Ilya Sutskever (OpenAI Chief Scientist) - Building AGI, Alignment, Spies, Microsoft, & Enlightenment

Dwarkesh Podcast
27 Mar 202347:41

Summary

TLDR在这次激动人心的采访中,OpenAI的联合创始人兼首席科学家Ilya Sutskever深入探讨了他在人工智能领域取得多项重大突破的背后动力和方法。他强调了持续的努力、对未来的愿景以及与可靠性和可控性挑战的斗争。Ilya对当前人工智能的经济价值、潜在的滥用风险、以及朝着人工通用智能(AGI)迈进的路上可能出现的发展窗口进行了深刻见解。此外,他还讨论了对未来的展望,包括人工智能在社会中的作用、与人类智能的比较,以及他对科技与人类未来共生的思考。

Takeaways

  • 😀 伊利亚·苏茨克弗表示,他能在AI领域取得多个突破的原因是极其努力和全力以赴。
  • 🤖 针对GPT潜在的不法使用,苏茨克弗认为这些风险现实存在,预计将来会有更多此类事件发生。
  • 🔍 在大规模追踪非法使用GPT方面,苏茨克弗认为这是可能的,需要特别的操作来实现。
  • 💡 苏茨克弗认为AI产业在达到通用人工智能(AGI)之前将经历多年的经济增值期。
  • 🚀 对于AI的经济影响,苏茨克弗预计将有显著增长,但具体的GDP占比难以精确预测。
  • 🤔 在讨论AI的可靠性问题时,苏茨克弗表示如果AI的可靠性不达标,将严重限制其经济价值。
  • 🌐 在讨论AI发展的下一步时,苏茨克弗认为现有的生成模型方法将会带来巨大进步,但可能还不是达到AGI的最终形态。
  • ✨ 苏茨克弗对AI进行强化学习的趋势表达了乐观态度,尤其是在自动化和与AI合作方面。
  • 🔧 关于AI硬件的讨论中,苏茨克弗表示现有硬件已足够支持当前的AI研究和应用。
  • 📊 苏茨克弗强调AI对世界的深远影响,认为人类可能需要与AI合作,以理解和解决未来的复杂问题。

Q & A

  • 伊利亚·苏茨克沃表示,为什么他能在其领域取得多次重大突破?

    -他表示,这是因为他非常努力,全力以赴,这一方法迄今为止有效。

  • 为什么目前还没有更多非法使用GPT的情况出现?

    -伊利亚认为,可能是因为还没有大规模地使用这项技术进行非法活动,但他也不排除这种情况正在发生。

  • 人工智能在达到AGI之前的经济价值窗口有多大?

    -伊利亚认为,这是一个好几年的时间窗口,因为人工智能在成为AGI之前的价值会以指数方式年复一年地增加。

  • 为什么在2030年人工智能对GDP的贡献百分比难以预测?

    -因为伊利亚认为他的误差范围是对数级的,可以想象一个巨大的百分比,也可以想象一个令人失望的小百分比。

  • 如果2030年人工智能经济价值较小,伊利亚认为最可能的原因是什么?

    -如果真的发生这种情况,伊利亚认为最可能的原因是可靠性问题,即人们需要不断检查人工智能的答案,这限制了其经济价值。

  • 未来是否有可能完全不需要人类干预就能进行人工智能的增强学习?

    -伊利亚认为,确实有可能实现这一点,未来的模型可能主要依赖于人工智能自我学习,而不是依赖于人类的直接干预。

  • 为什么人工智能在进行多步骤推理时看似表现不佳?

    -伊利亚解释说,人工智能在不允许“大声思考”时在多步骤推理方面似乎表现不佳,但允许它们这样做时,它们表现得相当好。

  • 伊利亚如何看待人工智能对数据需求可能达到极限的情况?

    -他认为,虽然目前数据情况还不错,但未来某一天数据会耗尽,届时需要寻找其他方式来训练模型,提高其能力。

  • 伊利亚认为,在人工智能研究中哪种方向最有希望?

    -他认为,将来可能需要将过去的所有不同想法整合在一起,而不是仅依赖当前的某个特定范式。

  • 在谈到未来人工智能的发展时,伊利亚是否认为当前的硬件是一个限制因素?

    -伊利亚认为,当前的硬件并不是限制因素,虽然他希望硬件成本更低,但总体上硬件对于人工智能的发展并不构成障碍。

Outlines

00:00

😊 伊利亚·苏茨克沃的科研成就

伊利亚·苏茨克沃谈到了他如何能够在自己的领域中取得多项重大突破。他强调了坚持不懈和全力以赴的重要性,并讨论了GPT的潜在非法使用及其防范措施。他还提到了AI技术在未达到通用人工智能(AGI)之前的经济价值窗口期,并探讨了自动驾车技术与AI模型发展的类比。

05:00

😃 AI技术的应用与风险

苏茨克沃讨论了AI在现实世界中可能遇到的挑战,尤其是在可靠性方面。他指出,虽然技术已经成熟,但其可靠性仍是一个未知数。此外,他探讨了生成模型之后的AI研究方向,并对超越人类性能的可能性提出了见解。苏茨克沃还谈到了通过增强学习让AI自我进步的前景,并展望了人机协作的未来。

10:06

😌 AI模型的多步推理与数据获取

在这一部分中,苏茨克沃讨论了AI模型在多步推理方面的表现及其提升空间。他强调了允许模型“大声思考”的重要性,并探讨了未来可能面临的数据短缺问题。他还评估了不同数据来源的价值,并对单模态与多模态学习的潜力进行了比较。

15:09

😎 AI对社会和经济的长远影响

苏茨克沃提出了关于AI对社会和经济长远影响的思考,包括AI在2030年对GDP的贡献。他探讨了AI技术未能创造预期经济价值的可能原因,并讨论了AI的可靠性和技术成熟度。此外,他对AI未来发展的路线图和潜在的研究方向进行了展望。

20:12

🤖 AI技术的未来发展和应用

在这一段中,苏茨克沃讨论了AI技术的未来发展方向,特别是在生成模型之后的研究领域。他对超越人类性能的AI的可能性表达了乐观态度,并探讨了通过增强学习实现AI自我进步的方法。苏茨克沃还预测了AI在教育和理解模型行为方面的潜力。

25:16

🧠 AI技术的对齐和安全问题

苏茨克沃在这一部分中探讨了AI技术的对齐和安全问题,特别是随着模型变得越来越强大,确保它们的行为与人类价值观一致的重要性。他讨论了不同的研究方向,并对AI对齐的最有前景的方法进行了评估。此外,他对AI模型理解和监管的未来进行了预测。

30:20

💡 AI技术发展的趋势和挑战

在最后一部分,苏茨克沃讨论了AI技术发展的趋势和挑战,包括硬件的影响、数据获取和处理的问题以及AI研究的未来方向。他还讨论了AI技术的民主化和如何保证AI系统的安全和有效性。最后,苏茨克沃分享了他对AI未来和人类社会将如何适应这些变化的见解。

Mindmap

Keywords

💡深度学习

深度学习是一种通过使用多层神经网络模拟人脑处理信息的方式,实现机器学习的技术。在视频中,Ilya Sutskever作为OpenAI的联合创始人和首席科学家,他在AI领域的多次突破大多与深度学习技术的发展密切相关。深度学习使得计算机能够在视觉识别、语言处理等多个领域实现接近甚至超越人类的性能。

💡AGI

AGI,即人工通用智能,是指一种具备广泛学习能力、理解能力和创造力的AI,能在任何人类智能可以执行的领域中表现出色。视频中提到,尽管AI技术正在快速发展,但达到AGI还有一段时间,这一过程中AI将带来巨大的经济价值。

💡GPT

GPT(Generative Pre-trained Transformer)是一个自然语言处理模型,通过大量文本数据预训练,能够生成连贯、相关的文本内容。在视频中,提及GPT的使用可能带来的风险,包括被滥用于传播虚假信息等,但同时也讨论了其检测这类滥用的能力。

💡可靠性

在AI领域,可靠性指的是模型输出的准确性和一致性。视频中Ilya Sutskever强调,如果AI模型在实际应用中不能达到高度的可靠性,那么它们创造的经济价值将受到限制。可靠性是确保AI系统安全、有效应用的关键因素之一。

💡模型训练

模型训练是机器学习中的一个核心概念,指的是使用数据集对算法进行训练,以使其学会识别模式或进行预测。在视频中,提到了使用大量数据训练GPT等模型,以及通过增强学习从人类反馈中进一步优化模型。

💡经济价值

经济价值是指AI技术在各个领域应用产生的商业和社会效益。Ilya Sutskever指出,尽管目前还未达到AGI,但AI已经在创造显著的经济价值,并预计这一趋势将持续多年。这体现了AI技术对于推动经济发展的重要作用。

💡增强学习

增强学习是一种AI训练方法,通过奖励或惩罚机制来指导模型做出正确的决策。视频中提到,增强学习被用于训练GPT等模型,帮助它们更好地理解人类语言和行为。这是实现复杂决策和任务自动化的关键技术之一。

💡对抗性训练

对抗性训练是一种提高模型鲁棒性和安全性的方法,通过训练模型识别和抵抗对抗性攻击。视频讨论了在AI模型,特别是GPT模型中使用对抗性训练的重要性,以防止模型被用于不良用途。

💡多模态学习

多模态学习涉及从文本、图像、声音等多种数据类型中学习,以提高AI的理解和交互能力。Ilya Sutskever提到,虽然目前文本数据仍有很大的开发潜力,但探索多模态学习是一个富有成果的方向,能够进一步拓展AI的应用场景。

💡算法改进

算法改进是提高AI性能的重要途径,包括优化现有算法和开发新算法。视频中强调了持续对算法进行改进的重要性,以实现更高的效率、可靠性和应用范围。Ilya Sutskever提到,即使在数据量不再增长的情况下,算法改进也能显著提升模型性能。

Highlights

伊利亚·苏茨克弗解释了自己在多个领域取得突破的秘诀,强调了全力以赴的重要性。

苏茨克弗讨论了GPT未被非法用途广泛利用的原因,提出可能是缺乏足够的认识或尚未大规模实施。

他确认有可能追踪到GPT被非法使用的情况,但这需要特殊的操作。

苏茨克弗预测,在达到人工通用智能(AGI)之前,人工智能将会是一个长期的经济增值窗口。

他探讨了自动驾驶汽车的进展,将其作为理解AGI发展进程的一个类比。

苏茨克弗谈到了未来人工智能对GDP的潜在贡献,承认这是一个难以预测的问题。

他指出,如果人工智能的经济影响低于预期,可能是因为可靠性问题。

在谈到未来的AI模型时,苏茨克弗认为多模式学习是一个富有成果的方向。

他预测,即使在数据资源耗尽时,算法改进也能带来性能提升。

苏茨克弗提出了对强化学习在AI发展中角色的看法,特别是人类反馈在训练奖励函数中的作用。

他讨论了去人类化AI训练过程的可能性,以实现更高效的自我改进。

苏茨克弗解释了多步推理在AI中的挑战,强调了允许AI“大声思考”的重要性。

他探讨了人工智能在未来可能面临的数据饥饿问题,以及如何克服这一挑战。

苏茨克弗对人工智能与人类工作共存的未来表示乐观,强调人机协作的重要性。

他谈到了在达到AGI之后个人寻求意义和目标的挑战,以及AI如何帮助人类更好地理解世界。

苏茨克弗对于人工智能未来的发展方向持开放态度,认为灵感可能来自于人类或其他途径。

Transcripts

play00:43

Today I have the pleasure of  interviewing Ilya Sutskever,  

play00:47

who is the Co-founder and Chief Scientist of  OpenAI. Ilya, welcome to The Lunar Society.  

play00:52

Thank you, happy to be here. First question and no humility  

play00:55

allowed. There are not that many scientists who  will make a big breakthrough in their field,  

play01:01

there are far fewer scientists who will make  multiple independent breakthroughs that define  

play01:05

their field throughout their career, what  is the difference? What distinguishes you  

play01:10

from other researchers? Why have you been able  to make multiple breakthroughs in your field?  

play01:13

Thank you for the kind words. It's hard to  answer that question. I try really hard,  

play01:21

I give it everything I've got and that has worked  so far. I think that's all there is to it.  

play01:30

Got it. What's the explanation for why  there aren't more illicit uses of GPT?  

play01:35

Why aren't more foreign governments using it  to spread propaganda or scam grandmothers?  

play01:42

Maybe they haven't really gotten to do it a lot.  But it also wouldn't surprise me if some of it  

play01:49

was going on right now. I can certainly imagine  they would be taking some of the open source  

play01:52

models and trying to use them for that purpose.  For sure I would expect this to be something  

play02:00

they'd be interested in the future. It's technically possible they just  

play02:03

haven't thought about it enough? Or haven't done it at scale using  

play02:06

their technology. Or maybe it is  happening, which is annoying.  

play02:09

Would you be able to track  it if it was happening?  

play02:10

I think large-scale tracking is possible, yes. It  requires special operations but it's possible.  

play02:18

Now there's some window in which AI is  very economically valuable, let’s say on  

play02:23

the scale of airplanes, but we haven't  reached AGI yet. How big is that window?  

play02:29

It's hard to give a precise answer  and it’s definitely going to be a  

play02:32

good multi-year window. It's also a question of  definition. Because AI, before it becomes AGI,  

play02:41

is going to be increasingly more valuable  year after year in an exponential way. 

play02:51

In hindsight, it may feel like there was only  one year or two years because those two years  

play02:55

were larger than the previous years. But I would  say that already, last year, there has been a fair  

play03:03

amount of economic value produced by AI. Next year  is going to be larger and larger after that. So  

play03:10

I think it's going to be a good multi-year  chunk of time where that’s going to be true,  

play03:16

from now till AGI pretty much. Okay. Because I'm curious if there's  

play03:21

a startup that's using your model, at some point  if you have AGI there's only one business in the  

play03:25

world, it's OpenAI. How much window does  any business have where they're actually  

play03:30

producing something that AGI can’t produce? It's the same question as asking how long until  

play03:36

AGI. It's a hard question to answer. I hesitate  to give you a number. Also because there is this  

play03:43

effect where optimistic people who are working  on the technology tend to underestimate the time  

play03:50

it takes to get there. But the way I ground  myself is by thinking about the self-driving  

play03:55

car. In particular, there is an analogy  where if you look at the size of a Tesla,  

play04:00

and if you look at its self-driving behavior, it  looks like it does everything. But it's also clear  

play04:09

that there is still a long way to go in terms of  reliability. And we might be in a similar place  

play04:14

with respect to our models where it also looks  like we can do everything, and at the same time,  

play04:20

we will need to do some more work until we really  iron out all the issues and make it really good  

play04:26

and really reliable and robust and well behaved. By 2030, what percent of GDP is AI?  

play04:31

Oh gosh, very hard to answer that question. Give me an over-under.  

play04:36

The problem is that my error bars are in log  scale. I could imagine a huge percentage,  

play04:41

I could imagine a really disappointing  small percentage at the same time.  

play04:44

Okay, so let's take the counterfactual where it  is a small percentage. Let's say it's 2030 and not  

play04:49

that much economic value has been created by these  LLMs. As unlikely as you think this might be,  

play04:53

what would be your best explanation right  now of why something like this might happen?  

play05:00

I really don't think that's a likely possibility,  that's the preface to the comment. But  

play05:08

if I were to take the premise of your question,  why were things disappointing in terms of  

play05:13

real-world impact? My answer would be reliability.  If it somehow ends up being the case that  

play05:22

you really want them to be reliable and they  ended up not being reliable, or if reliability  

play05:26

turned out to be harder than we expect. I really don't think that will be the case.  

play05:31

But if I had to pick one and you were telling  me — hey, why didn't things work out? It would  

play05:37

be reliability. That you still have to look  over the answers and double-check everything.  

play05:42

That just really puts a damper on the economic  value that can be produced by those systems.  

play05:47

Got it. They will be technologically  mature, it’s just the question of  

play05:49

whether they'll be reliable enough. Well, in some sense, not reliable means  

play05:53

not technologically mature. Yeah, fair enough.  

play05:57

What's after generative models? Before, you  were working on reinforcement learning. Is this  

play06:02

basically it? Is this the paradigm that gets  us to AGI? Or is there something after this?  

play06:05

I think this paradigm is gonna go really, really  far and I would not underestimate it. It's quite  

play06:10

likely that this exact paradigm is not quite  going to be the AGI form factor. I hesitate  

play06:17

to say precisely what the next paradigm will  be but it will probably involve integration of  

play06:24

all the different ideas that came in the past. Is there some specific one you're referring to?  

play06:33

It's hard to be specific. So you could argue that  

play06:35

next-token prediction can only help us match  human performance and maybe not surpass it?  

play06:40

What would it take to surpass human performance? I challenge the claim that next-token prediction  

play06:45

cannot surpass human performance. On the surface,  it looks like it cannot. It looks like if you  

play06:53

just learn to imitate, to predict what people  do, it means that you can only copy people.  

play07:00

But here is a counter argument for why it might  not be quite so. If your base neural net is smart  

play07:07

enough, you just ask it — What would a person  with great insight, wisdom, and capability do?  

play07:15

Maybe such a person doesn't exist, but there's  a pretty good chance that the neural net will  

play07:19

be able to extrapolate how such a person  would behave. Do you see what I mean?  

play07:25

Yes, although where would  it get that sort of insight  

play07:27

about what that person would do? If not from… From the data of regular people. Because if you  

play07:32

think about it, what does it mean to predict  the next token well enough? It's actually a  

play07:38

much deeper question than it seems. Predicting  the next token well means that you understand  

play07:45

the underlying reality that led  to the creation of that token.  

play07:52

It's not statistics. Like it is  statistics but what is statistics?  

play07:57

In order to understand those statistics to  compress them, you need to understand what  

play08:03

is it about the world that creates this set of  statistics? And so then you say — Well, I have all  

play08:08

those people. What is it about people that creates  their behaviors? Well they have thoughts and their  

play08:14

feelings, and they have ideas, and they do things  in certain ways. All of those could be deduced  

play08:20

from next-token prediction. And I'd argue that  this should make it possible, not indefinitely but  

play08:28

to a pretty decent degree to say — Well, can you  guess what you'd do if you took a person with this  

play08:33

characteristic and that characteristic? Like such  a person doesn't exist but because you're so good  

play08:39

at predicting the next token, you should still  be able to guess what that person who would do.  

play08:42

This hypothetical, imaginary person with far  greater mental ability than the rest of us.  

play08:51

When we're doing reinforcement learning on  these models, how long before most of the  

play08:54

data for the reinforcement learning  is coming from AI and not humans?  

play08:59

Already most of the default enforcement  learning is coming from AIs.  

play09:05

The humans are being used to train the  reward function. But then the reward function  

play09:12

and its interaction with the model is automatic  and all the data that's generated during the  

play09:16

process of reinforcement learning is created by  AI. If you look at the current technique/paradigm,  

play09:25

which is getting some significant attention  because of chatGPT, Reinforcement Learning  

play09:30

from Human Feedback (RLHF). The human feedback  has been used to train the reward function  

play09:36

and then the reward function is being used  to create the data which trains the model.  

play09:40

Got it. And is there any hope of just  removing a human from the loop and have  

play09:43

it improve itself in some sort of AlphaGo way? Yeah, definitely. The thing you really want is for  

play09:56

the human teachers that teach the AI to  collaborate with an AI. You might want to  

play10:06

think of it as being in a world where the human  teachers do 1% of the work and the AI does 99% of  

play10:11

the work. You don't want it to be 100% AI. But you  do want it to be a human-machine collaboration,  

play10:17

which teaches the next machine. I've had a chance to play around  

play10:20

these models and they seem bad at multi-step  reasoning. While they have been getting better,  

play10:25

what does it take to really surpass that barrier? I think dedicated training will get us there.  

play10:31

More and more improvements to the  base models will get us there. But  

play10:38

fundamentally I also don't feel like they're that  bad at multi-step reasoning. I actually think that  

play10:42

they are bad at mental multistep reasoning  when they are not allowed to think out loud.  

play10:46

But when they are allowed to think out  loud, they're quite good. And I expect  

play10:50

this to improve significantly, both with  better models and with special training.  

play10:56

Are you running out of reasoning tokens on  the internet? Are there enough of them?  

play11:02

So for context on this question, there are claims  that at some point we will run out of tokens,  

play11:08

in general, to train those models. And yeah, I  think this will happen one day and by the time  

play11:13

that happens, we need to have other ways of  training models, other ways of productively  

play11:18

improving their capabilities and sharpening their  behavior, making sure they're doing exactly,  

play11:23

precisely what you want, without more data. You haven't run out of data yet? There's more?  

play11:29

Yeah, I would say the data situation is  still quite good. There's still lots to  

play11:33

go. But at some point the data will run out. What is the most valuable source of data? Is it  

play11:40

Reddit, Twitter, books? Where would you train  many other tokens of other varieties for?  

play11:46

Generally speaking, you'd like tokens  which are speaking about smarter things,  

play11:50

tokens which are more interesting.  

play11:55

All the sources which you mentioned are valuable. So maybe not Twitter. But do we need to go  

play12:01

multimodal to get more tokens? Or do  we still have enough text tokens left?  

play12:04

I think that you can still go very  far in text only but going multimodal  

play12:08

seems like a very fruitful direction. If you're comfortable talking about this,  

play12:11

where is the place where we  haven't scraped the tokens yet?  

play12:16

Obviously I can't answer that question  for us but I'm sure that for everyone  

play12:21

there is a different answer to that question. How many orders of magnitude improvement can  

play12:24

we get, not from scale or not from data,  but just from algorithmic improvements?  

play12:30

Hard to answer but I'm sure there is some. Is some a lot or some a little?  

play12:35

There’s only one way to find out. Okay. Let me get your quickfire opinions  

play12:39

about these different research directions.  Retrieval transformers. So it’s just somehow  

play12:43

storing the data outside of the model  itself and retrieving it somehow.  

play12:47

Seems promising. But do you see that as a path forward?  

play12:51

It seems promising. Robotics. Was it the right  

play12:54

step for Open AI to leave that behind? Yeah, it was. Back then it really wasn't  

play13:01

possible to continue working in robotics  because there was so little data.  

play13:06

Back then if you wanted to work on robotics, you  needed to become a robotics company. You needed  

play13:11

to have a really giant group of people working  on building robots and maintaining them. And  

play13:20

even then, if you’re gonna have 100  robots, it's a giant operation already,  

play13:24

but you're not going to get that much data. So in  a world where most of the progress comes from the  

play13:31

combination of compute and data, there was no  path to data on robotics. So back in the day,  

play13:46

when we made a decision to stop working  in robotics, there was no path forward.  

play13:51

Is there one now? I'd say that now it is possible  

play13:56

to create a path forward. But one needs to really  commit to the task of robotics. You really need  

play14:02

to say — I'm going to build many thousands, tens  of thousands, hundreds of thousands of robots,  

play14:10

and somehow collect data from them and find a  gradual path where the robots are doing something  

play14:15

slightly more useful. And then the data that is  obtained and used to train the models, and they do  

play14:22

something that's slightly more useful. You could  imagine it's this gradual path of improvement,  

play14:25

where you build more robots, they do more  things, you collect more data, and so on. But  

play14:29

you really need to be committed to this path.  If you say, I want to make robotics happen,  

play14:33

that's what you need to do. I believe that  there are companies who are doing exactly  

play14:39

that. But you need to really love robots  and need to be really willing to solve all  

play14:45

the physical and logistical problems of dealing  with them. It's not the same as software at all.  

play14:51

I think one could make progress in  robotics today, with enough motivation.  

play14:56

What ideas are you excited to try but you can't  because they don't work well on current hardware?  

play15:01

I don't think current hardware is a  limitation. It's just not the case.  

play15:05

Got it. But anything you want to  try you can just spin it up?  

play15:09

Of course. You might wish that current  hardware was cheaper or maybe it  

play15:18

would be better if it had higher  memory processing bandwidth let’s say.  

play15:23

But by and large hardware is just not an issue. Let's talk about alignment. Do you think we'll  

play15:30

ever have a mathematical definition of alignment? A mathematical definition is unlikely. Rather than  

play15:42

achieving one mathematical definition, I think  we will achieve multiple definitions that look at  

play15:48

alignment from different aspects. And that this  is how we will get the assurance that we want.  

play15:55

By which I mean you can look at the behavior in  various tests, congruence, in various adversarial  

play16:03

stress situations, you can look at how the neural  net operates from the inside. You have to look at  

play16:09

several of these factors at the same time. And how sure do you have to be before you  

play16:14

release a model in the wild? 100%? 95%? Depends on how capable the model is.  

play16:18

The more capable the model, the  more confident we need to be.  

play16:24

Alright, so let's say it's something  that's almost AGI. Where is AGI?  

play16:27

Depends on what your AGI can do. Keep  in mind that AGI is an ambiguous term.  

play16:32

Your average college undergrad is an AGI, right?  There's significant ambiguity in terms of what is  

play16:42

meant by AGI. Depending on where you put this  mark you need to be more or less confident.  

play16:49

You mentioned a few of the paths toward  alignment earlier, what is the one you  

play16:52

think is most promising at this point? I think that it will be a combination.  

play16:56

I really think that you will not want to  have just one approach. People want to have  

play17:03

a combination of approaches. Where you spend  a lot of compute adversarially to find any  

play17:09

mismatch between the behavior you want it to  teach and the behavior that it exhibits.We  

play17:14

look into the neural net using another neural net  to understand how it operates on the inside. All  

play17:21

of them will be necessary. Every approach like  this reduces the probability of misalignment.  

play17:28

And you also want to be in a world where  your degree of alignment keeps increasing  

play17:35

faster than the capability of the models. Do you think that the approaches we’ve taken  

play17:38

to understand the model today will be applicable  to the actual super-powerful models? Or how  

play17:38

applicable will they be? Is it the same kind  of thing that will work on them as well or? 

play17:38

x It's not guaranteed. I would say  

play17:39

that right now, our understanding of our models is  still quite rudimentary. We’ve made some progress  

play17:44

but much more progress is possible. And so I would  expect that ultimately, the thing that will really  

play17:49

succeed is when we will have a small neural net  that is well understood that’s been given the  

play17:55

task to study the behavior of a large neural  net that is not understood, to verify.  

play17:59

By what point is most of the  AI research being done by AI?  

play18:03

Today when you use Copilot, how do you divide  it up? So I expect at some point you ask your  

play18:13

descendant of ChatGPT, you say — Hey,  I'm thinking about this and this. Can  

play18:16

you suggest fruitful ideas I should try? And  you would actually get fruitful ideas. I don't  

play18:22

think that's gonna make it possible for you  to solve problems you couldn't solve before.  

play18:24

Got it. But it's somehow just telling the humans  giving them ideas faster or something. It's  

play18:29

not itself interacting with the research? That was one example. You could slice it in  

play18:33

a variety of ways. But the bottleneck there is  good ideas, good insights and that's something  

play18:38

that the neural nets could help us with. If you're designing a billion-dollar prize  

play18:42

for some sort of alignment research result or  product, what is the concrete criterion you  

play18:47

would set for that billion-dollar prize? Is there  something that makes sense for such a prize?  

play18:50

It's funny that you asked, I was actually  thinking about this exact question. I haven't  

play18:55

come up with the exact criterion yet. Maybe a  prize where we could say that two years later,  

play19:06

or three years or five years later, we look  back and say like that was the main result.  

play19:11

So rather than say that there is a prize  committee that decides right away, you wait  

play19:15

for five years and then award it retroactively. But there's no concrete thing we can identify  

play19:20

as you solve this particular problem  and you’ve made a lot of progress?  

play19:25

A lot of progress, yes. I wouldn't say  that this would be the full thing.  

play19:30

Do you think end-to-end training is  the right architecture for bigger  

play19:35

and bigger models? Or do we need better  ways of just connecting things together?  

play19:40

End-to-end training is very promising.  Connecting things together is very promising.  

play19:43

Everything is promising. So Open AI is projecting revenues  

play19:47

of a billion dollars in 2024. That might very  well be correct but I'm just curious, when you're  

play19:52

talking about a new general-purpose technology,  how do you estimate how big a windfall it'll be?  

play19:58

Why that particular number? We've had a product  

play20:07

for quite a while now, back from the GPT-3 days,  from two years ago through the API and we've seen  

play20:12

how it grew. We've seen how the response to  DALL-E has grown as well and you see how the  

play20:17

response to ChatGPT is, and all of this gives  us information that allows us to make relatively  

play20:23

sensible extrapolations of anything. Maybe that  would be one answer. You need to have data,  

play20:29

you can’t come up with those things out of  thin air because otherwise, your error bars  

play20:36

are going to be like 100x in each direction. But most exponentials don't stay exponential  

play20:41

especially when they get into bigger  and bigger quantities, right? So how  

play20:45

do you determine in this case? Would you bet against AI?  

play20:51

Not after talking with you. Let's talk about  what a post-AGI future looks like. I'm guessing  

play20:58

you're working 80-hour weeks towards this grand  goal that you're really obsessed with. Are you  

play21:02

going to be satisfied in a world where you're  basically living in an AI retirement home?  

play21:08

What are you personally doing after AGI comes? The question of what I'll be doing or what people  

play21:15

will be doing after AGI comes is a very tricky  question. Where will people find meaning? But  

play21:21

I think that that's something that AI could  help us with. One thing I imagine is that  

play21:29

we will be able to become more enlightened  because we interact with an AGI which will help us  

play21:35

see the world more correctly, and become better  on the inside as a result of interacting. Imagine  

play21:40

talking to the best meditation teacher in  history, that will be a helpful thing. But  

play21:46

I also think that because the world will change a  lot, it will be very hard for people to understand  

play21:52

what is happening precisely and how to  really contribute. One thing that I think  

play21:59

some people will choose to do is to become part  AI. In order to really expand their minds and  

play22:05

understanding and to really be able to solve the  hardest problems that society will face then.  

play22:10

Are you going to become part AI? It is very tempting.  

play22:14

Do you think there'll be physically  embodied humans in the year 3000?  

play22:19

3000? How do I know what’s gonna happen in 3000? Like what does it look like? Are there still  

play22:23

humans walking around on Earth? Or have  you guys thought concretely about what  

play22:26

you actually want this world to look like? Let me describe to you what I think is not quite  

play22:33

right about the question. It implies we get  to decide how we want the world to look like.  

play22:40

I don't think that picture is correct. Change  is the only constant. And so of course, even  

play22:45

after AGI is built, it doesn't mean that the world  will be static. The world will continue to change,  

play22:50

the world will continue to evolve. And it will  go through all kinds of transformations. I  

play22:57

don't think anyone has any idea of how  the world will look like in 3000. But  

play23:03

I do hope that there will be a lot of descendants  of human beings who will live happy, fulfilled  

play23:08

lives where they're free to do as they see fit.  Or they are the ones who are solving their own  

play23:14

problems. One world which I would find very  unexciting is one where we build this powerful  

play23:21

tool, and then the government said — Okay, so  the AGI said that society should be run in such  

play23:27

a way and now we should run society in such a  way. I'd much rather have a world where people  

play23:32

are still free to make their own mistakes and  suffer their consequences and gradually evolve  

play23:38

morally and progress forward on their own, with  the AGI providing more like a base safety net.  

play23:46

How much time do you spend thinking about these  kinds of things versus just doing the research?  

play23:50

I do think about those things a fair bit.  They are very interesting questions.  

play23:55

The capabilities we have today, in what ways  have they surpassed where we expected them to  

play23:59

be in 2015? And in what ways are they still not  where you'd expected them to be by this point?  

play24:05

In fairness, it's sort of what I expected in 2015.  In 2015, my thinking was a lot more — I just don't  

play24:13

want to bet against deep learning. I want to make  the biggest possible bet on deep learning. I don't  

play24:17

know how, but it will figure it out. But is there any specific way in which  

play24:21

it's been more than you expected or less than  you expected? Like some concrete prediction  

play24:26

out of 2015 that's been bounced? Unfortunately, I don't remember  

play24:31

concrete predictions I made in 2015.  But I definitely think that overall,  

play24:36

in 2015, I just wanted to move to make the  biggest bet possible on deep learning, but  

play24:44

I didn't know exactly. I didn't have a specific  idea of how far things will go in seven years. 

play24:49

Well, no in 2015, I did have all these best with  people in 2016, maybe 2017, that things will go  

play24:55

really far. But specifics. So it's like, it's  both, it's both the case that it surprised me  

play25:02

and I was making these aggressive predictions. But  maybe I believed them only 50% on the inside.  

play25:10

What do you believe now that even most  people at OpenAI would find far fetched?  

play25:16

Because we communicate a lot at OpenAI people  have a pretty good sense of what I think and  

play25:21

we've really reached the point at OpenAI where  we see eye to eye on all these questions.  

play25:25

Google has its custom TPU hardware, it has  all this data from all its users, Gmail,  

play25:31

and so on. Does it give them an  advantage in terms of training  

play25:34

bigger models and better models than you?  

play25:38

At first, when the TPU came out I was  really impressed and I thought — wow,  

play25:41

this is amazing. But that's because I  didn't quite understand hardware back then.  

play25:45

What really turned out to be the case is  that TPUs and GPUs are almost the same thing. 

play25:52

They are very, very similar. The  GPU chip is a little bit bigger,  

play25:59

the TPU chip is a little bit smaller, maybe a  little bit cheaper. But then they make more GPUs  

play26:03

and TPUs so the GPUs might be cheaper after all. But fundamentally, you have a big processor,  

play26:10

and you have a lot of memory and there is a  bottleneck between those two. And the problem  

play26:16

that both the TPU and the GPU are trying to  solve is that the amount of time it takes you  

play26:21

to move one floating point from the memory to the  processor, you can do several hundred floating  

play26:26

point operations on the processor, which means  that you have to do some kind of batch processing.  

play26:30

And in this sense, both of these architectures  are the same. So I really feel like in some sense,  

play26:37

the only thing that matters about hardware  is cost per flop and overall systems cost.  

play26:44

There isn't that much difference? Actually, I don't know. I don't know  

play26:47

what the TPU costs are but I would suspect  that if anything, TPUs are probably more  

play26:54

expensive because there are less of them. When you are doing your work, how much of the time  

play26:58

is spent configuring the right initializations?  Making sure the training run goes well and getting  

play27:04

the right hyperparameters, and how much is  it just coming up with whole new ideas?  

play27:07

I would say it's a combination. Coming  up with whole new ideas is a modest part  

play27:16

of the work. Certainly coming up with new  ideas is important but even more important  

play27:20

is to understand the results, to understand the  existing ideas, to understand what's going on. 

play27:26

A neural net is a very complicated system,  right? And you ran it, and you get some behavior,  

play27:31

which is hard to understand. What's going  on? Understanding the results, figuring out  

play27:36

what next experiment to run, a lot of the time is  spent on that. Understanding what could be wrong,  

play27:41

what could have caused the neural net to  produce a result which was not expected. 

play27:48

I'd say a lot of time is spent coming up  with new ideas as well. I don't like this  

play27:57

framing as much. It's not that it's false but  the main activity is actually understanding.  

play28:03

What do you see as the  difference between the two?  

play28:05

At least in my mind, when you say come up  with new ideas, I'm like — Oh, what happens  

play28:09

if it did such and such? Whereas understanding  it's more like — What is this whole thing? What  

play28:15

are the real underlying phenomena that are  going on? What are the underlying effects?  

play28:22

Why are we doing things this way  and not another way? And of course,  

play28:24

this is very adjacent to what can be described  as coming up with ideas. But the understanding  

play28:30

part is where the real action takes place. Does that describe your entire career? If you  

play28:34

think back on something like ImageNet, was that  more new idea or was that more understanding?  

play28:38

Well, that was definitely understanding. It  was a new understanding of very old things.  

play28:44

What has the experience of  training on Azure been like?  

play28:49

Fantastic. Microsoft has been a very,  very good partner for us. They've really  

play28:56

helped take Azure and bring it to a  point where it's really good for ML  

play29:04

and we’re super happy with it. How vulnerable is the whole AI  

play29:08

ecosystem to something that might happen in  Taiwan? So let's say there's a tsunami in Taiwan  

play29:13

or something, what happens to AI in general? It's definitely going to be a significant setback.  

play29:24

No one will be able to get more compute for a few  years. But I expect compute will spring up. For  

play29:29

example, I believe that Intel has fabs just like  a few generations ago. So that means that if Intel  

play29:35

wanted to they could produce something GPU-like  from four years ago. But yeah, it's not the best, 

play29:41

I'm actually not sure if my statement about Intel  is correct, but I do know that there are fabs  

play29:49

outside of Taiwan, they're just not as good. But  you can still use them and still go very far with  

play29:54

them. It's just cost, it’s just a setback. Would inference get cost prohibitive as  

play29:59

these models get bigger and bigger? I have a different way of looking at  

play30:02

this question. It's not that inference will  become cost prohibitive. Inference of better  

play30:07

models will indeed become more expensive. But  is it prohibitive? That depends on how useful it  

play30:15

is. If it is more useful than it is  expensive then it is not prohibitive. 

play30:19

To give you an analogy, suppose you want  to talk to a lawyer. You have some case  

play30:23

or need some advice or something, you're  perfectly happy to spend $400 an hour.  

play30:29

Right? So if your neural net could  give you really reliable legal advice,  

play30:33

you'd say — I'm happy to spend $400 for that  advice. And suddenly inference becomes very much  

play30:39

non-prohibitive. The question is, can a neural  net produce an answer good enough at this cost?  

play30:48

Yes. And you will just have price  discrimination in different models?  

play30:53

It's already the case today. On our product, the  API serves multiple neural nets of different sizes  

play31:02

and different customers use different neural nets  of different sizes depending on their use case. 

play31:07

If someone can take a small model and fine-tune  it and get something that's satisfactory for them,  

play31:12

they'll use that. But if someone wants to do  something more complicated and more interesting,  

play31:16

they’ll use the biggest model. How do you prevent these models from  

play31:19

just becoming commodities where these different  companies just bid each other's prices down  

play31:23

until it's basically the cost of the GPU run? Yeah, there's without question a force that's  

play31:28

trying to create that. And the answer is you  got to keep on making progress. You got to keep  

play31:31

improving the models, you gotta keep on coming  up with new ideas and making our models better  

play31:36

and more reliable, more trustworthy, so you  can trust their answers. All those things.  

play31:43

Yeah. But let's say it's 2025 and somebody  is offering the model from 2024 at cost.  

play31:48

And it's still pretty good. Why would  people use a new one from 2025 if the  

play31:53

one from just a year older is even better? There are several answers there. For some  

play31:58

use cases that may be true. There will be a new  model for 2025, which will be driving the more  

play32:03

interesting use cases. There is also going to  be a question of inference cost. If you can do  

play32:07

research to serve the same model at less cost. The  same model will cost different amounts to serve  

play32:18

for different companies. I can also imagine some  degree of specialization where some companies may  

play32:22

try to specialize in some area and be stronger  compared to other companies. And to me that may  

play32:30

be a response to commoditization to some degree. Over time do the research directions of these  

play32:36

different companies converge or diverge? Are they  doing similar and similar things over time? Or are  

play32:41

they branching off into different areas? I’d say in the near term, it looks  

play32:46

like there is convergence. I expect there's  going to be a convergence-divergence-convergence  

play32:51

behavior, where there is a lot of convergence  on the near term work, there's going to be some  

play32:57

divergence on the longer term work. But then  once the longer term work starts to fruit,  

play33:01

there will be convergence again, Got it. When one of them finds the  

play33:05

most promising area, everybody just… That's right. There is obviously less  

play33:10

publishing now so it will take longer before  this promising direction gets rediscovered. But  

play33:14

that's how I would imagine the thing is going  to be. Convergence, divergence, convergence.  

play33:18

Yeah. We talked about this a little bit at  the beginning. But as foreign governments  

play33:22

learn about how capable these models are,  are you worried about spies or some sort of  

play33:28

attack to get your weights or somehow  abuse these models and learn about them?  

play33:34

Yeah, you absolutely can't discount that.  Something that we try to guard against to the  

play33:45

best of our ability, but it's going to be a  problem for everyone who's building this.  

play33:48

How do you prevent your weights from leaking? You have really good security people.  

play33:55

How many people have the ability to  SSH into the machine with the weights?  

play34:04

The security people have done a  really good job so I'm really not  

play34:09

worried about the weights being leaked. What kinds of emergent properties are you  

play34:13

expecting from these models at this scale? Is  there something that just comes about de novo?  

play34:19

I'm sure really new surprising properties will  come up, I would not be surprised. The thing which  

play34:24

I'm really excited about, the things which I’d  like to see is — reliability and controllability.  

play34:28

I think that this will be a very, very important  class of emergent properties. If you have  

play34:34

reliability and controllability that helps you  solve a lot of problems. Reliability means you can  

play34:39

trust the model's output, controllability means  you can control it. And we'll see but it will be  

play34:45

very cool if those emergent properties did exist. Is there some way you can predict that in advance?  

play34:50

What will happen in this parameter count,  what will happen in that parameter count?  

play34:52

I think it's possible to make some predictions  about specific capabilities though it's definitely  

play34:57

not simple and you can’t do it in a super  fine-grained way, at least today. But getting  

play35:02

better at that is really important. And anyone who  is interested and who has research ideas on how to  

play35:09

do that, that can be a valuable contribution. How seriously do you take these scaling laws?  

play35:14

There's a paper that says — You need this  many orders of magnitude more to get all  

play35:19

the reasoning out? Do you take that seriously  or do you think it breaks down at some point?  

play35:23

The thing is that the scaling law tells you what  happens to your log of your next word prediction  

play35:31

accuracy, right? There is a whole separate  challenge of linking next-word prediction accuracy  

play35:37

to reasoning capability. I do believe that  there is a link but this link is complicated.  

play35:45

And we may find that there are other things  that can give us more reasoning per unit effort.  

play35:54

You mentioned reasoning tokens,  I think they can be helpful.  

play36:00

There can probably be some things that help. Are you considering just hiring humans to  

play36:07

generate tokens for you? Or is it all going to  come from stuff that already exists out there?  

play36:11

I think that relying on people to teach our models  to do things, especially to make sure that they  

play36:18

are well-behaved and they don't produce false  things is an extremely sensible thing to do.  

play36:23

Isn't it odd that we have the data we  needed exactly at the same time as we  

play36:27

have the transformer at the exact same  time that we have these GPUs? Like is it  

play36:32

odd to you that all these things happened at  the same time or do you not see it that way?  

play36:35

It is definitely an interesting situation  that is the case. I will say that  

play36:42

it is odd and it is less odd on some level.  Here's why it's less odd — what is the driving  

play36:48

force behind the fact that the data exists, that  the GPUs exist, and that the transformers exist?  

play36:57

The data exists because computers became  better and cheaper, we've got smaller and  

play37:00

smaller transistors. And suddenly, at  some point, it became economical for  

play37:04

every person to have a personal computer.  Once everyone has a personal computer,  

play37:07

you really want to connect them to the network,  you get the internet. Once you have the internet,  

play37:11

you suddenly have data appearing in great  quantities. The GPUs were improving concurrently  

play37:16

because you have smaller and smaller transistors  and you're looking for things to do with them. 

play37:20

Gaming turned out to be a thing that you could  do. And then at some point, Nvidia said — the  

play37:26

gaming GPU, I might turn it into a general  purpose GPU computer, maybe someone will find  

play37:34

it useful. It turns out it's good for neural  nets. It could have been the case that maybe  

play37:41

the GPU would have arrived five years later,  ten years later. Let's suppose gaming wasn't  

play37:47

the thing. It's kind of hard to imagine,  what does it mean if gaming isn't a thing?  

play37:52

But maybe there was a counterfactual world  where GPUs arrived five years after the data  

play37:57

or five years before the data, in which  case maybe things wouldn’t have been as  

play38:04

ready to go as they are now. But that's the  picture which I imagine. All this progress in  

play38:09

all these dimensions is very intertwined. It's  not a coincidence. You don't get to pick and  

play38:16

choose in which dimensions things improve. How inevitable is this kind of progress?  

play38:23

Let's say you and Geoffrey Hinton and a  few other pioneers were never born. Does  

play38:28

the deep learning revolution happen around  the same time? How much is it delayed?  

play38:32

Maybe there would have been some  delay. Maybe like a year delayed?  

play38:34

Really? That’s it? It's really hard to  

play38:37

tell. I hesitate to give a longer answer  because — GPUs will keep on improving.  

play38:45

I cannot see how someone would not have discovered  it. Because here's the other thing. Let's suppose  

play38:51

no one has done it, computers keep getting faster  and better. It becomes easier and easier to train  

play38:56

these neural nets because you have bigger GPUs,  so it takes less engineering effort to train  

play39:02

one. You don't need to optimize your code as  much. When the ImageNet data set came out,  

play39:06

it was huge and it was very, very difficult  to use. Now imagine you wait for a few years,  

play39:11

and it becomes very easy to download  and people can just tinker. A modest  

play39:18

number of years maximum would be my guess. I  hesitate to give a lot longer answer though.  

play39:26

You can’t re-run the world you don’t know. Let's go back to alignment for a second. As  

play39:33

somebody who deeply understands these models, what  is your intuition of how hard alignment will be?  

play39:39

At the current level of capabilities, we have a  pretty good set of ideas for how to align them.  

play39:45

But I would not underestimate the difficulty  of alignment of models that are actually  

play39:50

smarter than us, of models that are capable of  misrepresenting their intentions. It's something  

play39:59

to think about a lot and do research. Oftentimes  academic researchers ask me what’s the best place  

play40:07

where they can contribute. And alignment research  is one place where academic researchers can make  

play40:13

very meaningful contributions. Other than that, do you think academia  

play40:17

will come up with important insights  about actual capabilities or is that  

play40:19

going to be just the companies at this point? The companies will realize the capabilities.  

play40:23

It's very possible for academic research to  come up with those insights. It doesn't seem  

play40:29

to happen that much for some reason  but I don't think there's anything  

play40:34

fundamental about academia. It's not like  academia can't. Maybe they're just not  

play40:40

thinking about the right problems or something  because maybe it's just easier to see what needs  

play40:46

to be done inside these companies. I see. But there's a possibility that  

play40:50

somebody could just realize… I totally think so. Why  

play40:53

would I possibly rule this out? What are the concrete steps by which  

play40:58

these language models start actually impacting the  world of atoms and not just the world of bits?  

play41:05

I don't think that there is a clean distinction  between the world of bits and the world of atoms.  

play41:10

Suppose the neural net tells you — hey here's  something that you should do, and it's going  

play41:15

to improve your life. But you need to rearrange  your apartment in a certain way. And then you  

play41:20

go and rearrange your apartment as a result.  The neural net impacted the world of atoms.  

play41:27

Fair enough. Do you think it'll take a couple  of additional breakthroughs as important as  

play41:30

the Transformer to get to superhuman AI? Or  do you think we basically got the insights in  

play41:36

the books somewhere, and we just need  to implement them and connect them?  

play41:40

I don't really see such a big distinction between  those two cases and let me explain why. One of  

play41:46

the ways in which progress is taking place in the  past is that we've understood that something had a  

play41:57

desirable property all along but we didn't  realize. Is that a breakthrough? You can say yes,  

play42:03

it is. Is that an implementation of  something in the books? Also, yes. 

play42:08

My feeling is that a few of those are  quite likely to happen. But in hindsight,  

play42:13

it will not feel like a breakthrough. Everybody's  gonna say — Oh, well, of course. It's totally  

play42:18

obvious that such and such a thing can work. The reason the Transformer has been brought  

play42:24

up as a specific advance is because it's the  kind of thing that was not obvious for almost  

play42:28

anyone. So people can say it's not something  which they knew about. Let's consider the most  

play42:35

fundamental advance of deep learning, that a big  neural network trained in backpropagation can do  

play42:40

a lot of things. Where's the novelty? Not in the  neural network. It's not in the backpropagation.  

play42:49

But it was most definitely a giant conceptual  breakthrough because for the longest time,  

play42:54

people just didn't see that. But then now that  everyone sees, everyone’s gonna say — Well,  

play42:58

of course, it's totally obvious. Big neural  network. Everyone knows that they can do it.  

play43:02

What is your opinion of your former  advisor’s new forward forward algorithm?  

play43:06

I think that it's an attempt to train a  neural network without backpropagation.  

play43:14

And that this is especially interesting if  you are motivated to try to understand how  

play43:20

the brain might be learning its connections.  The reason for that is that, as far as I know,  

play43:27

neuroscientists are really convinced  that the brain cannot implement  

play43:31

backpropagation because the signals in  the synapses only move in one direction. 

play43:36

And so if you have a neuroscience  motivation, and you want to say — okay,  

play43:42

how can I come up with something that tries to  approximate the good properties of backpropagation  

play43:50

without doing backpropagation? That's what the  forward forward algorithm is trying to do. But  

play43:56

if you are trying to just engineer a good system  there is no reason to not use backpropagation.  

play44:03

It's the only algorithm. I guess I've heard you  

play44:06

in different contexts talk about using  humans as the existing example case that  

play44:14

AGI exists. At what point do you take the metaphor  less seriously and don't feel the need to pursue  

play44:20

it in terms of the research? Because it is  important to you as a sort of existence case.  

play44:25

At what point do I stop caring about humans  as an existence case of intelligence?  

play44:29

Or as an example you want to follow in  terms of pursuing intelligence in models.  

play44:37

I think it's good to be inspired by humans,  it's good to be inspired by the brain. There  

play44:44

is an art into being inspired by humans in the  brain correctly, because it's very easy to latch  

play44:50

on to a non-essential quality of humans or of the  brain. And many people whose research is trying  

play44:58

to be inspired by humans and by the brain often  get a little bit specific. People get a little  

play45:03

bit too — Okay, what cognitive science model  should be followed? At the same time, consider  

play45:07

the idea of the neural network itself, the idea  of the artificial neuron. This too is inspired  

play45:12

by the brain but it turned out to be extremely  fruitful. So how do they do this? What behaviors  

play45:19

of human beings are essential that you say this  is something that proves to us that it's possible?  

play45:24

What is an essential? No this is actually some  emergent phenomenon of something more basic, and  

play45:31

we just need to focus on  getting our own basics right.  

play45:43

One can and should be inspired  by human intelligence with care.  

play45:47

Final question. Why is there, in your case,  such a strong correlation between being first  

play45:53

to the deep learning revolution and still  being one of the top researchers? You would  

play45:56

think that these two things wouldn't be that  correlated. But why is there that correlation?  

play45:59

I don't think those things are super correlated.  Honestly, it's hard to answer the question. I just  

play46:10

kept trying really hard and it turned  out to have sufficed thus far.  

play46:14

So it's perseverance. It's a necessary but not  

play46:18

a sufficient condition. Many things  need to come together in order to  

play46:22

really figure something out. You need to really  go for it and also need to have the right way  

play46:29

of looking at things. It's hard to give a  really meaningful answer to this question.  

play46:37

Ilya, it has been a true pleasure. Thank you so  much for coming to The Lunar Society. I appreciate  

play46:40

you bringing us to the offices. Thank you. Yeah, I really enjoyed it. Thank you very much.

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