Paul Feyerabend, The Case Against Method and Incommensurability

Summary

In this video, Matt Brown discusses Paul Feyerabend’s *Against Method*, focusing on chapters 15 and 16. Feyerabend challenges the idea of a unified scientific method, arguing that science is inherently pluralistic, chaotic, and creative. He critiques the distinction between the context of discovery and justification, and highlights the incommensurability between scientific theories, suggesting that these theories cannot be directly compared. Feyerabend also explores the nature of scientific progress, emphasizing the replacement of theories rather than incremental growth, and discusses the interplay between conceptual systems and perception. His work urges a more flexible, historically grounded view of scientific practice.

Takeaways

• 😀 Feyerabend critiques the idea of a single, universal scientific method, arguing that science is diverse and does not adhere to a rigid methodology.
• 😀 He uses Galileo as a key example, showing that his 'counterinductive' methods challenge conventional scientific practices, yet should still be seen as part of scientific progress.
• 😀 Feyerabend rejects the logical empiricist distinction between the 'context of discovery' (creative, messy process) and the 'context of justification' (formal validation), asserting that they are entangled in real scientific practice.
• 😀 He introduces an alternative distinction between 'context of inquiry' (experimentation and theory-building) and 'context of certification' (peer review and wider scientific community approval).
• 😀 Feyerabend critiques the rigid separation between prescription (what science should be) and description (how science actually works), emphasizing their interaction.
• 😀 He highlights that methodological prescriptions should be tested by examining how they function in the history of science, rather than being applied abstractly.
• 😀 Incommensurability between scientific theories means that there is no logical, rational way to compare two theories directly because they operate with different conceptual frameworks.
• 😀 The concept of incommensurability is discussed through a mathematical analogy: the length of the side and diagonal of a square, which cannot be expressed in the same numerical system.
• 😀 Feyerabend argues that while incommensurability is a philosophical problem, scientists manage theory changes practically, adapting to new frameworks without demanding perfect logical compatibility.
• 😀 In chapter 16, Feyerabend explores the relationship between conceptual systems and perception, suggesting that when scientists shift to a new theory, they are effectively perceiving a different world.
• 😀 He concludes that scientific progress is more complex than rationalists admit, and that creativity, variety, and historical contingency are crucial to understanding science.

Q & A

What is the main argument in Fire Robin's book 'Against Method'?

Fire Robin argues against the notion that there is a single scientific method that unites all scientific activities. He emphasizes the diversity and complexity of scientific practices and suggests that the method of science should not be rigidly defined or standardized.

How does Fire Robin use Galileo’s case in his argument?

Fire Robin uses Galileo as an example to show that scientific innovation often involves methods that violate traditional empiricist prescriptions. Galileo’s use of counterinductive approaches challenges the idea that there is a fixed scientific method.

What is the distinction between 'context of discovery' and 'context of justification'?

The 'context of discovery' refers to the messy, creative processes scientists go through when formulating new theories and hypotheses. The 'context of justification' is where those theories are rigorously tested and logically validated based on evidence. Fire Robin critiques this distinction, arguing that both processes are entangled in practice.

What is Fire Robin’s objection to the 'context of discovery vs. justification' distinction?

Fire Robin argues that the context of discovery and justification cannot be strictly separated. In practice, scientific inquiry involves a dynamic interplay between these contexts, and focusing too rigidly on one or the other would limit our understanding of how science progresses.

What does Fire Robin say about the relationship between 'prescription' and 'description' in science?

Fire Robin suggests that there is an important interaction between methodological prescriptions (how science should be done) and the historical descriptions of how science actually unfolds. He believes that methodological prescriptions are often tested and challenged by the historical record of science.

How does Fire Robin view scientific progress, especially in relation to theory change?

Fire Robin challenges the traditional view of scientific progress as a linear accumulation of knowledge. He argues that theory change often involves the replacement of old theories with new ones, which may not simply represent a growth of empirical content but a shift in conceptual frameworks.

What is the concept of 'incommensurability' in scientific theories?

Incommensurability, according to Fire Robin, means that different scientific theories cannot be directly compared or lined up in a rational, logical way. The change from one theory to another often involves conceptual shifts that make direct comparison difficult, leading to what he calls 'incommensurability' between the theories.

How does Fire Robin’s view of 'incommensurability' differ from its use in mathematics?

In mathematics, incommensurability refers to the impossibility of expressing certain numbers (like the length of a diagonal) as a ratio of integers. Similarly, Fire Robin applies the concept to scientific theories, where different theories have incommensurable concepts and methods, making it impossible to directly compare them in the same system.

What is Fire Robin’s stance on the philosopher's problem of incommensurability?

Fire Robin argues that incommensurability is primarily a philosophical problem rather than a scientific one. Scientists can still make comparisons between theories despite the conceptual changes, whereas philosophers tend to make this an artificial problem by attempting to impose a rigid, rational structure onto scientific progress.

What role do conceptual systems play in shaping our perception of the world, according to Fire Robin?

Fire Robin argues that the conceptual systems or frameworks we use shape not only what we believe about the world but also how we perceive it. Changing from one theory to another often leads to perceiving a different world, as our concepts and perceptions are deeply interconnected.