Language & Meaning: Crash Course Philosophy #26

Summary

This Crash Course Games episode delves into the complexity of defining 'game,' challenging traditional notions of competition and fun. It introduces philosophical perspectives on language and meaning, particularly Frege's concepts of 'sense' and 'reference.' Wittgenstein's ideas on 'family resemblance' and 'cluster concepts' are explored to explain the fluidity of word meanings within linguistic communities. The episode ponders the legitimacy of word meanings and the role of use in defining them, suggesting an experiment to create new meanings and highlighting the difference between speaker and audience meanings.

Takeaways

• 🎲 The script explores the difficulty in defining what constitutes a 'game', challenging the idea that games are strictly competitive activities with winners and losers.
• 🤔 It questions whether games require a minimum number of players, using solitaire as an example of a game that can be played alone.
• 🎉 The script suggests that games might be defined by their fun aspect, but then ponders activities that are not typically considered fun, like 'who can stay quiet the longest'.
• 🗣️ Philosophers of language are introduced as they grapple with the meaning of words, using 'game', 'red', and 'banana' as examples.
• 🧠 Language is described as a tool for transferring thoughts from one brain to another, likened to telepathy with the added step of verbal or written communication.
• 📚 German philosopher Gottlob Frege's concept of 'sense' and 'reference' is introduced to explain the different ways words can point to the same object or concept.
• 🔍 The traditional view of definitions as meeting necessary and sufficient conditions is discussed, with the example of bachelorhood.
• 🏡 Ludwig Wittgenstein's critique of rigid definitions is presented, arguing that for some concepts like 'game', a universally satisfying definition is unattainable.
• 👪 Wittgenstein introduces the idea of 'family resemblance' and 'cluster concepts' to explain how words can have related but not identical meanings within a group of associated concepts.
• 🌐 The script touches on the idea that language and its meanings are dynamic, changing with use and community agreement, encapsulated by Wittgenstein's phrase 'meaning is use'.
• 🔑 The concept of 'private language' is introduced as a thought experiment to illustrate the challenges of using language to communicate subjective experiences.

Q & A

What is the traditional view of defining a word?

The traditional view of defining a word is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that exclude all non-X's and include all X's, where X is the term being defined.

What is the difference between a necessary and a sufficient condition in definitions?

A necessary condition is what must be present for a thing to be a thing, while a sufficient condition is something that's enough for a thing to be a thing, but it's not required for that thing to meet that definition.

How does Ludwig Wittgenstein challenge the traditional view of definitions?

Ludwig Wittgenstein challenges the traditional view by arguing that it's not possible to define words like 'game' in a way that satisfies everyone, as any definition will have counterexamples.

What is Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance'?

Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance' suggests that words don't have a single element in common but share something with some other members of the group, similar to how family members share traits.

What does Wittgenstein mean by 'meaning is use'?

Wittgenstein's phrase 'meaning is use' implies that the meaning of a word is determined by how a linguistic community uses it, rather than by rigid definitions.

What is the difference between speaker meaning and audience meaning?

Speaker meaning is what the speaker intends when using a word, while audience meaning is what the audience understands from the word. They should ideally match for effective communication.

What is the concept of a 'private language' as discussed by Wittgenstein?

Wittgenstein's concept of a 'private language' refers to a language that only one person understands, suggesting that such a language is impossible because language requires a shared understanding within a community.

How does the script relate the concept of 'beetles in a box' to the understanding of language?

The 'beetles in a box' concept illustrates that we cannot know if our subjective experiences, like the color red, are the same as others', and thus language can only refer to publicly observable aspects.

What is the significance of the experiment proposed at the end of the script?

The experiment of referring to bananas as 'chom choms' is meant to explore whether a linguistic community can create new meanings through use and agreement.

How does the script suggest language evolves?

The script suggests that language evolves through the creation of new words as needed and the falling out of use or changing of meanings of existing words, reflecting the dynamic nature of language.

What role do linguistic communities play in determining the meaning of words?

Linguistic communities play a crucial role in determining the meaning of words by their use and agreement, which can lead to the acceptance or rejection of new or existing meanings.

Outlines

00:00

🎲 Defining 'Game' and the Philosophy of Language

The paragraph begins by questioning the definition of a game, challenging the simple notion that games are merely competitions with winners and losers. It explores various examples to question whether games need multiple players or can be solitary, and whether they must be fun or have serious consequences. The discussion then shifts to the philosophy of language, focusing on the meaning of words and how we understand them. It introduces Gottlob Frege's concepts of 'sense' and 'reference' to explain how words can have the same reference but different senses. The paragraph also touches on Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of 'family resemblance' and 'cluster concepts,' suggesting that words like 'game' don't have rigid definitions but are understood through their shared characteristics within a community. Wittgenstein's view that 'meaning is use' is highlighted, indicating that the meaning of a word is determined by how it's used within a linguistic community.

05:02

🗣️ Language, Community, and Private Meanings

This paragraph delves into the concept of linguistic communities and how they shape the meaning of words. It considers the idea of regional or group-specific language use and the possibility of private languages between individuals. The 'beetle in a box' thought experiment by Wittgenstein is introduced to illustrate the challenges of verifying the meaning of words when they refer to subjective experiences. The paragraph discusses how language cannot directly reference internal states but only observable behaviors. It concludes with a playful experiment proposed by the speaker, suggesting that if the Crash Course viewers start using the term 'chom choms' for bananas, it could potentially create a new meaning. The distinction between 'speaker meaning' and 'audience meaning' is also mentioned, emphasizing the potential for misunderstandings in communication.

Keywords

💡Game

A game, as discussed in the video, is a structured form of play, often with a set of rules and objectives. It can be competitive or cooperative, with or without winners and losers. The video challenges the simple definition by questioning whether all games require competition or multiple players, using examples like 'ring around the rosie' and 'solitaire' to illustrate the diversity within the concept of games.

💡Philosophy of Language

The philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature, origins, and use of language. In the video, it is used to delve into the meaning of words and how they convey meaning, with a focus on the word 'game' and its complexities.

💡Sense and Reference

Sense and reference are concepts introduced by philosopher Gottlob Frege to distinguish between the way a word is used (sense) and the object or concept it points to (reference). The video uses these terms to explain how different words can refer to the same thing (same reference) but have different implications or uses (different senses).

💡Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

These are logical terms used to define the criteria for something to be classified as a particular thing. A necessary condition must be present for something to be that thing, while a sufficient condition is enough for it to be that thing but is not mandatory. The video discusses how traditional definitions rely on identifying these conditions but also how they can fail to capture the essence of certain concepts like 'game'.

💡Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosopher who challenged the traditional view of definitions. He introduced the idea of 'family resemblance' and 'cluster concepts,' suggesting that words do not have rigid definitions but are understood through their use within a community. The video uses his philosophy to explain the difficulty of defining 'game' and the flexibility of language.

💡Family Resemblance

Family resemblance is a concept from Wittgenstein that suggests that members of a category (like 'game') may not all share a single common feature but are related through a series of overlapping similarities. The video uses this concept to explain why some activities are more centrally recognized as games than others.

💡Cluster Concepts

Cluster concepts, as proposed by Wittgenstein, are categories where members do not all share a single defining feature but are connected through a web of similarities. The video uses this idea to discuss how the meaning of 'game' is not fixed but is understood through the various ways it is used and recognized in a community.

💡Paradigm Cases

Paradigm cases are examples that are most clearly representative of a category. In the context of the video, 'football' is given as an example of a paradigm case of a game, something that is widely and unambiguously recognized as such.

💡Fringe Cases

Fringe cases are examples on the periphery of a category that may be contested or less clearly fit the definition. The video suggests that activities like 'knife fights' or 'holding one's breath underwater' might be considered fringe cases of games, where there is less consensus on whether they should be included.

💡Meaning is Use

This is a principle from Wittgenstein that emphasizes the importance of how words are used within a linguistic community as the determinant of their meaning. The video suggests that the meaning of a word is not static but evolves based on its use, and this is true for the word 'game' as well.

💡Private Language

The concept of a private language refers to a language that is understood only by a single individual, which Wittgenstein argued is impossible. The video uses the 'beetle in a box' thought experiment to illustrate how language requires a shared context to have meaning.

Highlights

A game is not just a competition; it can also be a solitary activity or a social one without winners and losers.

The necessity and sufficiency conditions for defining a game are challenged by the existence of games with varying characteristics.

Gottlab Frege's distinction between sense and reference helps understand the different ways words can tie us to the same object or concept.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance' explains how words can have shared characteristics within a group without a single common element.

Wittgenstein's 'cluster concepts' show that word meanings can be a collection of related characteristics rather than a single defining feature.

The idea that 'meaning is use' suggests that the meaning of a word is determined by how it's used within a linguistic community.

Language is dynamic, with words evolving in meaning and use over time, reflecting Wittgenstein's view on the living nature of language.

Regional and group-specific language use highlights the community-based aspect of linguistic meaning.

Private languages and code words between individuals illustrate the potential for language to have personalized meanings.

Wittgenstein's 'beetle in a box' thought experiment questions the possibility of a truly private language and the subjective nature of meaning.

The concept of 'speaker meaning' and 'audience meaning' differentiates between the intent of the speaker and the understanding of the audience.

The experiment of renaming bananas to 'chom choms' explores the potential for a linguistic community to adopt new meanings.

The importance of matching speaker and audience meaning for effective communication is emphasized through examples of misunderstanding.

The philosophical exploration of language and meaning in this transcript challenges traditional definitions and encourages a deeper understanding of linguistic nuances.

Transcripts

What is a game? Easy question, right?

You know what a game is – there’s basketball, Chutes and Ladders, Dungeon and Dragons, tennis, Wizard School!

But those are examples of games. What I’m asking for is the definition of a game.

Maybe, if you haven’t been keeping up with Crash Course Games, you’d simply say that,

a game is a competition, with winners and losers.

But, what about a game like ring around the rosie?

Does a game require at least two players?

No, there is literally a game called solitaire solitaire.

Maybe a game is just a thing you do for fun.

But what about “who can stay quiet the longest” –

the game that your parents used to use on long car trips?

Or, like, Russian roulette?

Or The Game of Thrones, where you win or you die?

When it comes to language, there’s a lot to philosophize about.

But one question that philosophers of language like to mull is the question of meaning.

What do words – like ‘game’ or ‘red’ or ‘banana’ What do they mean?

How do we know what they mean?

And who gets to decide?

[Theme Music]

Language is one of our most nuanced and powerful tools.

It takes all of the stuff that’s swirling around in each of our lonely, isolated brains – all those thoughts – and transfers them into someone else’s brain.

Which is really, fabulously cool. It’s like telepathy!

But with the extra step of actually speaking or writing.

But, how do words – a collection of sounds or written symbols – key into the mental concepts that we want to communicate?

The naive understanding of what words mean is just that they’re just whatever the dictionary says.

But we know that’s not totally true.

Think about the difference between words like ‘cat,’ ‘kitty,’ ‘mouser,’ and ‘feline’.

Early 20th century German philosopher Gottlab Frege helped parse out this difference by drawing a distinction between what he called sense, and reference.

The reference of a word is the object or concept that it’s meant to designate.

The reference of all these words is this.

Sense, on the other hand, is the way in which the words tie us to the object or concept.

So, while the reference of each of these words is the same, they have different senses.

A kitty might be a baby cat, or sort of fancy lap cat,

while a mouser might be a cat that lives in a barn and kills rodents for a living.

So how do words get their meaning?

A definition is traditionally understood as whatever meets the conditions for both necessity and sufficiency.

A necessary condition is what’s needed – like, what must be present – in order for a thing to be a thing.

In order for X to be X.

A necessary condition of being a bachelor, for example, is that you must be unmarried.

A sufficient condition is something that’s enough for X to be X,

but it’s not required for that thing to meet that definition.

For example, being born in the United States is a sufficient condition for being an American citizen.

But it’s not a necessary condition, because people who weren’t born in the US can still become citizens.

The long-standing view of definitions was that, if you can figure out both the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be X, then you’ll have your definition.

That is, you’ll have found the criteria that exclude all non-X’s, but include all X’s.

If you’re following me.

But 20th century Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein said this rigid concept of definitions doesn’t actually work.

For example, you just can’t define the word ‘game’ in a way that’s going to make everybody happy.

Any definition you give, someone’s going to come up with a counterexample –

either some game that’s excluded by the definition,

or something that the definition includes that not everyone would agree is a game.

It took Andre and entire 10 minute episode to define games!

But the thing is, Wittgenstein said this doesn’t matter!

Because, everyone knows what a game is!

He pointed out that we learn and know the meaning of words

by hearing the way other members of our linguistic community use them.

We hear Candyland, rugby, and Cards Against Humanity all referred to as games,

so eventually our brains piece together what’s common between them,

in a recognition that Wittgenstein called family resemblance.

You know how you can just see the relation between people sometimes?

Rather than rigid definitions, Wittgenstein said word meanings are so-called cluster concepts.

There’s no one element that everything in the cluster has in common,

but they all share something with some other members of the group.

It’s sort of like you have your dad’s nose and your mom’s sense of humor,

and your sister has your mom’s eyes and your dad’s athleticism.

You and your sister don’t really have much in common, but you do both resemble both parents.

But it’s not like every concept in the cluster is equal.

The ones that everyone would accept are the paradigm cases – you can picture them in the center of the cluster.

And as you move to the outer edges you’ll get fringe cases, the ones that some people would include in the group but others would exclude.

Everyone will agree that football is a game, but there’s going to be some disagreement about things like,

I don’t know, knife fights, or how long you can hold your breath under water.

And Wittgenstein said that’s fine.

Language is a living phenomenon, and like most living things, there’s going to be change and variation.

But who gets to decide what words mean, or if a meaning is legitimate?

Here, Wittgenstein said, “meaning is use.”

In other words, as long as a linguistic community uses a word in a particular way, it has that meaning.

Watching the way words develop and change does suggest that Wittgenstein was onto something.

I mean, ‘mouse’ didn’t used to mean that thing, but now it does.

We make words up as we need them.

And at the same time, words also fall out of use, or take on entirely new meanings.

Now, this view of language assumes that meaning is tied to a particular linguistic communities.

And a community might, or might not, span all of the speakers of that language.

Think about the regional differences in words that might be specific to your town, or school, or group of friends, or family.

And what about this: Do you and your best friend have code words – words that you use to talk privately, even when you’re in public?

Like, the two of you could be at a club, and one of you would say to the other:

“That guy at the bar is a total shoehorn” and the other one would know exactly what you meant?

In that case, do those words, that have meaning specific to the two of you,

really mean what you say they mean, even if no one else agrees with you?

And what happens if the two of you forget that meaning?

Is the meaning still there?

Or does it only exist as long as someone uses the word that way?

Let’s bounce over to the Thought Bubble for a bit of Flash Philosophy.

A linguistic community of two – like you and your friend – seems fairly plausible.

But is it possible to have an entirely private language?

Wittgenstein asked us to imagine that each of us has a box, and inside each box is something.

We all refer to the thing in our box as ‘a beetle,’ but no one can see inside anyone else’s box, ever.

We all call our hidden thing a beetle, but we have no idea if the content of our boxes is the same.

Wittgenstein said there’s no way we can meaningfully use the word ‘beetle’ in this context,

because we have no way of verifying what others mean when they use the word, and they have no way of verifying what we mean.

This is meant to illustrate how it’s impossible to directly communicate our subjective experiences.

We all use the word ‘red’ to refer to the color we see when we look at a stop sign,

but I have no way of knowing if you’re actually seeing the same thing that I’m seeing.

I don’t know if your pain feels like my pain or your love feels like my love.

Our minds are like boxes.

No one else can see what’s inside.

But here’s the thing: it doesn’t matter.

Because ‘beetle’ just means, ‘what’s in the box.’

It could literally be a beetle, or it could be a fox! In socks!

The point is, we don’t know if the color red in my mind is the same as the color red in your mind, because the color red is a beetle in a box.

It’s a label for what’s in our minds.

So language, Wittgenstein said, can’t refer directly to an internal state,

like what it’s like to see the color red, or to experience pain.

Instead, it can only refer to the aspect of it that’s publicly observable by other people.

So, the word ‘pain’ isn’t the feeling of physical suffering, it’s jumping on one foot and cursing when you stub a toe.

It’s rubbing your temples when you have a headache – the observable behaviors that are associated with it.

Thanks, Thought Bubble! Now I want to propose an experiment.

If use is meaning, you should be able to give a word meaning by using it, right?

At least, if you can convince a linguistic community to go there with you.

So let’s try it.

If every Crash Course viewer starts referring to bananas as chom choms, can we make it catch on?

Can we create meaning?!

We’ll have to stay tuned for the answer to that one, but in the meantime, we can think about what might happen.

And to do that, we need to make a distinction between two different types of meaning.

When people communicate verbally, there’s speaker meaning, which is what the speaker intends when using a word.

And then there’s audience meaning, which is what the audience understands.

Since the whole point of language is communication, our goal is for speaker meaning and audience meaning to match up.

But, as anyone who’s ever, like, had a conversation, knows, this doesn’t always work out.

Like, Billy tells Bobby that he likes Sally.

Billy, the speaker, means that he likes Sally as a friend.

Bobby, the audience, takes Billy’s statement to be a profession of, like, you know, like-like.

So Bobby then goes and tells Sally that Billy like-likes her, when in fact Billy actually like-likes Suzy, and pretty soon, you know how it goes. Tears.

The point is, that even with a simple word that we all think we understand, like ‘like,’

speaker meaning and audience meaning can fail to connect.

When we get into more complicated or nuanced words, or when we try to invent a new word, like chom chom,

we’re likely to run into some pretty high-level speaker-meaning/audience-meaning confusion.

But for now, we learned about meaning.

We talked about sense and reference, beetles in boxes, and language games.

And we learned that bananas are called chom choms.

Repeat it with me: chom choms.

Never say bananas again.

Next time, we’re going to talk about another linguistic concept – conversational implicature.

Crash Course Philosophy is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios.

You can head over to their channel to check out a playlist of the latest episodes from shows like

PBS Idea Channel, It's Okay to be Smart, and Physics Girl.

This episode of Crash Course was filmed in the Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio

with the help of all of these awesome people

and our equally fantastic graphics team is Thought Cafe.