Pro-Choice Arguments

Summary

The script explores two pro-choice arguments on abortion. The first, 'right to life does not generate obligation,' is illustrated by Judith Jarvis Thompson's thought experiment, suggesting a woman is not morally obligated to sustain a fetus's life. The second argument, 'no valuable future,' posits that fetuses lack unified consciousness, making abortion not as wrong as killing a person. Challenges to these views are also discussed, emphasizing the complexity of the abortion debate.

Takeaways

• 📚 The speaker introduces two pro-choice arguments: one that abortion is permissible even if the fetus has a right to life, and another that fetuses do not have a right to life.
• 🤔 The 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument challenges the assumption that if a fetus has a right to life, it obligates others to sustain it.
• 🎻 Judith Jarvis Thompson's 'violinist' thought experiment is used to illustrate that one's right to life does not impose an obligation on another to use their body to sustain that life.
• 🤰 The argument suggests that a woman's consent to sex does not equate to consent to pregnancy, challenging the idea that she has a special obligation to a fetus.
• 🚫 The 'no V-flow' argument posits that killing is wrong because it takes away a valuable future, which is not present in zygotes, embryos, and fetuses due to the lack of unified consciousness.
• 🧠 The unified consciousness, which is necessary for valuing a future, is not present in early stages of fetal development, suggesting that abortion at these stages is not morally wrong in the same way as killing a person.
• 🤷‍♀️ The speaker acknowledges that while abortion may not be wrong because of the 'wrongness of killing,' it can be wrong for other reasons, such as cruelty or an inappropriate understanding of motherhood.
• 👶 The argument does not prove that killing a zygote, embryo, or fetus is morally acceptable, but rather that it is not wrong in the same way as killing a person with a unified consciousness.
• 💡 The speaker concludes that abortion can be morally complex and context-dependent, with potential wrongness arising from factors other than the act of killing a fetus.

Q & A

What is the main argument presented by Judith Jarvis Thompson in her paper on abortion?

Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that even if fetuses have a right to life, it does not necessarily create an obligation for a pregnant woman to sustain that life. This is based on the premise that a right to life does not generate a right to someone else's body to sustain that life.

What is the 'violinist argument' and how does it relate to the discussion on abortion?

The 'violinist argument' is a thought experiment by Judith Jarvis Thompson where she imagines a scenario where a person wakes up attached to a famous violinist to save their life. The argument suggests that even though the violinist has a right to life, it doesn't morally obligate the person to sustain the violinist's life against their will, thus paralleling the idea that a pregnant woman should not be obligated to carry a fetus to term.

How does Thompson's argument apply to cases of rape?

Thompson's argument is particularly relevant to cases of rape because it suggests that the woman did not willingly or knowingly create a life and therefore should not have a special obligation to sustain the life of the fetus. The 'violinist argument' is used to illustrate that being connected to another life without consent does not impose a moral obligation to continue sustaining it.

What is the counterargument to Thompson's 'right to life does not generate obligation' argument?

One counterargument is that by engaging in sexual intercourse, a woman understands the potential consequences, including the creation of a life, and thus may have a special obligation to that life. This suggests that the act of sex implies a tacit agreement to the potential responsibilities that come with it.

What is the 'no V flow argument' and how does it relate to the moral permissibility of abortion?

The 'no V flow argument' posits that killing is wrong because it takes away a valuable future, which is only possessed by beings with unified consciousness. Since zygotes, embryos, and fetuses lack this unified consciousness, it is argued that killing them does not deprive them of a valuable future like ours, and therefore, abortion may not be morally wrong in the same way as killing a person with unified consciousness.

How does the concept of 'unified consciousness' play a role in the 'no V flow argument'?

In the 'no V flow argument', 'unified consciousness' is used to differentiate between beings that have a valuable future and those that do not. It is suggested that only beings with this consciousness can value anything, and since fetuses do not exhibit organized brain activity indicative of unified consciousness until a certain stage of development, their destruction does not carry the same moral weight as killing a person with such consciousness.

What is the potential issue with the 'no V flow argument' as it pertains to infanticide?

The potential issue with the 'no V flow argument' is that if it is accepted that the absence of unified consciousness justifies the permissibility of abortion, it could also be used to argue for the permissibility of infanticide, which is generally considered morally wrong. This highlights a possible inconsistency in the argument's application.

How does the speaker suggest that abortion might be wrong in ways other than the wrongness of killing?

The speaker suggests that abortion might be wrong due to factors such as a person's lack of an appropriate sense of awe, acting cruelly, wrongly assessing the value of motherhood, or having an inappropriate understanding of disabilities. These factors could make an abortion decision morally questionable, even if the act of killing a fetus is not inherently wrong.

What is the speaker's conclusion regarding the morality of abortion based on their dissertation?

The speaker concludes that abortion is not inherently wrong because killing zygotes, fetuses, or embryos is wrong, but it can often be wrong for other reasons, which may vary on a case-by-case basis. They also mention that sometimes, not having an abortion might be wrong if bringing a child into existence would cause significant hardship.

What is the significance of the speaker's mention of the potential moral obligations of a doctor who gives a drug to a violinist?

The speaker uses the example of a doctor who gives a drug to a violinist to illustrate that creating a dependency or ensuring someone's life does not automatically impose an ongoing obligation to sustain that life. This is relevant to the discussion on abortion as it challenges the idea that a woman who becomes pregnant has a moral obligation to continue the pregnancy simply because she was responsible for the conception.