Taras Zhovtenko - Unpacking the Authoritarian Toolkit of Propaganda that Russia Exports to the World
Summary
TLDREl guion de este video trata sobre la amenaza continuada de la desinformación y la guerra de información que impacta la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales. Se discute cómo la desinformación puede socavar los procesos democráticos y cómo la IA exponencial y el interferencia rusa están aumentando. El entrevistado, Tas, un experto en seguridad nacional y analista de amenazas híbridas, explora la evolución de las operaciones de información y psicología, y cómo Rusia ha adaptado estas tácticas en su guerra híbrida, destacando la importancia de la resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la propaganda.
Takeaways
- 🌍 La desinformación sigue siendo una amenaza para la soberanía de Ucrania y también está dirigida a las democracias occidentales y a los aliados de Ucrania en todo el mundo.
- ⚔️ La guerra de información agresiva amenaza la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter a su influencia.
- 🗳️ Se observa la influencia indebida en los resultados electorales y la toma de decisiones de los votantes, socavando los procesos democráticos, lo cual es especialmente importante en el contexto de las numerosas elecciones de 2024.
- 🧩 La introducción de fakes creados por inteligencia artificial exponencial y el aumento en la interferencia rusa representan nuevos desafíos en la lucha contra la desinformación.
- 🎓 Tas jaena, con un doctorado en Seguridad Nacional y miembro del consejo consultivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Ucrania, es un experto en áreas como las operaciones de información, las amenazas híbridas y la seguridad internacional.
- 🔍 La distinción entre operaciones de información (IOPs) y operaciones psicológicas (PSYOPs) se ha vuelto menos clara con el tiempo, y ambas se han integrado en el concepto de guerra centrada en la red (NCW).
- 🌐 La guerra centrada en la red se basa en tres pilares: la integración de IOPs y PSYOPs, la influencia en la guerra convencional y la unificación de todas las unidades militares en una red de información.
- 📡 La información y la tecnología de la información han cambiado la forma en que se llevan a cabo las operaciones de información y psicología, requiriendo una adaptación a las nuevas formas de comunicación y la creciente disponibilidad de información.
- 🤹 La estrategia híbrida de Rusia, observada en Crimea y Ucrania, aprovecha las debilidades de las sociedades democráticas y utiliza una variedad de tácticas para sembrar la desconfianza y la incertidumbre.
- 💡 La propaganda rusa moderna no busca convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias específicas, sino más bien sembrar la desconfianza y la incredulidad en las instituciones y en el sistema democrático.
- 🛡️ La resistencia social e institucional es clave para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información y propaganda, fortaleciendo los valores y creencias preexistentes en las sociedades democráticas.
Q & A
¿Qué amenaza representa la desinformación para la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales?
-La desinformación es una amenaza para la soberanía ucraniana y las democracias occidentales porque se utiliza en la guerra de información agresiva, lo que puede amenazar la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter a su influencia.
¿Cómo afectó la guerra de información en las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos?
-La guerra de información influenció las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos al tener un impacto indebido en las decisiones de los votantes, pudiendo socavar los procesos democráticos y alterar los resultados electorales.
¿Qué es IOPS y qué relación tiene con las operaciones de información de EE. UU. en Afganistán y Irak?
-IOPS, o operaciones de información, se refiere a actividades planificadas y dirigidas para influir en la información y la infraestructura de información del oponente. El investigador Tas Jaena estudió estas operaciones durante las campañas militares de EE. UU. en Afganistán en 2001 y 2002, e Irak en 2003, y su evolución hacia el concepto de guerra centrada en la red.
¿Qué es la guerra centrada en la red y cómo se relaciona con las operaciones de información y psicológicas?
-La guerra centrada en la red es un concepto que surge en los años 2000 y se basa en la fusión de operaciones de información (IOPS) y operaciones psicológicas (SCOPS), influyendo tanto en la infraestructura de información como en la percepción colectiva de la sociedad y el liderazgo político o militar del oponente.
¿Cómo influye la tecnología de la información y la comunicación en la guerra de la información moderna?
-La tecnología de la información y la comunicación ha permitido que la información se difunda rápidamente y esté disponible para un público más amplio, lo que ha llevado a la fusión de las operaciones de información y psicológicas y ha dado lugar a la guerra centrada en la red, donde la información es un elemento clave para influir en la percepción y decisiones.
¿Qué es la guerra hibrida y cómo se relaciona con el concepto de la guerra centrada en la red?
-La guerra hibrida es un enfoque que utiliza una variedad de tácticas, incluyendo la guerra centrada en la red, para influir en el oponente. Se basa en el análisis de errores cometidos por otros, como EE. UU. en Irak, y el desarrollo de estrategias que aprovechan las debilidades del adversario, como lo hizo Rusia en Crimea en 2014.
¿Cómo describe Tas Jaena la evolución de la propaganda rusa en el siglo XXI y su enfoque en la desconfianza?
-Tas Jaena describe que la propaganda rusa moderna se centra en sembrar desconfianza en las instituciones democráticas, líderes políticos y procesos electorales, en lugar de intentar convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias específicas. Esto se logra a través de la difusión de teorías de la conspiración y la manipulación de la información en redes sociales y otros medios.
¿Por qué es importante la construcción de resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información?
-La resiliencia social e institucional es crucial para absorber el impacto negativo de la desinformación y propaganda, reequilibrar la sociedad y las instituciones políticas y de seguridad, y neutralizar la influencia destructiva al reforzar las visiones del mundo y los conjuntos de creencias preexistentes en las sociedades democráticas.
¿Cómo se diferencia la propaganda interna en Rusia de la propaganda externa en occidente?
-La propaganda interna en Rusia y la propaganda externa en occidente utilizan el mismo conjunto de herramientas, pero con narrativas diferentes adaptadas a las sociedades y audiencias objetivo. Mientras que en Rusia se promueve la desconfianza en todas las fuentes de información excepto las oficiales del estado, en occidente se abordan diferentes audiencias con mensajes y argumentaciones específicas.
¿Cómo ha cambiado el enfoque de los servicios de inteligencia rusos para adaptarse a la realidad de la información moderna y las redes sociales?
-Los servicios de inteligencia rusos han adaptado su enfoque al trabajar a través de redes sociales y aplicaciones de mensajería, buscando tener 'agentes de influencia' en lugar de agentes tradicionales. Esto permite una colaboración más fluida y menos detectable, aprovechando la percepción y la predisposición de individuos en la sociedad occidental para amplificar sus mensajes.
¿Por qué es fundamental ser proactivo en la lucha contra la propaganda y la desinformación en lugar de solo desenmascarar las mentiras?
-Ser proactivo en la lucha contra la propaganda y la desinformación es fundamental porque deja a los agresores sin tiempo ni recursos para planificar estrategias ofensivas adicionales. Al tener su propia agenda de información e imponerla a la sociedad y servicios de inteligencia rusos, se les dificulta tener éxito en la construcción de nuevas estrategias ofensivas contra el occidente.
Outlines
😨 Amenaza de la desinformación y guerra de información
El primer párrafo aborda la persistencia de la desinformación como una amenaza para la soberanía de Ucrania y para las democracias occidentales y sus aliados. Se discute cómo la guerra de información agresiva puede socavar la seguridad de la información y la estabilidad social, especialmente en los estados que Rusia busca desestabilizar o someter. Se menciona la interferencia en las elecciones de 2016 en los Estados Unidos y la posibilidad de que afecte los resultados electorales y el proceso democrático. Además, se presenta el podcast 'Silicon Curtain', enfocado en la tecnología y la seguridad, y se da la bienvenida a Tas jaena, un experto en seguridad nacional y en la lucha contra las amenazas híbridas, que se presenta con su trayectoria y áreas de especialización.
🤖 La evolución de las Operaciones de Información y Psicológicas
En el segundo párrafo, se profundiza en las definiciones de Operaciones de Información (IOP) y Operaciones Psicológicas (OP), así como en su evolución hacia la Guerra Centrada en la Red (NCW). Se discute cómo la IOP se enfoca en influir en la infraestructura y el procesamiento de información del adversario, mientras que la OP busca cambiar la percepción colectiva o individual dentro de la sociedad y liderazgo del oponente. La NCW se presenta como un concepto que surge en los años 2000, integrando la IOP y la OP y enfatizando la importancia de la información y los medios en la planificación y ejecución de operaciones militares.
🔍 Análisis de la Guerra Híbrida y la Operación en Crimea
El tercer párrafo explora el concepto de Guerra Híbrida, ilustrado con la operación en Crimea en 2014 como un ejemplo de aplicación exitosa de la NCW. Se comparan las tácticas utilizadas por Rusia con las fallidas por EE. UU. en Irak, destacando la importancia de la percepción y la manipulación de la información. Se menciona el uso de 'hombres verdes' como una táctica de la 'herramienta híbrida' de Rusia, así como la disposición de Rusia para mentir como instrumento de política exterior, en contraste con las democracias occidentales que suelen ser menos propensas a la desinformación.
📢 Propaganda y disidencia en la era de las redes sociales
El cuarto párrafo analiza cómo la propaganda en el siglo XXI y el uso de Internet y las redes sociales han cambiado la forma en que se lleva a cabo la desinformación. Se argumenta que la nueva propaganda no busca convencer a la audiencia de un conjunto de creencias, sino más bien sembrar la desconfianza y la incredulidad en las instituciones democráticas y los procesos electorales. Además, se describe cómo la propaganda rusa utiliza técnicas de teoría de la conspiración para moldear gradualmente la percepción de la audiencia en su favor.
🌐 Estrategias de Guerra de Información Híbrida
El quinto párrafo examina las estrategias no lineales de la Guerra de Información Híbrida, donde se pueden tomar acciones en cualquier momento sin seguir un algoritmo lineal. Se discute cómo la repetición de mensajes, como las amenazas nucleares, se ajusta a esta estrategia y cómo la propaganda rusa explota las debilidades de las sociedades democráticas. Se enfatiza la necesidad de construir resiliencia social e institucional para contrarrestar la influencia destructiva de la información y resaltar las creencias y valores existentes en las sociedades democráticas.
🎯 Diferencias entre propaganda interna y externa rusa
En el sexto párrafo, se discuten las similitudes y diferencias entre la propaganda interna y externa de Rusia, destacando que, aunque se utiliza el mismo conjunto de herramientas, las narrativas varían según el público objetivo. Se describe cómo la población rusa ha sido inmersa en una cultura de desconfianza hacia la información objetiva, a excepción de las fuentes oficiales del estado. Además, se señala cómo la propaganda rusa se dirige a diferentes estratos de la sociedad occidental, adaptando su mensaje y su lenguaje para cada audiencia.
🤝 La necesidad de una contraofensiva en la Guerra de Información
El séptimo párrafo enfatiza la importancia de una contraofensiva en la Guerra de Información para contrarrestar las tácticas de propaganda rusas. Se argumenta que la defensa total y la exposición de las mentiras de la propaganda no es una estrategia ganadora, sino que debe haber una ofensiva para dejar a Rusia sin tiempo ni recursos para planificar estrategias ofensivas adicionales. Se sugiere que una agenda informativa activa puede desviar a Rusia de sus esfuerzos de construcción de narrativas propagandísticas en contra de las democracias occidentales.
🕵️♂️ La evolución de los métodos de inteligencia rusa en occidente
El octavo párrafo explora cómo los servicios de inteligencia rusos han evolucionado sus métodos para adaptarse a las tecnologías de comunicación y las redes sociales modernas. Se señala que, a diferencia de la Guerra Fría, no es necesario reclutar y gestionar agentes de forma clásica, sino que se trabaja con 'agentes de influencia' que pueden no ser conscientes de su asociación con la inteligencia rusa. Esta estrategia permite una amplia difusión de mensajes a través de la amplificación en redes sociales y la utilización de plataformas de mensajería para comunicarse y posiblemente reclutar a personas dentro de las sociedades occidentales.
🤔 Conclusión y oportunidades futuras de exploración
El último párrafo resalta la fascinación del entrevistador por los temas tratados y la esperanza de explorar en detalle las metodologías de propaganda rusa y las soluciones que Ucrania está desarrollando para contrarrestar la Guerra de Información. Se menciona el trabajo en herramientas analíticas y de alfabetización mediática para afrontar los desafíos de la desinformación y se agradece a Tas jaena por su participación en el podcast.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Desinformación
💡Guerra de información
💡Elecciones de 2024
💡AI exponencial
💡IOPS
💡PSICOOPS
💡Guerra centrada en la red
💡Híbrido
💡Resiliencia social e institucional
💡Agentes de influencia
Highlights
Disinformation poses a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and targets Western democracies, impacting information security and social stability.
Russian information warfare has evolved from separate terms of IOPS and SCOPS into the concept of network-centric warfare.
The 2016 US elections demonstrated the potential of information warfare to influence voter decisions and democratic processes.
The introduction of exponential AI and fake content, along with Russian interference, is a growing concern in the 2024 elections.
Tas jaena's expertise in IOPS, SCOPS, and hybrid threats offers insight into the evolving nature of information warfare.
Information operations aim to influence an opponent's information and infrastructure, while psychological operations target perception.
The development of ICT has led to a merging of information and psychological operations due to the widespread availability of information.
Network-centric warfare prioritizes information and media domains over physical warfare outcomes.
The US military's failure to implement network-centric warfare concepts in Afghanistan and Iraq contrasts with Russia's successful application in Crimea.
Russian intelligence learned from US mistakes and developed their own hybrid warfare strategies.
Russian propaganda focuses on sowing disbelief and utilizing existing societal issues to manipulate perceptions.
The nonlinear nature of hybrid warfare means strategies can change dynamically without following a set algorithm.
Russian propaganda's advantage lies in its willingness to lie as a key instrument of foreign policy.
Building social and institutional resilience is crucial to counter the negative impact of disinformation.
Russian domestic and external propaganda use the same toolkit but with different narratives tailored to the target audience.
Russian intelligence now relies more on agents of influence and social media networks rather than traditional agent recruitment.
Active measures from the KGB heritage are part of Russia's hybrid toolkit for influencing public opinion both internally and externally.
The key to countering information warfare is to be proactive and impose one's own information agenda on the adversary.
Transcripts
disinformation continues to be a threat
to Ukrainian sovereignty and is also
targeted at Western democracies and
allies of Ukraine around the world
aggressive information Warfare threatens
information security and social
stability especially in states which
Russia seeks to destabilize or coers
into supporting it we saw it in the 2016
US elections and it can potentially
threaten the results of voting Place
undue influence on voters decisions and
undermine Democratic processes this is
more important than ever because in 2024
we are seeing a huge number of Elections
take place and we're starting to see the
introduction of exponential AI created
fakes and of course a huge uptick in
Russian interference welcome to Silicon
curtain podcast please like subscribe uh
definitely comment on the materials that
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helps new people to discover are
fantastic
guests also check out the validated
Ukrainian Charities that appear in the
description of the video Tas jaena has a
PHD in National Security and is on the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
public Advisory board he is a researcher
and analyst in the area of iops scops
hybrid threats deformation and
International Security and Tas I hope I
pronounced your name correctly if not
please do tell us the correct
pronunciation uh this is the perfectly
welcome pronunciation thank you very
much Jonathan good good well first of
all let's dive into what you do and your
areas of expertise because I know what
cops is I'm not so sure what iops is and
of course everyone has their own
different um terminology around these
things as well as gry Zone hybrid
Warfare and all this kind of stuff so
could you could you lay out your
definitions of this ecosystem
uh uh thank you very much uh so this
sphere of uh my practical and academic
interest has been vital for me for uh
more than 20 years actually already and
uh uh my uh PhD research which I've
passed in 2010 was closely connected to
information operations and psychological
operations of the uh US Army which were
conducted during their military
campaigns in Afghanistan in 2001 and
2002 and in Iraq in 2003 so uh uh
eventually I was
um found laying the foundation of my
research based on uh us uh Department of
Defense operational doctrines which
regulated information operation
psychological operations and uh uh
actually I've uh seen this evolution of
uh information Warfare transcending from
separate uh terms of iops and scops and
merging them into one uh newly founded
concept of network Centric Warfare which
became relevant in early 2000s so to
start with definitions uh when we speak
about information operations uh we
basically uh think of uh our uh targeted
and planned activities to influence uh
the uh information and information
infrastructure which our opponent owns
and and which our opponents utilizes uh
to his benefit so we either uh change or
erase or modify the information uh which
our opponent uses within his information
framework or we try to um somehow
disturb his uh information
infrastructure and to make it useless uh
to his own information demands if we
speak about so this is purely about
information and uh basically processing
the information the uh hardware and
software uh of this process and
influencing in these very spheres if we
speak about psychological operation
these are the activities which we craft
specifically to uh influence uh
individual or uh Collective perception
of the target audiences within our
opponents Society political or military
leadership so this is not about uh uh
technical modifying of information or
interfering with information
infrastructure this is about
disseminating specially crafted
information messages to uh try to um
make people uh think or percept uh their
reality in the way they
uh did not plan before our
interference uh so this is basically the
this divided concept uh was um uh kind
of a mainstream uh in pursuing uh
information Warfare in the uh '90s uh
but with the development of uh
information and communic Technologies
with the development of the uh worldwide
net and other Regional and Global
Network systems uh and with the spread
of information and with this with the uh
spread of information sources and with
information be becoming widely aailable
uh these separate concepts of
information and separate psychological
operations they kind of begin to merge
up because uh when we speak about um
influencing the information
that our opponent uses uh we also uh
keep must keep in mind that this
information uh is utilized by the end
user or end users and the uh changed
information also changes the mindset of
the person who reads who digests this
information so basically if we speak
about the spread of uh the information
sources the uh uh developing This Global
Information uh infrastru structure
within the uh uh on the planetary scale
on the global scale let's say uh there
is practically there virually is no
difference between the information
operations and psychological operations
because once we uh change or modify the
information our opponent uses uh then
the uh second effect is that this
modification influences the people who
read this modified information and uh
this modified information influences
them mindset their way of thinking their
perception of uh different objects in
reality so in this way uh these two uh
concepts of information operations and
psychological operations they started to
merge up and uh eventually in early
2000s uh uh this merging up ended in uh
creating a New Concept which was called
the network Centric Warfare uh it is
based on uh three uh uh very uh
Innovative pillars the first pillar is
actually the thing we've already
discussed so this there is no
distinction and there is no difference
between iops and scops so whenever you
try to modify or change information or
information infrastructure which your
opponent uses uh the uh second eff is
that you are changing the mindset of the
people who are perceptive this
information and or who use the
information
infrastructure uh the second pillar of
the NCW concept is that um
uh it uh greatly influences the uh
conventional Warfare uh so when military
commanders are planning their operations
uh both on tactical operational or
strategic level uh they must keep in
mind that the uh well this is a victory
to be reached is going to be reached not
in the physical domain but in the
information or in the media domain so
actually it doesn't matter uh what
happens on the battlefield uh but it
matters greatly what happens uh around
these events in the information sphere
in the uh in the media context in social
media in general uh so the first
priority of uh military strategy becomes
not uh paying too much attention to
physical domain of the Warfare uh as to
paying uh much more attention to uh
information and media domain of the
Warfare and the third uh pillar of the
NCW concept uh was that uh due to
development of the ICT uh the
information has to become uh kind of a
glue which uh has to merge all um
components of the
uh national uh uh military so there are
all military units uh on all levels of
uh uh on sea on air or on the land they
have to be United within one Information
Network they have to have uh equal
access to the information which is
gathered by different Military
Intelligence assets and civilian
intelligence assets this information is
updated uh live 247 and uh each
commander on each level has access to
the whole amount of information and in
this way the planning and execution of
military operations then essentially the
information psychological operations uh
becomes much more efficient so uh the
United States tried to launch this
concept within their uh their military
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq but
eventually they failed to uh put into
practice all three pillars of of this
concept and they had to put a pose on
the concept in general itself but
uh several people in Moscow and
specifically in Kremlin were observing
carefully what Americans were doing
specifically in Iraq and uh uh they
analyzed uh the mistakes which were made
by us commanders and
uh essentially the analysis of those
mistakes LED Russian intelligence
military agencies to uh develop their
own concept of hybrid Warfare because uh
what we have seen in February 2014 in
Crimea uh in Ukraine uh was actually the
network Centric Warfare operation uh
done the right way uh I will here I will
just put one one practical example of
how how did it work with the the
Russians and how did how it didn't work
with the American troops in your Iraq uh
when the US commanders were sending
their uh SEAL Teams uh to search for
illegal uh ammunition weapons uh or
explosives in Baghdad for example or in
any other civilian Iraq Iraqi City uh so
these raids were actually conducted by
the uh regular SE teams and uh then the
US uh Regional command was trying to put
up uh some positive Med coverage uh
telling people of the amount of the
explosives and illegal ammunition and
weapons which were found uh and
eventually saying that the terrorist
Acts were prevented and the civilian
lives were saved so essentially it was a
positive message sent to the Target
audiences but nevertheless Target
audiences never reacted positively on
these messages and they were always
saying that US military has always
violating the rights of the civilian
population they are not doing things
right and so
uh but the uh us uh commanders they
didn't take into account one slight
thing which Uh Russian intelligence
analysts obviously have thought of very
great importance because if the US
commanders while uh before sending uh
those sealed teams to uh search for
weapons and uh uh and ammunition if they
took off all the ID patches uh from the
uniform of the SEAL Teams uh uh they
would uh create alog together another
information and media situation so the
public uh the journalist uh local
government they in Iraq they simply
wouldn't do what happens and they would
come for answers to the US commanders
who would already have the answers and
these answers would be listened to and
they would be percepted by the target
audience by the Iraqi civilians and
their leadership uh so this was the
mistake which Russians corrected and
this is how they came up with the uh
concept of this uh unknown green men in
Crimea but and this is only one of this
hybrid toolkit which Russia widely
utilizes not only in Ukraine but also
tries to U impose this tool kit onto uh
different uh different other targets and
these hybrid scenarios they are Al also
evolving and this is something I am very
keen on tracking and analyzing like on
the spot now Russia of course has an
Advantage here because we talk about
these techniques but there's a
fundamental Foundation to this and this
is the willingness to lie not just
selectively but lie ubiquitously and lie
as a key instrument of foreign policy
that is not how Western democracies work
you know um often if they are caught out
in a lie it's extremely
negative um and counter propaganda
really kind of gets to work on that uh
certainly Russia propaganda does Russia
however seems to deploy the you know
pkin facade kind of strategy which is
that nothing is true and everything can
be manipulated There's No Limit there's
no standard there's no red lines nothing
everything is up there everything is a
weapon does this give them a distinct
advantage in this kind of hybrid
space you're absolutely right and uh we
must understand that Russian military
and intelligence units they uh utilize
any weaknesses they can found in any
Democratic nation in uh any uh
Democratic
Society and they utilize uh any uh
inside domestic problems uh any
contradictions which already exist
within the target Society uh they
actually they they are not so much
trying to invent something uh out of the
scratch so some problems which actually
do not exist but they take the already
existing problems and they are twisting
them Beyond uh uh any recognition and in
this way they really have no red lines
and in this way we must understand one
fundamental thing of how Russian
propaganda works in the 21st century in
the era of social media networks and in
the era of Internet 2.0 and we are
already transitioning to the internet 3
.0 with artificial intelligence tools uh
iming all those uh information uh
toolkit that and communication toate we
are already utilizing and so uh in this
way uh in this uh uh highly intense
information environment uh the the
classic propaganda cannot work like for
example it had worked during the times
of the Cold War when you essentially had
a few uh information sources which would
which were easily controlled you could
control your own information environment
by cutting out all other foreign sources
and um denying any access of your
audience to those foreign sources and
this way uh you could really persuade
large masses of people uh in uh certain
uh ideological or World viw strategic uh
uh strategic perception things uh but uh
eventually in um modern information
world uh it's a very hard and
practically impossible task to uh
persuade your audience in in a very
certain in very certain things in very
certain uh set of beliefs because they
always can find alternative sources of
information you simply cannot control
the process uh but uh in a way uh this
new information landscape uh shaped the
priorities of the new propaganda
2.0 and uh this new propaganda which
Russia widely
utilizes uh focuses not on uh persuading
the audience in the uh something which
is essentially foreign to this audience
uh but the new propaganda uh Works in
dissuading audience in sowing
disbelief uh the new propaganda seeks to
uh uh make people uh stop believing in
uh uh in the system they live uh in the
society they live uh stop believing in
Democratic Institution Stop Believing
their political leaders Stop Believing
their neighbors Stop Believing actually
the election processes and in this total
disbelief it's much easier to uh impose
any uh additional propaganda narratives
but again uh Russian hybrid interference
utilizes uh well less direct approach
here because uh after this first phase
when you are showing disbelief in the
target audience you then impose uh hints
on uh the their new beliefs uh shaped up
for example in conspiracy theory so it's
not that you directly impose the already
uh uh created picture of the new beliefs
on your audience you are doing it step
by step uh just so that your audience uh
uh did not notice what's happening
because this is the key so they uh don't
uh have to find the moment uh when they
realize they are being manipulated so
you have to do it in a very subversive
way and so uh you are showing disbelief
uh you are try you are starting to feel
this disbelief vacue with various
conspiracy theories and then based on
those conspiracy theories which are to
some extent reflected not only by well
the uh low quality media sources but
they are also uh picked up by uh
politicians like we are seeing for
example in the uh Trump's
surrounding uh in in in the United
States in this presidential election
process uh and uh after you have all
those uh conspiracy the theory sketches
uh on place then you are uh putting up
one by one arguments uh which in in in
way you are trying to shape their
perception of your audience uh well to
your favor but again this is not kind of
um algorithm this is not kind of lineer
strategy as uh the classic propaganda of
used to work because hybrid strategy and
hybrid approach uh due to all those uh
very Dynamic circumstances which we have
already mentioned uh hybrid strategy is
uh completely nonlinear uh so it's again
it's a mistake to see um well hybrid
aggression or hybrid operation as a
number of algorithm uh steps algorithmic
steps which you take for example you
take step one to then to NE to next take
your step two and then to go to move to
step three three four five and so on uh
in hybrid strategy you can take uh uh
for example step one and then move to
step five then you can return to step
three and then you can advance to step
number 10 and you have all the toolkit
on your table and again there is no
algorithm on uh which stage do you use
uh which toolkit so you take the current
situation you take the current
circumstances you analyze it you see uh
what your priorities are to and as of
now and uh you pick up uh any approach
you pick up any tool any key any tool or
uh any set of tools which all
are Beyond you uh which which all yeah
which all are uh before you on the table
and then you uh address the situation
and you try to influence the situation
uh then again when tomorrow comes you
have another set of circumstances and uh
if you can see that your yesterday's uh
uh set of tools could actually help you
the next day then you do it so uh this
is the kind of solving the mystery of
Med who uh always likes to text
something about nuclear megadon nuclear
World War 3 and so on uh doing it
actually several times a month and uh
well it it might it might create uh
perception that this is that well uh
it's a kind of a lunacy to repeat all
the same things without uh anything
being actually done but uh it perfectly
fits into this hybrid nonlinear approach
so if for example uh Kremlin analysts uh
think that uh such kind of a nuclear
blackmail uh can uh put can influence
the situation uh in their favor today
and right now so they are putting this
kind of a this nuclear blackmail out uh
if for example they think that this this
very nuclear blackmail can uh influence
the situation in their favor tomorrow or
the day after tomorrow they would repeat
it without any hint of
uh of disbelief or something like that
or uh without hesitation uh so this is
how uh hybrid strategy works and this is
how uh Russian propaganda works right
now so uh it's um uh
uh highly uh threatening because it it
exploits all the weaknesses of the
Democratic societies and uh on the other
hand it uh it targets practically all
the audiences with one simple message
you cannot trust anyone you cannot trust
your government you cannot uh trust your
media you cannot trust your uh neighbors
you go citizens uh uh your elected
representatives and so on and uh this is
the uh the most dangerous way the
propaganda can work and uh the only uh
way out of this situation is actually
trying to build the uh social resilience
and institutional resilience which also
is a very important thing uh in trying
to uh well somehow compensate for uh
this uh destructive information
influence to uh uh rebalance itself to
rebalance Society to rebalance political
and security institutions uh to uh
absorb this negative impact of such kind
of information and then to neutralize it
uh by uh well stressing the uh already
existing uh World Views and already
existing set of beliefs of the audience
and of the nations of democratic
societies and is there a really major
difference between the mechanics of
domestic internal Russian propaganda and
external propaganda or is it more a
question of the same toolkit but with
different
narratives uh it's uh it's the second
option it's the practically more or less
same toolkit but with very different
narratives uh it's also part of a uh KGB
former
KGB Heritage which was called active
measures or Activa in Russian uh so
actually the second part of Russian
hybrid toolkit aside of the American
Network Centric Warfare concept is this
KGB Heritage of active measures and this
Heritage it uh consists of of uh uh
different means and instruments of
influencing public opinion uh not only
abroad but also
inside Uh Russian State and uh uh
clearly uh these instruments they work
differently uh outside and inside
Russian borders because it all uh
depends on how the target Society uh
reacts to these instruments and how it
how it reacts to the information uh
which you impose on them by on on the
Audience by these instruments so if we
speak about the specifics of Russian
audience perception of
information uh so during at least during
last 20 years Uh Russian citizens uh
were gradually accustomed to the thought
uh that uh there is simply not such
thing as objective uh information and
there is no s such thing as objective
truth neither in Russian Federation nor
uh
specifically nor in the western world uh
so in this way uh the Kremlin had tried
to develop the kind of anti-propaganda
immunity of the Russian population
because again the same concept has has
been applied to uh Russian citizens you
cannot believe uh anything you are said
but except if uh the source of
information is uh Russian political
leadership uh political or military
leadership or uh the official Russian in
information or media source so this is
the only case where you can believe the
information you are hearing or uh you
are seeing well this a kind of a
uh stretch to um former Russian
propaganda Heritage when again uh Soviet
Union didn't have any other information
sources except the ones that were owned
by state that were run by state and that
were controlled by the state if we speak
about how Russia utilizes the same
approaches on Western audiences so uh
there are two very specific things to
keep in mind first of all uh Russia
tries to communicate to very different
audiences in the west so it it tries to
talk not only to political leaders uh to
opposition leaders to well leaders of
public opinion in Western democracies
but um Russian propaganda addresses uh
the uh lowest classes of uh Western
societies so it lives viritual
uh no target audience uh uninfluenced by
this systematic propaganda and within uh
communicating with each audience Uh
Russian propaganda has its own so-called
language uh it's not a linguistic term
but it's a term of the uh terms they are
using the logic they are using uh the
message is always the same but the
argumentation and the terminology uh and
the logic of delivering this message is
always unique for each target audience
uh which Russian propaganda is
addressing so this is a very systematic
work uh and uh it doesn't mean that
Russia seeks to uh have success on all
the levels of employing this uh toolkit
so uh Russians are just pitching uh the
uh right uh the right input into uh any
certain Society or into any certain
Western democracy if they find it on the
highest level so be it if they find it
the lowest levels of the society again
uh this is this is
of an issue of no concern and um the
only thing uh to uh be effective in uh
in this kind of warfare because it
actually is Warfare uh is to be uh
active on the battlefield because uh if
uh Ukraine or if uh the Western world uh
chooses an option to uh go to Total
Defense and uh just uncovering fakes
saying that Russian propaganda is
constantly lying trying to show those
lies and to uh somehow explore them uh
before the public eyes uh this is the uh
no win strategy because uh it gives uh
uh Russian Federation and gives Putin's
regime uh a chance to Simply increase uh
its own propaganda in numbers uh if we
can uncover for example uh
500 fake news per month uh then we're
hinting Russians then that if they
increase the number of fake news up to
1,000 we would be drowning in those fake
news uh so uh as I always saying to uh
my students and to to my audiences when
I am lecturing on information Warfare
that information Warfare is like a
street fight so who hits first wins but
if you are going uh defensive uh this is
a no- win situation you simply cannot
win theight right if you are not hitting
back uh so this is again another key to
understanding what Russians are doing in
using their hybrid toolkit and their uh
information and psychological uh
instruments of influence and uh how to
effectively counter it so uh we must be
more active in uh hitting Russians in
the information and psychological way uh
and uh uh this would give us uh several
benefits so the first benefit we are uh
uh this is precisely the language which
Putin's regime understand so they
understand show not the demonstration of
of strength but they understand uh when
this strength is applied directly
against them so this is the only
argument which goes directly into uh
Russian political and Military
leadership leadership's mind and uh the
other thing is that by being active in
this information Warfare against
Russians uh we are simply leaving them
no time no resources and no intellectual
power to uh plan for other information
offensive strategies against the West uh
so we must uh uh have our own agenda
information agenda imposed on Russian uh
society and imposed on Russian uh
military and intelligence services and
in this way we leave them no chance in
being successful in constructing uh more
uh and new offensive strategies against
the West because they would have to deal
uh and to react uh on what we are doing
and on what we are imposing against them
so this is the key to victory in this
highly intensive information Warfare as
it is of the moment and the last
question I think that we that we'll have
time for is does this mode of operation
and especially Russian uh sort of hybrid
informational Warfare does it also
require them for it to really work does
it require them for the for them to seed
assets and agents in the West to have
client journalists academics useful
idiots do they need people voices from
within the system to be amplifying and
distributing their propaganda
narratives uh yes of course uh although
this work is uh much easier for Russian
intelligence Services right now because
they are utilizing uh social media
networks they are utilizing what
networks Within These social media to
amplify the messages that they were they
are sending to Western audiences but
nevertheless they really actually need
uh people in place uh they actually need
people who will uh try to magnify the
information and psychological effect of
the messages delivered through uh social
media networks uh but uh one thing uh
here is one thing which is uh uh very
drastically in contrast uh with the uh
the the previous uh I'd say cold war
experience of um Russian intelligence
Services because we all know that uh
mostly if we speak about those people
who are working in favor of uh uh
Putin's regime and uh uh Russian
aggressive politics right now in the
western democracies those are the people
who are uh to some extent directly or
indirectly associated with Russian
intelligence Services uh but unlike uh
the situation which was during the Cold
War when the Russian intelligence had to
actually recruit those people and run
them as agents uh physically run them as
agents because again we are talking
about the uh information exchange and we
are talking about the information
Communications Technologies and the
evolution which we have already uh
already mentioned today uh so right now
uh Russian intelligence Services they
practically don't need uh recruiting and
running agents in a classic way like
they did in the west like they did
during the Cold War uh because it's a
it's kind of a robust operations right
now uh we are already seeing that um
Western C Counter Intelligence services
are actively reacting towards uh what
Russian intelligence is trying to do uh
in uh Western European societies and
nations in Great Britain in the United
States and so on and uh Western count
Counter Intelligence agencies they are
simply uh rooting out all those uh uh
Russian agent networks within the
country and then dropping them out of uh
out of the Border uh but uh Russian
intelligence uh tried to uh adapt its
approaches uh within this new
information reality and they are more
working with through uh social media
they are working through uh popular
messages such as telegram WhatsApp and
so on the closed groups there to
communicate with the uh people whom they
try either to recruit or uh to ask for
favors and uh uh one fundamental shift
which uh makes Russian intelligence work
in the west today very unlike to uh what
it used to be during the Cold War is
that uh Russians are right now they are
trying not so much to recruit and run
agents uh but to uh have the so-called
uh agents on off influence uh in in the
western societies so this is the term
which does not uh require the classic
Recruitment and classic run running of
the agent so the person might might even
not know that he or she is associated
with Russian intelligence but
nevertheless due to his or her own
perceptions uh he or she that person
might might be used to uh sporadically
so it's not a systematic work but if you
have enough those agents of influence
you would have a systematic result uh to
sporadically deliver uh certain
information messages to amplify what's
being said by Russian intelligence in
the social media by uh journalists and
so on and so this all like a mosaic it
gets into the Strategic uh picture of
how Russian intelligence is uh viewing
its work right now today in the western
democracies and how it utilizes all the
ICT instruments and all the Hy toolkit
it has in hand uh to proceed with these
strategic goals well Tas this is
absolutely fascinating there are so many
areas that I'd like to explore in more
detail we're out of time in today's
episode but I very much hope that we get
the chance to maybe unpick certain areas
of Russian propaganda methodology and
start to explore the ecosystem in which
Ukraine is placing a a playing a very
active part which is developing
solutions to that both in terms of media
literacy but also software and
analytical tools to be able to counter
this information Warfare but for now
teras thank you so much
andavo I'm Slava thank you very much
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