Lecture 05

IIT KANPUR-NPTEL
25 Jul 202447:51

Summary

TLDRThe transcript from a cybersecurity class discusses the complexities of the Command and Control (C2) system used by adversaries, emphasizing the importance of understanding malware's communication for defense strategies. It delves into the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) and MITRE ATT&CK framework, illustrating how attackers achieve their objectives through various tactics and techniques. The lecture also touches on the role of threat intelligence, the challenges of attribution, and the ethical implications of exploiting vulnerabilities, urging students to stay informed about the ever-evolving landscape of cyber threats.

Takeaways

  • 📚 The instructor begins by addressing the class size and attendance, suggesting the use of fingerprint attendance to ensure participation.
  • 👀 It is assumed that students have watched a pre-recorded video posted on Canvas, indicating the importance of pre-class preparation.
  • 🔒 The lecture delves into the concept of Command and Control (C2) used by adversaries in cybersecurity, explaining its role in malware communication and data exfiltration.
  • 🛡️ The class discusses the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model, emphasizing the importance of stopping an attack at any stage to prevent the adversary from achieving their final goal.
  • 📈 The students are engaged in an interactive exercise to order the stages of the CKC correctly, highlighting the educational approach of the class.
  • 🔎 The lecture touches on the significance of post-incident analysis, stressing the need to understand why defenses failed rather than just being relieved that an attack was unsuccessful.
  • 🌐 The topic of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups is introduced, with a focus on their resourcefulness and the difficulty of attribution.
  • 🇷🇺 A correction is made regarding APT group AP28, clarifying that it is a Russian group responsible for the SolarWinds attacks, not Chinese.
  • 📚 The importance of understanding the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of adversaries is discussed, leading into the introduction of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
  • 🤖 The MITRE ATT&CK framework is described as a knowledge base that provides a structured way to understand and analyze the behavior of cyber adversaries.
  • 🛠️ The lecture concludes with the purpose of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which is to help defenders evaluate the adequacy of their defenses against known adversary tactics and techniques.

Q & A

  • What method does the professor suggest for students to answer questions anonymously in class?

    -The professor suggests using mente.com with the code 6324165 to answer questions anonymously.

  • What is the purpose of the pre-recorded video posted on Canvas mentioned in the script?

    -The pre-recorded video on Canvas is meant for students to watch before class, and the professor has questions related to its content for discussion.

  • What is the significance of the 'Command and Control' (C2) in the context of malware?

    -The Command and Control (C2) is significant as it allows the adversary to communicate with the malware, understand if it has been installed, and customize payloads based on the information gathered by the malware.

  • Why does the professor emphasize the importance of incident analysis after a cyber attack?

    -The professor emphasizes incident analysis to understand why the defense failed, to identify what the adversary did, and to improve security measures to prevent future attacks.

  • What is the role of 'privilege escalation' in the context of cybersecurity?

    -Privilege escalation is a technique used by attackers to gain higher levels of access within a system, which is a local action and not directly related to the command and control side of an attack.

  • What is the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) and how does it relate to the stages of a cyber attack?

    -The Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) is a model that outlines the seven stages an adversary goes through during an attack, from initial reconnaissance to the final objective.

  • What is the difference between 'initial access' and 'execution' in the context of the CKC?

    -In the CKC, 'initial access' refers to the first step where the attacker gains entry into the target system, while 'execution' is the stage where the attacker's payload is run to further the attack.

  • What is the role of 'MITER ATT&CK' in understanding and defending against cyber attacks?

    -MITER ATT&CK is a knowledge base that provides a detailed framework for understanding the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries in cyber attacks, aiding defenders in assessing and improving their defenses.

  • Why is it important to map an incident to the MITER ATT&CK framework?

    -Mapping an incident to the MITER ATT&CK framework helps in analyzing the attack, understanding the tactics and techniques used, and identifying potential gaps in the defense strategy.

  • What is the significance of understanding the tactics and techniques of APT groups?

    -Understanding the tactics and techniques of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) groups helps organizations to anticipate and prepare for potential attacks, ensuring they have adequate defenses in place.

  • How does the professor suggest students can find the book mentioned in the script?

    -The professor suggests that students might find a PDF copy of the book online but requests they support the author by purchasing the book, which is not very expensive in India.

Outlines

00:00

📚 Class Attendance and Pre-recorded Video Discussion

The instructor addresses the class, noting the discrepancy between the expected and actual attendance, and the need for fingerprint attendance verification. They assume students have watched a pre-recorded video on canvas and plan to discuss it. The focus then shifts to an interactive question about the command and control (C2) structure used by adversaries in cyber attacks, specifically how malware communicates back to its operator. The instructor guides the students through understanding the different uses of C2, including checking malware installation, gathering information about the target system, and data exfiltration. The correct answer to the question is that privilege escalation is not a use of C2, as it is a local action unrelated to remote communication. The segment ends with a prompt for students to engage with a platform called mente.com for anonymous responses to questions.

05:01

🔒 Cyber Kill Chain and Incident Analysis

The instructor discusses the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), a model that outlines the stages of a cyber attack. Students are asked to reorder the stages into the correct sequence, with a focus on the importance of incident analysis after a potential attack. The discussion highlights the need to understand why an attack was successful or unsuccessful, emphasizing the necessity of learning from defensive failures and conducting root cause analysis. The segment also touches on the challenges of attributing cyber attacks to specific threat groups, using the example of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) groups, which are often state-sponsored and difficult to identify accurately.

10:03

🌐 Understanding Advanced Persistent Threat Groups

The segment delves into the specifics of APT groups, correcting misconceptions about their national affiliations. It clarifies that APT28 is Russian, not Chinese, and was responsible for the SolarWinds attack in 2020. The discussion also covers other APT groups like APT3, which is Chinese, and APT37, which is North Korean and sometimes associated with the Lazarus Group. The instructor emphasizes the complexity of attributing cyber attacks to specific groups, as multiple groups may share similar tactics, malware, and infrastructure, making it difficult to pinpoint a single source.

15:04

📖 Book Discussion on Government Cyber Programs

The instructor introduces a book by a New York Times cybersecurity reporter, which explores government cyber programs and their implications. The book discusses how governments, including those of the US, China, Russia, and Israel, find vulnerabilities in widely used software systems and purchase exploits from hackers. It also touches on the controversial company NSO, known for creating the Pegasus malware, which has been used for surveillance and espionage. The book warns of the potential for catastrophic events if such cyber capabilities are not controlled, advocating for the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities.

20:06

💡 The Role of MITRE ATT&CK Framework in Cybersecurity

The instructor introduces the MITRE ATT&CK framework, a knowledge base that provides a detailed understanding of how adversaries attack systems. The framework is more comprehensive than the Cyber Kill Chain, offering a breakdown of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by attackers. The segment explains the importance of the framework for defenders to assess the adequacy of their defenses, respond to threat intelligence, analyze collected data, and evaluate cybersecurity tools. The framework is continually updated by the community, including contributions from MITRE Corporation and others, making it a valuable resource for understanding and combating cyber threats.

25:07

🛠️ Analyzing the Stuxnet Worm and Its Impact

The segment discusses the Stuxnet worm, a sophisticated malware designed to sabotage Iran's nuclear program by causing centrifuges to malfunction. The discussion covers the development and delivery of the worm, the challenges it posed to the targeted systems, and the broader implications of its discovery. The Stuxnet attack is used as a case study to illustrate the complexity of cyber attacks, the importance of understanding the tactics and techniques involved, and the potential for such attacks to spread beyond their intended targets.

30:09

🎯 The Importance of Tactics and Techniques in Cybersecurity

The instructor explains the concept of tactics and techniques in the context of cyber attacks, using the example of the Stuxnet worm. Tactics refer to the short-term goals an attacker sets to achieve their final objective, such as gaining initial access or moving laterally within a network. Techniques are the specific methods used to implement these tactics, such as exploiting vulnerabilities or using social engineering. The segment emphasizes the non-linear and iterative nature of these tactics and techniques, highlighting the importance of understanding them for effective cyber defense.

35:12

🌐 Community-Driven Knowledge Base of Cyber Threats

The segment highlights the community-driven aspect of the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, which includes contributions from various experts in the field. It discusses the categorization of tactics into enterprise, mobile, and ICS (Industrial Control Systems), each with its unique set of techniques. The instructor provides an overview of the techniques available for different tactics, such as privilege escalation and initial access, and emphasizes the importance of this knowledge base for understanding and defending against cyber threats.

40:13

🕵️‍♂️ Threat Intelligence and Analysis of APT Groups

The instructor discusses the use of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for analyzing threat intelligence and APT groups. The segment provides examples of how different APT groups, such as APT1, are attributed to specific military units and how their tactics, techniques, and procedures are documented. The discussion includes the analysis of specific campaigns and attacks, such as the 2015 Ukrainian power grid attack, to demonstrate how the framework can be used to understand the methods and tools used by these groups.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Fingerprint Attendance

Fingerprint attendance refers to a biometric method of verifying and recording an individual's presence by scanning their fingerprint. In the script, it is mentioned as a potential method for the teacher to ensure that all 92 students are accounted for in the class, highlighting the issue of attendance and the need for verification.

💡Command and Control (C2)

Command and Control (C2) is a term used in cybersecurity to describe the mechanisms by which a hacker or an adversary manages and directs malware within a compromised system. The script discusses how C2 is used to check if malware has been installed, to customize payloads based on the malware's findings, and to facilitate data exfiltration, emphasizing its role in the cyber kill chain.

💡Cyber Kill Chain

The Cyber Kill Chain is a model that represents the stages of a cyber attack, from initial reconnaissance to the final objective. In the script, the educator is discussing the order of these stages and their importance in understanding the progression of an attack, as well as the significance of stopping the chain at any point to prevent the adversary's goals.

💡Privilege Escalation

Privilege escalation is the act of exploiting a vulnerability in a system to gain higher-level access rights or permissions. The script mentions privilege escalation as a concept that is not associated with command and control, being a local operation within a system rather than a network-based activity.

💡MITER ATT&CK

MITER ATT&CK is a knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures used in cyber attacks. The script explains that this framework is more comprehensive than the Cyber Kill Chain, offering a detailed structure for understanding various attack methods, which is crucial for defenders to anticipate and counteract threats effectively.

💡Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) refers to a type of threat actor, often state-sponsored, that is highly resourceful and conducts long-term, stealthy cyber operations. The script discusses APT groups like APT28, APT3, and APT37, attributing them to different nation-states and their respective activities, emphasizing the global and strategic nature of cyber threats.

💡Incident Analysis

Incident analysis is the process of examining a security incident to determine what happened, how it happened, and why it was successful. The script highlights the importance of this process for understanding defense failures and for improving security measures, rather than merely being relieved that an attack did not succeed.

💡Root Cause Analysis

Root cause analysis is a methodical approach to identifying the underlying reasons for an incident or problem. In the context of the script, it is mentioned as a critical step in incident response, where understanding the fundamental causes of a security breach is essential for preventing future incidents.

💡Exploits and Vulnerabilities

Exploits and vulnerabilities are concepts central to cybersecurity. An exploit is a piece of software or technique used to take advantage of a vulnerability, which is a weakness or flaw in a system that can be exploited. The script discusses how governments and other entities buy and sell exploits, and how they can be used in sophisticated attacks like Stuxnet.

💡Stuxnet

Stuxnet is a sophisticated malware that was specifically designed to target industrial control systems, famously causing physical damage to Iran's nuclear program by manipulating the speed of centrifuges. The script uses Stuxnet as an example of a complex cyber attack that combines multiple tactics and techniques to achieve a strategic objective.

💡Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are specialized computers used in industrial control systems to manage processes. The script refers to PLCs in the context of the Stuxnet attack, where the malware targeted these controllers to alter the speed of motors in uranium enrichment centrifuges, demonstrating the potential impact of cyber attacks on physical infrastructure.

Highlights

Introduction of a new module on MITRE ATT&CK, a knowledge base for understanding adversary tactics and procedures in cyber attacks.

The class has 92 students but only 25 are present, prompting the use of fingerprint attendance.

Students are expected to have watched a pre-recorded video on Canvas before class.

Engagement with mente.com is used for anonymous in-class polling to gauge student understanding and participation.

Explanation of the Command and Control (C2) structure used by adversaries in cyber attacks, including its role in malware communication.

Clarification that Command and Control is not used for local activities like privilege escalation within a system.

Discussion on the importance of incident analysis after a cyber attack to understand defense failures and improve security measures.

The Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model is critiqued for being too simplistic and linear, leading to the development of the more comprehensive MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Misunderstandings about APT groups are corrected, such as APT28 being Russian, not Chinese, and their involvement in the 2020 SolarWinds attacks.

The role of threat intelligence in attributing cyber attacks to specific state-sponsored groups and the challenges therein.

The book by New York Times reporter Nicole Perlroth on the risks of uncontrolled cyber warfare leading to potential global disasters.

The commercial aspect of cyber attacks, including the sale of exploits and command and control systems to governments by companies like NSO Group.

The use of MITRE ATT&CK framework by defenders to assess the adequacy of their defenses against known adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The dynamic nature of cyber attacks where tactics and techniques are not linear and can be reused in various orders to achieve an attacker's goals.

The Stuxnet worm case study illustrating the multi-stage goals of an attack, from initial infection to causing physical damage in an industrial control system.

Community contribution to the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, making it an extensive and constantly evolving resource for the cybersecurity community.

The structure of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, including its 14 tactics, over 300 techniques, and associated procedures for a comprehensive view of cyber attack methods.

Transcripts

play00:10

[Music]

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good morning everyone uh I have 92

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students in the class but it seems like

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25 people sitting

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here uh I have to uh start uh asking for

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fingerprint uh um attendance

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in any case um we uh I assume that you

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have watched the uh pre-recorded uh

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video that was posted on

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canvas um so I have uh few questions for

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you before we

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start so we'll

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be looking at

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that okay so uh if you haven't done so

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go to mente.com on your phone use the

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code 632

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4165 and uh answer the

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questions since this is completely

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Anonymous you can be truthful if you

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haven't watched you can decide

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okay so uh looks like large number of

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you have watched at Leist uh parti or

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completely so now tell

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me the command and control is not used

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for which of the following activities by

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the adversary right so I have four

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different activities

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here remember it's not

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not okay so um suppose you are you are

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the one sending a malware to somebody

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else's

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machine and you want to know if the

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malware has has been installed there how

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do you how would you do that you have to

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have the malware communicate to you

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right so then the first

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choice is that the command and control

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wants to know the uh adversary wants to

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know if the malware has been installed

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then it wants it will write the malware

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in such a way so that the as soon as the

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malware finds a uh Target and uh

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executes it will call on the network

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functions and communicate to the command

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and control isn't it how else will the

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adversary know that the malware actually

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got

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installed now once the adversary knows

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that the that it has been installed then

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it will want that uh the malware finds

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something on that machine what

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applications are running what what

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versions are running what are the

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different uh files in the file system

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what are the uh if there are any

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credentials uh uh somewhere in that

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machine is there a weak implementation

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of a protocol through which it can move

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so all this information the malware will

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send to the

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adversary via the command and control

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route then the adversary based on the

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information it got it will customize a

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payload that can exploit that particular

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situation that the malware is telling C2

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so therefore the second one is also

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something that is used uh the C2 is used

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for right to get better understanding of

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its Target and

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customize more virulent payload for the

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Target now if you want to do data

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exfiltration let's say you want to

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filtered data from another person's uh

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system using a

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malware how will that

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malware send the data where will it send

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the

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data it will read the data from the

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target machine but it has to send it

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somewhere so that has to be a command

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and control server

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right so so all these three choices are

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not correct because I'm asking what is

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which one of this is not an use of

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command and control right I'm not asking

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which one is is a Cho use of Comm and

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control because that would make sense

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because I have three different choices

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all of which are actually use of command

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and control so the last one the

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privilege escalation is the Natural

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Choice because privilege escalation is

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nothing to do it's a very local thing it

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has nothing to do with what happens

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there like in the command and control

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side if there is a weak program which

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has a privilege escalation

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vulnerability and your homework one will

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make you do a privilege escalation so

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you will understand how privilege

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escalation happens right so so in terms

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of homework you will get virtual

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machines which you'll have to install on

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your machine and do all these things

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right on the on on that virtual

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machine okay so next one

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so this is an easy one use your finger

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to push up and down and sort them in the

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order in which they appear in CKC so

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these are the seven stages of cyber kill

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chain they're in a in a random

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order so you have to basically push them

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up and down to put them in the right

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order so I see there are not many

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responses

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[Music]

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yet it's almost

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correct it's almost

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correct where is it not exactly

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correct see you have to do exploitation

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of a weakness in the system

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before you can do installation right so

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your exploitation and installation order

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for majority basically is in the

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opposite order but otherwise you got the

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other ones right but this one has gotten

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a little bit you know in the reverse

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order okay so now go to the next one

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here I'm asking like uh suppose you you

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disrupt remember like in CC seven stages

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and claim of CC is that if your defense

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can actually stop them in one of the

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seven stages then you win right you

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cannot get get it the adversary do the

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final thing that it wants to

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do now the question here is that

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uh whether uh you you know whether you

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stop it or not you have to do po

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incident

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analysis and there are three reasons

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given why and you have to basically say

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which one is more important important

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reason why I would like to do the PO

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incident analysis and not be happy that

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okay you know the bad thing didn't

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happen also well that end well is

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doesn't work right I mean here you have

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to uh actually analyze why it could

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actually do what it could do okay so so

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this uh ordering is not uh you know it's

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it's rather subjective of course you

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have to know where the defense failed

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right and then you have to fix that

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because your defense must have failed in

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one of at least whichever stage up to

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whichever stage the adversary could come

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in until that stage you your defense

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didn't work at least against that

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particular adversary so so you have to

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figure out what failed and then

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accordingly fix those now there is a

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there is a you can debate about second

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and third which is uh of course you need

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to learn more about the

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adversary but also so you have to do

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root cause analysis and in a

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well-governed cyber security

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environment every incident root cause

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analysis is presented to the highest uh

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you know Authority in order for um you

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know for the highest authority to know

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where uh the possible risks are in the

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organization right so so that's kind of

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uh you know you can have a second and

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third kind of a risk condition

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now this one I have put uh intentionally

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I haven't uh really told you about all

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possible AP groups advanced persistent

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thread groups I have said that advanced

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persistent thread groups are very

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resourceful thread groups usually

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supported or funded by nation state

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governments and uh it's actually quite

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difficult to tell whether a particular

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thread group is uh working for a

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specific government uh this process is

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called attribution so it's an

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attribution is difficult but there are

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some which are kind you know which have

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been analyzed by a lot of threat

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intelligence companies and there are we

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kind of

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know which one you know is correct uh

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and some of them we do not know as fully

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correct okay so in this case so I wanted

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to see if you got interested beyond the

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class and actually did some studies

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about this uh nation state adversaries

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in any case ap28 is not a Chinese AP

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it's actually a Russian AP they were

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responsible for uh the solar wind

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attacks in 2020 in the US many US

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government uh entities their

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organization were infiltrated by the uh

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supply chain attack on a software system

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uh that for network monitoring called

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toar wind uh so ap28 is not a Chinese

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group so so most of you are have avoided

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that and indeed ap3 is a Chinese thread

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group right so so most of you have

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looked at that so uh so that's good now

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for each of these you have to say

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whether it's true or

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false so well first one I have already

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disclosed so for the other two

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so AP 28 nobody got

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wrong so AP 37 indeed is a North Korean

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group and sometimes it is considered

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that this is also the same as the

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Lazarus group

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uh they actually go after countries like

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South Korea uh

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us uh they have been found in India also

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uh they are pretty uh resourceful very

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skilled set of uh

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hackers a33 is also correctly uh in

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Iranian group right so

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cd33 uh is an Iranian hacker group as

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you uh can imagine that uh countries

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like North Korea Russia Iran are some of

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the most uh and Chinese are some of the

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most notorious thread groups they have

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multiple different thread groups not

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just one thread groups now remember that

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uh when I say something like ep3 is

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Chinese thread group right and AP1 is

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also a Chinese thread group it may be in

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reality that the AP1 and ap3 might be

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the same set of people based on the uh

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the attacks they use the malware use the

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command and control infrastructure they

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use the kind of uh targets they actually

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choose uh all these things U allow a

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threat intelligence company uh or

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organization to Cluster these attacks

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many attacks together and name them as a

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AP group now it may so happen that uh uh

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what we are calling

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ap28 maybe actually two different groups

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who are all using similar set of malware

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similar set of attack motor supper and

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so on or it can also be the case that uh

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AP1 and ap3 are the same group thus they

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are using two different sets of

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infrastructure two different types of

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malware to different types of things so

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so all these things are shrouded in

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mystery right so we do not really know

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that uh you know that ap28 is uh being

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uh directly uh talking to for example

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Putin right we do not know that but uh

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the the threat intelligence companies

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over time have analyzed and found that

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uh they they found fragments of Russian

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language uh uh comments in their in

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their code they found uh command and

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control infrastructure that are uh not

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necessarily in Russia but actually have

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been found to be used by Russians in

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other places they also find that uh that

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this time of the day when they were most

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active uh they also find the targets

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that they choose uh like Ukraine us

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these are mostly their targets from that

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they actually came up with this uh uh

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you know uh idea that uh this is uh

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Russian now in India we do not have uh

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this capability of

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attribution so in cab we are doing aot

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lot of work on this attribution but in

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general uh we haven't developed this

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attribution capabilities so far uh in

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India the last question so this is a

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book I already

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mentioned uh this is a uh this is a book

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by uh New York time

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cyber security

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reporter uh if you remember uh well you

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are probably too young to remember

play15:29

how many of you heard about Snowden so

play15:32

Snowden was a consultant employee in the

play15:36

uh I I believe in buo alen Hamilton uh

play15:39

which is a defense

play15:41

contractor and then he exfiltrated a lot

play15:45

of data uh during uh early

play15:48

2000s about many secret

play15:51

programs uh that us where you know

play15:54

military and and the intelligence

play15:56

agencies were

play15:57

doing uh including spying on its own

play16:02

citizens so what he did is that he then

play16:05

gave this information to certain news

play16:09

organizations New York Times was one of

play16:11

them and nicool Parra worked on that

play16:16

team and since then she found that there

play16:19

are lot of programs by governments and

play16:23

not necessarily only Russian and Chinese

play16:27

and and Ukraine the usual suspects it's

play16:29

not the only The Usual Suspects it's

play16:32

actually governments like the US

play16:34

government like our government like uh

play16:37

the European uh governments they all

play16:41

have programs to find

play16:45

vulnerabilities in and of course Israel

play16:48

uh find vulnerabilities in uh will uh

play16:53

very highly used software systems right

play16:56

for example in in iOS or in uh Android

play17:00

or in Windows or in uh uh Windows Office

play17:04

or things which are widely

play17:06

used and uh governments

play17:09

buy this

play17:12

vulnerabilities from hackers who are

play17:15

blackhead hackers who are not

play17:17

necessarily considered responsible

play17:19

hackers so responsible hackers they

play17:22

actually go and when they find a

play17:24

vulnerability they do an what what we

play17:26

call a responsible disclosure they go

play17:29

and tell the company look uh you have

play17:31

this problem I'm going to publish this

play17:33

in uh blackhead conference or uh

play17:37

whatever conference but I will wait

play17:39

until you fix it right so that's what

play17:41

responsible disclosure they won't

play17:43

disclose it to the world until it is

play17:46

fixed unfortunately the uh blackhead

play17:49

hackers are the opposite they find

play17:52

vulnerabilities but they do

play17:54

not uh disclose to the organization that

play17:57

is responsible for that software

play17:59

Hardware Etc they will go and sell it in

play18:02

the black market and one of the biggest

play18:05

buyer of this black market are

play18:07

governments so governments actually buy

play18:10

this

play18:11

exploits uh for example National

play18:13

Security Agency in the US and then they

play18:16

actually use it right so uh use it

play18:19

against uh other uh countries uh like uh

play18:24

important uh Personnel like their Prime

play18:27

Ministers or uh you know whatever uh

play18:30

this is and now uh there are companies

play18:34

who actually uh uh also create this uh

play18:38

use this um exploits and create a

play18:41

complete Comm and control system so you

play18:44

can buy the entire command and control

play18:46

system from them and one of this famous

play18:49

company that you might have heard of is

play18:51

NSO right NSO is the company that is was

play18:54

responsible for Pegasus Pegasus was a

play18:57

malware that was a zero click and zero

play19:01

day malware uh and they basically sell

play19:04

to the

play19:06

governments uh to this whole command and

play19:09

control infrastructure through which you

play19:10

can actually see what is happening in

play19:13

somebody else's phone uh and actually uh

play19:16

from that you can uh spy on them right

play19:19

you can spy on them you can also put in

play19:23

incriminating evidence in their phone or

play19:25

in their desktop Etc which will let

play19:28

later on be used against them so there

play19:31

there is a whole uh business around this

play19:35

uh vulnerabilities and exploits there

play19:38

are also open companies where you can

play19:41

find uh not even in the dark web in the

play19:44

in the in the regular web surface web

play19:47

there are companies which will pay you

play19:50

over million dollar if you find an iOS

play19:53

vulnerability that is zero zero click

play19:56

and zero day right so this is the

play19:58

situation so what this book basically

play20:01

says that you know we already have seen

play20:06

stocket being used by other countries in

play20:09

Iranian nuclear plants what stops Iran

play20:13

to use the same on other countries and

play20:15

they have tried and Iran has actually

play20:19

attacked dams water like the hydro

play20:24

uh systems in in the US uh by mistake

play20:28

they did as very small dam so it didn't

play20:30

work but the same name dam was also in

play20:34

Oregon if they had they had done the

play20:36

same attack on that then thousands of

play20:39

people would be flooded away right if

play20:42

the the gates open in the dam by uh

play20:45

remote control similarly uh the uh uh

play20:50

North Koreans are doing this all the

play20:52

time to South Koreans and uh Russians

play20:55

are doing this to Ukraine they did shut

play20:57

down their power and uh you know various

play21:00

things so so what this book is saying is

play21:02

that if we do not have control on this

play21:06

uh we are going to uh basically at this

play21:08

at some point we'll create a nuclear

play21:11

disaster or some kind of a weapon system

play21:14

misfiring and that could create a entire

play21:17

you know worldwide uh uh war and and the

play21:20

world uh end this is a very uh dystopian

play21:24

view of things uh I don't want to scare

play21:27

you but it's a serious thing to be taken

play21:31

uh very seriously and I would highly

play21:33

suggest reading this book if you can if

play21:37

you if you try hard you will find a PDF

play21:40

copy somewhere on the net on the

play21:44

internet but I would request you to not

play21:47

use that and buy it it's not very

play21:50

expensive it's like 500 rupees or

play21:52

something in

play21:54

India Okay so

play21:58

so now I'm going to

play22:00

start our new uh

play22:03

module miter at and

play22:07

CK so miter ATN CK is a knowledge based

play22:12

of how

play22:14

adversaries attack our

play22:17

systems and to remember like in in CC

play22:21

what we saw is that they said they're

play22:23

very simplistic they said these are the

play22:24

seven stages through which an attack

play22:27

adversary has to get into your system

play22:30

install things make it permanent

play22:32

persistent then may actually go into uh

play22:36

uh communicate to the command and

play22:37

control then eventually do something

play22:40

that is harmful

play22:42

right so miter actually is came much

play22:46

later than CKC so they actually analyzed

play22:49

you know thousands and thousands of

play22:51

attack

play22:53

incidents papers and so on and they said

play22:55

okay this is not uh as simplistic and as

play23:00

linear as CKC might give you an idea of

play23:05

so I'm going so they created a knowledge

play23:07

base now this knowledge base is actually

play23:11

uh very extensive it has uh 14 tactics

play23:15

and 300 over 300 techniques and then

play23:19

more process procedures right so it's a

play23:22

is basically what is called TTP tactics

play23:25

techniques and

play23:26

procedures so what

play23:30

uh so we'll talk about what this ATN CK

play23:34

is all about and then we'll uh uh teach

play23:38

you how to

play23:41

map a an incident like an attack

play23:45

incident into uh at and CK framework and

play23:50

we can do it from reports from analysts

play23:53

or we can do it from raw data the data

play23:56

that we collect as evidence uh from

play23:59

there and then we'll talk about a tool

play24:01

that uh miter has provided to do this

play24:04

kind of work and then uh we'll see that

play24:10

of course uh this is not to teach you

play24:12

how to attack this is actually for

play24:14

Defenders to understand the attacker so

play24:17

that they can actually uh figure out for

play24:21

each of these techniques if my defense

play24:24

is adequate or do I have to do something

play24:25

else so so to kind of wrap your head

play24:28

around what can happen to my system and

play24:33

figuring out how would I stop or how

play24:35

would I detect that uh when it h when it

play24:42

happens

play24:44

so as a

play24:46

Defender I want to know various things

play24:48

right so I want to know whether the my

play24:51

current um uh defense is adequate right

play24:56

and the controls that I have like I I

play24:58

have firewalls I have endpoint detection

play25:00

I have network monitoring I have uh you

play25:03

know uh strong authentication I have

play25:07

two- Factor authentication I have uh

play25:09

Network segmentation I have all these

play25:12

things but is this enough does so if if

play25:16

the question is this enough can only be

play25:18

answered if you know what the other site

play25:20

can do right if you if you assume that

play25:23

the other side is very stupid you know

play25:26

they can they will only try to do

play25:27

something that that you know fishing and

play25:29

nothing else right so then of course you

play25:32

do not have to do a whole lot right you

play25:33

can may stop that by by giving a lot of

play25:38

training to your employees and users

play25:41

that don't click on this kind of things

play25:43

don't download this kind of things and

play25:44

continue to say such things and you will

play25:47

be fine but the adversary is not simple

play25:51

right so they are much like as I said

play25:53

that they're backed by government have

play25:55

lot of funding lot of good hackers what

play25:58

for them and so on and so forth so

play26:00

therefore I cannot really depend on uh

play26:04

uh this uh small uh or ad hoc

play26:08

implementation of uh defense like

play26:11

sometimes people do not think about

play26:13

adversity and all they just put a

play26:15

firewall they just put a uh you know

play26:17

proxy and they they just put some

play26:19

antivirus and think that everything is

play26:21

fine but actually it is not until you

play26:24

actually figure out what the attacker

play26:26

might do and then compare uh whether uh

play26:30

whether you have adequate defense so

play26:32

that is something every Defender wants

play26:34

to

play26:35

know and then so uh second thing is that

play26:40

um let's say I get I read in the news

play26:43

that educational institutes are now

play26:46

being targeted by let's say

play26:49

aptx right so sometimes like you know

play26:52

they attack some AP groups Target Health

play26:55

sector some AP groups attack the um the

play26:59

oil and gas sector and some nuclear

play27:02

plants so there could be an AP Group

play27:04

which might be attacking uh let's say

play27:07

educational sector so as as iitk I will

play27:11

be then immediately worry about whether

play27:14

I can be a Target and if I am the target

play27:18

I have to read all all the information

play27:20

that from other incidents what what how

play27:23

they got in what did they do whether

play27:25

they did any kind of data exfiltration

play27:27

whether they do ransomware attack and so

play27:30

on then I have to check whether against

play27:32

all my defense controls whether I can

play27:36

handle that particular AP so so this

play27:39

question here is not just about ap3 or

play27:41

let's say 29 29 is also Russian threes

play27:44

Chinese you know but uh actually uh this

play27:49

uh uh for any kind of threat

play27:52

intelligence that you get in the in the

play27:55

news and in from your from let's say

play27:58

or other places that this EP group is

play28:01

now focusing on this particular sector

play28:04

then I have to check against my defenses

play28:07

whether uh that EP group can be uh can

play28:10

be theed by my defenses and to do that I

play28:13

have to understand the what that AP

play28:16

group

play28:17

does uh and uh so this is the question

play28:21

like you know can I stop AP

play28:24

attacks uh and then the question other

play28:27

question is that

play28:28

when I collect so I do uh so

play28:30

organizations collect a lot of data from

play28:33

their own infrastructure right so for

play28:35

example if they have a network

play28:37

monitoring they have a um endpoint

play28:40

monitoring lots of data logs logs from

play28:43

all the all the systems firewall logs

play28:46

and and web server logs and so on so

play28:48

it's a huge amount of data we collect

play28:51

and then we analyze it and we display uh

play28:53

the main uh findings on a screen like in

play28:57

an see now the question is that is that

play29:00

data that I'm

play29:02

collecting is useful in protection

play29:05

detection or uh uh response right so

play29:08

this is the other question that I may

play29:11

have the other question is that am I

play29:14

actually overdoing it am I actually

play29:16

having many tools which have overlapping

play29:19

functionality they they meant to do the

play29:21

same they're meant to detect or they're

play29:24

meant to defend against the same thing

play29:27

maybe I'm just unnecessarily buying two

play29:30

different tools paying their license fee

play29:32

and so on so that's another question I

play29:34

may want to

play29:35

know and then other thing is that when

play29:37

the vendors come to you the cyber

play29:39

security tool vendors they will tell you

play29:42

all kind of things right so but you have

play29:44

to actually you know formulate the right

play29:48

questions in your mind that what is this

play29:51

tool for what you know with respect to

play29:54

this uh uh type of adversarial activity

play29:57

will this tool help

play29:58

and these kind of questions can be

play30:00

answered better if you actually think uh

play30:03

formulate everything in terms of miter

play30:04

at and CK so so these are the reasoning

play30:08

why MIT ATN CK was created

play30:14

right so so ATN CK is a knowledge base

play30:20

it's actually not a tool it's a

play30:24

framework to actually think and study

play30:28

the adversary's behavior in a very

play30:31

structured way right as I said that this

play30:35

group miter Corporation has is a think

play30:38

tank uh they have a group they they

play30:41

formed a group and this group actually

play30:43

went through a very large number of

play30:45

incidents and what happened in those

play30:48

incidences and and what uh was done and

play30:51

so

play30:52

on and then they came up with this

play30:55

structured way of uh capturing all this

play30:58

incidents right so so they said uh an

play31:01

adversary actually has a final goal like

play31:04

for example in case of stocket the final

play31:07

goal was to actually uh change the

play31:10

program of programmable logic

play31:12

controllers such that the motor that

play31:16

that rotates the

play31:18

spindles for enriching uranium this

play31:21

motor sometimes goes very fast and

play31:24

sometimes goes very

play31:25

slow and instead of going going in an

play31:28

uniform speed and at at a critical speed

play31:31

right the the whole nuclear enrichment

play31:34

uh they had like thousands and thousands

play31:36

of very large you know tubes in which

play31:39

you know uranium was being rotated for

play31:43

uh you know this uh you know enriching

play31:46

the uranium so these spindles uh if they

play31:49

rotate at a critical speed or Beyond a

play31:52

critical speed only then it works that

play31:54

was the whole

play31:56

idea now what this attackers did is that

play31:59

they said okay so who rotates the

play32:02

spindles there are Motors right every

play32:05

every a spindle has a motor right so

play32:07

that motor rotates the spindle so they

play32:10

said okay fine so what I'll do is I will

play32:14

see how I can get to the PLC the

play32:17

programmable logic controller which

play32:19

tells the motor to you know run in what

play32:22

speed and so on right so which basically

play32:24

gives signal to the motor sets its speed

play32:27

and and so

play32:28

on so so how do I get to the PLC right

play32:32

so PLC is actually is is within the

play32:36

within the uh uh you know uh the the

play32:40

place where the spindles are are

play32:43

situated it's like a factory floor right

play32:46

so these plcs are now uh actually being

play32:50

controlled uh by uh scada systems uh

play32:54

these are uh supervisory control and

play32:57

data acquisition systems but plc's plc's

play33:00

are are you plcs are not like regular

play33:03

computers you cannot SE seat on them

play33:05

there's no screen uh there is a there is

play33:08

no like LCD display there is there may

play33:10

be a small display and some stuff but

play33:12

there is no large display and there's no

play33:15

keyboard and stuff so you actually

play33:17

create the PLC programs and put them

play33:20

download them into the PLC right from

play33:22

from Windows

play33:23

machines so if I if I need the PLC

play33:26

program to change

play33:28

then I have to actually go to find those

play33:30

windows machines from which the PLC

play33:33

program is loaded right now how do I get

play33:37

to that Windows machine right so that

play33:40

Windows machine is uh within the uh

play33:43

within the network uh but that Network

play33:45

itself is not connected to the

play33:48

internet so but uh this within this

play33:53

network the office Network at which

play33:56

regular uh uh you know officers were

play33:58

working and the network uh at on which

play34:02

that Windows machine was there from

play34:05

which the PLC programs are loaded we in

play34:07

the same segment same network

play34:11

segment so so if I can get one of these

play34:13

office

play34:14

guys to carry the malware the malware is

play34:18

written very very care carefully and

play34:21

with lot of the Ground Intelligence

play34:23

right they knew exactly which uh like it

play34:26

was a cmen PLC that were that they were

play34:28

using an S S7 right so so they knew

play34:31

exactly make an model and how it works

play34:34

how the PLC is loaded with programs from

play34:36

Windows all this stuff they researched

play34:39

so they then apparently uh they give

play34:42

some free USB somewhere or something

play34:45

where the actual malware was loaded and

play34:48

one of the officers actually brought

play34:50

that in plugged it in the malware got

play34:53

copied into his machine same network by

play34:57

us utilizing the connection between one

play35:01

machine to the other it did a lateral

play35:03

movement and then it actually went

play35:05

eventually to find the machine where the

play35:07

PLC program uh is loaded it replaced the

play35:11

PLC program by a program that will um

play35:15

make the mo motor run erratically and

play35:19

these motors are very sophisticated so

play35:22

if they run erratically for a while they

play35:24

burn out so so the

play35:28

main idea was to actually burn out as

play35:31

many uh as many uh Motors in a very

play35:35

short time as possible again and again

play35:38

and uh the attacker the the defender is

play35:42

thinking so Motors often Crash and Burn

play35:46

right so but that percentage is very

play35:48

small like uh you know maybe 1% Motors

play35:52

uh also uh Crash and Burn quickly so

play35:56

when they started started seeing that

play35:58

Motors are crashing and burning but they

play36:01

they saw that this Crash and Burn is is

play36:03

is a very fast rate like you know very

play36:06

large percentage of motors are crashing

play36:08

and burning which basically halted their

play36:12

uranium enrichment Pro uh program then

play36:15

they realized something is not right and

play36:18

then they did the analysis they looked

play36:20

at the PLC program and they say this is

play36:23

a different program uh this is this no

play36:27

this is not

play36:28

program that was already there then they

play36:31

you know worked it out and they figured

play36:33

out that they have been uh they have

play36:35

been uh taken in for so uh so at this

play36:39

point they actually started they figured

play36:42

out and they started launching the same

play36:45

thing saate everywhere else so in a in a

play36:49

couple of months after after the

play36:51

Iranians got got to know in a couple of

play36:55

months staet was found a everywhere in

play36:58

Europe then in uh in uh us uh South

play37:03

America and also in India and Asia right

play37:07

so within like that year we are seeing

play37:09

stack net everywhere and various

play37:11

variants of Stack net right so so at

play37:14

this point uh the governments who

play37:17

actually did this they got really afraid

play37:20

that okay we have launched

play37:23

something we have uh we have unbottled a

play37:25

genie which cannot be put back into to

play37:27

the bottle that is the situation like so

play37:29

we thought that we'll just do it nobody

play37:31

would know we'll delay their nuclear

play37:34

program and they will not figure out how

play37:38

how they were having so many motor uh

play37:41

malfunctioning uh for a while they they

play37:43

will replace it by then we have a large

play37:47

uh gap between their uh you know in the

play37:49

advancement of their nuclear program but

play37:53

unfortunately the the the thing came out

play37:56

open in the open and there are various

play37:59

variants of stock net started coming and

play38:01

also various variants of uh other

play38:05

malware which seems to be from the same

play38:08

um same group that actually started the

play38:12

St net malware and it got you know

play38:15

forked into multiple different uh uh

play38:17

types of

play38:19

malware I have a whole lecture on that I

play38:21

will post that uh so uh so the

play38:24

idea that I'm trying to tell you is that

play38:27

the

play38:28

has a eventual goal that is to destroy

play38:32

their nuclear capabilities by delaying

play38:34

it that is their final goal but they

play38:37

don't get to the final goal just just

play38:40

directly right you cannot get attain the

play38:42

final goal directly so what you have to

play38:44

do is that you have to do various uh

play38:47

short um you know short range goals

play38:50

right how do I get in right so there

play38:54

this this system is not connected to the

play38:56

internet so they don't read emails on

play38:59

their computer so I cannot fish them so

play39:01

I have to figure out how to how

play39:04

to deliver the malware so so USB it is

play39:09

right so once they got that they got one

play39:11

goal done but to before doing that goal

play39:15

they also had to do weaponization

play39:17

because to write that stuck net worm was

play39:20

a lot of work it probably years of work

play39:23

right so weaponization was done and then

play39:26

uh the reconnaissance which uh

play39:28

Executives to actually uh you know

play39:31

Target that I have to figure out right

play39:34

so that that also I have to uh figure

play39:36

out so so reconnaissance was done so

play39:40

reconnaissance was done weaponization

play39:42

was done in in in fact reconnaissance

play39:44

was probably done after weaponization

play39:47

right because you write the St net in

play39:50

the lab you test it on a test bed then

play39:54

you go and find who in that particular

play39:56

facility

play39:58

is amenable to a taking a USB inside

play40:01

without suspecting anything so that is

play40:04

reconnaissance uh then we find the

play40:07

delivery delivery was through the USB

play40:09

stick then that worm has to actually

play40:12

figure out the uh the machine in which

play40:16

that worm was initially executed it may

play40:19

not be a high privileged account right

play40:21

so it has to figure out maybe how to do

play40:23

privilege escalation or it has to figure

play40:26

out how to move across the that machine

play40:28

to another

play40:29

machine eventually in search of the

play40:32

machine that has the PLC uh

play40:35

system so these are small small goals

play40:38

right so how to get in how to um move

play40:42

from one machine to the other how to how

play40:45

to collect the data about which machine

play40:48

has the right target system all this

play40:51

stuff has to be done and these are

play40:53

called tactics so when an attacker even

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eventually wants to execute a goal he

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has to string together tactics right so

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so and these tactics are not necessarily

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in a linear fashion like as I said in

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stocket probably the the reconnaissance

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happened after weaponization right so it

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does Tactics do not happen in a linear

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order they may happen in multiple order

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same tactic may be used multiple times

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in the same chain of events but

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eventually you want to execute the final

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goal that is what this thing is about so

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tactics uh are then now now to implement

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the tactics you need techniques so there

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are a lot of uh different techniques you

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can use for example delivery by a USB is

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one technique for for delivery but you

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could also deliver it through a CD maybe

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you could have delivered it through a um

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you know email you could have delivered

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delivered it through some other

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mechanism like like uh finding um uh

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weakness in their local network and by

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uh sending a spy into the into the uh

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facility all all the all kinds of stuff

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can be actually done so so each tactic

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has a multiple techniques by which that

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tactic can be

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realized and uh then techniques can be

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described in terms of procedures how a

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technique is actually applied so there

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are procedures

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so and this knowledge Bas is Community

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Driven so it's not like done only by

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miter people they invited uh everybody

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to actually contribute to this and it's

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it has become a very huge and very

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useful knowledge base for

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everybody okay so let me let me show you

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the knowledge base because I don't think

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I have a whole lot of time

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here 5 minutes

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so uh uh

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so so attack. miter.org is where you

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have to

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go uh here you'll see the tactics right

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so uh tactics here you see the tactics

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that I'm going to talk about in the

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class is Enterprise tactics so

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Enterprise tactics there are 14 uh

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tactics right now if you go into their

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mobile tactics how mobile attacks on

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mobile mobile phones happen then you

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will see a a slightly different set of

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tactics and if you go to their IC

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tactics that is industrial control

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system then they will see a slightly

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different and a smaller number of

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tactics doesn't mean that the attack on

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IC requires less number of tactics but

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so far the attacks that have been

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analyzed has seen only these tactics

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tomorrow there may be another tactics

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added to this list but to far this uh

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this are the tactics that have been seen

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in

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use then if you if you actually go into

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the uh techniques so Enterprise

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techniques so here is a list of

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techniques there are 300 plus

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techniques so here and then there are

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sub techniques so for example here you

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say that abuse elevation control

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mechanism right so here uh this is uh

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about privilege escalation right so

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there are multiple different sub

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techniques within privilege escalation

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like uh you know those those of you who

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know about set uid set G ID thing here

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is the bypass of user account control

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using Pudo or pseudo caching uh elevated

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execution with prompt uh temporary

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elevated Cloud access access token

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manipulation so there are many different

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ways you can actually do the privilege

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escalation okay so similarly you can

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have techniques that are associated with

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let's say uh initial access so initial

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access you can have content injection

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drive by compromise uh exploit public

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facing application external remote

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services and so on so these are

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techniques we'll we'll get into this uh

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later but uh this uh thread intelligence

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right so there are thread

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groups so you can see all this different

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thread groups like uh like we talked

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about the AP1 right so AP1 is a Chinese

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thread group attributed to the second

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Bureau of people's Liberation Army

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general staff departments third

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Department commonly known its military

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unit cover designator as unit 6 uh

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61398 so this group has been analyzed

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quite a bit by the various threat

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intelligence agencies so that's why

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they're being so specific right about

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who might be behind the

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AP1 some of the groups may not be

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actually you know known that

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definitely here you have all the

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techniques that has been seen to be used

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by this AP group the kind of software

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they use for their attacks and so on and

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then there are some of this uh analysis

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and stories related to AP1 so this is

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where you find find more information of

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AP groups you can find about different

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softwares used for attacks so you can

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see uh and this this uh list continues

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to grow as we know more campaigns there

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are

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campaigns uh which are basically uh the

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what the AP groups take carry out so if

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you want to know like you know how the

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2015 Electric Power Attack then you can

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go

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here and you can actually see what

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techniques were used and then you can

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from that you can figure out what

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tactics were used so you see that these

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are some of the uh software that were

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used for this uh Ukraine Electric uh

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power grid attack and there are so many

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uh of these techniques were used so

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we'll stop here

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[Music]

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[Music]

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[Music]

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