalin  did, and both relied on projecting powerful images  

to remain in control. Both also routinely replaced  the people around them, with a specific focus  

on military generals who failed to achieve the  outcomes they hoped to achieve. Hoover also points  

out that the two share motifs in their propaganda,  with each calling for sacrifices in service of the  

motherland, with those sacrifices coming in  the form of the blood of their people. You  

could even argue that Putin’s displays of callous  disregard for the Russian people, as seen in the  

Kursk submarine incident and the bungled approach  to the Beslan hostage crisis, are echoes of  

Stalin’s willingness to kill his own to maintain  his power base. Parallels among parallels, not  

just in personality but in approach. Ultimately,  it’s those parallels that may spell the end for  

Putin and cause his Russian empire to crumble.  He has failed to learn from the mistakes of his  

country’s past. It’s Putin’s underestimation of  his enemies—and overestimation of himself—that  

allowed the Kursk invasion to happen. As a result  of that invasion, discontent is growing among his  

people, with that discontent only adding to that  felt by many of the Russian elite. Putin has  

already had to fight off one insurrection during  the war, and there’s a good chance more will  

come as his people grow increasingly disaffected.  Vladimir Putin is on shaky ground. Ground that is  

so shaky that it may be his own people who defeat  him before Ukraine does. Which might come as early  

as 2025, if some strategists are concerned, but  more on that in some of our other videos. But what  

do you think? Does Putin stand on the precipice  of losing his power or will he find some way to  

recover his strongman image? Share your thoughts  in the comments and thank you for watching this  

video. Now go check out The Collapse of the  Russian Army or click this other video instead!