The Case for Metaphysical Idealism [Advanced] | The Problem of Perception and Physical Anti-Realism

Summary

This script delves into metaphysical idealism, challenging the notion of an independent physical world by asserting its existence is constituted in consciousness. It examines arguments for and against idealism, exploring direct and indirect realism, and phenomenalism. The debate centers on the problem of perception and the gap between our experiences and external reality, questioning the veracity of physical realism and suggesting that metaphysical idealism offers a compelling alternative view of reality.

Takeaways

• 🌌 Metaphysical idealism asserts that the physical world is not independent but exists within consciousness, challenging physical realism.
• 🤔 The existence of a consciousness-independent physical world is questioned, a stance known as physical anti-realism.
• 📚 Metaphysical idealism has been less prominent in contemporary philosophy but has been defended by philosophers like Timothy Sprigge and John Foster.
• 👀 The problem of perception and the debate between physical realism and anti-realism are central to discussions of metaphysical idealism.
• 🌐 Epistemological idealism, which includes linguistic idealism, suggests that our understanding of reality is shaped by our perceptions and interpretations.
• 💭 Metaphysical idealism is a stronger claim, positing that reality cannot be explained independent of consciousness and rejecting the existence of a physical world outside of it.
• 🔍 The argument for metaphysical idealism often starts from the explanatory gaps in other metaphysical positions, particularly concerning consciousness.
• 👁 Direct realism, indirect realism, and phenomenalism are the three main positions on perception's relation to reality, each with its own challenges and objections.
• 💡 Phenomenalism, or subjective idealism, struggles with objections related to solipsism and the lack of an objective external reality.
• 🔮 Indirect realism, or representative realism, avoids some of the issues faced by direct realism and phenomenalism but still faces skepticism regarding the 'veil of perception'.
• 🧠 The causal relationship between brain states and mental states, often cited against idealism, can be reinterpreted within a metaphysical idealist framework as causality within a non-physical external reality.

Q & A

What is metaphysical idealism?

Metaphysical idealism is the philosophical position that the physical world is not an independently existing reality but rather an appearance or construction within consciousness. It asserts that consciousness has ontological priority over the physical.

What is the difference between metaphysical idealism and physical realism?

Metaphysical idealism denies the existence of a consciousness-independent physical world, whereas physical realism asserts that the physical world exists and has its fundamental properties independently of our perceptions and experiences.

What are the two main arguments for metaphysical idealism presented in the script?

The two main arguments for metaphysical idealism are: 1) the explanatory shortcomings of other metaphysical positions, particularly regarding the problem of consciousness, and 2) the argument through the problem of perception, which includes a critique of direct realism, indirect realism, and phenomenalism.

What is the problem of perception and why is it relevant to metaphysical idealism?

The problem of perception is the philosophical inquiry into how we can have knowledge of the external world through our senses. It is relevant to metaphysical idealism because it challenges the notion of direct access to a physical reality and supports the idea that our perception of the world is constructed within consciousness.

What is phenomenalism and why is it less advocated in contemporary philosophy?

Phenomenalism, or subjective idealism, holds that sense data are entities created by consciousness and are unrelated to any physical objects. It is less advocated because it faces significant challenges, such as the subjective aspect of idealism and the need for an objective external underpinning to avoid solipsism.

What is the disjunctive theory of perception and what are the criticisms against it?

The disjunctive theory of perception posits that real and illusory experiences are fundamentally different, with the former being part of the current mental state and the latter not. Criticisms include the inability for an experiencer to introspectively distinguish between the two mental states and issues with the assumption that consciousness supervenes on the neural system.

What is the intentionalist theory of perception and its main objection?

The intentionalist theory of perception suggests that perceptual mental states represent particular aspects of the world non-relationally. The main objection is that it does not sufficiently differentiate perception from other types of intentionality, failing to capture the qualitative character or 'feeling' of perceptual experiences.

What is the adverbial theory of perception and its main objections?

The adverbial theory explains perception through adverbs that modify the verbs of perception, suggesting that we perceive in certain ways rather than perceiving objects directly. Objections include the ambiguity of combining adverbs when sensing multiple things and the failure to explain why we have the experience of directly accessible objects.

What is the 'veil of perception' argument against representational realism?

The 'veil of perception' argument against representational realism is that sensory data, acting as a veil between consciousness and the external world, prevents us from having direct access to the world, potentially leading to radical skepticism and making epistemic access to the world impossible.

What is the argument against physical realism based on the verification problem?

The argument against physical realism based on the verification problem is that we can only access representations of external reality, not the reality itself, making it impossible to verify statements about the external world and challenging the justification for physical realism.

Why might the metaphysical premise of physicalism be considered less well-founded than commonly assumed?

The metaphysical premise of physicalism may be considered less well-founded because it is merely a premise without compelling reasons to choose it over other metaphysical positions. Additionally, physicalism has not been able to justify itself or explain the existence of consciousness.

Outlines

00:00

🌌 Metaphysical Idealism and Its Arguments

This paragraph introduces metaphysical idealism, which posits that the physical world is a construct of consciousness rather than existing independently. It highlights the difference between epistemological and metaphysical idealism and mentions that while metaphysical idealism has been less prevalent in contemporary philosophy, it has strong arguments and proponents like Timothy Sprigge and John Foster. The main topics discussed are the problem of perception and the debate between physical realism and anti-realism. The paragraph also outlines two main arguments for metaphysical idealism: one based on the shortcomings of other metaphysical positions, especially regarding consciousness, and the other through the problem of perception, which is explored in more detail in the video.

05:02

🔍 Direct Realism and Its Challenges

The second paragraph delves into direct realism, the belief that we have immediate perceptual access to the physical world as it truly is. It faces criticism due to phenomena like illusions and hallucinations, which suggest that perception may not provide direct access to external objects. The paragraph also discusses the disjunctive theory of perception, which differentiates between real and illusory experiences, and the intentionalist theory, which argues that perception is representational but not relational. Both theories attempt to address the issues raised by illusions and hallucinations, but each faces its own set of objections, indicating that the debate on perception is far from settled.

10:03

🤔 The Debate on Perception and Realism

This paragraph continues the discussion on perception, focusing on the intentionalist view and its critique. It contrasts the intentionalist view with naive realism and disjunctivism, highlighting the 'greatest chasm in the philosophy of perception.' The Adverbial Theory and its issues with adverbial descriptions are also mentioned. The paragraph then addresses indirect realism and its challenges, such as the 'veil of perception' and the potential for radical skepticism. It also considers the compatibility of these views with naturalism and concludes that while the problem of perception is central to metaphysical idealism, none of the main positions of direct realism can fully support rejecting the others.

15:07

🌐 Physical Realism vs. Anti-Realism

The fourth paragraph examines the concept of physical realism, which asserts that the world exists with fundamental properties independent of our experiences. It discusses the verification problem, which questions how we can verify statements about external reality when we only have access to our representations of it. The paragraph also explores the idea that even if our experiences correspond to external reality, they are not identical, and physical realism cannot be justified without acknowledging a fundamental uncertainty. It concludes by suggesting that physical realism is more a question of plausibility, supported by empirical arguments, despite the challenges posed by the problem of perception.

20:09

💡 Questioning Physicalist Assumptions

This paragraph presents arguments that challenge the physicalist or naturalist metaphysics, suggesting that it is a premise without compelling justification. It points out that physicalism cannot explain consciousness and that we only have access to 'neutral' or quantitative knowledge of the external world, leaving the intrinsic or qualitative aspects inaccessible. The paragraph also critiques structural realism and its inability to account for causality and the difference between the abstract and the concrete. It concludes by suggesting that there are strong arguments against physical realism, opening the door for alternative views such as metaphysical idealism.

25:15

🌟 The Case for Metaphysical Idealism

The final paragraph concludes the discussion by summarizing the challenges faced by both phenomenalism and direct realism and suggests that representative or indirect realism stands stronger, despite its own set of counterarguments. It argues that substantial arguments exist against physical realism, particularly the unresolved problem of representation. The paragraph also discusses the compatibility of metaphysical idealism with the empirical fact of consciousness supervenience on the neural system, suggesting that the brain is an appearance of an underlying external reality. It concludes by noting that metaphysical idealism, including absolute idealism, is a promising alternative to physical realism, opening up a path for further exploration in philosophy.

Keywords

💡Metaphysical Idealism

Metaphysical idealism is the philosophical position that the physical world is not an independently existing entity but rather a construct or appearance within consciousness. It is a form of anti-realism that denies the existence of a physical world independent of consciousness. In the video, this concept is central as it frames the discussion on the nature of reality and the arguments presented for and against it.

💡Ontological Priority

Ontological priority refers to the idea that one entity or aspect of reality exists or is fundamental before or over another. In the context of the video, it is used to express that consciousness or the mental has ontological priority over the physical, meaning that the mental realm is more fundamental or primary in the constitution of reality.

💡Physical Anti-Realism

Physical anti-realism is the denial of the existence of a physical world separate from consciousness. It is a stance that is intrinsic to metaphysical idealism and is discussed in the video as a key aspect of the debate on the nature of reality. The script mentions this concept in relation to the rejection of a consciousness-independent physical world.

💡Epistemological Idealism

Epistemological idealism is the view that knowledge of reality is constructed by our perceptions, interpretations, and language rather than reflecting an objective reality. The video discusses this concept in relation to the problem of perception and the challenges it poses to the idea that we can know the real world as it is, independent of our cognitive processes.

💡Linguistic Idealism

Linguistic idealism posits that language plays a central role in shaping our reality. It is a form of idealism that suggests our understanding and experience of the world are mediated by language. In the video, this concept is mentioned as an example of how our perception of reality might be influenced by the symbolic systems we use to describe it.

💡Direct Realism

Direct realism is the theory that we have immediate and direct access to the external physical world through our senses. The video discusses this position and the challenges it faces, such as the phenomena of illusions and hallucinations, which seem to undermine the idea that our perceptions give us direct access to external objects.

💡Indirect or Representative Realism

Indirect or representative realism is the view that our perception of the world is mediated by mental representations or sense data that stand between us and the external world. The video explores this concept as an alternative to direct realism, discussing its implications and the philosophical objections it faces, such as the 'veil of perception' argument.

💡Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism, also referred to as subjective idealism in the video, is the position that sense data are entities created by consciousness and are not directly related to any external, physical objects. The script discusses this view as one of the main positions on the relationship between perception and reality, noting its challenges, such as the solipsism problem and the lack of objective support.

💡Perception

Perception is the process by which the mind organizes and interprets sensory information to give meaning to the world. The video delves into the problem of perception, exploring how different philosophical positions attempt to explain the relationship between our perceptions and the reality they purport to represent.

💡Physical Realism

Physical realism is the belief that the physical world exists and possesses its fundamental properties independently of our experiences or perceptions of it. The video examines this position in the context of the debate on the nature of reality, highlighting the challenges it faces, such as the verification problem and the gap between realist metaphysics and epistemology.

💡Structural Realism

Structural realism is a position that asserts only the structural or mathematical content of scientific theories is ontologically committing, and that the physical world's intrinsic qualities are inaccessible to us. The video mentions this view as an alternative to traditional physical realism, discussing its strengths and the counterarguments against it, such as the inability to explain causality and the qualitative aspects of the world.

Highlights

Metaphysical idealism posits that the physical world is a construct of consciousness rather than existing independently.

Consciousness is given ontological priority over the physical realm in metaphysical idealism.

Physical anti-realism denies the existence of a consciousness-independent physical world.

Metaphysical idealism has been less prominent in contemporary philosophy but still has proponents like Timothy Sprigge and John Foster.

Epistemological idealism is more common than metaphysical idealism in contemporary philosophy, suggesting we cannot characterize reality independent of our views.

Linguistic idealism, a form of epistemological idealism, claims language creates our reality.

Metaphysical idealism argues reality is not only unknowable independent of consciousness but also lacks a consciousness-independent physical existence.

The possibility of an external objective reality is not excluded by metaphysical idealism, but it must be mind-like and experiential.

Two main arguments support metaphysical idealism: one based on the shortcomings of other metaphysical positions, and the other on the problem of perception.

Direct realism, which claims we have immediate perceptual access to the physical world, faces challenges from phenomena like illusions and hallucinations.

The disjunctive theory of perception suggests real and illusory experiences are fundamentally different, despite appearing similar.

The intentionalist theory of perception posits that perceptual states represent the world but do not require a relational action-object relationship.

Adverbial Theory and its critique highlight the difficulty in explaining why we have the experience of directly accessible objects.

Representational realism's 'veil of perception' argument opens the door to skepticism and challenges the accessibility of the external world.

Physical realism is contested on the grounds that it cannot be conclusively justified and does not account for the intrinsic qualities of the world.

Metaphysical idealism gains support from the unresolved problem of representation and the limitations of physical realism.

Absolute idealism, combining representative perception with non-physical external realism, presents a promising alternative to physical realism.

Transcripts

The position of metaphysical idealism claims that what appears to be the independently

existing physical world is instead an appearance or construction, constituted in consciousness.

Consciousness or the mental has ontological priority over the physical.

The existence of a consciousness-independent physical world is denied – this is physical

anti-realism.

While metaphysical idealism has been presented in various forms throughout the history of

philosophy, in contemporary philosophy it has lived a rather withdrawn life.

It has had its proponents, though – most notably perhaps Timothy Sprigge and John Foster

– as there are quite strong arguments in favor of this position, and it is therefore

worth looking into as a serious position on the nature of reality.

In this video, I will therefore look at these arguments – as well as counterarguments:

the case for metaphysical idealism.

The two main topics of relevance here are the problem of perception and the question

of physical realism vs. anti-realism.

In contemporary philosophy, epistemological idealism is not uncommon: the view that it

is not possible to characterize the real in positive ways independent of our views and

interpretations.

Linguistic idealism, for example, claims that language in some sense creates our reality.

As noted, metaphysical idealism, however, is the stronger claim that not only can we

not explain reality independent of consciousness, but physical realism is rejected – the physical

world does not possess consciousness-independent existence.

On the contrary, it is constituted in consciousness.

This position does not rule out the possibility that an external, objective reality exists,

but it does rule out the possibility that such a world is of a physical nature.

So, while physical realism is rejected, other – weaker – forms of realism are acceptable.

On such a view, external reality, to the extent that it exists, must be directly linked to

consciousness - to be 'mind-like', as it were - in the sense that it is an experiential

reality, that there is a way it is to be this reality.

These are the core conditions accepted by the idealist tradition.

There seem to be two main lines of argument for metaphysical idealism.

One starts from the explanatory shortcomings of the other main metaphysical positions,

not least the very significant problem of consciousness, and attempts to address the

problems idealism faces, arguing that they are less severe than the problems facing the

other positions, and thus idealism provides a better option than its rivals.

I have followed that line of argument somewhat in a previous video, so in this video I present

the second line of argument: Here metaphysical idealism is argued for in

a more direct way, through the problem of perception.

There are three main positions regarding the question of how perception relates to reality:

direct realism, indirect or representative realism, and phenomenalism.

Phenomenalism—roughly, subjective idealism—holds that sense data are consciousness-created

entities unrelated to any consciousness-independent, perhaps physical, objects.

Phenomenalism is the least advocated of the three main positions in contemporary philosophy,

and this is probably not without reason: typical objections often point to the subjective aspect

of this type of idealism, and its contravention of common sense.

An even more important objection notes that an objective, external underpinning for how

things are disposed to appear is necessary to avoid solipsism.

A willing, creating deity has been proposed as providing this underpinning, but in this

video we won’t engage with the theistic position.

So, the phenomenalist position clearly faces significant challenges.

According to the position of direct realism, we have direct perceptual access to the physical

world: what we experience is the external world as it is, or roughly as it is.

A common objection to this position is that phenomena such as illusions and hallucinations

undermine the belief that perception gives us direct access to external objects, with

these being independent of consciousness.

Also, as modern science has uncovered, objects are not simply as they are concretely perceived,

but consist of smaller physical systems or parts – although this is only an objection

against naive realism – the claim that the world is exactly as it appears – rather

than against scientific realism, which holds that science describes the actual world and

is not merely a construct.

Most difficult, though, is the question of how consciousness reaches the external, physical

object – how do we get beyond our experience of the thing, and out to the thing itself?

One version of this argument against direct realism claims that it is impossible to genuinely

imagine a physical event or thing that can exist apart from awareness of it, because

"you always imagine it in possession of properties which it could only have for a conscious subject.”

"Thus if we say that the physical world (...) does exist apart from consciousness, we do not

really know what we are talking about, at least not in the way that a metaphysician

should expect to know what he is talking about.”

Direct realism claims that physical objects themselves feature immediately in our conscious

experiences, in a substantive, phenomenal sense.

This seems to imply, however, that physical objects are fundamentally mind-dependent,

that is, that direct realism is actually fundamentally idealistic when it comes down to it.

The view that that we have direct perceptual access to the object is hit hard by the illusion

and hallucination arguments.

One attempt to solve this problem is the disjunctive theory of perception: While other positions

accept a premise that the real and the illusory or hallucinatory experiences must have something

in common, this view rejects that – these experiences might appear similar, but they

are in fact different, since, it is argued, the former is the actual world that is experienced,

since it is partly constitutive of the current mental state, while this is not the case with

the latter.

The perceptual states are thus separated disjunctively, so that when an object is seen, it is either

the case that the object is actually present and perceived, or it only appears as if the

object is present and perceived.

A significant objection against this point of view, though, is that it is then apparently

not possible for the experiencer to introspectively say which of the two mental states is in play

at any given moment.

A related criticism imagines a case in which an object is genuinely perceived, but during

this perception it is removed, and at the same time, the brain is stimulated to remain

in the state it would have been in if the object had continued to be present.

This will mean a changed mental state, even though the brain state was completely unchanged,

which contradicts the common assumption that consciousness supervenes on the neural system.

According to the intentionalist theory of perception, perceptive mental states do have

the property of representing particular aspects of the world, but while perceptual experience

in this view is representational, it is not relational, and the action-object relationship

is rejected.

That is, it is a non-relational representation of ordinary objects.

The illusion argument is handled by referring to the fact that one can very well have false

beliefs, and representational states can thus be erroneous, without this implying that there

is no shared intentional content – in the case of true perception, the content is a

representation of the world, while in the case of illusion or hallucination it is not.

A main objection to the intentionalist view, however, is that it does not sufficiently

separate the perception experience from other types of intentionality.

Thus, the peculiarity of perception is not captured, that is, the qualitative character

or 'feeling' of the perceptual experience.

The debate between naive realists and disjunctivists versus intentionalists has thus been characterized

as "the greatest chasm in the philosophy of perception", and the debate on the problem

of perception is thus still very much open.

A number of objections have been advanced against the indirect realist views.

In the Adverbial Theory, perception is understood as explained through adverbs that describe

the verbs of perception - I do not see a green object, but my perception is modified in the

special way that can be described as that I see 'greenly' - I see in a green way – and

indirect realism is thus rejected.

Important objections to this theory note that these adverbial descriptions are not unambiguous

when it comes to combining the adverbs in the right way when several things are sensed

at the same time, and that, since experience is not seen as consisting of representations,

it is not explained why we have the experience of directly accessible, consciousness-independent

objects that we have.

A significant objection to the representational realistic position is that sensory data – sometimes

called the 'veil of perception' – which in a representational view of perception is

present between consciousness and the external world, means that our access to the world

is prevented.

It opens space for radical skepticism, thereby potentially making epistemic access to the

world impossible.

One counterargument to this objection is that sense data is merely the medium through which

we perceive the real, consciousness-independent world, and, as it is phrased, we “no more

create a ‘veil of perception’ than the fact that we use words to talk about things

create[s] a 'veil of words' between us and the things we talk about.”

In general, the argument about the obscuring of the external world must thus be seen as

significant but facing counterarguments.

In addition, the fundamental perceptive inaccessibility of external reality need not be seen as something

that must be countered, but may instead be a significant point in favor of the view.

Another objection concerns the apparent incompatibility with a naturalistic view.

However, here it is important to consider which form of naturalism is taken as framework.

If it is reductionist naturalism, grounded in the physicalist view, this problem is clearly

present.

In a broader conception of naturalism, which can embrace (for example) metaphysical idealism,

this incompatibility is not present – I have advocated such a broader variant of naturalism

in another video.

Ok.

Summary: the problem of perception plays – and this is quite to be expected – a decisive

role regarding the foundation of metaphysical idealism.

None of the main positions of direct realism stands sufficiently strong to adequately support

rejecting the other positions.

On the contrary, the problem of how to bridge the gap between the externally existing thing

and our experience of it seems to cause direct realism major problems, and no satisfactory

solutions are presented.

Phenomenalism faces its own difficulties, though, not least the problem of lack of objective

support.

Representative realism, on the other hand, seems more difficult to refute.

And it stands perhaps even stronger than the direct realist positions if physical realism

is not assumed.

While the philosophical debate today is primarily oriented towards realism vs. anti-realism

rather than realism vs. idealism, there is nevertheless a great deal of overlap, and

the realism vs. anti-realism question is therefore relevant when it comes to the question of

metaphysical idealism.

Realism regarding the external, physical world – physical realism – has been formulated

as the view that "the [physical] world exists and has its fundamental properties independently

of the way it is experienced, conceived, spoken or written about or coped with by conscious

beings.”

While this position of realism can be contested from a linguistic idealist angle, the focus

in this video is instead the metaphysical angle.

On the assumption that representational realism is true, one might object, against physical

realism, that external reality is arranged in a way that does not correspond one to one

to the representation of it, to our experience of it.

We have no way at all to determine whether this is the case.

Any statement about external reality faces the verification problem: how do we verify

the statement given that we only have access to representations of external reality, not

external reality itself?

And even if external reality were to correspond completely to the physical world that we experience,

we still cannot equate the two, it has been argued – they are not identical, not least

as the latter has an experience-constitutive aspect which the former does not.

That is, even in this best case scenario for physicalism, where external reality and what

we experience as the physical world correspond completely, physical realism cannot be adequately

justified.

Thus, the physical realist position can certainly be criticized on the basis of skepticism,

but more than that, the skeptical view can be enhanced by asserting that the physical

realist position does not leave room for such a principled uncertainty, since the physical

world, in order for it to be what we mean by 'the physical world' must be empirically

immanent: it must possess a direct nearness to us, be a ‘world for us’, as it has

been phrased.

Physical realism is a position that is about the metaphysical nature of the physical world,

and not about what we can most plausibly say about this nature, it is argued.

However, if the claim of physical realism asserted epistemically is less strong, it

also avoids this objection somewhat: If it is acknowledged that physical realism cannot

be conclusively justified through a rejection of physical anti-realism accomplished solely

by a priori arguments, not least because of the fundamental problem of verification, one

must instead resort to a posteriori arguments.

Defense of physical realism in contemporary philosophy thus includes a more empirically

oriented approach, where the aim is not to show that physical realism is necessarily

true, but instead to show that it is likely true through reference to its greater explanatory

power, simplicity, and so on.

Physical realism then becomes (merely) a question of plausibility.

Further, physical realism stands stronger than anti-realism, it is argued, since physical

realism seems to be the most natural conclusion to draw: If things do appear 'realistically',

then why not take it at face value?

Why not assume that those things and states of affairs which appear to be real – and

which we understand as such – are really real?

It is plausible that a physical object that causes the experience of such an object actually

exists – it is precisely an apple that causes the appearance to me of an apple, it is argued.

That is, physical anti-realism has a greater burden of proof than physical realism, so

to speak.

So the realist point of view has been supported through empirically based arguments (despite

the problem of perception).

At least to some extent, these arguments seem to rest on the assumption of a materialist-naturalist

framework.

However, there are rather strong arguments for questioning this assumption – I have

advocated such questioning in other videos.

They include that the naturalist or physicalist metaphysics cannot justify itself – it is

precisely a metaphysical premise or assumption, and there are thus no compelling reasons to

choose that metaphysics over another.

That it is often done anyway can be seen as an expression of the spirit of the times,

rather than as a sign of physicalism being more substantiated than other possible metaphysical

positions.

And not least, nothing in the physical world has been found that explains the existence

of consciousness.

The metaphysical premise of physicalism or metaphysical materialism must therefore be

judged to be less well-founded than is often assumed – it is merely a premise.

Another argument against physical realism, especially physicalism, is that we only have

access to 'neutral' or quantitative knowledge of the external physical world – assuming

it exists – while the intrinsic or qualitative aspects of it are inaccessible to us.

The only knowledge we can obtain about the world, both through ordinary perception and

through science, is about structural conditions, which means that the qualitative elements

– which are fundamentally present in our world of experience – cannot be explained.

Metaphorically, like a man born blind: He can know what spheres and cubes are to touch,

and he can know the basic structural or formal facts about them, but he cannot know what

the forms look like.

This is not a problem from an ontological structural realist point of view – that

only the structural or, loosely speaking, mathematical content of a scientific theory

is committing, and the only things that exist are these structures.

However, a number of counter-arguments have been advanced against this point of view,

including that it is not sufficiently developed as an alternative to traditional metaphysics;

that causality is not adequately explained; that structural realism is less obvious when

it comes to sciences other than the mathematically oriented ones such as physics; that the difference

between the mathematically abstract and the physically concrete cannot itself be explained

in a purely structural description; that it is debatable whether it is a genuine form

of realism; and more.

Thus, there are powerful arguments against the structuralist realist position.

So, although physical antirealism conflicts heavily with common sense, there are rather

strong arguments against physical realism.

A weaker form of realism within the framework of representative realism is another option,

though, and it avoids a number of those objections.

In contrast to phenomenalism, it could be argued that our experiences must have a cause

outside of ourselves, some kind of non-physical, transempirical reality, with the causal properties

and the structure we ordinarily ascribe to the physical world – there must be something

that causes us to have the experience of a consistent physical world, something that

provides the objective underpinning of this experience.

This combination of representative perception and external realism (but not physical realism)

– a metaphysical idealistic view – would avoid many of the objections mentioned.

Also, the empirical fact that changes in brain states seem to cause changes in mental states,

that consciousness supervenes on the neural system, poses a specific, seemingly rather

strong argument against idealism, since the causal relation is here claimed to be the

opposite – that the mental is more fundamental than the physical.

However, under a premise of representative perception and external but non-physical realism,

it is not a matter of a change in a brain state causing a change in a mental state,

but instead that the seemingly physical brain is itself an appearance of a part of the underlying

external reality.

As this external reality, and not the appearances of it, possesses the actual causal properties,

a causal relation between brain activity and mental states is consistent with this view.

Only is it not a causal relation between a physical brain and mental states, but a causal

relation within the transempirical external reality.

Variants of absolute idealism have been advanced, combining representative perception and non-physical,

external realism, and they look promising – I have touched upon that subject already

in a previous video, and I will cover Sprigge's absolute idealistic metaphysics specifically

in a later video.

Ok.

To conclude: both phenomenalism and direct realism are confronted with powerful counterarguments,

and while representative or indirect realism faces its own counterarguments, it at least

arguably stands stronger.

While this position is compatible with physical realism, substantial arguments do speak against

physical realism.

Most notably that there is, at least at the present, no adequate solution to the most

crucial problem for a physical realist view: the problem of representation.

It has been noted that "[a]nti-realism gains much of its force by highlighting a gap between

realist metaphysics and epistemology that no one really knows how to bridge.”

This paves the way for phenomenalism – roughly, subjective idealism – as well as absolute

idealism, with the latter looking perhaps most promising.

That is, the door is opened for metaphysical idealism.

As one philosopher has noted: "Deviations from [direct realism] have (...) a tendency

to become uncontrollable: one gives idealism a little finger and apparently has to accept

that it takes the whole hand!"

Thanks!