Digital Competition Law: Catch-All Proposal, Exemptions, And The Miss | NDTV Profit

NDTV Profit
18 Mar 202427:53

Summary

TLDRThe video discusses the proposed Digital Competition Bill in India, aiming to regulate big tech companies like Amazon, Google, and Flipkart. The conversation revolves around the necessity and potential impact of the bill, with experts expressing concerns that it might stifle innovation and growth in India's digital economy. They debate whether the existing Competition Act is sufficient or if an ex-ante framework is needed to address anti-competitive behaviors more swiftly. The discussion also touches on the bill's provisions for significant market players, penalties for non-compliance, and the possibility of exemptions, comparing India's approach with that of the European Union's Digital Markets Act.

Takeaways

  • πŸ“œ The discussion revolves around the proposed Digital Competition Law in India, aimed at regulating anti-competitive practices among digital giants.
  • πŸ›οΈ Nisha Oboy argues that the existing Competition Act is sufficient to regulate digital players, citing the CCI's ability to investigate and penalize them.
  • 🌐 The proposed law is compared to European regulations, with a focus on creating an ex-ante framework to quickly address the dynamic nature of digital markets.
  • πŸš€ A concern is raised about the potential stifling of innovation and growth in India if the law is implemented too restrictively, especially given India's status as a leader in innovation.
  • πŸ›‘ The concept of 'significant systemically important digital enterprises' (SSDE) is introduced, which would be subject to additional regulations under the new law.
  • πŸ’‘ The new law could potentially penalize companies twice for the same offense, once under the Competition Act and again under the Digital Competition Act.
  • πŸ”’ The draft bill does not cover 'killer acquisitions', which are acquisitions designed to eliminate future competition, a point of contention given their prevalence in the digital space.
  • πŸ”„ There is a debate on whether the law should protect the process of competition or specific competitors, with the latter not aligning with the principles of antitrust.
  • πŸ“Š The proposed law includes a broad range of digital services, from social media platforms to e-commerce and aggregator services, all of which would fall under its purview.
  • πŸ”„ The discussion highlights the need for a balance between regulation and fostering an environment that encourages growth and innovation in the digital sector.

Q & A

  • What is the main purpose of the proposed digital competition law in India?

    -The main purpose of the proposed digital competition law in India is to check anti-competitive conduct and abuse in the digital world, aiming to make the digital market fairer and more competitive.

  • Why does Nisha Oboy believe that India does not currently need this new law?

    -Nisha Oboy believes that India does not need this new law because the existing Competition Act is sufficient to regulate digital competition players, as evidenced by the CCI's ongoing investigations and imposed penalties on various digital platforms.

  • What are the potential drawbacks of introducing the digital competition law according to the discussion?

    -The potential drawbacks include stifling growth and innovation in the digital economy, and the possibility of creating a level playing field that may curtail the growth of digital players upfront through precautionary antitrust measures.

  • What is the concern regarding the overlap between penalties under the Competition Act and the proposed digital competition law?

    -The concern is that entities could be penalized twice for the same offense under both the existing Competition Act and the proposed digital competition law, leading to duplicity of proceedings and potentially increased uncertainty and chaos.

  • What is the significance of the 'significant systemically important digital enterprises (SSDE)' concept in the proposed law?

    -The SSDE concept is used to identify large digital platforms that could have significant influence over the market. These enterprises would be subject to additional regulations and obligations to prevent anti-competitive practices.

  • How does the proposed law address the issue of 'killer acquisitions'?

    -The proposed law does not specifically address 'killer acquisitions' as the committee believes the existing deal value threshold under the Competition Act is sufficient to address concerns related to anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions.

  • What are the 'core digital services' mentioned in the proposed law, and how do they relate to regulation?

    -Core digital services are specific types of digital services offered by a platform that could have significant market influence. Each core digital service would be regulated differently based on its nature and the platform's influence, with tailored obligations for each.

  • Why is there a debate on whether the proposed law should include exemptions similar to those in the European Union's Digital Markets Act?

    -There is a debate because the European Union's Digital Markets Act provides exemptions for 'gatekeepers' under certain conditions, allowing them to demonstrate that a particular service should not be regulated despite the overall entity's size. The proposed law in India does not fully adopt this approach, leading to discussions on whether such exemptions should be included.

  • How does the proposed law's approach to data and user consent differ from the current Competition Act?

    -The proposed law has predefined obligations regarding data and user consent for designated SSDEs, requiring explicit consent and prohibiting certain data practices, which is a more proactive approach compared to the current Competition Act that investigates and penalizes after the fact.

  • What is the role of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) under the proposed digital competition law?

    -Under the proposed law, the CCI would have the authority to designate enterprises as SSDEs, regulate their conduct, and impose penalties for non-compliance. It would also have the power to customize regulations for each core digital service provided by SSDEs.

Outlines

00:00

πŸ“œ Introduction to the Digital Competition Law in India

The video script begins with a discussion on the proposed Digital Competition Law in India, aimed at regulating the conduct of digital giants such as Amazon, Google, and Flipkart. The law seeks to prevent anti-competitive behavior and is compared to similar regulations in Europe. The conversation features Anika Kakar and Nisha Oboy, legal experts from Sir Amaran Mangaldas and Trilegal, respectively. They debate whether the current Competition Act is sufficient or if a new law is necessary to address the unique challenges of the digital market.

05:02

πŸ›οΈ The Need for a Digital Competition Law

Nisha Oboy argues against the necessity of the new law, asserting that the existing Competition Act is adequate to regulate digital platforms. She cites ongoing investigations by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and suggests that the proposed law might stifle growth and innovation. Anika Kakar, on the other hand, considers the imminent introduction of the law and discusses the potential impact on innovation in India. The conversation highlights the debate over whether the law will protect competition or specific competitors.

10:03

πŸš€ Implications of the Digital Competition Law

The discussion delves into the practical implications of the Digital Competition Law, focusing on the designation of 'significant scale and size of digital economy' (SSDE) enterprises. These enterprises would be subject to specific obligations to prevent self-preferencing, data misuse, and other anti-competitive practices. The panelists explore how the law could affect various digital services, including social media, search engines, and online intermediation services.

15:05

πŸ’‘ Concerns and Overlaps with Existing Competition Act

Advantia and Nisha express concerns about potential overlaps between the Digital Competition Law and the existing Competition Act. They discuss the possibility of entities being penalized twice for the same offense under both laws. The conversation also touches on the lack of clarity regarding how the two statutes will operate in tandem and the potential for increased legal complexity and uncertainty.

20:05

🌐 Learning from International Models and Addressing Killer Acquisitions

The panelists compare India's Digital Competition Law with international models, particularly the European Union's Digital Markets Act. They discuss the concept of exemptions for certain digital services and the need for a more comprehensive approach in the Indian context. Additionally, they address the issue of 'killer acquisitions,' where large companies acquire smaller competitors to eliminate potential threats, and the adequacy of the current deal value threshold to regulate such acquisitions.

25:06

πŸ” Final Thoughts on the Draft Digital Competition Bill

In the concluding part of the discussion, the panelists share their final thoughts on the draft Digital Competition Bill. They emphasize the importance of rationality and proportionality in the enforcement of the law and the need for clarity to avoid chaos and uncertainty. The conversation also highlights the importance of stakeholder consultations in shaping the final version of the bill.

Mindmap

Keywords

πŸ’‘Digital Competition Law

The Digital Competition Law refers to the proposed legislation in India aimed at regulating anti-competitive practices in the digital market. This law is designed to prevent the abuse of dominance by large digital platforms. In the script, the discussion revolves around the necessity and implications of such a law, especially in the context of digital marketplaces, food aggregators, and cab aggregators.

πŸ’‘CCI

CCI stands for Competition Commission of India, which is the regulatory body responsible for enforcing the Competition Act in India. It investigates anti-competitive practices and ensures a fair market. The script mentions CCI's role in the context of ongoing investigations and its ability to impose penalties on digital players, highlighting its current effectiveness and potential challenges with the new law.

πŸ’‘Anti-Competitive Conduct

Anti-competitive conduct refers to practices that unfairly limit competition in a market, often by larger entities that abuse their market power. The script discusses the need for a predetermined framework to check such conduct, suggesting that the proposed digital competition law aims to provide this framework and make the digital world fairer.

πŸ’‘Ex-Ante Regulation

Ex-ante regulation is a form of pre-emptive regulation where rules are set before any action is taken to prevent potential future harm. In the script, the discussion around the proposed digital competition law indicates a shift towards ex-ante regulation to quickly address issues in dynamic digital markets, as opposed to ex-post regulation which acts after the harm has been established.

πŸ’‘Significant Financial Thresholds

Significant Financial Thresholds are financial benchmarks used to identify enterprises that could potentially have a significant impact on the market. The script mentions these thresholds as criteria for designating a company as a Systemically Significant Digital Enterprise (SSDE), which would then be subject to additional regulations under the proposed law.

πŸ’‘Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing is a practice where a company favors its own products or services over those of competitors on its platform. The script discusses how the proposed law would regulate such behavior, ensuring that digital platforms do not unfairly promote their own services at the expense of others.

πŸ’‘Data Consent

Data Consent refers to the permission granted by users for the collection and use of their personal data. The script highlights the importance of obtaining relevant consent in the context of data regulation under the proposed law, emphasizing the need for transparency and user control over their data.

πŸ’‘Tying and Bundling

Tying and bundling are practices where the sale of one product or service is conditioned on the purchase of another. The script mentions these practices as potential areas of concern under the new law, where such behavior by digital platforms could be restricted to promote fair competition.

πŸ’‘Core Digital Services

Core Digital Services are fundamental services provided by digital platforms that have a significant influence on the market. The script discusses how the proposed law would tailor regulations for each core digital service offered by an SSDE, ensuring that each service complies with specific conduct standards.

πŸ’‘Killer Acquisitions

Killer Acquisitions refer to the practice where a dominant company acquires a potential competitor to eliminate competition. The script mentions that the proposed law does not cover such acquisitions, which has been a point of discussion, as it could allow dominant players to consolidate their market position without scrutiny.

Highlights

Introduction to the digital competition law proposed in India to regulate anti-competitive conduct in the digital world.

Discussion on whether the existing Competition Act is sufficient to regulate digital players in India.

Argument that the new law is not needed as the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has been effective in regulating digital players.

Concerns that the proposed law might curtail growth and innovation in India's digital economy.

Debate on whether India should follow Europe's approach to digital regulation.

Explanation of the consumer welfare standard and its role in competition law.

Discussion on the need for a time-bound statutory framework for competition cases.

Concerns about the potential for entities to be penalized twice under the new law and the existing Competition Act.

Details on the proposed law's focus on systemically significant digital enterprises (SSDEs) and the criteria for designation.

Explanation of the obligations that come with being designated as an SSDE.

Discussion on the definition of core digital services and how they will be regulated under the new law.

Concerns about the lack of exemptions for SSDEs in the draft bill compared to the European model.

Debate on whether the draft bill should cover 'killer acquisitions' and the adequacy of the current deal value threshold.

Argument that the draft bill's catch-all provision may empower the commission more than necessary.

Final thoughts on the draft digital competition Bill and its potential impact on India's digital economy.

Transcripts

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hi there this is NTV profit and you're

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watching the fine print Amazon Google

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flip cart Apple Uber Ola zomato swiggy

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and the likes dig digital Giants of e

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marketplaces food aggregators cab

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aggregators search engines will soon

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have to deal with to the new law in

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India and that's the digital competition

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law proposed to check abuse in the

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digital world the committee submitted

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its report last week saying we need a

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predetermined framework to check

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anti-competitive conduct so will this

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proposed law make digital world fairer

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to answer that I have with me aanka

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kakar partner at sir amaran mangaldas

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and Nisha oboy from Tri legal Nisha

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aanika welcome to the fine print Nisha

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I'll start with you in your opinion we

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don't need this new law why is

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that than SP the reason that we don't

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need this new law is because the

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competition Act is already sufficient to

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regulate digital competition players as

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is evident the CCI has had over 25

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ongoing investigations whether it's food

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delivery platforms whether it's cab

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aggregators whether it's search engines

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the CCI has been able to effectively

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investigate these players despite them

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being digital players and has in certain

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instances imposed penalties and

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directions on Behavior so it's not that

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the regulator cannot regulate them the

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reason why they're looking at this

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particular proposed digital competition

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bill at the moment is because just like

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Europe they want an exante framework on

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the basis of the fact that

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investigations and appeal processes are

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timec consuming digital markets are

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Dynamic and tip quick in favor of a

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Winner Takes It All approach

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unfortunately at the stage where India

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is at today on its Economic Development

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priority should be growth Innovation and

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investment and a Level Playing Field

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which allows players to grow not curtail

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their growth upfront by virtue of

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precautionary antitrust economics which

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is what an ex Anil law is and therefore

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this is not the right time to introduce

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this proposed digital competition bill

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Europe might be number one in terms of

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Regulation but India is very much number

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one in terms of innovation and therefore

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we should not blindly copy what's

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happening in Europe here in our economy

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at this stage sure Nisha aanda and I

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should have done in the introductions

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you guys represent some of the largest

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player uh players who are probably uh

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meant to be covered uh in under this

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proposed law uh but I'd request you to

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not sort of probably speak on behalf of

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your clients today but as sort of of

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practitioners of the law uh to try and

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understand uh you know the need of this

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new law uh and how will it will it be

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implemented Nisha I take your point that

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you know we are probably not at the

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stage where uh a developed jurisdiction

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like Europe is but under the current

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competition act uh you know the CCI has

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to look at whether uh The Entity is

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dominant or not uh you have to delate

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relevant market and expert councils like

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yourself and avantia while just get to

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in a minute um will you know move Heaven

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and Earth to make relevant markets as

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broad as possible so that your clients

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don't end up being called dominant and

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then uh you know uh the abuse then sort

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of quickly Fizzles as well um so help me

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understand that you know we've seen like

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you said you need to give a Level

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Playing Field but it is not a Level

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Playing Field right um there are in most

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sort of sectors or rather spaces that I

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called out we have clear sort of

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Market leaders right and for the smaller

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guys the startup guys um maybe some of

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these were startups at one point

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themselves um it takes sort of a lot to

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get user attention it takes lot to sort

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of move the market share needle um in

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that space uh or in that reality um

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doesn't a new law a targeted law make

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sense so the reason why it doesn't and

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this is not wearing a client hat but

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from a competition law perspective the

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entire ideaa of the current competition

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Act is based on the notion of the

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consumer welfare standard where you look

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to protect the process of competition

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you do not look to protect a competitor

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right so when you're going towards the

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digital competition Bill and an exante

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regulation what you're looking at is

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protecting not the process of

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competition and not fair outcomes right

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but to protect specific competitors

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which is not the purpose of antitrust

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what is needed yes in terms of expost

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which the CCI is already looking at even

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for digital economy players the delay R

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lies in the investigation the delay lies

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in the overburdened courts right what is

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needed perhaps is what is in the IBC you

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need a statutory framework which is time

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bound and where you have a specialized

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competition appell tribunal reinstituted

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or specialized competition benches so

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that these competition cases whether

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they're digitally economy or not do not

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then languish for a 5 to 10 year period

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trust me as Misha somebody who's covered

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IBC very closely the dirty doesn't are

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still not resolved let me get aanka here

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aanka Nisha has made a very strong case

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uh that you know um we don't need this

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law at this stage uh but the reality is

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that you know once the committee has

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submitted rep its report the bill is out

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uh we sort of post that point where we

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can argue uh against the need of this

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law

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um come in here very quickly first on

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your quick thoughts on what you made of

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the um approach that the committee took

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in drafting this new

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bill um so well um no I have to agree

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with you uh I think it's now imminent um

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I don't know if it makes sense for us to

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argue uh that we don't need this law um

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I expect like the rest of the world uh

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we will see uh this law uh take effect

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eventually the question is how and in

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what form um again I wasn't part of the

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committee so I don't have the details on

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its approach uh byin but from what I can

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make out uh there's a lot of reference

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to um International uh sort of

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developments and um and equally the

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committee has sort of uh considered um

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the the multiple cases uh that I think

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the committee had the benefit of having

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insight into uh because these are fairly

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public investigations run uh by the

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CCI um so that's about it on the

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approach but um I think to add to what

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Nisha said I have to say that uh you

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know this law may be imminent but uh

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we've had enough jurist Prudence now in

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the competition space to know um what

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the possible pitfalls may be um we also

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don't know whether this law will

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actually uh heighten innovation in India

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I mean we we've acknowledged that we are

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an Innovative economy uh but uh I think

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my fundamental problem and not wearing

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any hat here with uh any sort of

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Regulation is that does it is it an

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enabler or is it something that's

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reigning some parties in uh in the hope

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that others will grow uh because the big

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guys rained in uh um I'm not I'm not

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philosophically sure um that approach

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will will serve the economy or the

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country uh very

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well okay AA I mean I'm guessing some of

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the fears that you've called out don't

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come to be true and we don't stifle

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Innovation uh Nisha I think the question

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to be asked at this point is that um

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while you know the committee has listed

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several behaviors that this law will

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sort of seek to look out for and then

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maybe uh

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you know punish if I can use the word or

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penalize companies who are exhibiting

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that behavior can you explain to me in

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Practical terms what are some of the use

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cases of this law um you know

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preferencing is one um broad area that

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you know the committee has mentioned

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steering anti- steering Pro uh sort of

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behavior is another one use of public

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data to then profile uh individuals and

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do targeted ad advertising this all

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seems um sort of behavior that you and I

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as consumers of marketplaces aggregators

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fac on a day-to-day basis right today if

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I go on Instagram and start looking for

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a particular uh sort of product um I can

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then see on my Google search on my

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Facebook search um all of those

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companies Etc coming back to me in my

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face that hey look this is the product

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that you were looking for on X website

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but now uh they show up in my sort of

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feed and other side social as well

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because a lot all of these are parent

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companies and you know Sister concerns

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so that data is clearly getting shared

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um can you articulate for me what are

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some of the behaviors prevalent today in

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the market that this law seem or this

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proposed law uh will then check so first

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to be clear there is nothing that this

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new proposed law will check which isn't

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already being checked under the

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competition act in terms of ab of

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dominance I take your point but

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I'm I'm just saying that that Behavior

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takes longer to check in the competition

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act so hopefully this will be a shorter

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route so no what what happens here is

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basically once you're designated as a

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significant ssde right once you're

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designated as an SSD bases Financial

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thresholds Financial reach or even if

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you don't meet either of these criteria

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if the CCI is of The View on 16 factors

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the last of which says bases any factor

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that the CCI considers that you have

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significant influence and and you're a

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digital economy player which effectively

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offers a core digital service then the

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CCI has the ability now to regulate you

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right so that regulation basically means

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certain obligations will apply to you

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irrespective of whether you do something

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or you don't do something from the start

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once you're designated an ssde you have

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to ensure that you don't do self-

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preferencing you have to ensure that in

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terms of data you have the relevant

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consent you again don't preference your

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particular lines and you don't

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disadvantage your business users you

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don't do tying and bundling right you

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don't do anti- steering and therefore

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all these obligations are predefined and

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pre-identified they also have in place a

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set of nine core Digital Services which

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will apply to each of these designated

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SSD and here is where they've moved from

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a principle based approach because the

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principles are these obligations which

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are clear across the board but for each

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each core digital service right because

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as a platform you could be providing

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more than one core digital service and

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there could be more than one player in

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this space who's offering that core

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digital service who has significant

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influence so to say and therefore each

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of their regulation will be tailored

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right so the commission one onone will

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then customize it which then is a hybrid

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between eu's DM the digital Market act

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and UK's proposed dmcc Bill to see what

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level of conduct this particular

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Enterprise for that core digital service

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needs to comply with basis the number of

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its users in terms of time and manner of

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compliance right and this applies across

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the board because it applies to Social

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Network platforms it applies to search

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engines it applies to online

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intermediation services which cover the

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gamut from food delivery to cab

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aggregators to online travel agencies

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right so literally every aspect of doing

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business is for a digital economy player

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now will pretty much fall within this

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score digital service and these score

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Digital Services have been defined in a

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schedule with a residuary power that

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they can be extended and every 3 years

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the central government in consultation

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with the CCI will reevaluate them right

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but I'm uh right so the you use cases to

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be clear right would would literally

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travel the gamut right you want to take

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a cab covered you want to order from an

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online food delivery platform covered

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right you want to order from an

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e-commerce platform covered you want to

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book your flight tickets on an online

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travel agency and your your hotels all

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covered right you want to do a search on

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the web covered so the entire gamut

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stands covered today under these score

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Digital Services just to close the loop

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on some of the references that Nisha

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made uh the draft bill says that the the

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proposed law will apply to systemically

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significant digital Enterprises and uh

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this is sort of a concept that has uh

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probably cre in in this proposed law

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from the uh it rules that we saw you

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know made public last year uh there's a

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dual test of significant financial

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strength and significant spread to

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identify these SSD but there is also U

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sort of a long list of factors uh that

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can qualify you as an ssde uh but I'll

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come to that in just a bit avantia come

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in here on U your concerns about some of

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the overlap that you saw in terms of

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penalties that uh can come um you know

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through the competition act and once

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this law or rather this bill becomes a

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law um through this bill through through

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the digital competition act as well so

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for the same offense uh your concerns

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are in the shape and form this bill has

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been proposed um an entity can be

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penalized

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twice exactly um and uh this is because

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there is no exclusion to um uh you know

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once you're identified as an

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ssde um uh post that uh there is no

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restriction on a possible claim also

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being initiated under section four of

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the competition act which is the abuse

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of dominance which is in fact um the the

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provision under which uh most of um the

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investigations by the CCI in the digital

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space have been uh initiated did um my

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problem with that is that you um what

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are we envisioning here we are

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envisioning two statutes you have the

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competition act and then you have uh

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this draft bill which regulates digital

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competition um and then uh what is going

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to happen is that parties have to uh

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self assess um and are required to

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report to the commission that yes we

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qualify for uh the criteria that have

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been listed

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and we are um an ssde so designate us so

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and then they have to comply with

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chapter three of uh this stat this draft

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statute and if they don't comply then

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there is a potential penalty of up to

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10% of the global turn over which as we

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know is not a mean sum um at the same

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entity could be proceeded against under

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section four of the competition act for

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potentially exactly uh the same Behavior

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Uh that it violates chapter 3 for

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allegedly and uh and then there is that

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process of the DG and the exact same

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mechanics uh the investigating whether

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or not there is an abuse of dominance

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and as you said by Asin earlier on

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whether in fact the Enterprise is

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dominant itself uh which I think should

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be easy if it's declared itself an SSD

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then perhaps uh there is um the high ch

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chance that it'll also be uh found to be

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dominant um and well it's a self

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assessment it's declared uh you know

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it's it's um sort of reported to the

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commission saying um well I meet this

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criteria so the question is then does it

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become dominant or not and yes lawyers

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will get very busy but I'm sure that's

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not uh the aim of this

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legislation uh but we will get busy

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arguing uh that merely being a n ssde

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does not make us dominant in said

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relevant Market uh we will argue the

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very same arguments to a great extent uh

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saying that we are no we are compliant

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with chapter 3 and no we're not abusing

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our dominance and ultimately the very

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same regulator the very same individual

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members of the competition Commission of

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India will make a finding on whether or

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not I have violated uh you know the

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digital competition act and whether or

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not I have also uh while I was doing

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that abused my dominance um there is no

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provision in the law as it reads right

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now that there will be some form of

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reasonableness and proportionality to

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this uh because there's going to be a

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multiplicity a duplicity of proceedings

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and will there also be a duplicity of

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penalty um and in the long ter if I can

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come in here that you could be penalized

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based on the proposal under the uh draft

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digital competition Bill 10% of your

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Global turnover and so is under the

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competition act so theoretically

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speaking you could look at up to 10%

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under uh the existing statute and the

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proposed one well uh this is 10% of the

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preceding Financial year whereas under

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the competition act the 10% threshold

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applies to an average of three years

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turnover so no it's not the same thing

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and uh it does the statute at least

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doesn't read as if it were covering the

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same subject um and therefore there has

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to be some provision and um I know that

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the committee uh deliberated on this

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subject and it was uh you know some of

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uh the commission's own submissions have

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been that uh you know there are hurdles

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to um you know enforcement under the uh

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competition act and that um uh you know

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uh it's better that they also have this

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um

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ssde uh identified by themselves so that

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they're able to you know

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more emphatically enforce uh competition

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act um there's also some discussion on

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the fact that the commission should keep

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in mind uh when it's running these two

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parallel proceedings um sitting as a

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judge in both proceedings uh that it

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might penalize uh the same party uh for

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violation of the digital competition act

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and so therefore it must keep that in

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mind

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when it you know penalizes under the

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competition act but this is not in the

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statute that's something the committee

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discussed and I believe that as part of

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the public comments that will no doubt

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be submitted um I think some amount of

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rationality in the way that this law uh

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if it does come into force is brought

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into force uh I think is going to be

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very very important because what you

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don't want is uncertainty what you don't

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want is chaos and may have uh Nisha one

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gripe that you have in the uh in the

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bill is the inspiration we have drawn

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from the digital markets act which is uh

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the law in the European Union uh that

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provides for exemptions for quote

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unquote Gatekeepers um which has not

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been to the full extent uh you know uh

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taken adopted here uh to a certain

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extent the committee has said that the

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exemptions should be encoded in the

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statute uh but they've not gone the full

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Hall explain to me uh why is that a

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concern so in Europe if you qualify as a

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gatekeeper basis quantitative and

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qualitative criteria you're

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automatically not designated as a

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gatekeeper to whom all of the dos and

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don'ts and the obligation apply you have

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the ability despite qualifying

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quantitatively as a gatekeeper once you

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self-report to build a case for an

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exemption before the European commission

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so for example Microsoft was able to get

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it for Bing where you're able to demonst

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demonstrate that in that particular

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service despite you as an overall entity

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being a gatekeeper that service is not

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large enough for you to be regulated

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that does not exist in our current

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version of the draft competition bill it

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is hoped that by way of public comments

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since we are copying from Europe we do a

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fullsome job and don't just cherry pick

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and therefore have the ability where an

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ssde whose core digital service is

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minimal

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should really not be regulated for that

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core digital service okay aanka what are

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some of the use cases in the Indian

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market for this exemption to your

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mind uh well that's uh difficult to say

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but uh again it could be uh and I don't

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I don't want to uh take names but it

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could be uh you know an ancillary to say

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um the fact that you provide U you know

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you also provide delivery services

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when you are a cab abator um so will

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that service uh should not be qualified

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as a core digital service it could just

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be that um it remains to be seen where

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this might be used but I I want to add

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that it's I mean I I don't think we have

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to copy only from Europe we can copy

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from other places uh where it's uh you

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know it's likely beneficial but even in

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the UK dmcc uh where the behavior

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benefits users or where there is a

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counterveiling impact that is the

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benefits outweigh uh the so-called harm

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uh there to there is a possibility of an

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exemption uh I believe that there is uh

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some rational uh in in incorporating

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such exemptions into our statute as well

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all right aanka the big miss that uh we

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just talked about and I want to come to

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you uh for that is uh the proposed bill

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is not going to cover killer

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Acquisitions and the committee says the

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deal value threshold in the competition

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Act is uh sufficient to address concerns

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on that front I looked up certain

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numbers on what the killer Acquisitions

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recently have been and actually the idea

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emanated from the standing uh committee

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report which said that uh these are the

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deals that are escaping uh CCI scrutiny

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so we put a 2,000 CR uh sort of

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threshold for that U if you look at

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certain numbers in terms of uh what the

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killer Acquisitions have been there have

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been many in this space that have been

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less than 2,000 CR uh mra's acquisition

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of Jong was 470 crores ola's acquisition

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of taxi for sure was 1,200 crores most

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recently BYU acquired white hat Junior

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for 400 crores U do you believe that the

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committee has uh you know rightly

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omitted mergers and Acquisitions from

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the purview of this new

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law um I mean I'm I'm interested and I

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don't represent any of the parties and

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didn't work on any of the transactions

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that you stated but I'm interested on

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why we believe these are killer

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Acquisitions at all merely because I'm

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acquiring a competitor uh doesn't mean

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that I'm engaging in a killer

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acquisition a killer acquisition is my

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understanding is intended to uh ensure

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that um you know the competitor uh does

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not provide a service that uh that could

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uh in the future compete with my own uh

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mere consolidation uh or buying of

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competitors is not a killer acquisition

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and and if it is then well you do have

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uh you know so-called killer

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Acquisitions even in the non-digital

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space that go unscrutinized and the

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answer has always been uh that uh well

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the commission can always pursue an

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investigation under the abuse of

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dominance Provisions uh under the ACT um

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I believe the same argument would apply

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for um so-called killer Acquisitions

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also this is exactly what the I'll use

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the Kinder word that you mentioned aanka

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which is consolidation uh which is to

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say that okay fine you are acquiring uh

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you know a competitor uh which then will

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make you probably the only player in

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some of the markets uh worth uh of of

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any sort of size that the user would

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want to engage with in those cases like

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you mentioned that currently we don't

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probably look at it in the offline space

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but now we are deliberating on a new law

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so to say that look we made a mistake

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that there to be able to copy that

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mistake here and continue making it uh

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why leave it okay the CCI can always say

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that okay we're not looking at m&a and

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suddenly an m&a comes which uh really

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wants to be looked at it should be the

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regulator should be at least empowered

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to look at it right right so um yeah

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let's let's look at that then maybe we

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found why the catch wall exists uh you

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know the catch wall that we were talking

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about under section 33 of the draft uh

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competition Bill uh where it says that

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even if uh none of the criteria are met

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uh by uh by an Enterprise the commission

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is at Liberty to uh declare that it is

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in fact uh an ssde perhaps that is why

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the catchall is although I I argue that

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it is unknowingly been put there uh

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perhaps in an uh you know in a bit to

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empower the commission uh more than was

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necessary given that we are targeting

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objective criteria and and uh you know

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in the identification of our Gatekeepers

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in India but uh sure I mean an enabling

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provision u i fully agree should exist

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um I'm not sure it's a Miss I believe

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that uh the drafts persons have

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considered the deal value threshold and

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they feel that that's the one that's

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going to catch digital um Acquisitions

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that uh that may lead to a consolidation

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that creates a possible Monopoly under

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the law uh

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I fully agree with you however that uh

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that threshold uh that has been

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determined by the commission is not

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really uh or or rather the ministry is

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not really um the appropriate uh

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threshold um but then India has very

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high thresholds in merger control where

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uh uh we it's it's been well

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acknowledged that our merger control

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thresholds are amongst the highest in

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the world so we'll perhaps never

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continued with this benevolence in the

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proposed law as as well avantia Nisha

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many thanks for joining me here with

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your quick takes uh uh on the draft

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digital competition Bill uh and of

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course as this uh Bill makes his journey

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to a law we'll remain on top of it after

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stakeholder consultation the final

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version as well thank you for joining us

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here on NDTV

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[Music]

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