G.E Moore's Non Naturalism (Open Question Argument & Intuitionism: Metaethics)

Philosophy Vibe
5 Feb 201808:00

Summary

TLDRThis video explores G.E. Moore's non-naturalism in metaethics, specifically focusing on Moore's open question argument and intuitionist theory. The discussion begins with an explanation of non-naturalism, which argues that moral terms cannot be defined in natural terms. Moore's open question argument illustrates the flaws of moral naturalism, showing that questions about whether natural properties like pleasure are 'good' remain open. The video also touches on Moore's intuitionism, suggesting that we recognize 'good' through intuition, although this view is critiqued for lacking empirical evidence and consistency across individuals.

Takeaways

  • 📚 Non-naturalism is a branch of cognitive ethics, which asserts that moral statements are factual and either true or false.
  • 🌱 Cognitive ethics can be divided into two branches: naturalism and non-naturalism. Naturalism defines moral terms using natural properties, while non-naturalism rejects this.
  • 🛑 G.E. Moore argued against defining moral terms with natural properties, claiming that this leads to the naturalistic fallacy.
  • ❓ Moore's Open Question Argument suggests that reducing moral properties to natural ones leads to an open, not closed, question, proving that moral and natural properties aren't synonymous.
  • ⚖️ The Open Question Argument attempts to show that moral realism (in its naturalist form) is false by demonstrating the failure to equate 'good' with any natural property.
  • 🧐 Moore’s intuitionism claims that moral terms like 'good' are simple and indefinable, much like the color yellow, which we recognize intuitively.
  • 🤔 A challenge to Moore’s intuitionism is the existence of moral disagreement, which raises the question: if morality is objective and intuitive, why don’t all people recognize it in the same way?
  • 🟡 Moore uses the analogy of recognizing 'good' like recognizing 'yellow,' but critics like Nietzsche argue this analogy doesn't work, suggesting potential 'ethical color blindness.'
  • 🧠 Moore’s theory lacks empirical evidence for moral intuition, making it seem metaphysical and less scientifically grounded.
  • 🚫 The Open Question Argument has been criticized for question-begging, assuming its conclusion (that natural properties aren’t identical to moral ones) without sufficient proof.

Q & A

  • What is non-naturalism in cognitive ethics?

    -Non-naturalism is a branch of cognitive ethics that argues moral terms cannot be reduced to natural terms. It posits that moral truths cannot be found in natural properties.

  • How does cognitive ethics relate to moral language?

    -Cognitive ethics is the idea that moral language is truth-apt, meaning that moral statements are either true or false, and morality exists in an objective world.

  • What is the naturalistic fallacy according to G.E. Moore?

    -The naturalistic fallacy, according to G.E. Moore, occurs when someone tries to define a moral term like 'good' using a natural term, such as pleasure. Moore argued that this is a mistake because moral properties cannot be reduced to natural ones.

  • What is the core idea of Moore's open question argument?

    -Moore's open question argument suggests that reducing a moral property to a natural property is flawed because it always remains an open question whether the natural property is truly good. This indicates that moral and natural properties are not equivalent.

  • What is an example used in the open question argument?

    -An example used is: if eating fast food is pleasurable (a natural property), one might ask 'Is eating fast food really good?' This question remains open, showing that 'good' cannot be synonymous with 'pleasurable.'

  • How does Moore's intuitionist theory explain moral recognition?

    -Moore’s intuitionist theory argues that moral terms like 'good' are indefinable and simple. Humans recognize them through moral intuition, much like how we recognize the color yellow without needing further definition.

  • What are the criticisms of Moore's open question argument?

    -One criticism is that Moore's open question argument begs the question by assuming, without proof, that asking whether a natural property is really good is an open question. This undermines the argument's logical foundation.

  • Why is Moore's intuitionist theory criticized for its explanation of moral disagreements?

    -The theory is criticized because if all humans have a moral intuition to recognize what is good, it doesn’t explain why people have moral disagreements or dilemmas, suggesting that moral recognition is not as clear-cut as Moore claims.

  • How does Nietzsche criticize Moore’s analogy between 'good' and 'yellow'?

    -Nietzsche criticized Moore’s analogy by suggesting that, unlike the universal recognition of the color yellow, people perceive 'good' differently. This indicates that morality might not be as universally intuitive as Moore suggests.

  • What is the issue with basing objective moral truths on intuition?

    -The problem is that there is no empirical evidence for moral intuition. Critics argue that basing objective moral truths on an unproven metaphysical intuition is problematic and lacks scientific support.

Outlines

00:00

📚 Introduction to Non-Naturalism and Moore's Open Question Argument

The paragraph introduces non-naturalism as a branch of cognitive ethics, which posits that moral language is truth-apt and that moral statements are factual, capable of being true or false. It contrasts this with naturalism, which claims moral terms can be defined using natural terms, often associating 'good' with 'pleasure'. Non-naturalism, championed by G.E. Moore, argues against this reduction, stating that ethical terms cannot be reduced to natural terms without committing the 'naturalistic fallacy'. Moore's open question argument is presented as a critique of moral naturalism. The argument uses a logical structure to show that defining 'good' as a natural property (like pleasure) leads to questions that imply it's not a definitive equivalence, thus suggesting that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural ones.

05:00

🤔 Critique of Moore's Non-Naturalism and Intuitionist Theory

This paragraph critically examines Moore's non-naturalism and his intuitionist theory. It points out that Moore's open question argument may be question-begging, as it assumes the conclusion in its premises by stating that a question about the moral value of a natural property is always open. Critics argue this assumption is not proven and thus the argument is flawed. The paragraph also challenges the intuitionist theory by questioning how, if morality is objective and recognizable by all, there can be such diverse moral disagreements. It also critiques Moore's analogy of 'good' to an indefinable term like 'yellow', suggesting that moral perceptions can vary. Lastly, it questions the lack of empirical evidence for moral intuition, implying that basing objective moral truths on such a claim seems unfounded.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Non-naturalism

Non-naturalism is a branch of cognitive ethics that claims moral terms cannot be reduced to natural terms or properties. In the video, it is explained as the idea that moral truths cannot be defined using empirical or natural characteristics, such as pleasure, and are instead grounded in something beyond the natural world. This concept opposes naturalism, which equates moral terms with natural properties.

💡Cognitive ethics

Cognitive ethics is the philosophical theory that moral statements are truth-apt, meaning they can be objectively true or false. The video explains that both naturalism and non-naturalism fall under this category, as both believe that moral language can describe objective truths, even though they disagree on whether these truths can be tied to natural properties.

💡Naturalistic fallacy

The naturalistic fallacy is the mistaken belief that moral properties can be directly equated with natural properties, such as equating 'good' with 'pleasure.' The video explains G.E. Moore's argument that attempting to define moral terms with natural terms commits this fallacy, as it oversimplifies and misunderstands the nature of moral properties.

💡Open question argument

The open question argument, formulated by G.E. Moore, asserts that moral terms like 'good' cannot be synonymous with natural terms like 'pleasure' because it remains an open, meaningful question to ask whether something pleasurable is truly good. In the video, this argument is used to show how moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties, as defining them in this way would eliminate the possibility of questioning their morality.

💡Moral realism

Moral realism is the belief that moral facts exist independently of human opinion. In the context of the video, it is discussed in relation to both naturalism and non-naturalism, with Moore's non-naturalist approach asserting that while moral facts are real, they cannot be defined by natural properties like pleasure or pain.

💡Intuitionism

Intuitionism is the view that humans have an innate ability to recognize moral truths through intuition rather than through empirical observation or reasoning. The video presents G.E. Moore’s argument that moral terms like 'good' are indefinable and can only be recognized through intuition.

Highlights

Non-naturalism is a branch of cognitive ethics, which asserts that moral statements are either true or false, reflecting an objective reality.

Moral naturalism attempts to define moral terms like 'good' using natural properties, such as pleasure, while non-naturalism claims that moral terms cannot be reduced to natural terms.

G.E. Moore argued that reducing moral properties to natural ones commits the naturalistic fallacy.

Moore's open question argument is key to his rejection of naturalism, showing that asking 'Is what is pleasurable really good?' remains an open question.

Moore uses the example of a bachelor to demonstrate how true analytic equivalences, such as 'a bachelor is an unmarried man,' close questions. In contrast, moral properties don't function this way.

The open question argument concludes that moral properties cannot be synonymous with natural properties like pleasure.

Moore's intuitionist theory suggests that moral terms like 'good' are simple and indefinable, akin to recognizing the color yellow.

Intuitionism proposes that humans have a moral intuition, allowing them to recognize good and bad without the need for definitions.

Critics argue that Moore's open question argument begs the question, as he assumes the conclusion within his premises.

Moore's claim that morality is objective and can be recognized by intuition raises the question of why moral disagreements and dilemmas occur if everyone has the same moral intuition.

Nietzsche criticized Moore’s analogy of color, suggesting that people may perceive moral truths differently, leading to 'ethical color blindness.'

The lack of empirical evidence for moral intuition is a significant problem for Moore’s intuitionist theory, as it relies on metaphysical claims.

Critics argue that basing objective moral truths on an intuition with no empirical support weakens the foundation of Moore's theory.

Moore's open question argument has not conclusively shown non-naturalism to be correct, nor has it proven naturalism to be false.

The video concludes by previewing a future discussion on non-cognitive ethics, specifically focusing on A.J. Ayer's emotivism.

Transcripts

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[Music]

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hello and welcome to philosophy but the

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channel where we discuss and debate

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different philosophical ideas so they

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were going to be continuing our

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discussion of metrics and looking at GE

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mores non naturalism I'll be explaining

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Moore's open question argument and his

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intuitionist theory so John would you

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like to just recap for us what non

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naturalism is so let's start off by

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saying that non naturalism is a branch

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of cognitive ethics cognitive ethics is

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the idea that moral language is truth

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apt moral statements are statements of

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fact and are either true or false

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and so morality is something that exists

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in an objective world cognitive ethics

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can then be divided into two branches

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one is naturalism this argues that moral

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terms can be defined with natural terms

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most common is to define the ethical

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term good with a natural term like

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pleasure the other branch is non

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naturalism this claims the opposite

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their ethical terms cannot be reduced to

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natural terms and we cannot find moral

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truths in natural properties exactly so

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a big advocate for non naturalism which

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GE Moore Moore argue that we cannot

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define moral terms using natural terms

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and when one does try to do so they are

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committing a naturalistic fallacy War's

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reasoning for this was based upon David

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Coombs is alt problem the idea that

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people reach moral conclusions about

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what ought to be based on what is and

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what they empirically understand I see

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so a moral naturalist my claim that what

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is good is what produces pleasure and

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what is bad is what produces pain in

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this instance Moore would claim that

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this is a naturalistic fallacy Moore

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Illustrated how reducing a moral

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property to a natural property is a

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mistake using the open question argument

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the argument goes as follows premise 1

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good has the same meaning as the natural

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property n let's say pleasure premise 2

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it is part of the meaning that if X is n

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then X is good so if X is eating fast

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food and eating fast food is pleasurable

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then eating fast food is good premise 3

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to ask

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is an X which is an N really good would

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be a meaningless question and would

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betray a conceptual confusion so askin

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is eating fast food which gives me

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pleasure really good is a meaningless

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question premise for however for any

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natural property n asking is an X which

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is an N really good is not a meaningless

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question and betrays no conceptual

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confusion it is an open question so

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asking the question is eating fast food

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really good is not a meaningless

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question but an open one premise 5

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therefore it cannot be the case that the

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predicate is good is synonymous with the

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naturalistic predicate N or pleasure

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premise 6 the property good cannot be

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identical to a natural property so

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conclusion naturalist moral realism is

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false

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here we can see how more followed this

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logic to claim that moral properties

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cannot be reduced in natural properties

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if the moral property good is

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analytically equivalent to a natural

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property then it would seem ridiculous

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to question if this natural property

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really is good yet we find that it is

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never a closed question when we attempt

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to define a more property if we say good

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is synonymous with what I desire it is

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always an open question for once I ask

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is what I desire always good and asking

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this question betrays no conceptual

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confusion if we look at another

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analytically equivalent example a

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Bachelor is an unmarried man for once I

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ask I know that X is a Bachelor but his

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excellent married man is a meaningless

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question and therefore closed most open

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question argument shows how problematic

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moral naturalism can be and also shows

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how a moral property cannot be reduced

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to a natural property and the

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complications that arise when one

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attempts to do so ok I understand

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but then please explain if more is a

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cognitivist he believes morality is

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truth apt morality is objective and

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moral language is subject to truth and

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falsity how then can we recognize what

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is morally good and what is morally

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wrong if we cannot define morality in

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natural terms well this is where more

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expands into his

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intuitionist theory more argued that

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moral terms like good cannot actually be

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defined words like good or simple terms

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they cannot be broken down any further

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he likened this to the color yellow we

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cannot define yellow any further yellow

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is just yellow and we just recognize it

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as yellow and so good is just good it's

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indefinable we just recognize good when

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we see it and we do this with our

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intuition explain humans just have this

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innate intuition a moral intuition where

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we just recognize good and recognize bad

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without us needing to define it so

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morality does exist and although we

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can't define it we can still recognize

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it interesting well more does give

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compelling arguments for non naturalism

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but there are still a few problems with

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this theory really well let's go back to

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the open question argument I would argue

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that this in fact begs the question

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question begging is a philosophical term

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that means one assumes the conclusion of

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their argument during their premises if

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we look at the logic of the open

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question argument more includes a

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premise within his logic which directly

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claims the conclusion is true when if we

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look at the steps taken above premise

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four immediately claims that asking is

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an X which is an N really good is an

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open question this is an assumption more

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has not proven this is an open question

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but has just stated it's an open

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question this is a very big problem for

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Moore as he should only appeal to

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premise for once he has established that

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it is in fact an open question in

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essence Moore use the open question

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argument which assumes all natural

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properties cannot be analytically

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equivalent to moral properties to prove

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that natural properties cannot be

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reduced to moral properties this is a

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categorical mistake and as such we

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cannot see the open question argument

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working as it's shown its logic to be

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question begging and more importantly

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the open question argument has not shown

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non naturalism to be correct and has not

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shown naturalism to be incorrect but has

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merely assumed it is I see if we move on

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we see even more problems with his

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intuitionist theory

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if Moore claims that people have this

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inmates moral intuition which enables us

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to recognize good then why do we have

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more ruthless agreements why is there

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moral dilemmas how can one person

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believe something to be good and another

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person believe the same thing to be bad

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if morality is objective and all people

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can recognize it why do we not recognize

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it in the same way interesting more use

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the example of the color yellow is an

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indefinable term like good

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however neech criticized this analogy

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and argued that one person may see good

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as one thing whereas another may see

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good as something else this would

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suggest something along the lines of

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ethical color blindness yes I see

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and finally the idea of an intuition

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lacks any empirical evidence we have

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zero proof of something like this

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existing this seems like a metaphysical

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claim and to base objective moral truths

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on a metaphysical belief in an intuition

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does not seem right to me

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interesting well we're going to be

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continuing with meta ethics in the next

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video and looking at the non cognitive

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branch specifically at aja as emotivism

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but that's all the time we have for now

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thank you for watching we hope you

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enjoyed the vibe please leave your

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thoughts and comments below and on

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naturalism don't forget to like share

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and subscribe and help grow this channel

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thank you very much and we'll see you

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all soon

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関連タグ
meta-ethicsnon-naturalismG.E. Mooremoral realismintuitionismphilosophy debatemoral languagenaturalismopen questioncognitive ethics
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