The Zombie Argument: Is Consciousness Physical?

Thinking About Stuff
19 Feb 202105:06

Summary

TLDRThe script explores the concept of consciousness through the lens of 'philosophical zombies,' beings physically identical to humans but devoid of conscious experiences. It challenges the idea that consciousness is purely physical, using the hypothetical possibility of zombies to suggest that there is more to consciousness than just physical processes. Philosopher David Chalmers' argument posits that if zombies are conceivable without contradiction, consciousness must transcend the physical, prompting a deeper inquiry into the nature of our conscious experiences.

Takeaways

  • 🧠 Consciousness is the felt experience of the mind, encompassing how things feel, smell, look, and hurt.
  • 🤔 The concept of consciousness includes 'what it's like' to have experiences, also known as phenomenal consciousness or qualia.
  • 🧟 Philosophical zombies are hypothetical entities that are physically identical to humans but lack conscious experiences.
  • 👥 Ted and Zed, the example given, are physically indistinguishable, but Ted has conscious experiences while Zed, the zombie, does not.
  • 😖 When Zed gets punched, he mimics pain but does not actually feel it, unlike Ted who experiences the pain.
  • 🎨 Zed can react to a beautiful painting but lacks the 'what it's like' sensation that Ted has when viewing it.
  • 🤷‍♂️ From an external perspective, it's impossible to distinguish a philosophical zombie from a normal person based on behavior alone.
  • 🤔 The possibility of zombies raises the question of whether consciousness is a physical phenomenon or something distinct.
  • 📚 Philosopher David Chalmers suggests that the conceivable existence of zombies implies that consciousness is not physical.
  • 🧐 The argument posits that if zombies are possible, and they are physically identical to humans but lack consciousness, then consciousness cannot be purely physical.
  • 💬 The script invites reflection on the nature of consciousness and stimulates debate on its relationship with the physical world.

Q & A

  • What is the general definition of consciousness according to the script?

    -Consciousness is the felt experience of the mind, encompassing the sensory and emotional aspects of our experiences, such as the smell of coffee, the sight of the color red, or the feeling of pain from a cut.

  • What is the term used to describe the 'what it's like' feeling of consciousness?

    -The 'what it's like' feeling of consciousness is sometimes referred to as phenomenal consciousness or qualia.

  • What is the difference between a philosophical zombie and an ordinary person?

    -A philosophical zombie is physically identical to an ordinary person but lacks conscious experiences or qualia, meaning there is no 'what it's like' to be them.

  • How does a philosophical zombie differ from an ordinary person in terms of experiencing pain?

    -While both a philosophical zombie and an ordinary person might say 'ouch' when punched, the ordinary person feels the pain, whereas the philosophical zombie does not have a conscious feeling of pain.

  • How can we tell if a person is a philosophical zombie or not, based on the script?

    -It is impossible to tell a philosophical zombie apart from an ordinary person through observation alone, as they can act and talk just like ordinary people.

  • What does the possibility of zombies teach us about the nature of consciousness, according to David Chalmers?

    -The possibility of zombies suggests that consciousness is not physical, as they are physically identical to ordinary people but lack conscious experiences.

  • What are the two premises of David Chalmers' argument regarding the non-physical nature of consciousness?

    -Premise one is that zombies are possible because we can conceive of them without contradiction. Premise two is that if zombies are possible, then consciousness is not physical, as they lack conscious experiences despite having the same physical attributes.

  • What is the main point of contention in the debate over Chalmers' argument about consciousness?

    -The main point of contention is whether the premises of Chalmers' argument are valid, particularly the conceivability of zombies and the conclusion that consciousness is not physical.

  • What is the script's stance on the actual existence of zombies?

    -The script does not argue for the actual existence of zombies; it discusses the hypothetical possibility of their existence to explore the nature of consciousness.

  • How does the script define 'philosophical zombies'?

    -Philosophical zombies are hypothetical entities that are identical to ordinary people in every physical aspect but lack any conscious experience or qualia.

  • What is the script's purpose in discussing the concept of philosophical zombies?

    -The script uses the concept of philosophical zombies to explore and discuss the nature of consciousness, particularly its potential non-physical aspects.

Outlines

00:00

🧠 The Nature of Consciousness and Philosophical Zombies

This paragraph introduces the concept of consciousness, emphasizing its experiential aspect beyond mere thinking or information processing. It explains consciousness as the 'what it's like' feeling, also known as phenomenal consciousness or qualia. The paragraph then contrasts this with the idea of philosophical zombies, which are beings physically identical to humans but lack conscious experiences. The key point is that while philosophical zombies can mimic human behavior, they do not have the subjective experience that defines consciousness.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Consciousness

Consciousness is the state of being aware of and able to think and experience one's surroundings and oneself. It involves the felt experiences of the mind, such as the way coffee smells or the pain from a cut. The video's theme revolves around understanding this subjective experience and its implications.

💡Qualia

Qualia refers to the individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. These are the 'what it's like' feelings, such as the redness of red or the pain of a headache. The video discusses qualia as a fundamental aspect of consciousness that zombies lack.

💡Philosophical Zombies

Philosophical zombies are hypothetical beings that are physically and behaviorally identical to humans but lack conscious experience. They help explore the idea that consciousness might be non-physical, as these zombies can perform all human actions without any internal experience.

💡Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness is the aspect of consciousness that involves the 'what it's like' experience of being. It includes the qualitative aspects of experiences, such as seeing colors or feeling pain. The video contrasts this with the idea of philosophical zombies, who lack phenomenal consciousness.

💡David Chalmers

David Chalmers is a philosopher known for his work on the philosophy of mind, particularly regarding consciousness. In the video, his argument that the possibility of zombies suggests consciousness is non-physical is a central point of discussion.

💡Physicalism

Physicalism is the doctrine that everything that exists is physical or depends on physical processes. The video challenges this view by suggesting that consciousness might be non-physical, as evidenced by the hypothetical existence of philosophical zombies.

💡Pain

Pain is used in the video as an example of a conscious experience. While both an ordinary person and a philosophical zombie might say 'ouch' when punched, only the ordinary person actually feels the pain, highlighting the presence of consciousness.

💡Experience

Experience refers to the conscious events or occurrences perceived by a person. The video uses various examples, such as seeing a painting or feeling pain, to illustrate the nature of conscious experiences and how they are absent in philosophical zombies.

💡Possible Worlds

Possible worlds are hypothetical scenarios used in philosophical arguments to explore different possibilities. The video uses this concept to discuss whether zombies could exist in a world different from ours, helping to argue that consciousness might not be purely physical.

💡Contradiction

A contradiction is a logical inconsistency between two or more propositions. The video argues that there is no contradiction in conceiving philosophical zombies, suggesting that their hypothetical existence is possible and thus supports the argument against physicalism.

Highlights

Consciousness is defined as the felt experience of the mind, encompassing how we perceive and feel the world around us.

Consciousness involves not just thinking or processing information, but also the 'what it's like' feeling, also known as phenomenal consciousness or qualia.

Philosophical zombies are conceptualized as beings identical to humans in physical form but lacking conscious experiences.

Philosophical zombies can mimic human behavior and speech, making them indistinguishable to an outside observer.

The concept of philosophical zombies raises the question of whether consciousness is a physical phenomenon or something distinct.

David Chalmers suggests that the possibility of zombies indicates that consciousness is not purely physical.

Chalmers' argument is based on the conceivability of zombies, implying a separation between physical existence and conscious experience.

The argument posits that if zombies are possible, then consciousness cannot be solely attributed to physical processes.

Philosophical debate exists around Chalmers' argument, questioning the premises and implications for the nature of consciousness.

The thought experiment of zombies challenges our understanding of the relationship between the physical and the experiential aspects of existence.

Zombies, as a hypothetical concept, provide a framework for exploring the limits of physicalism and the essence of conscious life.

The comparison between Ted, an ordinary person, and Zed, a philosophical zombie, illustrates the difference between physical similarity and conscious experience.

Zed's lack of conscious feeling when punched or viewing a painting emphasizes the absence of the 'what it's like' aspect in philosophical zombies.

The possibility of zombies existing in a world with the same physical bodies and brains but no conscious experience suggests a dualistic view of reality.

Chalmers' argument opens up discussions on the nature of consciousness, prompting further inquiry into the non-physical aspects of our existence.

The philosophical zombie thought experiment is a tool for examining the potential non-physical components of human experience.

The debate over the possibility of zombies underscores the complexity of defining and understanding consciousness.

Zombies teach us about the potential non-physical nature of consciousness, challenging materialistic views of the mind.

Transcripts

play00:00

what can zombies teach us about

play00:06

[Music]

play00:14

consciousness

play00:21

before talking about zombies let's talk

play00:23

about consciousness

play00:25

consciousness is hard to define but

play00:27

we're all very familiar with it

play00:30

think about the way coffee smells that

play00:32

smell

play00:33

feels a certain way think about the way

play00:35

the color red

play00:36

looks that visual experience feels a

play00:39

certain way

play00:41

think about the way a cut hurts that

play00:44

pain

play00:44

feels a certain way all of those

play00:48

are conscious experiences consciousness

play00:51

is not just about

play00:52

thinking or processing information it's

play00:55

the felt

play00:55

experience of your mind it's the what

play00:58

it's like

play00:59

feeling when you experience the world

play01:02

this what it's like feeling of

play01:04

consciousness is sometimes called

play01:06

phenomenal consciousness or qualia

play01:10

so what does consciousness have to do

play01:11

with zombies

play01:13

well when you hear the term zombie you

play01:15

probably think of an undead brain eating

play01:17

monster

play01:18

but philosophers have something slightly

play01:20

different in mind

play01:22

philosophical zombies are identical to

play01:25

ordinary people

play01:26

in most ways they're made up of all the

play01:30

same kinds of atoms and molecules

play01:32

they have all the same body parts

play01:34

including a brain

play01:36

they can even talk and act just like

play01:38

ordinary people

play01:40

but unlike ordinary people philosophical

play01:43

zombies have no

play01:44

conscious experience there's no what

play01:48

it's like to be a zombie

play01:50

let's compare ted an ordinary person to

play01:53

zed

play01:54

a philosophical zombie ted and zed are

play01:57

exactly alike in every physical way

play02:00

the only difference is that zed is a

play02:02

zombie and ted

play02:03

is not when ted gets punched he says

play02:06

ouch

play02:07

when zed gets punched he also says ouch

play02:10

but ted actually feels the pain zed

play02:14

says he's in pain but he has no

play02:16

conscious feeling of the pain

play02:19

when ted looks at a beautiful painting

play02:21

he says

play02:22

wow that's beautiful when zed looks at a

play02:25

beautiful painting

play02:26

he also says wow that's beautiful

play02:29

but ted's experience includes the what

play02:32

it's like to see the picture

play02:34

sensation when zed looks at the picture

play02:37

there's no what it's like feeling to go

play02:40

along with it

play02:41

so zombies might talk and act as if they

play02:44

had

play02:45

conscious experience and to an outside

play02:47

observer

play02:48

there's no way to tell a philosophical

play02:50

zombie apart from a normal person

play02:53

but the normal person has the feeling of

play02:55

consciousness

play02:56

and the zombie does not

play02:59

now that you know what zombies are we

play03:01

can ask are zombies possible

play03:04

notice we're not asking whether zombies

play03:07

actually exist

play03:08

we're asking if the world was different

play03:11

is there any

play03:12

possible way they could exist

play03:15

are zombies possible it seems like they

play03:18

are

play03:19

there's no contradiction involved in

play03:21

thinking about the existence of zombies

play03:24

i can conceive of a world where people

play03:26

have our same

play03:27

physical bodies and brains and behave

play03:29

just like

play03:30

us but they have no conscious experience

play03:34

so it seems that zombies are possible

play03:38

now what does all of this teach us well

play03:40

according to the philosopher david

play03:42

chalmers

play03:43

thinking about zombies can tell us

play03:45

something significant

play03:46

about the nature of consciousness he

play03:49

argues that the possibility of zombies

play03:52

shows

play03:53

us that consciousness is not physical

play03:56

here's a shortened version of the

play03:58

argument premise

play04:00

one says zombies are possible

play04:03

this seems true because we can conceive

play04:05

of them without any contradiction

play04:08

again this isn't saying they're real

play04:10

it's just saying

play04:11

if the world had been different they

play04:13

could have been real

play04:15

premise 2 says if zombies are possible

play04:18

then consciousness is not physical

play04:21

remember

play04:22

zombies are physically identical to

play04:25

ordinary people

play04:26

so if they have all the same physical

play04:28

stuff but they don't have the same

play04:30

conscious experience

play04:32

then the conscious experience must not

play04:35

be part of the physical stuff

play04:38

if these premises are true then it

play04:40

follows

play04:41

that consciousness is not physical

play04:44

now lots of philosophers have debated

play04:46

this argument and there's room to push

play04:48

back on either of the premises

play04:50

but if chalmers is right it turns out

play04:52

that zombies

play04:53

teach us a lot about consciousness

Rate This

5.0 / 5 (0 votes)

Related Tags
ConsciousnessZombiesPhilosophyQualiaDavid ChalmersMind-BodyPain PerceptionSensory ExperienceExistential PossibilityConscious Awareness