GM Recall : The Switch From Hell - the fifth estate
Summary
TLDRThe Fifth Estate investigates General Motors' deadly secret involving defective ignition switches in their compact cars, particularly the Chevrolet Cobalt. The documentary reveals GM's internal knowledge of the fatal flaw since 2001, their decision not to recall the vehicles, and the tragic consequences, including numerous deaths. It questions the role of Transport Canada in vehicle safety, highlights the corporate culture prioritizing cost over safety, and the lack of legal power to enforce recalls, suggesting a systemic issue in the auto industry's approach to safety.
Takeaways
- 🔍 The 'Fifth Estate' investigation uncovers General Motors' (GM) deadly secret regarding the ignition switch defect in their Chevrolet Cobalt cars.
- 🏁 GM made a business decision to not fix the safety defects, prioritizing cost over customer safety, which led to fatalities.
- 💔 The tragic death of Dany Dubuc-Marquis in Quebec and Brooke Melton in Georgia highlighted the fatal flaw in GM vehicles that could have been addressed over a decade ago.
- 🔧 A 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, was identified as the critical part that, if fixed, might have saved lives, but GM chose not to incur the cost.
- 📋 Transport Canada's role in vehicle safety is questioned, as they did not take immediate action on the GM ignition switch issue despite early warnings.
- 🤔 The script raises concerns about corporate greed and the safety of millions of motor vehicles, as well as the effectiveness of regulatory bodies.
- 🛠️ Mechanic Charlie Miller's examination of the ignition switch revealed a design flaw that could cause the key to easily slip from the 'on' to 'accessory' position, disabling critical safety features.
- 🆚 A comparison of old and new ignition switches showed a significant difference in the force required to move the key, indicating a deliberate change by GM that was not communicated to customers.
- 📉 The economic downturn and GM's financial struggles seemed to take precedence over addressing the ignition switch issue, delaying necessary recalls and repairs.
- 📖 Internal GM documents and testimonies revealed a corporate culture that downplayed safety issues and even conducted cost-benefit analyses on the value of human life versus the cost of recalls.
- ⚠️ Despite knowing about the defect since 2001, GM did not issue a recall until 2014, and only after significant public and legal pressure.
Q & A
What was the central issue with General Motors' Chevrolet Cobalt?
-The central issue with the Chevrolet Cobalt was a defective ignition switch that could move from the 'on' to the 'accessory' position, causing a loss of power, steering, and anti-lock brakes, leading to fatal accidents.
How did the defective ignition switch in the Cobalt affect safety?
-The defective ignition switch could cause the car to stall, disabling power steering, power brakes, and anti-lock braking systems, and preventing airbags from deploying, which resulted in a higher risk of fatal accidents.
What was the cost of the part that General Motors failed to replace, which could have prevented these accidents?
-The part that needed replacement was a 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, which if fixed, could have prevented the ignition switch from moving to the 'accessory' position.
Why did General Motors not disclose the ignition switch defect to the public?
-General Motors did not disclose the defect because they made a business decision that it was cheaper to pay for damages in lawsuits than to recall and repair the vehicles, which would have cost them more financially.
What role did Transport Canada play in the handling of the GM ignition switch issue?
-Transport Canada was criticized for not taking proactive measures to address the issue. They only became aware of the problem when GM announced the recall in February 2014, despite evidence suggesting they had knowledge of the issue earlier.
How did the Melton family react to the official story of their daughter's accident?
-The Melton family did not accept the official story that their daughter's accident was due to a driving error. They believed it had to be a mechanical failure and sought the help of an automotive detective to uncover the truth.
What was the significance of the discovery by engineer Mark Hood regarding the ignition switch?
-Mark Hood discovered that the newer ignition switch had a plunger that was 1.6 millimeters longer than the defective one, making it harder to move the key from 'run' to 'accessory' or 'off'. This change was made without informing customers or issuing a recall.
What was the role of Charlie Miller, the mechanic from Merigold, Mississippi, in the investigation?
-Charlie Miller was an expert witness in automobile lawsuits. He found that the ignition switch in Brooke Melton's car had moved to the 'accessory' position, causing the loss of power, and that the switch was easily jostled out of position.
What actions did General Motors take after the ignition switch issue became public?
-After the issue became public, General Motors recalled millions of vehicles, admitted to at least 29 fatalities related to the ignition switch, and faced congressional investigations, a Department of Justice investigation, and a fine from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
What was the impact of the ignition switch scandal on General Motors' corporate culture?
-The scandal revealed a corporate culture that prioritized cost over safety and penalized employees for speaking up about problems. GM dismissed 15 employees, including Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer responsible for the ignition switch, as a result of the scandal.
What were the legal implications for General Motors in the U.S. and Canada?
-In the U.S., GM faced congressional investigations, a Department of Justice investigation, and a $35 million fine for not disclosing the ignition switch defects. In Canada, Transport Canada did not take any official action against GM, but the company still faced criticism for not addressing the issue sooner.
Outlines
🚗 Deadly GM Cobalt Secrets Revealed
The script begins with an introduction to a shocking revelation about General Motors (GM) and its handling of a deadly safety defect in the Chevrolet Cobalt model. The narrative focuses on the tragic consequences of GM's decision not to fix a known issue with the ignition switch, which led to numerous accidents and fatalities. The story highlights the case of Dany Dubuc-Marquis, a young man whose life was cut short due to the defect, and raises questions about corporate responsibility and the role of Transport Canada in vehicle safety.
🔍 Uncovering the Faulty Ignition Switch
This paragraph delves into the investigative journey of the Melton family, who sought to uncover the truth behind their daughter's fatal car accident involving a GM vehicle. The narrative introduces Charlie Miller, a mechanic, and Mark Hood, an engineer, who together discovered the ignition switch's critical flaw. The switch, a mere 57-cent piece, was found to be the pivotal component that could cause the vehicle to lose power, steering, and brakes, leading to catastrophic accidents. The summary also reveals GM's knowledge of a safer ignition design used in newer models but not implemented in older vehicles, exposing a disregard for consumer safety.
🏁 GM's History of Safety Concerns
The script provides a historical context of GM's safety issues, dating back to the 1960s with the Chevrolet Corvair. It outlines the company's portrayal as an iconic automobile manufacturer and its subsequent exposure by consumer advocate Ralph Nader for design flaws. The narrative moves through time, discussing GM's reluctance to address safety defects in its vehicles, including a service bulletin that acknowledged the ignition switch issue without a formal recall. The paragraph also introduces Ray deGiorgio, an engineer who internally referred to the ignition switch as 'the switch from hell,' foreshadowing the internal knowledge of the defect.
📉 Financial Priorities Over Safety
This section of the script discusses GM's internal cost-benefit analysis regarding vehicle safety. It reveals the company's prioritization of financial considerations over the lives of its customers, with a focus on the 2008 economic downturn and GM's bankruptcy. The narrative describes how GM's corporate culture discouraged speaking up about safety issues and how the company rationalized not disclosing the ignition switch defect as it was deemed a 'customer convenience issue' rather than a safety hazard.
📜 Deceptive Practices and Legal Consequences
The script uncovers GM's deceptive practices, including a secret replacement of the defective ignition part in newer models without informing customers or initiating a recall. It details the legal pursuit by attorney Lance Cooper, who deposed key GM engineers, revealing their knowledge and denial of the ignition switch issue. The narrative also highlights a critical document that surfaced after a GM engineer's testimony, which contradicted his claims of ignorance about the part change, implicating GM in a cover-up of the defect.
🇨🇦 Transport Canada's Inaction Questioned
This paragraph raises questions about the role and effectiveness of Transport Canada in vehicle safety regulation. It contrasts the U.S.'s proactive approach to automotive safety with Canada's reactive stance, suggesting that Canada often follows the lead of the U.S. in safety recalls. The narrative points out that Transport Canada was aware of an accident involving a defective GM ignition switch months before the official recall but did not act on this information, leading to further fatalities.
🚨 The Ignition Switch Recall and Its Aftermath
The script describes the aftermath of GM's delayed recall of vehicles with the defective ignition switch, which承认ably led to numerous fatalities and injuries. It details the media coverage, public outcry, and the legal and congressional investigations that ensued in the U.S. The narrative also addresses the lack of official action by Transport Canada and the discrepancy in the statements of Canadian officials regarding their knowledge of the issue prior to the recall.
🛑 The Tragic Impact of Delayed Action
This section of the script highlights the tragic consequences of GM's and Transport Canada's delayed response to the ignition switch issue. It tells the story of Danylo Kulish, whose death in a crash involving a GM vehicle with the defective ignition switch occurred after the known issue but before the recall. The narrative emphasizes the families' frustration with GM and Transport Canada, and the latter's perceived lack of independence and proactivity in ensuring vehicle safety.
🌐 The Broader Implications and Future Concerns
The script concludes with a broader discussion of the implications of GM's negligence and the regulatory shortcomings in the automobile industry. It suggests that without prioritizing safety and without stronger regulatory oversight in Canada and the U.S., similar tragedies could occur in the future. The narrative ends with a note on GM's dismissal of employees involved in the ignition switch scandal and the skepticism surrounding the company's claims of executive ignorance.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡General Motors
💡Ignition Switch
💡Defective
💡Recall
💡Safety Defects
💡Cost-Benefit Analysis
💡Transport Canada
💡Corporate Greed
💡Liability
💡Engineer Ray deGiorgio
💡Airbag Non-deployment
Highlights
General Motors (GM) made a business decision not to fix a known safety defect in their vehicles, prioritizing cost over customer lives.
The defective ignition switch in GM's Chevrolet Cobalt and other models was identified as a potential issue as early as 2001 but was not addressed until a recall in 2014.
A 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, was the critical component that, when faulty, could cause the ignition to switch positions and disable crucial safety features.
GM's internal culture discouraged speaking up about problems, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability regarding safety issues.
The story of Dany Dubuc-Marquis, a 23-year-old whose death in a Cobalt crash raised questions about Transport Canada's handling of vehicle recalls and safety.
Investigations revealed that GM had secretly replaced the defective ignition part in newer models without informing the public or addressing the older vehicles.
Engineer Mark Hood discovered that the newer ignition switches had a plunger 1.6 millimeters longer, preventing the key from slipping into the 'accessory' position.
GM's lack of disclosure about the ignition switch defect and their decision not to issue a recall until 2014 has been linked to at least 29 fatalities.
Transport Canada's response to the GM ignition switch issue was criticized for being reactive rather than proactive, with no official action taken against GM.
The regulatory power of Transport Canada is limited compared to the U.S., lacking the authority to order recalls and relying on manufacturer cooperation.
GM's history of safety issues dates back to the 1960s with the Chevrolet Corvair, and has continued with various models, including pickup trucks with side saddle gas tanks.
Internal GM documents and testimonies revealed a pattern of ignoring safety defects until they became publicly and legally unavoidable.
The Melton family's pursuit of justice for their daughter Brooke, who died in a Cobalt crash, led to the exposure of GM's negligence and the ignition switch defect.
Mechanic Charlie Miller's examination of the Cobalt's ignition system provided critical evidence of the defect and GM's failure to address it.
GM's cost-benefit analysis of safety recalls revealed a corporate culture that calculated the expense of fatalities against the cost of repairs.
After the ignition switch scandal broke, GM dismissed 15 employees, including Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer associated with the defective part, though senior management claimed no knowledge.
Critics argue that safety should be the top priority for the auto industry, but the lack of stringent regulations and proactive oversight may lead to future safety crises.
Transcripts
(♪♪)
>> Bob: On this edition of
"The Fifth Estate"...
>> I have a warning for you
tonight.
>> Bob: It was General Motors'
deadly secret.
>> What happened to this GM
car?
Crappy little Cobalt.
>> Bob: Now, a startling look
inside the GM culture that put
a price on their customers'
lives.
>> GM made a business decision
not to fix the safety defects.
>> Bob: The dead Canadian who
might have been saved.
>> He died for a 57-cent piece
that should have been fixed
over ten years ago.
>> Bob: And the life or death
question, what's Transport
Canada doing to protect you?
>> It's incumbent upon the
manufacturer to let Transport
Canada know about a defect in
a timely fashion.
>> That's right.
>> Is almost a decade-and-a-half
in timely fashion?
>> Bob: I'm Bob McKeown.
This is "The Fifth Estate."
Ahead, the story of the switch
from hell.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: You may not know his
name yet but Dany Dubuc-Marquis
of Quebec's eastern townships
will be a pivotal figure in
this story.
At 23, he was all you'd want a
young man to be.
Good son.
Great friend.
The favourite camp counsellor.
Passionate about everything he
did.
Studying to be a Special Ed.
teacher, he and his college
class were soon to depart for
summer school in Belgium.
But then in June 2013, on this
highway near Granby, Quebec,
Dany's Chevrolet Cobalt left
the road and crashed.
His father Normand got the
phone call every parent dreads.
(speaking in French)
>> Bob: As you'll see, how and
why Dany Dubuc-Marquis died
should be a cautionary tale
for Canadians.
It raises questions about
corporate greed but also about
the safety of Canada's 23
million motor vehicles, and
specifically how Transport
Canada handled the recall of
millions of General Motors
cars and the fatal flaw that
GM hid from Canadians and
Americans for years.
For General Motors, it all
began to go wrong along a
stretch of highway in Georgia
on March the 10th, 2010.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: At the wheel of her
Chevrolet Cobalt was Brooke
Melton, a pediatric nurse
outside Atlanta.
It was her 29th birthday and
she was driving down this
two-lane highway to meet her
boyfriend for dinner.
When suddenly her car veered
across the centre line and an
SUV travelling in the opposite
direction smashed into the
Cobalt, demolishing it.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: Later that night,
Brooke's mother and father,
Beth and Ken, were contacted
by the local hospital.
>> And the surgeon got on the
phone with me and told me how
bad Brooke's accident was and
that she would not be able to
recover, she had a broken
neck, and, um, there was nothing
that she could do for her.
>> Bob: The police said her
death was a tragic accident
caused by a driving error on
wet pavement.
But Brooke's dad just couldn't
bring himself to accept the
official story.
>> Brooke was so conscientious
in her driving.
I know that's easy to say for
a parent about their child,
but she was.
She was very conscientious.
And very careful.
That's why I knew it had to be
something else.
I knew it had to be a mechanical
failure somewhere.
>> Bob: The Meltons were also
convinced that Exhibit "A" was
the twisted hulk of Brooke's
car.
Her 2005 Chevy Cobalt, but
they needed someone to unlock
the mysteries it held, an
automotive detective to
discover what really killed
their daughter.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: It would be a circuitous
path that brought them to this
unlikely place, the little
town of Merigold, Mississippi,
population 439.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: There's only one garage
in Merigold, mechanic Charlie
Miller started it 30 years ago.
He's since earned a reputation
as the go-to expert witness in
hundreds of American automobile
lawsuits.
>> They wanted to know the
truth, no matter what the
truth was, they needed to know
why their daughter died.
>> Bob: And immediately,
Charlie Miller knew something
was very wrong when he
downloaded the data from the
Chevy Cobalt's computer.
>> The engine went from around
2,000 rpm to 0 in one second.
As a mechanic, you know that's
impossible.
>> Bob: What's more, Miller
learned that Brooke Melton's
ignition switch had somehow
moved from "on" to the
"accessory" position, apparently
with disastrous consequences.
>> And what that told me as a
mechanic, that if this switch
moved from "on" to "accessory,"
she had no anti-lock brakes, she
had no electronic power
steering, and she had no engine
control at all.
>> Bob: Miller also noticed
how easily the Chevrolet
Cobalt's key could be moved
from the "on" position to
"accessory" with just the
slightest jostle, without even
knowing it.
>> It seemed too easy to me,
it seemed very easy to move.
I could tell the difference,
it was very obvious.
>> Bob: But was that a problem
unique to Brooke Melton's car?
To find out, Miller went to
the local junkyard to get
another used Cobalt ignition
so he could compare the two.
And?
>> It was weak, as I would
turn it, just like hers.
It was very close to hers.
It didn't have as much force
as I thought it should.
>> Bob: So that means both of
the old ignitions malfunctioned.
But what would happen if he
compared them to a brand-new
Chevy Cobalt ignition?
Miller got one from the local
GM dealer.
It had the same GM part number
as the old ones so it should
have performed exactly the
same.
But it didn't.
>> And when I installed that
new switch, the effort to turn
this key went up dramatically.
It would click in place, it
was harder to move it out of
position.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: The question was why?
Enter Mark Hood, an engineer
from Pensacola, Florida.
Hood's specialty is failure
analysis.
Investigating events like
bridge collapses and plane
crashes.
Now his assignment was to
explain the mysterious loss of
power in the Chevy Cobalt in
which Brooke Melton died.
>> This is an actual ignition
switch assembly.
>> Reporter: This is how a
Cobalt ignition switch works.
>> Clutch in.
(engine starts)
>> Bob: When you insert the key,
it turns what's called the
ignition column.
At the far end is a part
called the detent plunger
which goes up and down like
the top of a ballpoint pen.
As it does, it rotates the
cylinder that moves the
ignition key from "on" to
"accessory."
If that tiny spring-loaded
plunger, a 57-cent piece, that
determines how easily the key
will move.
So what was going on inside
the Cobalt's ignition switch,
causing the older ignitions to
let the key slip into the
"accessory" position with such
tragic consequences?
Atlanta attorney Lance Cooper
set out to piece together that
puzzle for the Meltons.
He says he'll never forget the
phone call he got from
engineer Mark Hood.
>> He says, "Lance, you're not
going to believe what I just
found," and I said, "What?"
And he said, "They changed the
switch."
I said, "What do you mean they
changed the switch?"
And he said, "They changed the
newer switch to make it harder
to turn the key from 'run' to
'accessory' or 'off'."
>> Bob: Hood had made a
crucial discovery.
The plunger from Brooke Melton's
ignition, the one that
malfunctioned, was
infinitesimally shorter than
the new part that worked just
fine.
>> And on this card, I taped
down a 2005 detent plunger and
a new replacement detent
plunger and you can see the
difference in length between
the two detent plungers.
>> Bob: That difference is a
mere 1.6 millimetres, just the
thickness of a quarter, but
it literally would be the
difference between life and
death for Brooke Melton.
And even more disturbing, when
hood discovered both ignition
switches had the same part
number, he knew General Motors
had put the new improved part
into its new models but left
the old defective part in its
older cars.
However, GM never told its
customers either about the
change, or the danger.
Attorney Lance Cooper.
>> What's the plausible
explanation, what's the
benefit to the company of
doing that?
>> Well, the company doesn't
want you to know that they've
changed the switch because if
you know they've changed the
switch and the old switch
harms or kills someone,
they'll be held responsible
for that.
Not only responsible for the
death but under U.S. law, liable
for punitive damages to punish
them for their bad conduct.
♪ Can you imagine when this
race is won ♪
>> Bob: When we come back,
selling cars with dreams of
graduation and the prom.
And keeping secrets about the
ignition switch from hell.
>> We certainly did not approve
the detent plunger design
change.
>> I asked him as many different
ways as I could whether he knew
of a change, whether GM knew
of a change.
He said I don't know, GM
doesn't know.
(♪♪)
(♪♪)
>> Bob: The aftermath of a
crash is always horrifying.
29-year-old Brooke Melton of
Georgia and 23-year-old Dany
Dubuc-Marquis of Quebec died
in their Chevy Cobalts but for
GM, safety problems go back
for half a century.
>> First of the 1960 compact
cars, the Chevrolet Corvair,
was revealed today.
>> Bob: As these Vintage
commercials show, General Motors
portrayed itself as an iconic
company.
It's automobiles symbols of a
prosperous North American
middle class.
>> The Corvair will be in mass
production within a few weeks,
at a new ten acre additiion...
>> Bob: Though GM long touted
its commitment to safety,
consumer advocate Ralph Nader
exposed design defects in its
first generation compact car,
the Chevy Corvair, that Nader
called unsafe at any speed,
as he told the CBC.
>> Well, then surely they did
the right thing, they found
out there was something wrong
with the car and they fixed
it.
>> The question is why did it
take them four years to find
out, this is my point.
Either it's sheer callousness
or indifference or they don't
bother to find out how their
cars behave.
>> Bob: Thanks to Ralph Nader's
campaign, it wasn't long before
the U.S. passed its first
legislation to mandate standards
of automotive safety and to
compel car makers to disclose
safety defects.
>> We have this exposed bit of
metal here instead of padding
as exists on the other model.
>> Bob: But the questions about
safety problems at General
Motors have resonated ever
since.
What did GM know, when,
and what did GM do or not do
about them?
In the 1970s and '80s, GM's
defective design of so-called
side saddle gas tanks made
its pickup trucks especially
vulnerable to fire and
collisions.
>> The fuel expulses from the
tank violently, gets ignited,
there's an immediate Holocaust
and the people in the pickup
burn to death.
>> Bob: GM motors stopped
manufacturing the trucks but
though hundreds of people
died, the worst fire hazard in
U.S. automotive history,
GM somehow made a deal to avoid
a recall, paying a $51 million
settlement instead.
The result is that GM vehicles
with those explosive gas tanks
remain on the road even today.
(♪♪)
♪ Can you imagine when this
race is won ♪
>> Bob: In recent years,
General Motors has refocused
on its compact car business.
With inexpensive automobiles
and ads aimed at young,
often first-time drivers.
♪ Forever Young ♪
>> Introducing the Saturn Ion,
specifically designed and
engineered for whatever's next.
>> Bob: After the Saturn Ion
came the Chevrolet Cobalt
marketed to the same youthful
demographic.
The two cars were different on
the outside but much the same
underneath.
Including the ignition switch.
>> Chevy Cobalt, an American
revolution.
>> Bob: And we now know that
General Motors insiders soon
seemed nervous about the
Cobalt's ignition.
In 2001, with the car still in
development, the engineer in
charge wrote an E-mail
complaining the design of the
ignition switch had failed
miserably.
When he ordered it to be
manufactured anyway, he called
it the switch from hell.
That GM engineer's name was
Ray deGiorgio.
You'll be hearing about him
again.
So by 2001, General Motors
knew the Chevy Cobalt ignition
switch was a problem.
In 2005 when the car went on
sale, the New York Times
reporter reviewing it told a
strange story about the test
Cobalt stalling after the
ignition switch had mistakenly
been bumped into the accessory
position.
Eventually the complaints and
the crashes were more than GM
could ignore but despite the
law requiring car companies to
publicly disclose safety
defects, GM didn't.
The company somehow
rationalized that a loss of
power, even at high speed,
wasn't really a safety issue
but more of a customer
convenience issue.
And there was no recall.
Instead, what General Motors
did was send this service
bulletin to its dealers in
Canada and the U.S.
Telling them the Cobalt
ignition could be rotated out
of position in an especially
heavy key ring, but no warning
about the deadly possibilities
if it was.
And no indication that General
Motors was about to secretly
replace that tiny but
defective ignition part, the
detent plunger that was too
short to keep the ignition key
in place and could cause
high-speed crashes.
But still, with no disclosure
of the defect and no recall.
According to auto industry
critic Clarence Ditlow, GM has
long been keenly aware of the
cost of recalling and repairing
its vehicles.
>> They certainly do a cost
analysis.
They've done cost benefit
analysis of what it would cost
to save a life.
>> Bob: A case in point, the
memo from a GM engineer in the
'70s that was infamous for its
callous calculation of the cost
per car at which it no longer
made financial sense for General
Motors to try to save a life
with a part change or recall.
How much was too much?
Incredibly, that prohibitive
amount was just $2.40 per
vehicle.
So it's worth it to pay the
damages of a lawsuit when
somebody dies in a fire because
of a faulty part?
>> That's right.
>> Rather than recall and repair
the part in the first place.
>> It's cheaper to pay the
lawsuit than it is to put the
safety into the vehicle.
>> Shares of General Motors
fell sharply today after the
brokerage firm Goldman Sachs
urged investors to sell the
stock.
>> Bob: And as the world
economy began its downward
spiral in 2007 and 8, financial
considerations apparently were
far more pressing than fixing
those troublesome ignition
switches.
>> The idea of having to recall,
you know, hundreds of thousands,
possibly millions, of cars to
make their repair was going to
cost the company money at a time
when it didn't have money.
>> Bob: Mary Ann Kellar is a
long-time auto industry analyst
who has written two books about
General Motors and its culture.
>> You don't speak up in
meetings, you don't talk about
the problem.
If you do talk about the problem
and become very aggressive
about it, you're branded a
disgruntled employee and your
career ends.
Simple.
>> Guys, you are looking at
GM's CEO Dan Ackerson,
he has just driven the first
Volt up on to the stage here.
>> Bob: After all the attention
to bankruptcy and bail-outs,
GM was intent on shifting the
spotlight, here announcing a new
electric car.
But it still couldn't escape
its past.
April 2013, Detroit, Michigan,
a meeting room at the Westin
Hotel.
Lawyer Lance Cooper
representing Brooke Melton's
family in their suit against
General Motors started taking
depositions.
On the hot seat, the GM
engineer who supervised
development of the Cobalt
ignition switch, Ray deGiorgio.
Remember, he called it the
switch from hell.
>> Primarily, I was the project
engineer for the ignition switch
in that vehicle.
>> Bob: You'll also recall
Lance Cooper's team had
discovered that GM secretly
replaced the defective part
called the detent plunger in
newer models of the Cobalt.
But asked whether he'd approved
the change, engineer DeGiorgio
denied any knowledge of it
whatsoever.
>> We certainly did not approve
a detent plunger design change.
>> I asked him as many different
ways as I could whether he knew
of a change, whether GM knew
of a change.
He said "I don't know, GM
doesn't know."
He said "I've spoken with the
supplier, they don't know of
any change, there was no
change ever made."
And then we presented him with a
photograph showing the change
and his position was "I don't
know anything about this."
>> Did you ever authorize --
>> Bob: Ray deGiorgio was then
asked by the General Motors
lawyer if he had approved that
new ignition switch.
Again, he denied it all.
>> Absolutely not.
>> So if any such change was
made, it was made without your
knowledge and authorization?
>> That is correct.
>> Bob: But after DeGiorgio
made those claims he knew
nothing, this document surfaced,
a letter from GM to the supplier
called Delphi that made the
controversial ignition switches.
It was dated 2006, but only
came to light eight years later,
after Ray DeGiorgio's testimony.
It's a requisition from GM
ordering the new changed
ignition switches.
It was approved and signed by
none other than Ray deGiorgio.
And a month-and-a-half after
DeGiorgio testified, Lance
Cooper deposed another key
engineer for the Chevy Cobalt
named Gary Altman.
Listen as Altman is asked
about the role of money in
GM's refusal to disclose that
ignition defect and order a
recall.
>> GM put its profits over the
safety of Brooke Melton,
didn't it?
>> Object to form.
>> It made a business decision
not to fix this problem and
five months later, sold her a
vehicle with the problem,
didn't it?
>> Object to form.
Argumentative.
Lack of foundation.
>> You can answer.
>> That is what happened, yes.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: It was a truly stunning
moment.
For all of GM's corporate
culture, the admission under
oath that General Motors
intentionally ignored a fatal
safety defect for years simply
because it would cost less.
>> Then he was asked, therefore,
GM made a business decision not
to fix these safety defects,
and he had to acknowledge yes.
>> Safety defects which cost
lives.
>> Sure.
That's the whole point, is
once you know there's a safety
defect -- this isn't a mirror
that's, you know, rusting too
early or something.
This is an engine stalling
problem and that's the whole
point we were making to them
was this is a safety defect
and ultimately, he and the
other engineers, when that
question was put to them, they
had to acknowledge, yes, it is
a safety defect.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: After the break, when it
comes to GM, have Canadian
vehicle safety regulators been
asleep at the switch?
>> Did Transport Canada know
that this was an issue before
February the 10th, 2014?
>> Please define "issue".
(♪♪)
>> Bob: Every year in Canada and
the U.S., millions of vehicles
are recalled for a variety of
reasons.
The public seldom knows about
most of them.
But what happened in February
2014 was different.
Not only did General Motors
announce that almost a million
of its compact cars had a
defective ignition switch, but
that a growing number of its
customers had lost their lives
because of it.
The media took notice.
>> What happened to this GM
car?
778,000 being recalled of
these crappy little Cobalts.
>> This is CNN breaking news.
>> Bob: As the story unfolded,
GM would exponentially
increase the number of
recalled vehicles.
>> Word of a massive recall
from General Motors, more than
1 million vehicles are
affected and here's the issue,
it's an ignition problem.
>> Bob: And the death toll has
kept mounting, too.
Grieving families gathering
outside the embattled
company's headquarters in
Detroit.
General Motors now admits the
ignition switch is related to
at least 29 fatalities.
In all, GM has received claims
for over 150 deaths and more
than 700 serious injuries.
Figures that keep going up.
In April 2014, Mary Barra, the
new General Motors CEO, but
long-time CEO employee, was
summoned to Washington,
to Capitol Hill to testify.
Finally answering questions
about the deadly ignition
switches that could have been
asked, indeed should have been
asked, a decade before.
>> Was there a culture in GM at
that time that they would have
put cost over safety?
>> Again, we're doing a complete
investigation but I would say,
in general, we've moved from
a cost culture after the
bankruptcy to a customer
culture.
>> Ms, Barra, GM knew about the
defect in the ignition switches
as far as 2001, 13 years before
the recall, correct?
"Yes" or "no" will work.
>> The investigation will tell
us that.
>> Bob: There's no question
that General Motors has taken
its licks in the U.S.
Its CEO has twice been summoned
to testify on Capitol Hill.
There are two on-going
congressional investigations
and another with the
Department of Justice.
And the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration
has fined GM the maximum
allowed by law, $35 million
for not publicly disclosing
the defects in its ignition
switches.
But here in Canada, our safety
regulators at Transport Canada
have taken no official action
against GM whatsoever.
Though almost 400,000 Canadian
cars are on that GM ignition
switch recall list.
And listen to federal Transport
Minister Lisa Raitt in the
House of Commons explaining
exactly when her department
first learned of the GM ignition
switch problem.
>> Transport Canada was not
aware of an ignition switch
issue prior to receiving its
first notice from GM Canada in
February.
>> Bob: So Raitt told Parliament
that Transport Canada didn't
know about the ignition switch
issue until the rest of us found
out, when GM announced that
massive recall.
That was February 2014.
The problem, as we're about to
show you, is that that appears
not to be true.
Remember, it was June 2013
when 23-year-old college student
Dany Dubuc-Marquis died in
the crash of his Chevy Cobalt.
That was eight months before
GM announced its recall.
Dany's dad Normand told
Transport Canada his son had
been drinking heavily with
friends that fateful night.
But when he saw the fatal wreck,
he immediately noticed something
else that troubled him.
Within days, Quebec police
contacted Transport Canada
investigators at their lab at
the Ecole Polytechnic in
Montreal.
They wanted to know, with such
severe frontal damage, why
didn't the airbags deploy?
And Transport Canada learned
something else.
At some point after Dany's
Cobalt left the road during
what investigators call the
collision event, the ignition
somehow moved from "on" to
"accessory."
How did that happen?
According to documents obtained
by "The Fifth Estate,"
Transport Canada investigators
would soon identify a possible
link between those two
suspicious events.
Two weeks after Dany died, an
internal E-mail to verify
if the fact that the ignition
switch was in the "accessory"
position could have influenced
anything with the non-deployment
event.
The next week, a phone call
from Transport Canada to
discuss the possible influence
on the air bag system of the
ignition switch in the
"accessory" position and in
October, a note about the
sharing of complaints,
presumably including the
ignition switch issue with the
vehicle manufacturer, in other
words, General Motors.
But again, listen to Lisa Raitt
months later denying any
knowledge of the defective
switch or the role it played
in Dany Dubuc-Marquis' death.
>> There was no connection made
to that previous accident that
the honourable member referred
to that happened unfortunately
in June of last year.
>> Bob: But Lisa Raitt's own
departmental file showed
Transport Canada had indeed
investigated that connection.
Lisa Raitt declined our request
for an interview.
However, Transport Canada
did make available its
director-general of motor
vehicle safety, Kash Ram.
Did Transport Canada know that
this was an issue before
February the 10th, 2014?
>> Please define "issue."
>> Bob: Well, you might ask
Lisa Raitt that.
Here's what she said in
Parliament, "Transport Canada
was not aware of an ignition
switch issue prior to receiving
its first notice from GM Canada
in February 2014."
So that's what the minister
says, is she correct about that?
>> Yes, in terms of a defect --
>> Bob: No idea it was an issue?
>> No.
>> Bob: But again, Transport
Canada's own documents leave
little doubt they knew the
ignition switch of Dany
Dubuc-Marquis' Chevy Cobalt
might have played a role in
his death.
That would seem to show within
a couple weeks of that crash,
Transport Canada knew there
could be a problem with that
ignition switch.
>> Now, what we determined in
a number of collisions is that
the switch had moved from
"run" to "accessory."
What we don't know in many
cases today is what caused
that switch to move.
At the time, it was reasonable
to believe that one contributor
could have been a bumping of the
switch.
We have seen that before in a
number of cases.
There was no reason to rule
out that the bumping of the
switch could have caused it.
>> Bob: Transport Canada was
seemingly on the verge of
figuring out the role of the
ignition switch in Dany
Dubuc-Marquis' death.
They knew the ignition had
mysteriously moved somehow to
the "accessory" position but
rather than take the next step
and hone in on proving why it
moved, Transport Canada
apparently said, well, he
might have bumped the switch,
and that's where they left it,
effectively shutting down
their investigation.
And Transport Canada sent
Dany's Cobalt to a local
junkyard where it would remain
for months until after the GM
recall in February.
According to Clarence Ditlow
of the U.S. Centre for Auto
Safety, Transport Canada is not
known as an especially proactive
organization.
>> We look at Transport Canada
from time to time just in terms
of are they doing the same
recall in Canada, are they
investigating in Canada the
defects that are being
investigated here and when it
comes to recalls, it looks
like Canada is a hand-me-down
country.
>> Bob: What do you mean by
that?
>> They get recalls handed
down from the U.S.
I mean, the best that Canada's
going to get in terms of recalls
is what the U.S. does and if
the U.S. misses it, Canada is
going to miss it.
And then sometimes Canada
doesn't even act.
>> Bob: When we return, the
life or death stakes of a
recall that comes too late.
>> He died for a 57-cent piece
that should have been fixed
over ten years ago.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: The city of Detroit,
Michigan, look its best from
high above after years of
lay-offs, bankruptcies and
recalls.
But Detroit remains the capital
of the American automobile
industry which de facto
makes it the capital of Canada's
automobile industry.
Even the minister in charge
of Canadian auto safety
acknowledges crucial decisions
for Canada, like those
concerning the ignition switch,
are made in executive suites
south of the border.
>> Mr. Chair, the timing of
when the parent company knew
of this defect is actually
under investigation by U.S.
authorities.
We know that GM Canada does
not act independently of its
parent company and decision
making like this recalls is
centralized as it is with
other manufacturers.
>> Bob: And not only do American
car companies like GM call the
shots for their Canadian
subsidiaries, but the laws
governing motor vehicle safety
in Canada are far weaker than
those in the U.S.
American regulators can order
the recall of cars with safety
defects.
In Canada, Transport Canada
has no such power.
The best it can do is to
request a recall, which the
manufacturer can refuse.
The result could be years
spent in court.
And under the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, Transport Canada
can only regulate GM Canada
which almost everyone agrees
mostly rubber stamps corporate
decisions that are made in
Detroit.
We asked Kash Ram, Transport
Canada's director-general of
motor vehicle safety, what GM
Canada told them about the
switch from hell.
Did GM Canada ever let you
know that there was a problem
with those ignition switches?
>> GM Canada did not say that
there were problems with the
ignition switches, no, they
did not.
And GM Canada did not admit to
a problem until such time that
the recall was decided upon by
the parent firm, GM U.S.
>> Bob: But under the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, GM Canada
is obliged to disclose a
safety defect in a timely
fashion.
"Timely" meaning what?
>> Well, "timely" meaning upon
becoming aware.
Now, it will depend based on
circumstances, in some cases
it's days, typically it's
days, upon determining, upon
becoming aware that there is a
safety-related defect.
>> Bob: Is almost a
decade-and-a-half in timely
fashion?
>> They have admitted fault,
but we have to see -- we have --
it has to be evidence-based.
>> Bob: Has General Motors
Canada owned up to the fact
that before that recall in
February 2014, they knew about
the ignition switch issue?
>> At this point in time, we
have no evidence to suggest
that GM Canada did not comply
with its obligations under the
Canadian law but it's not
closed yet.
We continue to scrutinize
their actions.
>> Bob: But there is evidence
that the GM Canada head office
in Oshawa knew of the ignition
switch problems long before
February.
GM Canada president Kevin
Williams declined our
interview request.
But according to a written
statement to us, GM Canada
participated in company meetings
in mid-December 2013 when the
ignition switch issue was
raised.
So that was two months before
the recall.
But then there's this,
from 2005, almost a decade
earlier, the service bulletin
sent by GM to its dealers in
Canada and the U.S.
Remember, that was when
General Motors in the U.S.
was about to secretly replace
the defective part without
letting its customers know.
Among the cars with that
ignition defect, the Chevy
Cobalt, the Saturn Ion and
another GM compact, the
Pontiac Pursuit.
Automotive watchdog Clarence
Ditlow asks how could GM
Canada not know about that?
>> The Pontiac Pursuit is on
that bulletin.
That's sold only in Canada.
You know, here's a bulletin
that says the ignition goes to
the "accessory" position and
GM Canada doesn't know about
it on a Canadian car sold in
Canada?
No, I don't believe that.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: So if GM Canada had done
more to get those dangerous
cars off the road when it first
learned of the ignition switch
problem, what difference might
it have made?
Well, consider a case we
discovered that took place in
Montreal in March, six weeks
after the recall.
55-year-old Danylo Kulish was
on the way to pick up his
girlfriend at Trudeau Airport.
He was driving his 2006 Saturn
Ion when it happened.
His younger brother Taras.
>> And it was a clear day,
there was no snowstorm.
He was driving southbound on
Highway 13.
And lost control.
He went straight into the
cement pillar that divided the
highway and the exit so the
pillar that's right there, he
went right in.
Full frontal crash.
>> Bob: Danylo Kulish was
pronounced dead of massive
internal injuries.
The Kulish family says no one
told them about the GM recall
until after his death.
>> My sister was watching TV,
and she saw a report, a TV
report, on this woman who was
holding a picture of her
daughter who she said died in
a Saturn Ion the same type of
situation.
>> Bob: It soon became clear
Danylo's crash looked very
much like the others involving
GM vehicles with defective
ignition switches.
>> Bob: No skidmarks?
>> No skidmarks which implies
he did not brake or could not
brake because the three things
that happen is you lose power
steering, any kind of power
steering, you lose your power
brakes, and the airbags don't
deploy upon impact.
>> Bob: And the clinching
detail, they say investigators
told them the ignition was
found in the "accessory"
position.
Kash Ram insists blame for the
death of Danylo Kulish lies
not with Transport Canada but
how long it took GM to admit
its mistakes.
>> They say if Transport Canada
had taken more of an interest
in this, had taken the
Dubuc-Marquis crash seriously
or more seriously, he might be
alive today.
What would you say to them?
>> I can't speak to the family.
It's a tragic loss when anyone
dies in one of these crashes.
It's very unfortunate, I can't
speak to GM's action in that
regard.
You'll have to ask GM why that
was the case.
>> It angers me because why
should we be waiting for
anything from the United
States?
I mean, Transport Canada
should be its own independent
organization and should be
able to react accordingly to
what is going on here and
they're just -- they're
nowhere to be seen or found.
>> Bob: It's a sentiment shared
by the family of Dany
Dubuc-Marquis.
They wonder about the
premature end to Transport
Canada's initial investigation
of Dany's death.
Whatever GM decides about any
claims for compensation from
the Dubuc family, for its part,
Transport Canada insists it
did a good job.
>> GM can speak for themselves
in terms of the evidence they
have in hand.
We speak based on the very
close, very careful assessment
we have done of these crashes.
>> Bob: Though Dany's dad
Normand is critical of
Transport Canada, he maintains
the real blame belongs to
General Motors.
And after all the promises
about a new customer culture,
the Kulish family got this
letter addressed to Danylo and
sent after the crash that
killed him.
In it, GM CEO Mary Barra
apologized for what she called
the inconvenience or frustration
caused by how the ignition
switch problems were handled.
By then, Danylo Kulish had
been dead for five months.
>> He died for no reason.
He died for a 57-cent piece
that should have been fixed
over ten years ago.
And would have cost them
hardly anything if they would
have just done the right thing
from day one.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: But the lesson of the
General Motors ignition switch
is that, inevitably, it will
happen again.
>> The problem is that in
North America, you know,
safety is not job number one
for any of the car companies.
And the regulatory agencies
either here in the U.S.
or Canada are not up to the
job of policing the auto
industry.
>> Bob: So until safety does
become job one for the
automobile industry, with 23
million motor vehicles in
Canada and without Canadian
laws that can assure they're
safe, the next switch from
hell may already be somewhere
out there on the road.
(♪♪)
>> Bob: A final note on our
story.
After General Motors admitted
the pattern of incompetence
and neglect which allowed that
defective ignition switch to
remain hidden for so long, it
dismissed 15 of its employees,
including the engineer
responsible for the switch
from hell, Ray DeGiorgio.
But GM insists no one in a
senior executive position had
any knowledge of what was
going on, which, given GM's
corporate culture, some
critics find hard to believe.
♪ ♪
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