Fast-Tracked Failure: The Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
Summary
TLDRThe Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1981 was a catastrophic event that resulted in over 100 deaths and over 200 injuries due to structural failure. The tragedy was caused by design changes, miscommunications, and a rush to complete construction. The incident led to significant legal consequences for engineers and firms involved, as well as reforms in building codes and safety regulations. The Hyatt Regency was later renovated, and a memorial was established to honor the victims.
Takeaways
- 🏢 The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, was a catastrophic structural failure that occurred in 1981, resulting in over 100 deaths.
- 🕺 The Hyatt Regency was a popular venue for tea dances, which attracted large crowds, including the night of the collapse when approximately 1,500 to 2,000 people were present.
- 🔍 The initial design for the walkways was altered late in the construction process, changing from single support rods to a double hanger rod and box beam connection, which was a critical factor in the collapse.
- 👷♂️ Fast-tracked construction, miscommunications, and a lack of redundancy in design contributed to the disaster, reflecting a culture of prioritizing speed over safety.
- 🚨 The National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now NIST) conducted a comprehensive investigation, which included interviews, lab studies, and physical simulations, to determine the cause of the collapse.
- 🏥 The response to the disaster involved immediate action from local fire and police departments, with over 100 first responders on the scene by the end of the night.
- 📊 The NBS investigation concluded that the design change, which reduced the load-bearing capacity of the walkways, was the primary cause of the collapse.
- 🏗️ The construction industry's culture at the time, which often dismissed the importance of peer reviews and quality control, played a significant role in the tragedy.
- 📜 Legal and professional consequences followed, with engineers losing their licenses and firms going bankrupt, highlighting the severity of the negligence involved.
- 🏛️ The Hyatt Regency underwent renovations, removing the suspended walkways and installing a wider, safer deck supported by columns, reflecting lessons learned from the disaster.
Q & A
What was the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?
-The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse was a structural failure that occurred on July 17, 1981, in Kansas City, Missouri, resulting in the tragic loss of 114 lives and injuring over 200 people when two walkways in the hotel's atrium collapsed during a crowded event.
What was the primary cause of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?
-The primary cause of the collapse was a design flaw in the walkways' support system. The original design was altered late in the construction process, changing the support from three pairs of single rods to a double hanger rod system that was unable to support the weight of the walkways and the people on them.
What was the role of fast-tracked construction in the disaster?
-Fast-tracked construction played a significant role in the disaster by prioritizing speed over quality and safety, leading to miscommunications, design changes without proper review, and a lack of quality control and peer reviews, which ultimately contributed to the structural failure.
What was the impact of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse on the community?
-The impact was profound, with the tragedy affecting the entire community of Kansas City. The incident led to trauma counseling for survivors and first responders, and it was said that nearly everyone in the city had some connection to someone involved in the tragedy.
What were the immediate rescue efforts after the collapse?
-The immediate rescue efforts involved the Kansas City Fire Department and police department, with over 100 firefighters, EMTs, doctors, and nurses on scene by 7:52 p.m. They worked through the night to rescue, recover, and provide medical assistance to the victims, using equipment like forklifts and a heavy crane that arrived later.
What was the role of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in the aftermath of the collapse?
-The NBS conducted a comprehensive 10-month investigation into the cause of the collapse. They analyzed the walkway spans, supporting rods, photographic evidence, and testimonies. They also conducted lab studies, mockup tests, and physical simulations to determine the structural failure's root cause.
What were the legal consequences for the engineers and companies involved in the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?
-In 1984, civil charges were brought against the project engineer, Jack Gillum, the engineer of record, and the GCE firm by the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors. Several engineers lost their licenses, and firms went bankrupt as a result of the hearings. Legal suits and insurance claims amounted to billions of dollars.
How did the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse lead to changes in construction practices and regulations?
-The disaster led to significant reforms in construction practices and regulations, including the implementation of stricter safety standards, the enforcement of quality control processes, and the requirement for peer reviews. It also highlighted the need for a culture of accountability in the construction industry.
What memorial exists to commemorate the victims of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse?
-The Skywalk Memorial Plaza was established adjacent to the Northeast of the former Hyatt Regency site. It features a memorial with the names of the victims prominently displayed to honor their memory.
What changes were made to the Hyatt Regency atrium after the collapse?
-Renovations to the atrium removed the remaining suspended third-floor walkway and constructed a single, much wider deck at the second floor level supported by massive columns, completely doing away with the previous walkway designs.
Outlines
🏢 Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
The Hyatt Regency in Kansas City, Missouri, experienced a catastrophic walkway collapse in 1981 due to design flaws and miscommunications during construction. The event resulted in over 100 deaths and numerous injuries during a crowded tea dance event. The atrium, designed with four-story high walkways, was a popular spot for social gatherings. The tragedy occurred when the topmost walkway and the one below it collapsed, crushing people below. The aftermath involved a massive rescue effort, with first responders facing the gruesome task of recovering victims amidst water and electrical hazards. The incident highlighted the need for better construction oversight and the importance of understanding the psychological impact on rescuers, as PTSD was not well recognized at the time.
🏗️ Construction and Design Flaws
The Hyatt Regency was part of the Crown Center redevelopment project, aimed at revitalizing downtown Kansas City. The hotel featured a unique four-story atrium with walkways connecting different parts of the building. The construction process was marked by fast-tracking, which led to oversights and design changes. The original design called for single support rods for the walkways, but these were changed to a double hanger rod system at the request of the contractor, Haven Steel. This change, along with other construction missteps, resulted in a structure that could not support the weight it was designed to bear. The incident also occurred against a backdrop of similar construction failures, indicating a broader issue with the industry's approach to safety and quality control.
🔍 Investigation and Aftermath
Following the collapse, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) conducted a thorough investigation, which included analyzing the walkway spans, supporting rods, and other evidence. The NBS found that the design changes had significantly reduced the walkways' load-bearing capacity. The investigation revealed a lack of communication, poor management of responsibility, and a disregard for safety regulations. The trial that followed saw engineers and firms held accountable, with some losing their licenses and firms facing bankruptcy. The tragedy led to significant changes in building codes, insurance claims, and a reevaluation of construction practices, emphasizing the need for a culture of accountability and public safety.
📜 Legal Consequences and Memorial
The legal proceedings that ensued after the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse resulted in civil charges against key engineers and the engineering firm GCE. The charges included gross negligence, incompetence, and misconduct. The trial led to the revocation of licenses for several engineers and had a profound impact on the engineering industry, prompting reforms in safety regulations and construction practices. The hotel underwent renovations, removing the problematic walkway design. A memorial was established to honor the victims of the tragedy, ensuring that their memory serves as a reminder of the importance of safety and responsibility in construction.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Hyatt Regency walkway collapse
💡Fast-tracked construction
💡Design changes
💡Miscommunications
💡Structural failure
💡National Bureau of Standards (NBS)
💡Crown Center
💡Tea dances
💡Investigation and trial
💡Quality control
💡Accountability
Highlights
The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse in Kansas City, Missouri, was a preventable structural failure that resulted in over 100 deaths.
The tragedy occurred during a tea dance event, which was a popular social gathering attracting a large crowd.
The walkways collapsed due to a design flaw that changed from single support rods to a double hanger rod system.
The initial design was barely capable of supporting the expected loads, even before the change.
The construction was fast-tracked, prioritizing speed over safety and quality control.
The investigation by the National Bureau of Standards highlighted the lack of redundancy in the design and construction.
The walkways were constructed with minimal capacity to resist their own weight, let alone additional loads from people.
The tragedy led to significant trauma for survivors and first responders, occurring before PTSD was well understood.
The Hyatt Regency was part of the Crown Center redevelopment project, aimed at revitalizing downtown Kansas City.
The collapse was influenced by a culture that prioritized schedule and cost over proper engineering calculations.
The investigation revealed miscommunications and a lack of peer review or design quality control during construction.
The walkway design was changed late in the construction process without proper review or calculation.
The tragedy prompted legal actions, insurance claims, and policy reforms, including changes in engineering practices.
The aftermath included a 26-week investigative trial and a shift in the culture of accountability in the construction industry.
The hotel underwent renovations, removing the suspended walkway design and replacing it with a safer structure.
A memorial was established to honor the victims of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse.
Transcripts
in 1981 design changes miscommunications
and a culture of fast-tracked
construction led to the Hyatt Regency
walkway collapse a tragic and
preventable structural failure in Kansas
City Missouri that claimed over 100
innocent
[Music]
lives
[Music]
it was just we were standing there and
all of a sudden it was on top of us
people praying and people calling for
help and it was so uh crowded there at
the edge of the dance for from watching
the dance contest that no one had a
chance to run away from
it the Crown Center an 85 acre location
of fountains public parks high-rise
hotels retail and more has long been a
primary destination in the downtown
Kansas City area the tea dances of the
time period were big band Big Draw
events attracting large crowds from
20-somethings to seniors at the Hyatt
Crown Center in Kansas City every Friday
partygoers would arrive in the late
afternoon dining drinking and dancing
the evening away held in the Hyatt's
four-story Grand Atrium the majority of
seating the evenings band The main Dance
Floor dining and activities all
centralized on the first floor with the
surrounding second through fourth floors
used mostly for those spectating
lounging or dancing away from the main
crowd with the Terrace balconies and
three Skywalk style walkways offering
impressive verticality and easy access
to equally impressive views overlooking
the party below these tea dances filled
the massive Atrium making it a lively
happy bustling place to dance your cares
away and Usher in the
weekend almost exactly 1 year after the
Hyatt location's July 1980 grand opening
the tea dance crowd on Friday July 17th
1981 by 1900 hours had reached the size
of roughly 1,500 to 2,000 with dozens
occupying the walkways
above and just as the band returned from
their break to pick the music back up at
7:05 the topmost walkway on the fourth
floor the one holding the second floor
walkway ripped loose from its support
rods at first making a loud pop heard by
some then instantly and simultaneously
sending both walkways crashing to the
floor below pancaking each other in the
process the third floor walkway
remaining unaffected and still in
place the collapse created such an
unimaginably gruesome scene that it
would haunt survivors and Rescuers for
the rest of their
lives the sheer force of these
collapsing walkways experienced by those
both on and under underneath rendered
many victims nearly unrecognizable or
largely unrecoverable causing such a
great deal of trauma to those First
Responders and survivors and all this in
the days before PTSD was well understood
that when attempting to ascertain the
approximate number of occupants on the
walkways at time of collapse
investigators like the National Bureau
of standards would in a rare move for
such an agency later utilize only local
press interviews afterwards for
eyewitness accounts stating this
investigation did not include any
organized effort to interview or solicit
eyewitness accounts of the collapse not
because of Any unwillingness to
cooperate but primarily because of great
difficulty in recalling And discussing
the
event the National Bureau of Standards
or NBS now known as the National
Institute of Standards and technology or
nist chose to forego this portion of the
investigation concluding that a rough
estimate of 63 persons total occupied
the second and fourth floor walkways at
the time of
collapse amidst the chaos and confusion
water was pouring into and filling the
atrium floor putting trapped victims at
further risk blasting out from High
Press sprinkler pipes ripped apart when
the walkways fell made all the more
perilous by live arcing electrical wires
now strewn about for the same
reason rescue would be carried out all
through the night the Kansas City Fire
Department and police department within
the first moments then by 7:52 p.m.
after calls for additional assistance
100 plus firefighters EMTs doctors and
nurses would be on scene working in
whatever way they could to rescue
recover determine needs for triage and
attempt to comfort those still alive
trapped in the rubble in addition to
forklifts and other equipment already on
scene by 10:30 p.m. a heavy crane would
arrive and be on standby it wasn't until
just after 3:00 a.m. however when the
first large section could be lifted span
u89 after which at 4:30 a.m. the final
Survivor would be pulled from the debris
at 6:00 a.m. the next span to be lifted
u78 revealed and confirmed Grim
expectations 31 victims crushed and
lifeless
Beneath The Rescuers First Responders
their coordination decisive action and
bravery in the face of such unimaginable
circumstances was legendary and has been
well recognized over the years in total
after investigations hospitalizations
and victim identifications it was
determined that over 200 were injured
and 114 Souls were
lost named for Hallmark's crown logo and
opened in 1971 Kansas City's Crown
Center would be founded by Hallmark
cards Incorporated intended to transform
this area of downtown from deteriorating
parking lots and dilapidated buildings
to one of the area's main attractions
through an urban renewal project of
vertical ality in retail residential
office and event space along with top
hotels outdoor public parks water
features and more and thus the Crown
Center Redevelopment Corporation was
also
formed in 1976 Crown would commission
Structural Engineering consultation and
design duties to GCE International
Incorporated and Structural Engineering
Services to pbnd DML Architects and
planners Incorporated for the upcoming
700 50 room 45 story Hyatt Hotel the
general contractor would be Eldridge
Construction Company who would in turn
subcontract much of this work out to
Haven Steel company the primary
subcontracted portion being the
four-story atrium Lobby connecting the
north highrise with the South function
and guest Recreation Wing by Spring of
1978 construction was underway on the
hayatt and like many similar projects in
other booming US cities of this era fast
tracking the process from start to
finish would be a primary goal for many
parties
involved in the early months of 1979
much back and forth took place though
between GCE the Consulting Engineers and
contractor Haven steel regarding the
hm's walkways drawings revised in an
overall plan of single support rods for
the fourth and second floor walkways
done away with at the request of Haven
Steel in favor of a double hanger Rod
box beam Connection in which to suspend
each walkway these revisions would
receive the approval of engineering firm
GCE specifically engineer of record Jack
D gillum's personal stamp of
approval in October of 1979 however with
construction of the atrium well underway
a 2,700 plus squ ft portion of the
atrium's roof collapsed fortunately
causing no injuries but still drawing
the attention of inspectors and prompted
Crown development to bring on an
independent engineering firm firm seden
pagee to investigate the
incident this investigative firm though
would only seek to determine cause of
the roof collapse their scope of work
not including any sort of design review
analysis of engineering revisions nor
any other portion of the atrium under
construction and just a month later in
November 1979 the owners and Architects
gave assurances of the entire atriums
quote overall
safety noteworthy and causing related
concern around the same time just a few
months prior in that same year the roof
of Kansas City's keer Arena had
collapsed fortunately while unoccupied
and with lack of injury but largely due
to the time period's overarching
phenomenon of fast-tracked construction
a lack of redundancy in the roof trusses
and underestimation in the Gathering of
roof collected rainwater ironically just
one day prior a convention for the
American Institute of Architects was
held just half a mile away from the keer
arena a prominent institution that had
bestowed their honor award upon the
arena in 1976 considering it quote one
of the finest buildings in the
nation also notable was in January of
1978 the Hartford Civic Center's roof
collapsed just 6 hours after the Ukon
verse UMass men's college basketball
game in Hartford Connecticut luckily
with no injuries a tragedy narrowly
avoided this major collapse was first
blamed on rooftop snow but investigators
found it to be glaringly due to
miscommunications of responsibility
during construction disparities between
original design versus actual
construction and a specific lack of any
peerreview or design Quality Control
process all of which proving to be yet
another case of fast trct construction
that due to such pathetically
underestimated loads investigators
discovered the Hartford Civic Center's
roof had been bowing and beginning to
fail even since the first days of
construction work would continue on the
atrium at the Hyatt fast forward to July
of 1980 with construction now complete
the hayatt Regency Hotel and its Grand
Atrium were now ready for
guests Kansas City was shook by this
incident to its core trauma counseling
the sights sounds and even smells
Rescuers dealt with and there were so
many lost that it was said Citywide
nearly everyone had some sort of
connection to someone involved with or
lost in this tragedy
between July 21st and August 13th
recovery operations of the walkway spans
and their supporting rods would commence
lifting them with straps and cross beams
to be relocated to a secure warehouse
nearby for storage and controlled
analysis by NBS investigators engineers
and
scientists this along with kmc's
videotape photographic evidence gathered
prior to debris removal testimony and
investigation of key parties
comprehensive lab studies combined with
mockup and physical simulation testing
and The Limited eyewitness accounts it
was a near 10-month Long investigative
process with nbs's final report being
issued in May of
1982 Then followed up by a more than
2-year long trial process that will
cover in this video
shortly widely known is that the failure
was ultimately down to poor design and
the supporting rods revisions late in
the process changing the second and
fourth floor portion from three pairs of
single rods suspended from the ceiling
to three pairs suspending the fourth
floor segment and a second set of rods
offset to the inside of the Box beams
the Second Story walkway suspended in
the same
fashion in the original designs the
upper not only carries the load of the
four floor
walkway with the single Rod transferring
the load
uniformly the second floor at the bottom
of the rod would work on the same
principle now with the revised design
however the lower nut on the fourth
floor's box beam connection carries the
weight of the fourth floor and second
floor walkways combined as if to be one
unit like trying to pull a large stalled
vehicle with a rope one team all grabs
hold of a single rope spanning the
length of the team but the other is only
allowed the person in front to grab the
Rope attached to the vehicle the rest
required to pull a separate rope
attached via harness to the leader whose
grip must now compensate for the pulling
action of the entire team behind as
well the leader may be able to maintain
grip briefly like the walkways holding
their own weight for a time but his grip
will quickly become the weak point like
the end of the Box
beams the box beam would split at the
welds and the downward force would pull
it around the uppermost rods nut
fastened below the box beam and thus all
that remained suspended from the ceiling
where the walkways fell were those three
pairs of rods with their nuts still
attached box beam hanger Rod connection
9u was considered by the NBS as first to
give way stating there was also evidence
to support the bottom weld having
already given way sometime prior to the
spectators gathering on the walkways
oscillations were also observed
According to some eyewitness accounts
initiated by dancing Spectators however
NBS investigators found this to be
negligible and not directly additive
stating walking or dancing on the
walkways would not have been significant
in comparison to the static
loads rarely is a single party or a
point of failure if ever to blame though
the breakdowns in communication the
group think fragile egos prioritization
of schedule or cost over propop
calculations mismanagement of
responsibility chains of failure like
these are where you'll find your true
need for more awareness the part of the
process where big fragile egos say no
keep prying eyes away is where the light
needs to be Shine the brightest to
affect any real change before all the
technical designs new policies
procedures and proper follow-through can
even be effective as we've seen in so
many of these videos now there has to be
parties involved that care about public
safety and doing the right thing to
begin with when those who have the
authority over others can dismiss out of
hand updated processes like peer reviews
quality control and safety regulations
what good are the policy changes without
an overall culture of
accountability this H Regency walkway
collapse was the epitome of these
circumstances when atrium construction
resumed after the initial roof collapse
amidst that incident's investigation and
up against a now further delayed
schedule combined this with peer reviews
and overall quality control seen as more
of an inconvenience in the industry's
cultural climate at the time the
walkways have been constructed using
those revised prints the design change
requested by Haven steel because the
fabric fabricator wanted to avoid
threading the entire length of each Rod
one of the reasons given allegedly being
that fully threaded rods of these
lengths were more prone to damage in
handling and construction which I
personally find questionable as being
the only reason it reeks of there being
more to it like cost cutting or
time-saving in addition multiple
requests by Gillum himself and GCE to
have a resident inspector full-time on
site would go unapproved by Crown due to
additional cost
through an exhaustive search by NBS
pouring over various records and
documents though it was discovered that
inspection company general Testing
Laboratories Incorporated had been
brought in for a one-time inspection
during a 3-day period in August of
1979 specifically to inspect the bolted
connections of the hanger rods but that
quote the hanging walkways were
inaccessible due to metal decking or
difficulty of position and that the
connections were not checked by a
calibrated t T wrench no additional
information on the walkways was found in
these reports filed by General Testing
Laboratories with this revised walkway
design from the day of construction they
had only minimal capacity to resist even
their own weight and had virtually no
capacity to resist additional loads
imposed by people also important to note
though was that even the original
designs were later determined to be just
barely capable of holding their expected
loads even if the single contain ous
rods had been used calculations bore out
that their capacity would have been just
60% of what's required by Kansas City
building code at the time the 26 week
long investigative trial that took place
thereafter saw GCE Representatives
denying having ever received calls about
the design changes by Havens denying the
conversations ever took place at all yet
engineer of record Jack Gillum had still
applied his personal stamp his seal of
approval to the design revisions the
implication being that in this
atmosphere of such poor mismanagement of
responsibility it's widely concluded
that approval was given to the change
inexplicably with Zero review in
calculation or design as an engineer
record you take the full responsibility
and that's what I did I sealed the
drawing and that's what where the buck
stopped and that's where will on every
single project in 1984 civil charges
were brought against Daniel M Duncan the
project engineer Jack Gillum engineer of
record along with the rest of the GCE
firm by the Missouri Board for
Architects Professional Engineers and
land
surveyors the charges being gross
negligence incompetence misconduct and
unprofessional conduct in their practice
of engineering several Engineers lost
licenses and firms went bankrupt as a
result of the hearings billions of
dollars in legal suits insurance claims
and City policy reforms also came as a
result by November of 1984 Duncan and
Gillum had been found guilty of their
previous charges and could no longer
practice Engineering in the states of
Missouri and Texas both of which still
went on to practice in other states
though and for their part it's been said
they have had difficulty living with
their
anguish renovations to The Atrium would
still include the second floor Terrace
but the remaining suspended third floor
walkway would be removed and eventually
a single much wider deck was constructed
at the second floor level supported by
massive columns doing away with the
previous walkway designs
entirely the hotel would be bought out
in 2011 becoming the Sheridan at Crown
Center the brand it retains to this
day the Skywalk Memorial Plaza sits
adjacent just to the Northeast with its
features well cared for and list of
names prominent on the main
[Music]
Memorial
[Music]
[Music]
for
[Music]
for
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