Pro-Choice Arguments

Summary

The script explores two pro-choice arguments on abortion. The first, 'right to life does not generate obligation,' is illustrated by Judith Jarvis Thompson's thought experiment, suggesting a woman is not morally obligated to sustain a fetus's life. The second argument, 'no valuable future,' posits that fetuses lack unified consciousness, making abortion not as wrong as killing a person. Challenges to these views are also discussed, emphasizing the complexity of the abortion debate.

Takeaways

• 📚 The speaker introduces two pro-choice arguments: one that abortion is permissible even if the fetus has a right to life, and another that fetuses do not have a right to life.
• 🤔 The 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument challenges the assumption that if a fetus has a right to life, it obligates others to sustain it.
• 🎻 Judith Jarvis Thompson's 'violinist' thought experiment is used to illustrate that one's right to life does not impose an obligation on another to use their body to sustain that life.
• 🤰 The argument suggests that a woman's consent to sex does not equate to consent to pregnancy, challenging the idea that she has a special obligation to a fetus.
• 🚫 The 'no V-flow' argument posits that killing is wrong because it takes away a valuable future, which is not present in zygotes, embryos, and fetuses due to the lack of unified consciousness.
• 🧠 The unified consciousness, which is necessary for valuing a future, is not present in early stages of fetal development, suggesting that abortion at these stages is not morally wrong in the same way as killing a person.
• 🤷‍♀️ The speaker acknowledges that while abortion may not be wrong because of the 'wrongness of killing,' it can be wrong for other reasons, such as cruelty or an inappropriate understanding of motherhood.
• 👶 The argument does not prove that killing a zygote, embryo, or fetus is morally acceptable, but rather that it is not wrong in the same way as killing a person with a unified consciousness.
• 💡 The speaker concludes that abortion can be morally complex and context-dependent, with potential wrongness arising from factors other than the act of killing a fetus.

Q & A

What is the main argument presented by Judith Jarvis Thompson in her paper on abortion?

Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that even if fetuses have a right to life, it does not necessarily create an obligation for a pregnant woman to sustain that life. This is based on the premise that a right to life does not generate a right to someone else's body to sustain that life.

What is the 'violinist argument' and how does it relate to the discussion on abortion?

The 'violinist argument' is a thought experiment by Judith Jarvis Thompson where she imagines a scenario where a person wakes up attached to a famous violinist to save their life. The argument suggests that even though the violinist has a right to life, it doesn't morally obligate the person to sustain the violinist's life against their will, thus paralleling the idea that a pregnant woman should not be obligated to carry a fetus to term.

How does Thompson's argument apply to cases of rape?

Thompson's argument is particularly relevant to cases of rape because it suggests that the woman did not willingly or knowingly create a life and therefore should not have a special obligation to sustain the life of the fetus. The 'violinist argument' is used to illustrate that being connected to another life without consent does not impose a moral obligation to continue sustaining it.

What is the counterargument to Thompson's 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument?

One counterargument is that by engaging in sexual intercourse, a woman understands the potential consequences, including the creation of a life, and thus may have a special obligation to that life. This suggests that the act of sex implies a tacit agreement to the potential responsibilities that come with it.

What is the 'no V flow argument' and how does it relate to the moral permissibility of abortion?

The 'no V flow argument' posits that killing is wrong because it takes away a valuable future, which is only possessed by beings with unified consciousness. Since zygotes, embryos, and fetuses lack this unified consciousness, it is argued that killing them does not deprive them of a valuable future like ours, and therefore, abortion may not be morally wrong in the same way as killing a person with unified consciousness.

How does the concept of 'unified consciousness' play a role in the 'no V flow argument'?

In the 'no V flow argument', 'unified consciousness' is used to differentiate between beings that have a valuable future and those that do not. It is suggested that only beings with this consciousness can value anything, and since fetuses do not exhibit organized brain activity indicative of unified consciousness until a certain stage of development, their destruction does not carry the same moral weight as killing a person with such consciousness.

What is the potential issue with the 'no V flow argument' as it pertains to infanticide?

The potential issue with the 'no V flow argument' is that if it is accepted that the absence of unified consciousness justifies the permissibility of abortion, it could also be used to argue for the permissibility of infanticide, which is generally considered morally wrong. This highlights a possible inconsistency in the argument's application.

How does the speaker suggest that abortion might be wrong in ways other than the wrongness of killing?

The speaker suggests that abortion might be wrong due to factors such as a person's lack of an appropriate sense of awe, acting cruelly, wrongly assessing the value of motherhood, or having an inappropriate understanding of disabilities. These factors could make an abortion decision morally questionable, even if the act of killing a fetus is not inherently wrong.

What is the speaker's conclusion regarding the morality of abortion based on their dissertation?

The speaker concludes that abortion is not inherently wrong because killing zygotes, fetuses, or embryos is wrong, but it can often be wrong for other reasons, which may vary on a case-by-case basis. They also mention that sometimes, not having an abortion might be wrong if bringing a child into existence would cause significant hardship.

What is the significance of the speaker's mention of the potential moral obligations of a doctor who gives a drug to a violinist?

The speaker uses the example of a doctor who gives a drug to a violinist to illustrate that creating a dependency or ensuring someone's life does not automatically impose an ongoing obligation to sustain that life. This is relevant to the discussion on abortion as it challenges the idea that a woman who becomes pregnant has a moral obligation to continue the pregnancy simply because she was responsible for the conception.

Outlines

00:00

🤔 The Permissibility of Abortion Despite Fetal Rights

The paragraph discusses two types of pro-choice arguments regarding abortion. The first argument, called the 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument, suggests that even if a fetus has a right to life, it does not impose an obligation on others to sustain that life. The speaker references Judith Jarvis Thompson's influential paper, which challenges the assumption that a right to life inherently creates a duty not to kill. Thompson introduces a thought experiment involving a violinist to illustrate her point that one's right to life does not equate to a right to another's body or resources. The argument is nuanced, considering cases of rape and the implications of consent and autonomy in the context of pregnancy.

05:02

👶 Autonomy and the Limits of Obligation in Pregnancy

This paragraph delves into the implications of the 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument, specifically addressing the小提琴家' thought experiment. The speaker argues that the violinist's right to life does not morally obligate an unwilling individual to be connected to them for an extended period. The discussion extends to the idea that a woman's decision to have sex does not equate to a consent to bear a child, drawing parallels to other situations where consent can be withdrawn. The paragraph also raises the question of whether creating a life gives one a special obligation to sustain it, using the example of a doctor who saves a life but is not obligated to provide ongoing life support.

10:04

🧠 The Lack of a Valuable Future in Early Stages of Life

The final paragraph presented introduces the 'no valuable future flow' argument, which posits that killing is wrong because it deprives an individual of a valuable future. The argument is applied to zygotes, embryos, and fetuses, suggesting that since they lack unified consciousness, their destruction does not deprive them of a valuable future. The speaker discusses the biological perspective that cells are regularly replaced in the body, but it is the unified consciousness that gives value to life. The paragraph concludes by suggesting that while abortion may not be wrong because of the lack of wrongness in killing at early stages, it can still be wrong for other reasons, such as cruelty or a lack of appreciation for the value of life.

Keywords

💡Pro-choice

Pro-choice refers to the belief that a woman has the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion. In the video, the presenter discusses pro-choice arguments, emphasizing the debate around the moral and legal aspects of abortion. The term is central to the video's theme as it sets the stage for exploring different philosophical perspectives on abortion rights.

💡Right to life

The 'right to life' is a philosophical and legal principle suggesting that every individual has an inherent right to live. In the context of the video, it is used to explore the argument that even if a fetus has a right to life, it does not necessarily impose an obligation on a woman to sustain that life, challenging traditional pro-life stances.

💡Violinist argument

The 'violinist argument' is a thought experiment introduced by Judith Jarvis Thompson to illustrate the concept that having a right to life does not automatically confer a right to another person's body. In the video, this argument is used to support the idea that a woman's body autonomy should not be compromised by the life of a fetus, even if it is assumed to have a right to life.

💡Autonomy

Autonomy in the video refers to an individual's right to self-governance, particularly in decisions regarding their own body. It is a key concept in the discussion of abortion rights, as it emphasizes the importance of a woman's control over her own body and life choices, independent of any obligations to a fetus.

💡Unified consciousness

Unified consciousness is a concept used in the video to describe the coherent and continuous sense of self-awareness that is typically associated with personhood. The argument suggests that since fetuses lack this unified consciousness, their potential for a valuable future like ours is not present, and thus, the moral wrongness of killing (in the traditional sense) does not apply to them.

💡Zygote, embryo, and fetus

These terms refer to different stages of prenatal development: a zygote is a fertilized egg, an embryo is the early developmental stage, and a fetus is the later stage before birth. The video discusses these stages to argue that at certain points, they may not possess the unified consciousness necessary for the moral considerations typically associated with personhood.

💡Moral obligation

Moral obligation is a duty or responsibility that an individual feels compelled to fulfill based on ethical principles. In the video, it is discussed in the context of whether a woman has a moral obligation to carry a pregnancy to term, even if it is argued that the fetus has a right to life.

💡Personhood

Personhood is a concept that refers to the status of being a person, often associated with rights and moral considerations. The video explores the debate over when a fetus attains personhood and whether this attainment should influence the moral and legal considerations of abortion.

💡Consent

Consent in the video is discussed in the context of sexual activity and the implications it may have for the moral obligations regarding pregnancy. It is used to argue that even if a woman consents to sex, which could lead to pregnancy, it does not necessarily mean she has consented to carry the child to term.

💡Hardship

Hardship in the video refers to the potential difficulties or suffering that might be caused by bringing a child into existence. The presenter suggests that in some cases, the hardship associated with having a child might make it morally justifiable not to have an abortion, challenging the idea that abortion is always wrong.

Highlights

Introduction of two pro-choice arguments: one posits that abortion is permissible even if the fetus has a right to life, and the other argues that abortion is permissible because fetuses don't have a right to life.

The 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument challenges the assumption that if fetuses have a right to life, there is a duty not to kill them.

Judith Jarvis Thompson's influential paper on abortion, which introduced a new perspective on the debate.

The 'violinist' thought experiment by Thompson to illustrate the argument that a right to life does not impose an obligation on others to sustain that life.

Critique of the violinist argument, suggesting it may apply more to cases of rape where the pregnancy was not consented to.

Argument that consent to sex does not equate to consent to pregnancy, using the analogy of a money clip left on a table.

Discussion on whether previous decisions, like consenting to sex, create an obligation to carry a child.

The 'no V-flow' argument, which claims that killing is wrong because it takes away a valuable future, but fetuses lack the unified consciousness to have such a future.

Biological perspective on the 'no V-flow' argument, noting that cells in the human body are replaced but the unified consciousness persists.

Challenge to the 'no V-flow' argument, pointing out that it might not be wrong to kill a zygote, embryo, or fetus, but this does not mean it is morally right.

The potential for abortion to be wrong not because killing a fetus is wrong, but for other reasons such as cruelty or inappropriate valuation of life.

The possibility that not having an abortion could be wrong if bringing a child into existence would cause significant hardship.

Conclusion that abortion is not inherently wrong because of the act of killing a fetus, but can be wrong for various other reasons on a case-by-case basis.

The importance of considering the context and individual circumstances when evaluating the morality of abortion.

Transcripts

I'm going to present to you two kinds of

pro-choice arguments still just two

arguments like I did with the pro-life

but two kinds and I'm gonna call the

first the abortion is permissible even

if the fetus has a right to life

argument I'm going to call it the right

to life does not generate obligation

argument still not a good name uh but

that's what I'm gonna call it and then

I'm going to talk about the idea that

abortion is permissible because fetuses

don't have a right to life so one says

that even if fetuses have a right to

life abortion is still okay and the

other says that um abortion is okay

because fetuses do not have a right to

life so let me talk about the first one

uh first the right to life does not

generate an obligation argument and what

I'm really doing here is I'm taking the

idea of an argument by a very famous uh

pro-life argument by Judith Jarvis

Thompson she had a really interesting

paper I think it was 74 but it might

have been a little before that I'm not

sure

um but a really interesting paper on

abortion what everybody had been doing

to that point is arguing over whether or

not fetuses have a right to life and

that it was just assumed that if fetuses

have a right to life then there's an

obligation not to there's a duty not to

kill them

um and

uh Thompson

agreed that fetuses did not have a right

to lie but she said well what if I

assumed for the sake of argument that

fetuses do have a right to life I think

even if I assume that which I don't

believe I can argue that abortion is

still permissible and so she comes out

with this uh article and it really

changed a lot of the way that people

thought about abortion especially in

cases of rape

um

but it had kind of long reaching effects

people's when you read on abortion

um it will always be included in that

discussion this article this argument

um you might have heard it referred to

as the violinist argument and you'll see

why in a little bit but let me just kind

of give you the version of it uh what

she says it's not exactly how she puts

it but something like this

um the right to life does not generate

an obligation argument so the argument

goes something like this a right to life

does not generate a an obligation

um for someone else to say in that life

or the way I have it in my notes a right

to life does not generate a right to

someone else's body to sustain that life

so if you have a right to life that

doesn't mean you have a right to

somebody else's body in order to sustain

that life or anything that has a right

to life doesn't have necessarily have a

right to use somebody else's body to

sustain that life so that's the first

premise the second premise it just says

so even if a fetus has a right to life

it does not follow that a pregnant woman

has an obligation to offer her body to

sustain that life so she says a right to

life does not generate an obligation for

somebody else to sustain that life so

even if a fetus has a right to life it

doesn't create an obligation on a

pregnant woman to sustain that life

how does she support this really

interesting thought experiment she's

she's great or she was great she passed

away unfortunately she was great about

these cool thought experiments and weird

thought experiments that she has in this

particular article has a lot of very

strange ones and that wasn't the only in

her career either but

um so she has one of the weird thought

experiments that she has is called the

violinist argument and what she says is

imagine that you and it's important

that's you it's nobody else it's you go

to sleep tonight and you wake up and you

find yourself attached to all these

medical tubes and stuff like this

remember this in the 70s

um to a famous violinist a very good

violinist overnight the society for

Musicians music lovers

um discovered that

the violinist was definitely ill and

um only you would be a match for

sustaining that violinist life and so

they attached to these tubes and if you

stay there for nine months and let that

person's blood pass through your kidneys

or whatever however it works your body

keeps them alive nine months then he'll

be okay and he can be separated at that

time

jar uh Thompson argues that it's not

clear that the violinists right to life

which he clearly has a right to life

just like you and me the violinist has a

right to life it's not clear that that

violinist right to life

um creates an obligation on you to

sustain that life it's nice of you to do

that it would be great of you to stay

hooked up to that guy for nine months

and and

um get him better but you have things to

do right you have families and stuff

like that

um and if nine months just sounds like

well okay yeah that's that sucks but I

would do it uh she said well extend that

then say it's nine years right she was

May say nine months because it was

um the the idea of pregnancy to say it

was nine years

um

you know I have grandkids and um and

people in my life that I and I got a job

and all of those things and I can't be

strapped to this person for nine years

um it would be nice of me true and nice

of you true to stay hooked up to this

person but you have goals you're at

college presumably because you have a

goal of graduating and working and doing

all those things and you can't do that

attached to this person and so the idea

here with the violin is now again you

might think there's a difference between

nine months nine years and all that kind

of stuff but again the idea is that just

because

we could keep extending that 90 years

whatever you want but at some point I

think most people would agree that that

person's right to life

while it's real doesn't override your

right to autonomy to choose what to do

with your body that you don't have to

you know it's nice of you it's great of

you to stay hooked up to the person but

it's not required morally required for

you to do that it would be a good thing

for you to do that but it's not morally

required that's the idea think about 20

years or whatever again the violinist

has a right to life but it's not clear

that you have a obligation to sustain

that life now

so it the the violentist example is

supposed to just prove that point that

one point that's all it's supposed to do

the violence example is supposed to

prove that a right to life doesn't

create an obligation on somebody else to

sustain it and she has these other

things that are really interesting you

know so like

um she said she has a sickness that only

the cool Touch of Henry Fonda you

wouldn't know that uh updated with I

don't know Chris Pine probably for most

of you that's uh all the Chris's are too

old too but whoever Harry Styles whoever

kids these days like I don't know right

uh you know just even if it's only his

healing touch only his touch on his head

uh on your head would heal you it would

be nice of that person to travel across

the United States and touch you on the

head but they don't have an obligation

to do that right so a right to life

doesn't necessarily create an obligation

on somebody else that's just to sustain

your life now a problem for this is

probably obvious to you

um people say look a woman who has

intercourse understands that intercourse

can lead sex can lead to the generation

of a life and they argue that because

the woman through her actions generated

the life she has a special obligation to

that life and the violinist case if it

is successful at all would apply in

cases of rape right because uh you went

to sleep and were plugged into it

against your will so um that would be in

the case of pregnancy because of rape

that would make sense because that

person's right to life the fetus is

Right to Life you didn't do anything

consciously that created that life and

so you don't have any special

obligations to it right

um so some people have pointed out that

it makes a lot of sense in the case of

rape but maybe not in anything else now

there are some responses to that too uh

for one thing it's not clear that

agreeing to have sex with somebody is

agreeing to carry a child if one is

produced

um so imagine so I always have a problem

uh with my wallet in my pocket you know

it hurts my back and something like that

and so say instead of carrying wallets I

carry money clips and I just so happen

to have gone to the bank to because we

send money to Peru and I have a ton of

money that I don't usually have in my

wallet right now but and so it's really

thick and heavy and it's not usually

thick and heavy I don't usually carry a

lot of money around but anyway it has a

lot and it hurts my back right and let's

say that I didn't have a while I just

had a money clip and so I just put it on

the table and um that's usually what we

do you know at a restaurant when we

leave a tip and I walk away and realize

oh no I didn't mean to do that and so um

just because I put money on the table

and forgot to pick it up it might be

uncomfortable

um for me to go back and and tell a

waiter no that's not your tip I need it

back but it doesn't seem like just

because I made a decision like that when

I didn't intend to give it uh just

because I because I didn't intend to

give it as tip it doesn't mean now I'm

obligated to go through with it so a

person who has sex and doesn't intend

um to have a child it doesn't seem like

that should obligate them then to go

through with that

um also it's not clear that one a person

signs away their autonomy by previous

decisions so I need to come up with a

better example of this I apologize if

this offends anybody and this one was on

my mind because I watched this

documentary on porn and um and they one

of the scenes was really really brutal

and the camera people like walked away

from it

um

because it was supposed to be this

violent scene but anyway so let's say

that there's a porn actress who agrees

consents to uh a like rough stimulated

um violent uh sex act

um but then as she's going through with

it

um says you know what this is too much I

mean I saw the videos and you guys told

me were honest with me what was going on

but this is just too much it brings up

too many memories or whatever I don't

want to do it right it's not like you

can say no you committed to doing this

and so you know we're gonna do whatever

that that would be rape right

um at that point

so even though she agreed and consented

to it at the time you know she could

lose her contractual obligations and all

that kind of stuff right but what she

did but just because she agreed to it

doesn't mean that she has an obligation

then to go through it so even if

somebody was having sex with the

intention of having a child it doesn't

seem like that creates an obligation for

them then to go through with having a

child because maybe once she experiences

it maybe the situations have changed

um maybe a partner's left or something

like that

um maybe once she experienced it says no

this was more than I handle uh I I you

know took into account just like the the

porn actress and so it doesn't look like

our commitments beforehand always create

an obligation to follow through with

those right and then lastly a problem

that says it's not clear that one has an

obligation to provide for another

another person's needs when they're

responsible for that person's existence

so we say hey there's a special

obligation the mom you know she had sex

and so you know she knew what could

happen but even if we are responsible

for somebody being alive it doesn't seem

that we do in many cases have an

obligation to sustain that life right so

imagine that there is a doctor who gives

the violinist a drug that will keep him

alive for 10 years but after he'll need

the doctor's kidneys and only the

doctor's kidneys it doesn't seem like

the doctor would be obligated then to

give that person use of the kidneys even

though he's responsible for him being

alive because he gave him the drug right

and so just

um just

giving the person life or ensuring that

they had life doesn't seem like you have

an obligation to sustain that life all

right so that is uh kind of Thompson's

argument and some problems and some

ideas about that I'm going to try to say

a little bit or get started on the no V

flow argument so the no V flow argument

goes from Marcus's argument because I

think there's something right about it

right

and it says killing is wrong because it

takes away one's valuable future like

ours

only the second premise only something

with the unified Consciousness has a

valuable future like ours zygotes

embryos and fetuses do not have a

unified Consciousness therefore killing

zygous and embryos and fetuses does not

take away a valuable future like ours

and so it doesn't capture the wrongness

of killing so there's nothing wrong with

it doesn't say there's something right

with it just says there's nothing wrong

with uh killing them and for support of

this somebody might point out that

biology doesn't have a v flow like we

talked about before every cell in the

human body I think maybe there's a

couple that are sticky but most every

cell in the human body is replaced

several times within an average life

what survives though is that unified

Consciousness that Consciousness that

you see yourself as an individual as as

a whole and that's the only thing that

can value anything at all and so that's

the only thing that has a valuable

future the brain can't sustain a unified

Consciousness in a zygote embryo fetus

there's no organized brain activity you

don't see Alpha Beta delta waves until

about 25 to 32 weeks depending on

um and there's no clear indication of a

unified Consciousness until at least 18

months after birth now that creates a

whole other problem right

um so uh it looks like the romness of

killing isn't in that right and so it

wouldn't be wrong to have an abortion

because the wrongness of killing

um the conditions for the wrongness of

killing aren't there this unified

Consciousness now uh this doesn't prove

the problem for this is that it doesn't

prove that killing a zygote embryo fetus

is okay it's just not wrong in the same

way as a killing other uh things it

might even work against

infanticide you might have to this might

say that infanticide is okay which seems

obviously wrong so let me just say

quickly my conclusion for what it's

worth which is worth nothing abortion

doesn't seem to be wrong because killing

zygos fetuses or embryos is wrong but

can and often is wrong in other ways

maybe on a case-by-case uh basis uh this

is what my whole dissertation was about

that sometimes it might be that a person

doesn't have an appropriate sense of awe

that they could be acting cruelly that

they could wrongly assess the value

value of motherhood that if they have an

inappropriate understanding of

disabilities or something like that

um sometimes even if even if it's wrong

not it might be wrong not to have an

abortion when bringing a child into uh

existence would bring a great hardship

okay that's all I have time for sorry