Egyptian ex-FM to Israel: If Gaza violence continues, Hamas continues | Conflict Zone
Summary
TLDRIn this Conflict Zone interview, former Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy discusses the dire situation in Gaza, highlighting Egypt's humanitarian efforts and diplomatic challenges. Fahmy emphasizes the need for a two-state solution, rejects Israeli security control over Gaza, and calls for international support to resolve the conflict, stressing the urgency of addressing the humanitarian crisis and the potential for regional instability if a peaceful resolution is not found.
Takeaways
- πͺοΈ The ongoing war in Gaza has resulted in a significant and escalating death toll among civilians, leading to a dire humanitarian situation.
- π¨ Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian foreign minister, emphasizes Egypt's reluctance to open its borders to Gazans due to political implications and concerns over indirectly supporting Israeli policies.
- π₯ Egypt continues to provide medical assistance to Palestinians in need, but refuses to allow a large-scale influx of Palestinians for fear of playing into Israeli hands.
- π₯ The interview highlights the challenging balance between addressing immediate humanitarian needs and upholding political and moral red lines.
- π« Egypt has participated in airdrops of aid and is engaged in negotiations with Israelis and other countries to address the ongoing crisis.
- π The discussion touches on potential diplomatic efforts, including the possibility of a partial hostage exchange and temporary ceasefire to facilitate aid delivery.
- ποΈ Fahmy advocates for a comprehensive peace deal that includes a ceasefire, security arrangements, recognition of a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, and Arab-Israeli relations normalization.
- π€ The Arab group, including Egypt, is reportedly pushing a post-war plan that envisions a reformed Palestinian Authority and a path to a two-state solution.
- π οΈ Fahmy rejects the idea of Egypt becoming a surrogate for Israeli security in Gaza, emphasizing the need for a Palestinian-led governance with international support.
- π The conversation suggests that any viable post-war scenario must involve a shift towards peace and a two-state solution, despite the current lack of readiness from both Israelis and Palestinians.
- β³ Fahmy does not foresee a short-term complete ending to the conflict, predicting cycles of temporary ceasefires and ongoing negotiations for a lasting peace.
Q & A
What is the main issue discussed in the interview with Nabil Fahmy?
-The main issue discussed is the ongoing conflict in Gaza, the humanitarian crisis, and Egypt's role and potential actions in response to the situation, including the possibility of opening its borders to Gazans on humanitarian grounds.
How does Nabil Fahmy view the potential opening of Egypt's border to Gazans?
-Fahmy believes that opening the borders would be participating in Israel's effort to decrease the density of Palestinians on their own territory, which Egypt politically cannot support as they stand by the Palestinian state alongside Israel.
What measures is Egypt currently taking to assist Palestinians in need?
-Egypt is taking in Palestinians who require medical supervision or help and has also conducted an airdrop of aid. They are also hosting negotiations between Israelis and other countries to address the ongoing issues.
What is the 'red line' that Egypt has set regarding the treatment of Palestinians?
-Egypt's red line is that it will not accept any forced displacement of Palestinians. They are against any actions that violate Palestinian rights or the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
What is the significance of the construction at the Egypt-Gaza border?
-The construction at the border involves a security perimeter. The area was originally filled with unlicensed buildings that were taken down, and the government rebuilt the area, inviting Egyptians back. However, the exact plans for the area, including whether it is intended to house Palestinians in case of an Israeli offensive, are unclear.
What are the current diplomatic efforts being made to address the crisis in Gaza?
-Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas, with Egypt's foreign minister expressing optimism about a temporary ceasefire being reached before Ramadan. Discussions also involve potential incentives for Egypt to take refugees and the urgency of negotiations and aid delivery.
What is Nabil Fahmy's proposed ten-point plan for resolving the conflict?
-Fahmy's ten-point plan includes a ceasefire, hostage exchange, humanitarian support, security arrangements between Palestinians and Israelis in Gaza, withdrawal of Israeli forces, recognition of a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, reaffirmation by Arab countries of their Beirut summit declaration, a Security Council resolution affirming the plan, elections in Israel and among Palestinians, and the establishment of a new Palestinian government.
How does Nabil Fahmy view the prospect of a two-state solution?
-Fahmy believes that the two-state solution is extremely difficult but necessary, as it is the only way to achieve peace in the region. He asserts that a one-state reality would lead to continuous conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.
What is the current stance of the international community on the two-state solution?
-The international community, including the US, Russia, China, France, and the UK, supports a two-state solution. However, the current mood on the ground in Israel does not favor such a solution after the events of October 7th.
How does Nabil Fahmy propose to address the security concerns of Israel?
-Fahmy suggests looking at ways to provide security for Israel that do not involve Israeli security supervision over Gaza. He proposes a structure where security could be managed by an international or Palestinian contingent with Arab oversight, provided that the principle of ending the occupation is accepted.
What is the potential role of Hamas in a post-war scenario?
-Fahmy acknowledges that Hamas is currently involved in negotiations, but emphasizes that for a lasting peace, Hamas and other parties would need to accept and pursue a two-state solution. He suggests that new leaders and a new format for Palestinian governance might be necessary to effectively administrate Gaza and the West Bank.
Outlines
ποΈ Humanitarian Crisis and Egypt's Dilemma
The first paragraph discusses the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, with a focus on Egypt's role and response. Nabil Fahmy, the former Egyptian foreign minister, explains Egypt's reluctance to open its borders to Gazans due to political reasons, despite the tragic deaths and suffering highlighted by an aid convoy attack. Fahmy emphasizes Egypt's commitment to the Palestinian cause and its efforts to provide medical assistance and negotiate with Israel for a resolution. The conversation also touches on the potential consequences of a large-scale influx of Palestinians into Egypt and the need for a moral decision in such a scenario.
π€ Diplomatic Efforts and Incentives
This paragraph delves into the diplomatic conversations between Egypt and Israel, focusing on potential incentives for Egypt to take in refugees. Fahmy clarifies that the issue is not about money but about Egypt's commitment to a two-state solution. He addresses Israeli politicians' intentions to move Palestinians out of Gaza and the potential violation of Palestinian rights and the Egypt-Israel peace agreement. The discussion also includes the importance of air dropping aid, international involvement in negotiations, and the possibility of a shift on the ground to allow more aid into Gaza.
ποΈ Ceasefire Talks and Long-Term Solutions
The third paragraph centers on the potential for a temporary ceasefire and the diplomatic efforts by Egypt and Qatar to mediate between Israel and Hamas. Fahmy discusses the optimism for a deal before Ramadan and the international pressure on both parties to reach a ceasefire. He outlines a ten-point plan for resolving the conflict, including a ceasefire, hostage exchange, humanitarian support, and a Security Council resolution affirming a two-state solution. The paragraph highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to the crisis and the challenges of implementing such a plan in the current political climate.
π Regional Tensions and the Two-State Solution
In this paragraph, the discussion shifts to the broader regional implications of the Gaza crisis, with Fahmy warning of a highly volatile regional context if the situation is not resolved. He emphasizes the need for a two-state solution and the historical significance of the current carnage. Fahmy also addresses the Arab group's potential post-war plan for Gaza, including a reformed Palestinian Authority and a path toward a two-state solution. The conversation explores the challenges of implementing such a plan and the need for a unified Palestinian government that can effectively administer Gaza and the West Bank.
π Post-War Scenarios and Palestinian Unity
The final paragraph focuses on the prospects for a post-war scenario in Gaza, including the potential involvement of Hamas and the need for a new Palestinian government. Fahmy discusses the erosion of the Palestinian Authority's credibility and the need for elections and a new technocratic government. He also addresses the role of Egypt as a mediator and the complexities of dealing with Hamas, given its status as a terrorist organization in the eyes of many countries. The conversation concludes with Fahmy's views on the potential end of the war in Gaza and the long-term prospects for peace in the region.
π Conclusion and Gratitude
The interview concludes with a brief acknowledgment of Nabil Fahmy's contributions to the discussion on the Gaza crisis and Egypt's role in the region. The host expresses gratitude for Fahmy's insights and for joining the show.
Mindmap
Keywords
π‘Humanitarian grounds
π‘Ceasefire
π‘Palestinian state
π‘Security arrangements
π‘Human rights
π‘International community
π‘Occupation
π‘Diplomacy
π‘Two-state solution
π‘Hostage exchange
Highlights
Five months into the war in Gaza, the desperation and climbing death toll among civilians is highlighted by the deadly chaos around an aid convoy.
Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian foreign minister, discusses the humanitarian crisis and Egypt's response on Conflict Zone.
Egypt's dilemma is whether to open its borders to Gazans on humanitarian grounds without indirectly supporting Israeli policies.
Egypt continues to accept Palestinians in need of medical help but refuses to facilitate a large-scale entry which could be seen as political participation.
Save the Children reports a 'mass killing of children in slow motion' due to lack of food, highlighting the dire humanitarian situation.
Egypt is in a difficult position, not wanting to starve Palestinians or be forced into a position that indirectly collaborates with Israel.
Egypt has conducted an airdrop of aid and is hosting negotiations with Israelis and other countries to address the crisis.
Egypt is building a security perimeter at the border, which has been classified as 'maintenance' by the foreign minister.
There are reports of Egypt planning an area to house Palestinians in case of an Israeli offensive on Rafah, but Fahmy states he does not know the exact details.
Fahmy emphasizes that Egypt will not condone Israeli actions that violate Palestinian rights or the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
Efforts to increase aid flow are being discussed, including a recent airdrop and potential ways to expand humanitarian assistance.
Aid cannot be sustained in a conflict zone without a secure area, which is currently lacking.
Egypt and Qatar are mediating between Israel and Hamas, with optimism for a temporary ceasefire before Ramadan.
Fahmy outlines a ten-point plan for a ceasefire, hostage exchange, humanitarian support, and a path towards a two-state solution.
The Arab group, including Egypt, is pushing a post-war plan for a reformed Palestinian Authority and a two-state solution.
Fahmy argues that the only realistic solution is a two-state solution; a one-state reality would lead to continuous conflict.
The war in Gaza is unlikely to have a permanent end soon, with potential for temporary ceasefires and continued cycles of violence.
Fahmy emphasizes the need for a new Palestinian government and a reformed relationship with Hamas for a future peace process.
Despite the challenges, Fahmy believes that a two-state solution is the only way to achieve peace in the region.
Transcripts
Five months into the war in Gaza, and deadly chaos around an aid convoy has glaringly highlighted
the desperation and climbing death toll among civilians.
The carnage of inhumanity is something we haven't seen for decades.
My guest this week on Conflict Zone is Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian foreign minister and
long-time diplomat.
At what point does Egypt have no choice but to consider opening its border to Gazans on
humanitarian grounds?
Have the shocking scenes of suffering brought this conflict to an inflection point?
Nabil Fahmy.
Welcome to Conflict Zone.
Thank you.
Tragic deaths around an aid convoy in northern Gaza have highlighted the desperation of civilians
for food and the lack of security in the enclave.
After everything that you've seen in the past days, is it time for Egypt to open its border
to civilians from Gaza?
The problem with opening the borders to civilians is this would be participating in a premeditated,
consistent effort by the Israelis to decrease the density of Palestinians on their own territory
and in something which politically we will not do because we support the Palestinian
state side by side with Israel.
We continue to take Palestinians in need of medical supervision or medical help β we
take those.
But a large-scale number of Palestinians would basically mean we're playing into Israeli
hands.
But, you know, Egypt has certainly made that red line quite clear that it will not accept
any forced displacement of Palestinians.
But how do you balance the humanitarian desperation?
I mean, you know, Save the Children just out this past week saying that we are, 'witnessing
a mass killing of children in slow motion because there is no more food left'.
How do you β how do you balance that with your red lines?
It's an absolutely great question.
We are in a very difficult situation.
We cannot allow Palestinians to starve.
We don't want them to be shot at.
At the same time, we don't want to be forced into a position where we collaborate indirectly
with the Israelis by decreasing events with Palestinians.
So what we are doing is providing as much assistance as we can through the border.
We had an airdrop also just about 48 hours ago, and we continue to host negotiations
with the Israelis and the countries to try to deal with all these issues.
But I guess my point is, you know, at what point does Egypt have no other choice morally
than to open the border?
Because, you know, we know that this is not a crisis of your making, but does Egypt need
to do more to help the people on the ground?
I think we are doing quite a bit.
But yes, I agree with you.
There will be a situation where if they're forced across the border, we will have to
make very difficult decision.
But how we respond to that, we clearly are not going to kill Palestinians.
But that being said, it should not be interpreted as meaning "push them across the border and
we will acquiesce" because pushing them across the border is not only a violation of Palestinian
rights, it's also, by the way, a violation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
And that will have consequences.
Yeah.
And, you know, I'd like to ask you a little bit about what is happening right now on the
ground at the border, because there's been a lot of questions about that.
Egypt has been building some sort of security perimeter at the border.
Last month, your foreign minister classified it as what he called "maintenance" on the
border.
Isn't Egypt planning an area to house Palestinians in case of an Israeli offensive on Rafah?
In all honesty, I don't know exactly.
But let me tell you what I do know.
The area where there is construction was originally an area of unlicensed buildings.
They were taken down and people were moved out.
The government rebuilt that area and invited the Egyptians to go back to that area.
They have not yet gone back to that area, and it's something that has been going on
for over a year.
You had the Gaza break out during the last five months.
So the pressure also became, what are we going to do if the Palestinians are forced across
the border?
We will have to deal with a very dire humanitarian situation, but we will also have to deal with
the situation where we will not in any way, directly or indirectly, condone Israeli actions,
that violates Palestinian rights in that respect, but also that violates the Egyptian-Israeli
peace agreement.
And that needs to be clearly understood.
Yeah.
So let me ask you a little bit more about the diplomacy that might be going on behind
closed doors right now, because, I mean, Israel's foreign minister has said that they have to
and I'm quoting here, "deal with Rafah because they cannot just leave Hamas there".
And that it would coordinate with Egypt to address concerns about refugees.
What conversations do you think are happening right now between Egypt and Israel, especially
when it comes to, you know, potential incentives, for example?
I mean, you know, money and incentives for Egypt to take refugees wouldn't hurt, would
it?
This is not an issue of money and incentives.
This is an issue β we are committed to a two-state solution.
The Palestinian part of that, of the two states, is Gaza and the West Bank.
If we were to reduce the numbers there, that would be very, very dangerous.
Some Israeli politicians in the cabinet have openly said, βyes, we need to move Palestinians
out of Gaza, into Egypt or even into Europe, and we'll find financing to do thatβ.
So that's their declared policy.
We didn't make this up.
But we have made it also clear that we will not participate in this process.
And I can tell you that affects our national security.
And that's a violation of the peace agreement.
Taking it back to getting aid in β air dropping of aid is picking up.
Even the United States has joined in.
There are currently discussions on how else to expand the flow.
And, you know, it's been reported that President Biden spoke last week with President al-Sisi
about urgency of negotiations and bringing more aid into Gaza.
I mean, as Egypt, you're next door, you're trying to get convoys in, do you see the potential
of anything shifting on the ground so that more aid can enter?
Yes, I do see, if there's a hostage, a partial hostage exchange versus the incarcerated and
a temporary ceasefire, that will facilitate aid going in.
The most recent incident that we saw, just 2 or 3 days ago, this was aid actually brought
in and organized by Palestinians and Israelis.
But given that it was a conflict zone, Israelis themselves attacked the group of people who
had gathered around the vehicles there.
So you can't have a sustained, substantial amount of aid going in a war zone, in a conflict
zone.
There's no really pure, secure area.
So, yes, we want β why are we hosting the negotiations on ceasefire and hostage exchange?
One of the reasons: stop getting people killed, but also allow for more effective humanitarian
aid.
Right.
And just to pick up on one thing that you said there.
I mean, the IDF has actually said that indeed they did fire, but they didn't actually fire
on individuals who were seeking to get aid.
But again, there's two sides of the story.
So I just want to highlight that that's the perspective that they are bringing in, in
the official statement.
Let's take it back to the ceasefire talks, because they were due at the time of this
interview, they were due to kick off, in Cairo.
Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas.
And your foreign minister has said in the past days that he's optimistic about a temporary
ceasefire being reached before Ramadan.
What do you think that he sees that might point to optimism for a deal?
Well, again, you have to ask Sameh [Shoukry] himself.
But let me tell you what I think he means.
If you simply listen to the international rhetoric, everybody has been telling the Israelis
and Hamas, let's have a ceasefire before Ramadan.
They're worried about the situation on the ground, humanitarian and political, but they're
also worried about it breaking out beyond the borders, in the states on Israel's border.
So there's also the threat of expansion.
That is what I think we're seeing.
Now, again β two points, two caveats here.
One, this is not a full ceasefire, nor a full hostage exchange.
This is a partial hostage exchange versus those incarcerated and a temporary ceasefire.
So it will be a positive step towards a complete ceasefire.
You're not going to get resolution of the conflict or an ability to start rebuilding
what has been destroyed, unless you get a complete ceasefire.
But as one of the, you know, the traditional mediators between these parties, um, talk
with us a little bit about how you think the pressure on those parties might be right now,
because, I mean, we have world leaders speaking out loudly against the scenes of suffering
right now in Gaza.
Even the US, Israel's strongest ally, seems frustrated.
Do you see this as an inflection point in the crisis?
Do you feel the mood could change the dynamics on the ground?
Again, thank you for that question.
I think it does.
But it's an inflection point from either we start a process of trying to deal with the
humanitarian situation more substantially and hopefully then the policy, the politics,
the policies, and the security situation or the inflection point will be that it would
move towards a highly volatile regional context.
And I don't mean full-fledged Arab-Israeli wars, but I do mean you see everything from
tension in the Red Sea to the Lebanese border to the Syrian border, stuff in Iraq, what's
happening inside Gaza, problems on our border as well.
This is going to break out of hand.
So the inflection point is either we find a way to slow this process down and try to
resolve it, or it's going to break out beyond control.
So you've made the bridge there basically from the temporary ceasefire talks now to
something a little bit more longer term.
And there seems to be a lot of will and diplomatic momentum, we have to say, from both Arab states
and Israel's allies, including the US and the UK, to secure such a long-term lasting
peace.
That would indeed include a two-state solution.
You know, you've seen over many decades all of the previous efforts that have failed.
Is something different this time?
Yes.
The carnage of inhumanity is something we haven't seen for decades.
It was always a horrible incident inside Israel or among Palestinian territories, including
assassination of leaders, by the way, not by the other side, but by their own people.
So we've seen that.
But to see five months, 30,000 people killed, at least β because there are those under
the rubble that we don't account for β 70% of whom are women and children, and children
starving, we have not seen that in a very long, long time.
So that's something which frankly...
I come from Egypt.
We were the first to have a peace agreement with the Israelis, and that's almost 50 years
ago.
50 years after the first peace agreement with Israel to see not only the lack of conclusion
of comprehensive peace completely, but to see the level of killing and encounter violence
is, frankly, quite shocking.
And it really burns in my gut as having been part of this process for so long.
And as you are coming from Egypt, I'd like to ask you about this Saudi led group of Arab
states that includes Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, which is reportedly now pushing this
post-war plan that would include a reformed Palestinian Authority governing in Gaza and
irreversible path toward a two-state solution.
From the perspective of Arab diplomacy, what could be offered to sweeten the deal for Israel?
Because, I mean, you've highlighted the trauma of these societies, the violence, the bloodshed.
There's no appetite right now for a two-state solution in Israel after October 7th.
That's why, I mean what I β let me talk about what I think can be done rather than
what's on the table by the Arab group, because I don't know actually how far they've gone.
I said crisis and conflict.
We need a ceasefire.
I'll give you ten quick points in 10 seconds.
Ceasefire, hostage exchange, incarcerated, humanitarian support, security arrangements
between Palestinians and Israelis in Gaza, including a withdrawal of Israeli forces,
a declaration recognizing a Palestinian state based on 1967 β Palestinian state under
occupation by the way, I'm not saying it's established β a Palestinian state under
occupation based on '67.
A re-affirmation by the Arab countries of their Arab-Beirut summit, where they said
they will all have relations with Israel if there is, an end of occupation.
I want to put all of that under a Security Council resolution.
Every one of these points, by the way, is supported by all of the international community.
I want to have that adopted by the international β by the Security Council in an affirmative
vote.
And then we go to the parties, because that will also require, by the way, elections in
Israel, elections among Palestinians.
The establishment of a new government by the Palestinians.
So then let me ask you: I mean, it's you know, you're presenting here a plan.
But I also want to ask you how you get that plan done with the mood that is currently
on the ground.
The Israeli cabinet right now has said that any recognition of a Palestinian statehood
in the wake of the Hamas terror attacks on Israel on October 7th, which, as we know,
killed 1200 people and 250 were taken hostage.
They've said, and I'm quoting here, it would "give a huge reward to unprecedented terrorism."
What's your response to that?
We're not dealing with one part of the problem rather than the other.
What I'm dealing here with is the whole issue.
And I'm not actually asking the Israelis and Palestinians to accept it at the beginning.
What I'm saying is that US, Egypt, Russia, China, France, UK, you name it, we've all
supported a two-state solution.
Let's agree to this annotated package.
And go with it to the Israelis and Palestinians, showing them that, okay, you have a ceasefire,
you'll have security, Israel will have security.
The Palestinians will have a relief from what's happening.
You're going to have to establish a new government, the Palestinians, to deal with Gaza and the
West Bank.
So we're dealing with the whole thing together and slowly within a two-year period, we can
get there.
If you go to the to the Arabs today, because I know this is probably on your mind.
Okay, why can't the Arabs take charge of Gaza and manage that and provide security?
And that's a question which Egyptians have been asked for hundreds of times.
It's probably the most illogical and irresponsible question anybody can think of, because we
will not be surrogates of Israelis...
But, you know...
Israel has said they will preserve.
Let me just continue.
But here's the thing.
But I just I need to follow up with you on that because, you know, and ask you to actually
respond to what Israel has put forward.
They set out this competing plan for postwar Gaza.
It does not include a two-state solution.
It does include overseeing security in the enclave.
You've talked about security there.
In fact, Netanyahu says that Israel should have security control over the Philadelphi
Corridor we know, that's that border zone between Gaza and Egypt.
Do you see any circumstances, you've talked about coming together, do you see any circumstances
under which Egypt would be willing to accept that?
Absolutely not.
Because that would basically mean...
So what are the alternatives?
From a security perspective.
This is my point.
Yeah.
Let me just continue.
If you tell me that this ten-point plan or eight, whatever number of points you want,
will ultimately lead to a Palestinian state down the road, then you can getβ and it
will not involve Israeli security supervision over Gaza.
The Arab states are definitely ready to help rebuild β not alone, but they're ready to
help rebuild and will help train and create mechanisms for better management in Gaza with
the West Bank.
But they're not going to be surrogates of Israel's security.
There's absolutely no way that they would accept that.
Furthermore, the reason why I said it's irresponsible, if we were to put Egyptian forces or trainees
in there, we have a peace agreement with the Israelis and the Israelis intervene militarily.
What do we do?
Shoot them?
We end up shooting Palestinians and Israelis?
It's not going to happen.
You've highlighted all the challenges, but what are the alternatives?
The alternative is give me a structure for a plan.
And then we can look at okay, is security managed by an Arab international contingent
or international contingent, Palestinian contingent with Arab oversight?
The details are plausible and we can look at creative solutions, but not solutions that
end up with the de facto Israeli occupation of Gaza.
That can't happen, but I agree β look, again we were the first to sign a peace agreement
with Israel.
So, Israel wants security β we accept that.
And we're looking at ways to achieve that, but only based on you can't have security
unless you solve the problem.
The problem is occupation.
And the Israelis want more transparency and more effectives on security that we can look
at.
Provided that the principle of ending the occupation is there.
Let's move on, because, you know, Egypt has been also part of this rethink of politics
in Palestinian areas.
And part of, you know, the plans for potential governance within Gaza itself.
How do you see the prospects for fragmented Palestinian politics to be able to unite after
the war?
Because, I mean, the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, is looking set to
stay in his position along with his security chiefs.
Do you think Palestinians will accept that and that the PA might administer Gaza?
He's widely unpopular.
Let me put it this way.
The only way to really administrate Gaza in a way that's effective for Palestinians and
ultimately also accepted by the Israelis without occupation, is to have a Palestinian - a new
understanding.
Whether we like it or not, Hamas had less support before October 7th.
Now they have more support, not because of what they did, but because of the Israeli
reaction to what they did.
That has, without a doubt eroded the PA's authority, the PA's credibility, excuse me.
But we need to rebuild that.
It may require new leaders.
I'm not agnostic to that.
All I'm saying is that.
Yes, you're hitting the point right on the head.
We need to get Palestinians to look for a new format.
That's why I said we need elections and we need a new technocratic government.
And there's both West Bank and Gaza.
There's a big debate also raging right now about whether or not to what extent Hamas
should be involved in all of that.
Egypt, for its part, has acted as a mediator between Hamas and its foes, Israel and Fatah.
As we've highlighted, it's also worked with Hamas in recent years to counter an Islamic
insurgency in the Sinai.
But, you know, for you personally, when you look at the situation after the horrors of
October 7th, can they really be part of a postwar scenario?
Again, it depends on the scenario.
If it's a postwar scenario where we continue to have cycles of violence, they'll be part
of it.
There's no question they'll be part because the asymmetrical balance of power...
Even though many countries around the world consider them to be a terrorist organization?
The United States, the EU, Israel itself.
Listen, listen to me carefully here.
I didn't say a postwar scenario where you have peace.
I said, if you continue to have a cycle of violence, they or others, other forms of Hamas,
will continue to exercise what they pursue as their policies.
What I'm putting forward is: I want to rebuild a Palestinian constituency that is effectively
supportive and pursuant to a two-state solution.
If parties don't want to accept that, then frankly, they can't qualify themselves to
be a part of that process.
If they do, they will have to change.
And let's also be cynically candid if you want.
Who are we negotiating with now?
The PA?
To get the hostage exchange?
Who is Israel negotiating with now?
Who is the US negotiating with now?
Who is it?
Nice question for you: It's Hamas.
So they are there.
My issue is not whether they're there or not, they are there.
My issue is, how do I build a scenario that allows for Egyptian, for Arab-Israeli peace,
including Palestinian-Israeli peace.
Those who don't want peace, we will then work against.
But frankly, on the one hand, we're being asked to talk to Hamas, whose relations with
Egypt were always very, very careful.
But we're asked to talk to them now and then we hear "but they're not part of the paradigm."
Well, okay, so who do we talk to?
So then, I mean, you know, when you look at all of the scenarios that are possible coming
out of this.
First of all, how do you think the war in Gaza ends and when do you see it ending?
Uh...
Do you think you'll see a permanent end to this conflict anytime soon?
I don't, I don't think you'll see a short-term complete ending.
You will probably find, get one hostage agreement, temporary ceasefire, and then another.
But then you'll have outbreaks from the agreement and a regression.
Neither side really is ready to make a strategic decision.
Be that the Israelis or Hamas, and that's the, that is what is required.
That's why at the beginning I said, let's put together a package that we outside the
region, we beyond the parties accept, and then we start talking to the parties, their
center.
To see if we can sell this peace deal.
I agree with you.
The sentiment today is not for a two-state solution, but actually it's the only one that
will get them out of this process.
As a former negotiator, do I think I can go and do it tomorrow?
Of course not.
It's a process...
And if a two-state solution cannot be reached, then what?
I mean, what realistic alternative do you see to a two-state solution that can provide
peace in the region, or is there none?
There is none.
What the other alternative is a one-state reality, which will be a continuous conflict
between Palestinians and Israelis, because they both want national identity on a very
small piece of land, and neither side will give it up completely to the other.
Furthermore, if you don't allow them equal rights, you will have conflicts within the
one state.
So a two-state solution is extremely difficult and one-state solution is completely implausible.
A one-state reality of continued conflict.
Nabil Fahmy, we have unfortunately run out of time.
We thank you so much for joining us here on Conflict Zone.
Thank you for your time.
Thank you.
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