Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: Major Malfunction | Retro Report | The New York Times

Summary

The script recounts the tragic history of NASA's Space Shuttle program, focusing on the Challenger and Columbia disasters. It highlights the organizational and technical failures that led to these tragedies, including the ignored warnings about O-rings and foam insulation, the pressure to launch despite risks, and the flawed decision-making processes within a highly rule-oriented organization. The narrative underscores the importance of recognizing and adapting to complex situations that defy standard operating procedures.

Takeaways

• 🚀 The script recounts the tragic Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, highlighting the technical and organizational failures that led to these incidents.
• 🛠️ The Challenger disaster was significantly influenced by the failure of O-rings in the solid rocket boosters, which were not designed to function properly at the unusually cold temperatures on the day of the launch.
• 🌡️ The decision to launch Challenger despite concerns about the O-rings was driven by organizational pressure and a flawed risk assessment process within NASA and its contractor, Morton Thiokol.
• 🔧 NASA's management overrode the engineers' recommendation to delay the launch due to the cold weather, leading to a catastrophic failure that resulted in the loss of the Challenger crew.
• 📈 The space shuttle program was initiated with ambitious goals and a novel approach to space travel, including reusability and the use of external fuel tanks and solid rocket boosters.
• 💡 The Columbia disaster was caused by damage sustained during launch from foam insulation that struck the left wing, which went undetected and led to the vehicle's destruction during re-entry.
• 🛫 NASA's response to the foam strike on Columbia was hindered by a reluctance to request additional imaging data, reflecting a pattern of underestimating risks and a failure to adapt to new information.
• 🔍 Both disasters underscored the importance of effective communication, leadership, and a safety culture that prioritizes the well-being of the crew and the integrity of the mission.
• 📊 The script also discusses the economic and logistical challenges of the shuttle program, including its high costs, the pressure to launch frequently, and the difficulty of meeting these ambitious targets.
• 🛑 The aftermath of the Challenger and Columbia disasters led to significant changes within NASA, including increased budget, design modifications, and a reevaluation of the organization's safety culture and decision-making processes.
• 🌌 The end of the shuttle program in 2011 marked a shift in NASA's focus towards smaller, unmanned spacecraft and international cooperation for manned space travel.

Q & A

What was the significance of the 25th space shuttle mission in the script?

The 25th space shuttle mission was significant because it was the launch of the Challenger, which unfortunately ended in a major malfunction and explosion, marking a tragic event in NASA's history.

What was unique about the Space Shuttle Columbia in comparison to the Apollo program?

The Space Shuttle Columbia was unique because it was designed to be almost entirely reusable, with the capability to land as a plane rather than using a single rocket like the Apollo program. It was also part of a new funding model where it would carry payloads into orbit for various clients.

What were the O-rings and why were they a concern in the Challenger disaster?

The O-rings were rubber seals in the solid rocket boosters that were designed to prevent hot gases from escaping. They were a concern because, on several flights, especially in cold temperatures, the O-rings did not seal properly, leading to a major malfunction in the Challenger disaster.

How did NASA initially plan to make the shuttle program self-funding?

NASA planned to make the shuttle program self-funding by charging the Department of Defense and private contractors to carry their payloads into orbit. The shuttle was intended to be a routine and cost-effective means of accessing space.

What was the role of Allyn Kilminster in the script?

Allyn Kilminster was the director of the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor project for Morton Thiokol, the company contracted by NASA to build the shuttle boosters. He was involved in the decision-making process leading up to the Challenger launch.

What was the impact of the Challenger disaster on NASA's organizational culture?

The Challenger disaster led to a significant reevaluation of NASA's organizational culture, prompting changes such as an increase in the program's budget, adding a third O-ring to the booster joints, and moving some managers out of the shuttle program. It also highlighted the need for better decision-making under uncertainty.

What was the Columbia disaster and how did it relate to the Challenger disaster?

The Columbia disaster occurred in 2003 when the Space Shuttle Columbia was destroyed upon re-entry due to damage caused by a piece of foam that struck the left wing during launch. Similar to the Challenger disaster, it was related to falling back on routine under uncertain circumstances and a flawed decision-making process.

What were the recommendations made by the Rogers Commission after the Challenger disaster?

The Rogers Commission recommended changes at NASA, including an increase in the program's budget, adding a third O-ring to the booster joints, and moving some managers out of the shuttle program. However, it did not provide specific guidance on how to change the organization's culture.

What was the role of Linda Ham in the Columbia disaster?

Linda Ham was the chair of the management team for the Columbia mission. She was involved in the decision-making process regarding the foam strike damage to the left wing, which ultimately led to the disaster.

What were the two major factors identified by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board as contributing to the disaster?

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board identified ineffective leadership and a flawed safety culture within NASA as the two major factors contributing to the Columbia disaster.

What was the ultimate fate of NASA's Space Shuttle program?

The Space Shuttle program was retired in 2011 after 133 successful missions, not including the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. NASA then shifted its focus to smaller unmanned spacecraft and now pays the Russian space agency to carry American astronauts into space.

Outlines

00:00

🚀 Launch of the 25th Space Shuttle Mission

The script begins with the dramatic launch of the 25th space shuttle mission, highlighting the main engine start sequence and the thrilling liftoff. The Challenger's ascent is described, including its roll and the engines throttling down. Tragically, a major malfunction occurs, leading to an explosion. The script then reflects on NASA's history, noting its innovative spirit and the sense of invincibility it had cultivated through successful Apollo missions. The Challenger disaster is contrasted with this image, revealing the underlying challenges and pressures faced by the agency. The narrative also touches on the ambitious plans for the shuttle program, which aimed to revolutionize space travel with reusable technology and a new funding model.

05:00

🔧 The Complexities of the Space Shuttle Program

This paragraph delves into the technical and logistical challenges of the space shuttle program. The shuttle's design, including its external fuel tank and solid rocket boosters, is described, with a focus on the critical role of the O-rings in sealing the booster joints. The script discusses the program's ambitious launch schedules and the reliance on private contractors to build shuttle systems. Issues with the O-rings, particularly at cold temperatures, are highlighted, revealing a pattern of accepted risk that ultimately contributed to the Challenger disaster. The decision to launch Challenger despite concerns about the O-rings is detailed, showcasing the pressure from NASA management and the ethical dilemmas faced by engineers and managers.

10:01

🌡️ The Challenger Disaster: Decision-Making Under Pressure

The narrative continues with the fateful decision to launch the Challenger despite concerns about the O-rings' performance at low temperatures. The script recounts the emergency teleconference held the night before the launch, where engineers from Morton Thiokol, the company responsible for the boosters, initially recommended delaying the launch due to the cold temperatures. However, under pressure from NASA management, the recommendation was reversed, and the launch proceeded as scheduled. The subsequent disaster is briefly mentioned, along with the aftermath, including the formation of the Rogers Commission to investigate the incident. The script underscores the organizational and cultural factors that contributed to the tragedy.

15:01

🛰️ Lessons from the Columbia Disaster: Organizational Culture and Safety

The final paragraph shifts focus to the Columbia disaster, which occurred years after Challenger. The script describes the initial launch and the discovery of foam insulation striking the shuttle's wing, raising concerns about potential damage. The decision-making process that followed is detailed, revealing a reluctance to request additional imagery to assess the damage. The script contrasts the Challenger and Columbia disasters, highlighting the recurring theme of relying on routine procedures in uncertain situations. The Columbia accident investigation board's findings are summarized, emphasizing the need for effective leadership and a safety culture within NASA. The narrative concludes with a broader reflection on the challenges of managing complexity in organizations and the importance of understanding and adapting to organizational culture.

Keywords

💡Space Shuttle Program

The Space Shuttle Program was NASA's initiative to create reusable spacecraft for human spaceflight. It included the construction of the shuttle orbiters, external fuel tanks, and solid rocket boosters. The program aimed to provide a more cost-effective and routine method of sending astronauts and cargo into space, as discussed in the context of missions like Columbia and Challenger.

💡Challenger Disaster

The Challenger disaster refers to the catastrophic failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger, which exploded 73 seconds after liftoff on January 28, 1986. The accident was caused by the failure of an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster. The disaster is a focal point of the video, highlighting the organizational and technical failures within NASA that led to the tragedy.

💡O-ring

An O-ring is a mechanical gasket used to seal joints and prevent leaks. In the context of the Challenger disaster, the failure of the O-rings in the solid rocket boosters due to cold temperatures was identified as a critical factor that led to the explosion. The video's narrative emphasizes the engineers' concerns about the O-rings' performance in low temperatures.

💡Columbia Disaster

The Columbia disaster occurred on February 1, 2003, when the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. The disaster was caused by damage to the shuttle's thermal protection system from a piece of foam insulation that broke off during launch. The video discusses the failure of NASA's management to properly address the damage and the subsequent loss of the crew.

💡NASA Management

NASA management refers to the leadership and decision-making processes within the agency. The video critically examines how management's adherence to routine and risk acceptance contributed to both the Challenger and Columbia disasters. It highlights the pressure to maintain schedules and the failure to adequately address safety concerns.

💡Foam Insulation

Foam insulation, specifically the insulation on the Space Shuttle's external fuel tank, played a crucial role in the Columbia disaster. During Columbia's launch, a piece of this insulation struck the left wing, leading to critical damage. The video details how this incident was initially underestimated by NASA management, contributing to the tragic outcome.

💡Teacher in Space

The Teacher in Space program was an initiative by NASA to send a civilian teacher into space to conduct educational activities. Christa McAuliffe, a teacher, was selected for this program and was onboard the Challenger during its fatal mission. The video discusses how this program attracted significant public and media attention, making the Challenger disaster even more impactful.

💡Safety Culture

Safety culture refers to the organizational attitudes, values, and practices regarding safety. The video explores how NASA's safety culture failed in the context of both the Challenger and Columbia disasters. It critiques the organization's approach to risk management and the normalization of deviance, where deviations from safety standards became acceptable over time.

💡Rogers Commission

The Rogers Commission was the presidential commission established to investigate the Challenger disaster. The video outlines how the commission's findings pointed to both technical issues and management failures, emphasizing the inadequate response to known risks, like the O-ring erosion. The commission's work led to significant changes in NASA's procedures and safety measures.

💡External Fuel Tank

The external fuel tank of the Space Shuttle carried the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen used by the main engines during launch. In the context of the Columbia disaster, foam insulation from this tank damaged the shuttle's thermal protection system. The video explains how such incidents of foam shedding were previously considered low risk, a misjudgment that proved catastrophic.

Highlights

The 25th space shuttle mission's liftoff and the main engine start sequence described.

Clearance of the tower and the beginning of the Challenger's roll program.

Throttling down of the engines at 94% velocity and altitude of 4.3 nautical miles.

Report of a major malfunction and the loss of the downlink from the flight Dynamics officer.

NASA's perception as an inventive and international leader before the Challenger accident.

The ambitious plans of NASA for the space shuttle program and its economic model.

The construction of the solid rocket boosters with O-rings and their potential issues.

The pressure to launch and the challenges faced in making the shuttle program routine.

The prediction of 60 shuttle launches a year and the reality of falling behind schedule.

The issue with O-rings not behaving as designed, especially in cold temperatures.

The decision to wave requirements for O-rings, expanding the bounds of acceptable risk.

The 10th Challenger launch and the decision to include an ordinary citizen, Christa McAuliffe.

The emergency teleconference and the engineers' concerns about O-ring seal performance.

The reversal of the initial recommendation to launch and the subsequent disaster.

The Rogers commission's findings on the Challenger disaster and the organizational pressure to launch.

The changes prompted by the Rogers commission and the continuation of the shuttle program.

The Columbia launch and the concern over debris damage to the left wing.

The decision-making process regarding the debris strike and the refusal to request more imagery.

The Columbia accident investigation and the conclusions about NASA's leadership and safety culture.

The end of the shuttle program in 2011 and the current reliance on Russian spacecraft for manned spaceflight.

The broader implications of organizational decision-making and the sensitivity required to complex systems.

Transcripts

7 6 we have main engine start 4

3 and liftoff liftoff of the 25th space

shuttle mission and it is cleared the

tower

[Music]

wow roll

wow good roll program

confirmed Challenger now heading down

range my

god oh

wow engines beginning throttling down

now at

94% velocity 2257 ft per second altitude

4.3 nautical miles downrange distance 3

nautical miles Challenger go with

throttle up go

[Music]

flly controllers here looking very

carefully at the

situation obviously a major malfunction

major

malfunction we have no down

link reports from the flight Dynamics

officer indicate that the vehicle um

apparently EXP

loed exped we looking at checking with

the recovery forces to see what can be

done at this

point vehicle had exploded please

don't

ES

up until the Challenger accident NASA

was a very untypical government agency

we were inventing as we went along so

you had a lot of freedom it was viewed

internationally

as a fantastic place the Apollo missions

gave it an aura of

invincibility we were taken as the

international leader in the space race

and no one was really expecting anything

to go wrong the Apollo program over the

years that it actually operated had very

few launches but NASA had uh some very

ambitious plans 4 minutes and 27 seconds

to go before the start of this historic

Mission the year was 1981 and NASA was

about to amaze the world with Colombia a

new spacecraft that pushed the limits of

AAG

they never before have sent a spacecraft

into orbit that is going to come down as

a plane instead of using a single rocket

like Apollo the shuttle was attached to

an external fuel tank and two solid

rocket boosters each of the boosters was

constructed of joined metal tubes and

the field joints were sealed with two

rubber gaskets called O-rings look at

those huge engines getting ready to

catapult this strange assemblage off the

Earth but all this technology wasn't

cheap and NASA had to come up with the

new funding model the creation of the

whole shuttle program came in a

different economic era than the Apollo

program so Congress and NASA decided the

shuttle program could pay its way by

carrying payloads into orbit the

Department of Defense private

contractors that wanted experiments done

in space would pay them to take them up

on the shuttle it was going to be a real

routine Expressway to space and unlike

Apollo the shuttle system was going to

be almost entirely reusable they had to

return this Hardware back into space as

rapidly as they could it wasn't long

into the program they realized that that

process was far more difficult than they

ever anticipated they were under

constant pressure to launch minus 10 9 8

I'm getting a few butterflies myself

right now we've gone for main entrance

start we

have baby

come on

baby Go

baby

go oh honey go f Like an

Eagle Colombia was a fantastic success

but NASA had to figure out how to make

these technological Feats routine they

predicted in the beginning that they

would be able to Launch launch 60

shuttles a year that NASA would in fact

become self-paying or self-funded we had

two pads up and running so you'd have

two vehicles out on the pad and they

were going to launch like three days

apart but that really never happened it

was an experimental technology and they

just couldn't manage that many so they

continually fell behind the shuttle

program never had more than nine

launches in a single year we have a

beautiful picture now it's coming

through and to help meet their ambitious

schedules NASA worked with private

contractors to build many of the shuttle

systems while NASA Engineers analyed

data to see how well everything

performed NASA kept very good records of

anomalies the problem is is that they

ran into a lot of these one thing

Engineers saw was the O-rings that

sealed the booster joints weren't

behaving according to design on several

flights especially those at cold

temperatures rocket propellant had blown

by the primary o-ring the first first

time it happened they accepted it they

tested it they thought they knew what

had happened and then the next launch

everything worked and then a few more

launches and it happened again but each

time the secondary o-ring prevented

gases from escaping the side of the

booster so rather than stalling the

program to redesign The Joint Nasa waved

the requirements governing O-rings which

effectively made it acceptable to fly

with minimal erosion even with the worst

o erosion they'd ever had it hadn't

failed so they started to work on it but

they really weren't rushing it didn't

seem so terrible but they continually

expanded the bounds of acceptable

risk and then came the 10th Challenger

launch and a mission unlike any NASA had

attempted before they decided to make

that the first flight that a ordinary

citizen can fly and that Drew a

tremendous interest from the public plus

the school systems are going to show

this live on television like this time

I'd like to introduce you to perhaps the

person you you came to see and that's uh

Christ mlla Our payload specialist

teacher in

space my job at the time of the

Challenger was the director of the Space

Shuttle solid rocket motor project for

my company Morton thol Morton thol was

an engineering firm out of Brigham City

Utah and had the NASA contract to build

the shuttle boosters well I am so

excited to be here and I just hope

everybody Tunes in on day four now to

watch the teacher teaching from space on

the day before Challenger there was an

overnight low that was record-breaking

got a telephone call from one of the

program managers back in Utah that work

for me and he says Ally says we just

heard that it might get down as low as

18° by tomorrow morning good grief I

said I'm really worried about these

o-ring seals being able to operate

properly at those kind of temperatures

the mission had already been rescheduled

after routine delays so now Morton thall

in NASA scheduled an emergency

teleconference the night before the

launch the engineers at TH call were

very concerned so they began scrambling

to put together an analysis of

temperature data Larry Malloy was NASA's

project manager for the solid rocket

boosters then we went out to the

teleconference and uh Roger boet who was

who was kind of the O-ring are at at

Morton thall did most of the

talking the recommendation was that we

wait until it's 54

degre before we launch so I said

something like 54 degre

[Music]

where they had never drawn a temperature

line before and it meant a tremendous

change to the shuttle's schedule that

isn't what they wanted to hear in fact

Larry made a comment I call when hell do

you want me to launch next

April Thia Call's engineers in Utah were

caught off guard by NASA's strong

reaction to their recommendation so they

asked if they could have some time off

the teleconference to review the data in

private and after they went offline Al

MacDonald was visibly upset and he said

I wouldn't want to be the guy that had

to appear at a board of inquiry if this

thing

blows and I said I understand that alen

you won't have

to that'll be

[Music]

me at Via call the vice president was

asking those Engineers to stand up for

what they said Roger boet took the lead

in the objections he said I I can't

prove it to you all I know is that it's

away from goodness in our experience

base but the engineers at TH call didn't

have the data so the vice president took

the decision-making away from the

engineers and asked the managers to

decide and they did more than 30 minutes

after the engineers had gone offline

Thia call managers voted to reverse the

recommendation and to launch the

Challenger as planned the Telecom

conference became a focal point for the

White House appointed Rogers commission

that investigated NASA after the

disaster there was not one positive

statement for launch ever made in that

room what was driving you here what what

was to be achieved that uh caused you to

go NASA pressured the folks at thol to

change their mind and it was clear to me

that we finally came back and gave them

what they wanted to hear you know we've

been rationalizing this erosion since

the second flight none of the

information the NASA managers were

getting was new this was not an

individuals getting used to something

this was

organizationally

supported that's

where the accident was

inevitable once thol reversed their

initial recommendation someone needed to

sign off on the launch rationale did the

smartest thing I ever did in my lifetime

I refused to sign it I just felt it was

too much risk to take so just before

midnight McDonald's boss Joe kilminster

signed off

instead after the disaster the

commission concluded cold and Joint

design were major factors in Challengers

o-ring failure it also squarely pointed

a finger at Nasa managers like Malloy

the commission did recognize that there

was pressure launch but they saw as it

enacted by amorally calculating managers

who were in positions of

responsibility I found something

completely different so V began her own

investigation no one wanted this to

happen but intuition you know I don't

feel good about this should have been

okay and they applied all the usual

rules in a situation where the usual

rules didn't apply 4 3 2

[Music]

1 we made AG grie with

sir so the real Crux of the matter is

how how do you get people to recognize

when you need to do something different

than what you've been trained to do

after Challenger the Rogers commission

prompted many changes at Nasa including

an increase in the program's budget

adding a third o-ring to the booster

joints and moving some managers

including Malloy out of the shuttle

program but there was nothing really

about how to change the organization

that came out of the commission report

good morning

Discovery rise and shine boys it took 2

years for NASA to launch another shuttle

but once it was away the program had 15

years of successful

[Music]

missions and then in 2003 came the 28th

Columbia launch the Space Shuttle that

started it all it seemed like any other

launch but on the second day someone

called me on the phone and said you've

heard about the large piece of debris or

foam that came off the tank and hit the

left wing caused a cloud a poof I said

no I didn't Colombia made it into orbit

safely but the concern was that if

debris had caused damage to the left

wing the point of impact could be

vulnerable to extreme heat and

turbulence on re-entry so just days

after the launch NASA formed a special

team to assess the damage we're supposed

to have this analysis all wrapped up in

three days but we didn't know exactly

where it hit we needed a photo an image

that definitely says here's where it hit

and here's the damage and the best

visuals the team had to work with were a

few grainy photos captured at launch the

decision to ask for more data the need

for it was unanimous but smaller foam

and other debris had fallen from

shuttles before without catastrophe and

since Colombia was already in orbit

getting better imagery meant NASA must

do it from space most likely by taking

shots of the shuttle's underside from a

nearby satellite the next day I get an

email saying the answer is no I called

up the chief engineer and said uh why

don't you back this up and he said well

I don't want to be a chicken little

about this and I was stunned by that

response and I said Chicken Little the

program is acting like an ostrich with

its head in the sand management was

worried about unnecessarily diverting

colia from its Mission since foam damage

had been generally considered to be a

non-threatening maintenance concern

Linda ham the chair of the management

team finally put the issue to rest on

teleconference 8 days into the mission

while Colombia's crew orbited above we

could lose an entire tile I mean it

could be a a significant area of child

damage he was just reiterating it was

Calvin that he doesn't believe that

there is any um burn through so no a

safety flight kind of issue it's more of

a turnaround issue similar to what we've

had on other flights all right any

questions on that in the end ham

received three requests for Imaging from

different parts of NASA and they were

all put down for different

reasons the similarity between

Challenger and Colombia was the falling

back on routine under uncertain

circumstances the day before the

teleconference NASA sent their only

communication to the Colombia astronaut

about the debris strike and on February

1st 2003 the crew began their return to

Earth can you look at the camera for a

second look at me

there part of our engineering culture is

that you should work through your chain

of command I will

regret always why I didn't break the

door down by myself and we're ready

Willie no Deltas everything look good to

you

I don't see anything out of the ordinary

this is amazing it's really getting uh

fairly bright out there they had just

started the deorbit burn they're coming

down and um we started seeing

temperatures change higher on the left

side versus the right FYI have just lost

four separate temperature transducers on

the left side of the vehicle the

anomalous data confirm my worst

[Applause]

[Music]

fear Columbia Houston UHF com

Columbia Houston UHF com Che I looked up

and I saw one of our chief engineers in

tears we can't get the crew she said

they've been

incommunicado it happened it

happened Colombia was destroyed on

re-entry

after the disaster V worked closely with

the Columbia accident investigation

board which concluded that NASA had

ineffective leadership and a flawed

safety culture we are quite convinced

that these organizational matters are

just as

important uh as the foam ham soon left

the shuttle program and Von's insights

into organizational decisionmaking have

proven relevant far beyond the walls of

NASA this happens in many different

kinds of organizations I don't think

that the general public

got the position of either Larry Malloy

or Linda ham and that their behavior was

to a great deal determined by working in

a very rule oriented

organization after Colombia NASA

restructured the shuttle program's

management team and required an

inspection of the Orbiter underbelly on

all trips to the international space

station all told NASA had 133 successful

shuttle missions apart from the

Challenger and Columbia tragedies but in

its more than 30 years of operation the

program was never able to cover costs

and in 2011 it all came to an end when

Atlantis touched down at Kennedy Space

Center and NASA fully turned its

attentions to smaller unmanned

spacecraft today NASA pays the Russian

space agency to carry American

astronauts into space we can never

resolve the problem of

complexity but you have to be sensitive

to your organization and how it works

while a lot of us work in complex

organizations we don't really realize

the way the organizations that we

inhabit completely inhabit

[Music]

us

[Music]

[Music]