Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis - Iran's proxies at work - The Global Jigsaw podcast, BBC World Service

Summary

This episode of The Global Jigsaw delves into the complexities of the Middle East's geopolitical landscape, focusing on Iran's so-called 'Axis of Resistance'—an alliance of groups opposing Israeli and US influence. The series explores Iran's strategic support for regional proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, highlighting their shared anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ideologies. The episode discusses the historical context of these alliances, the impact of the Gaza war on regional dynamics, and the potential future of these resistance movements. It underscores the role of Iran in providing military and financial backing to these groups, while also examining the internal and external pressures they face, including tensions within the Axis of Resistance and the challenges posed by international recognition of a Palestinian state.

Takeaways

• 🌐 The 'Axis of Resistance' is a coalition led by Iran, which includes allies and proxies opposed to Israeli and US influence in the Middle East.
• ⚔️ Iran launched a direct attack on Israel from its territory in April, marking a historic moment and causing celebration in Tehran.
• 🔄 Iran's network of allies and proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, have played significant roles in shaping events in the Middle East.
• 🇮🇱 Hezbollah, meaning 'the Party of God' in Arabic, is considered a key group backed by Iran and has deep societal roots in Lebanon.
• 🤝 Iran has provided substantial support to Hamas, reflecting a strategic alliance based on shared enemies.
• 📈 The Houthis, backed by Iran, have gained global attention by attacking ships in the Red Sea and demanding an end to the Gaza conflict.
• 💣 The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, largely backed by Iran, have grown in strength and influence despite the decline of ISIS.
• 🇸🇾 The Syrian government's survival is largely credited to Iranian and Russian support, with Iran providing significant military and financial aid.
• 📊 Iran's influence in the region is strategic, aiming to counter Western and Israeli influence while expanding its own power.
• 🔄 Tensions within the Axis of Resistance show that while Iran can lead the coalition, it faces challenges in maintaining unity among its allies.
• 🌟 The future of the Axis of Resistance is tied to ongoing regional crises, which provide opportunities for Iran and its allies to grow and assert their influence.

Q & A

What is the term 'Axis of Resistance' as referred to by Iran?

The 'Axis of Resistance' is a term used by Iran to describe a coalition of allies and proxies that are against Israeli and US influence in the Middle East. It encompasses the history of anti-colonial struggle in the region, with the Arabic term 'muqawama' and Persian 'muqawamat' referring to resistance.

How did Iran's attack on Israel from its own territory in mid-April affect the region?

Iran's attack marked a historic first and prompted jubilation in Tehran. It demonstrated Iran's willingness and capability to launch direct attacks, which could potentially escalate conflicts and shape events in the Middle East.

What is Hezbollah's role in the Axis of Resistance?

Hezbollah, meaning 'the party of God' in Arabic, is often described as the jewel in the crown of the groups backed by Iran. It is a significant player in the Axis of Resistance, with a guiding religious ideology and extensive support from Iran.

How has Iran's support for Hamas influenced the group?

Iran has been said to provide substantial support for Hamas, framing their alliance under the principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.' This has helped Hamas maintain its operational capabilities and political influence.

What is the significance of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq?

The PMF, also known as al-Hashashabi in Arabic, is a coalition of paramilitary entities in Iraq that has been largely backed by Iran. It has grown in influence and numbers post the defeat of the Islamic State, becoming a significant political and economic force within Iraqi society.

How did the Badr Brigades gain influence within the Iraqi government?

The Badr Brigades played a role in the democratic process in Iraq, allowing them to gain influence and control over the interior ministry from 2005 onwards. This enabled them to place their personnel within the security forces, thus consolidating their power.

What has been the impact of the sectarian violence in Baghdad post-2003?

The sectarian bloodbath in Baghdad resulted in thousands of deaths, with estimates suggesting around 35 to 40,000 civilians killed annually during that period. This led to a significant demographic shift, with mixed districts in Iraq becoming almost non-existent.

Why is the presence of American forces in the Middle East seen as an obstacle to Iranian interests?

American forces, though not numerous, have been able to keep ISIS at bay and prevent the establishment of an uncontested zone of control from Tehran to the Mediterranean by Iran-backed paramilitary forces. This is seen as a hindrance to Tehran's regional ambitions.

How has the relationship between Hamas and Iran evolved over time?

While ideologically Hamas, a Sunni group, and Iran, a Shia-majority state, are on opposite sides of the sectarian divide, their relationship has been one of convenience. Iran has provided financial and military support to Hamas, which has worked in favor of Iranian interests in the region.

What is the Houthis' stance on Israel and their role in the conflict?

The Houthis, a Yemen-based group, are staunchly anti-Israel and anti-West, with their slogan being 'death to America and death to Israel.' They have conducted attacks on ships in the Red Sea to exert pressure on Israel to halt its military campaign in Gaza, positioning themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause.

How does Hezbollah's media presence contribute to its influence?

Hezbollah has a powerful media machine, including its own TV station Al Manar and a network of pro-Hezbollah outlets. This allows them to disseminate their messages and official statements, enhancing their appeal and reinforcing their image as a resistance movement.

Outlines

00:00

😀 Introduction to the Axis of Resistance

This paragraph introduces the concept of the Axis of Resistance, which Iran uses to describe a network of allies and proxies opposing Israeli and US influence in the Middle East. It discusses the historical context of resistance in the region, including the launch of an attack by Iran on Israel and the role of various proxy groups in shaping Middle Eastern events. The episode's focus is set on exploring Iran's influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza.

05:04

🏛️ The Rise and Influence of the Badr Brigades in Iraq

The second paragraph delves into the Badr Brigades, an Iraqi paramilitary group with significant influence within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). It traces the group's origins, its rise to power following the US invasion in 2003, and its control over the interior ministry. The paragraph also discusses the sectarian violence that ensued in Baghdad and the group's transformation into a politically and economically significant entity within Iraq.

10:10

🤝 Iran's Support and Influence in Syria

The third paragraph examines Iran's critical role in preserving the Syrian government during the civil war. It highlights the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) support for the Syrian regime and the various militias that have been fighting on behalf of the Syrian government. The paragraph also touches on the strategic importance of Syria's geographical location for Iran's regional ambitions.

15:15

🕌️ Hezbollah's Multifaceted Role in Lebanon

This paragraph provides an overview of Hezbollah, a powerful Lebanese group with strong ties to Iran. It discusses Hezbollah's evolution from a paramilitary group to a political force with significant social influence, particularly within the Shiite community. The paragraph also covers the group's formation, its objectives, and the support it receives from Iran, both ideologically and materially.

20:20

📈 Hamas and the Palestinian Cause

The fifth paragraph focuses on Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist group that has been a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It outlines the group's origins, its governance of the Gaza Strip, and its relationship with Iran. The paragraph also discusses the financial support Hamas receives from various sources, including Iran, and its role in the broader Axis of Resistance.

25:22

🏺 The Houthis and the Yemeni Conflict

The sixth paragraph introduces the Houthi rebels, a group based in Yemen that has been involved in conflict with the Yemeni government and has conducted attacks in the Red Sea. It discusses the Houthis' relationship with Iran, their ideological alignment, and the support they receive, which includes military assistance. The paragraph also highlights the Houthis' media presence and their stance on the Palestinian cause.

30:25

💥 The Gaza War and Regional Tensions

The seventh paragraph discusses the impact of the Gaza war on the region, particularly how it has affected the Tehran-led alliance. It covers the tensions between Syria and Hamas, the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria, and Hezbollah's cautious approach to the conflict. The paragraph also explores the potential for further radicalization following the war and Iran's potential to exploit the situation.

35:33

🌐 Social Media Warfare and the Palestinian Issue

The eighth paragraph examines Hamas's use of social media during the Gaza conflict, highlighting their efforts to maintain a strong public image and their portrayal of the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza. It discusses the group's attempts to shift the blame for the crisis onto Israel and the international community, as well as the potential for Iran to benefit from the post-war situation.

40:38

🔍 The Future of the Axis of Resistance

The ninth paragraph concludes the series with an analysis of the future of the Axis of Resistance. It emphasizes the historical circumstances that have allowed these groups to thrive and the role of Iran in exploiting regional instability. The paragraph also discusses the potential implications of a long-term solution to the Palestinian issue for Iran and the ongoing regional tensions.

45:41

📢 Production Credits

The final paragraph credits the production team behind the episode, including the producer, host, sound engineer, and editor. It also encourages listeners to recommend the podcast to friends if they find it enlightening.

Keywords

💡Axis of Resistance

The 'Axis of Resistance' refers to a coalition of states and non-state actors in the Middle East that are opposed to Israel and Western, particularly American, influence in the region. The term encompasses a broad spectrum of groups including political entities, militias, and proxy forces, which are often supported by Iran. In the video, it is mentioned that Iran considers this alliance as a counter to Western influence and is highlighted in the context of the current Gaza war.

💡Iranian Proxy

An 'Iranian Proxy' is a group or entity that is backed, either financially, militarily, or politically, by Iran to serve its interests in a region or conflict where it may not be directly involved. In the context of the video, groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Iraqi Shia militias are described as Iranian proxies, which are part of Iran's strategy to expand its influence in the Middle East.

💡Hezbollah

Hezbollah, meaning 'The Party of God' in Arabic, is a Lebanese political and militant group that is heavily supported by Iran. It is considered a key component of the 'Axis of Resistance' and is known for its military capabilities, political influence, and social service provisions within Lebanon, particularly for Shiite communities. The group's role and relationship with Iran are central to the discussion in the video, highlighting its status as 'the jewel in the crown of the groups backed by Iran'.

💡Hamas

Hamas, an acronym for 'Islamic Resistance Movement', is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist militant group and political organization. It has governed the Gaza Strip since 2006 and is known for its armed resistance against Israel. The video discusses Hamas's relationship with Iran, which is framed as a 'marriage of convenience', and its role within the broader 'Axis of Resistance'. Despite being Sunni, Hamas receives support from Iran, which is predominantly Shia, to counter their common enemy, Israel.

💡Houthis

The Houthis are an armed movement based in Yemen, primarily associated with the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam. They control much of Northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. The video describes the Houthis as being backed by Iran and highlights their anti-Western and anti-Israel stance. Their actions, such as attacking ships in the Red Sea, are positioned in the context of regional conflicts and their alignment with the 'Axis of Resistance'.

💡Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), also known as al-Hashashabi in Arabic, is an Iraqi umbrella organization consisting of around 40 militias, most of which are Shia groups. They were formed in response to the call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to combat ISIS. In the video, the PMF is discussed in the context of Iran's influence in Iraq, with the Badr Brigades being highlighted as a significant component within the PMF.

💡Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a branch of the Iranian military that also functions as an intelligence and military organization. It is deeply involved in Iran's foreign operations and supports various proxy groups across the Middle East. The video mentions the IRGC's role in advising and supporting the Houthis in Yemen, and its critical support to the Syrian government, emphasizing its influence in shaping regional dynamics.

💡Syrian Civil War

The Syrian Civil War is an ongoing multi-sided conflict that began in 2011 with protests against the government of Bashar al-Assad, which escalated into a full-scale civil war. The video discusses the role of Iran and Russia in supporting the Syrian government, contrasting with Western and Israeli interests. The war has been a significant theater for the 'Axis of Resistance' and a key area where Iran has sought to counter Western influence.

💡Gaza War

The Gaza War, as mentioned in the video, refers to the recurring military conflicts between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, particularly Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip. The video highlights the impact of the Gaza War on the broader Middle East, including the rise of local armed groups in the West Bank and the regional response to the conflict, which has the potential to further entrench the 'Axis of Resistance'.

💡Palestinian Authority (PA)

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is the interim self-government body established to govern the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, although its actual control is limited to parts of the West Bank due to the governance of Gaza by Hamas. The video discusses the PA in the context of the West Bank and the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict, noting the tensions between the PA and Hamas, and the implications of international recognition of a Palestinian state for Iran's regional strategy.

💡Quds Force

The Quds Force is a special operations unit within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for extraterritorial operations. The video refers to the killing of Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani by the U.S. and the subsequent impact on the dynamics of the 'Axis of Resistance'. The Quds Force is known for its support to various proxy groups and its role in shaping Iran's foreign influence.

Highlights

Iran's Axis of Resistance is a coalition of allies and proxies opposing Israeli and US influence in the Middle East.

The term 'resistance' in this context refers to the history of anti-colonial struggle in the Middle East.

Iran launched a direct attack on Israel from its own territory in April, marking a historic first and causing celebrations in Tehran.

Iran's network of allies and proxies has significantly shaped events in the Middle East for decades.

Hezbollah, meaning 'party of God' in Arabic, is considered the most prominent group backed by Iran.

Iran has provided substantial support to Hamas, reflecting the strategy of aligning with enemies of their enemies.

The Houthis in Yemen are confirmed to be backed by Iran, with reports of IRGC advisers present in the country.

There are dozens of entities within Iraqi society where the army does not have a monopoly on the use of force.

The IRGC is seen as the lifeline of the Syrian government, illustrating Iran's significant role in the Syrian conflict.

The Badr Brigades, a component within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), have grown in influence within Iraq's government and security forces.

The PMF's budget has doubled despite the defeat of the Islamic State, indicating their continued and growing influence.

Paramilitary groups in Iraq have diversified their income through various money-making opportunities, increasing their economic significance.

Iranian-backed groups aim to reduce Western, particularly American, influence in Iraq and the Middle East.

There have been over 160 attacks by Iraqi entities against American bases and interests, with a surprisingly low US casualty rate.

The Gaza war has exposed tensions within the Tehran-led alliance, particularly regarding the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria.

Hezbollah's military potential is significant, with an estimated 150,000 missiles and rockets that can reach anywhere in Israel.

Hamas, a Sunni group, has a relationship with Iran based on mutual benefit, despite sectarian differences.

The Houthis' media messaging machine has gained them popularity on social media, positioning them as defenders of the Palestinian cause.

Iran's attack on Israel with drones and missiles in April 2023 signifies a new level of confrontation in the region.

Transcripts

This episode of The Global Jigsaw  is part 2 of a mini-series on what  

Iran calls the Axis of Resistance - a  loose coalition of allies and proxies,  

sworn against Israeli and US influence. Here’s  a reminder of what they say it stands for.

When we talk about resistance. Primarily,  

we're talking about a catch-all term that  encompasses the history of, we can say,  

anti-colonial struggle in the Middle East -  muqawama in Arabic and muqawamat in Persian.

In mid-April, in a historic first, Iran launched  a direct attack on Israel from its own territory,  

prompting jubilation on the streets of Tehran.

Some of Iran’s proxies chipped  in - from Yemen, Iraq and Syria

Iran’s network of allies and proxies  has shaped events in the Middle  

East - for decades. Its potential  to disrupt has been highlighted,  

in the context of the current Gaza war. In  this episode, we’ll take you to Lebanon,  

Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza to untangle the web of  Tehran’s influence operations across the region.

Here’s a quick snapshot before  we dive into the details.

Hezbollah - it means the party of God in Arabic,  which is an indication of its guiding religious  

ideology, and it's often described as the jewel  in the crown of the groups backed by Iran.

Iran has been said to have  provided lots of support for  

Hamas. A marriage of convenience of  the enemy of the enemy is my friend.

The Houthis are definitely backed by Iran. We've  also seen reports that IRGC advisers are in Yemen.

We're talking about literally dozens of entities  

within Iraqi society. where the army does  not have the monopoly on the use of force.

The IRGC is essentially the life saver of  

the Syrian government. You can't  really look at it any other way.

Hold on to your hats - it’s going to be a  whirlwind tour of the Middle East - starting  

in Iraq. Our guide is Barry Marston  from our Jihadist media monitoring team.

Its quickly gets very complicated because here  we're talking about literally dozens of entities.  

Some of which came into being in the 1980s, based  in Iran in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. Some  

of which appeared in the 1990s, fighting Saddam  Hussein from the marshes in the south. Then you  

have a whole new crop of groups that appeared  after 2003, some of which were specifically  

put together to fight the Americans. Some of  those groups grew their own split-off branches  

that went often to fighting in Syria and then  they all come back together under this single  

coalition which in Arabic is al-Hashashabi,  which is the Popular Mobilisation Forces,  

the PMF. There are dozens of these entities  and only a very small number are strategically  

relevant. The Badr brigades are by far the  biggest component within the PMF. Likewise,  

Assad al-Haq, which appeared after 2005  purely put together to fight the Americans.

Some of these groups may go  back to the Iran-Iraq war,  

but it was another war - decades later -  that offered them a comeback opportunity.

After 2003 forces like the Badr  Brigades came back from Iran,  

where they had been based for the previous  20 years and they weren't very popular  

inside Iraq. They'd been seen as fighting  on the wrong side in the Iran-Iraq war.

For these reasons the Badr Brigades may not  have been too popular, but they found a way  

to ingratiate themselves with those who had the  power and the purse - the US forces in Iraq.

They actually gained influence by playing nice  to the Americans by saying that we believe in  

democracy, we believe in this new Iraq, allow us  to play a role in politics. So the Dawa party,  

the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in  Iraq, the Badr Brigades, these entities played  

a full role in the democratic process and  therefore, from 2005 onwards were able to  

play a dominant role within the government.  Badr Brigades from then on controlled the  

interior ministry which allowed them to flood  the security forces with their own personnel.

And just like that - from exile to power,  in no time. With the added bonus of a  

fast track to the generous state budget. This  had disastrous consequences for Baghdadis.

Literally thousands went straight on  to onto the interior ministry payroll.  

By 2006 we saw the consequences of this with  effectively a sectarian bloodbath in Baghdad,  

where death squads had been constituted.  The estimated number of civilians killed  

on an annual basis around that period  was in the range of around 35 to 40,000  

people over that period, according to UN, with  Sunni extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda killing  

Shia civilians and Shia death squads involved in  killing very large numbers of Sunni civilians.  

The result was Baghdad went from being a very  cosmopolitan mixed capital city. The population  

Baghdad changed almost beyond recognition.  There are almost no mixed districts in Iraq.

What a change in just 10 years. After the  violent reshaping of internal politics in Iraq,  

a formidable new enemy emerged.  It was so alarming it temporarily  

eclipsed the old foes and forced  the Iranian-backed groups to unite.

They were brought together by a  fatwa, by Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.  

We're talking about a period in 2014 where  a third of Iraq had very quickly come  

under control of the Islamic state group,  Isis. The army had pretty much collapsed.

Isis was moving rapidly with nothing to stop  it. So this coalition of paramilitary entities  

was very quickly cobbled together with the primary  aim of fighting Isis. But the entities within that  

coalition that persist today - the best armed, the  most influential are almost entirely Iran backed.

A menacing new enemy at the gates and a  fatwa from the ayatollah solidified this  

coalition of paramilitaries. And what happened  to some of these groups after the victory over  

the so-called Caliphate is quite startling -  their enemy diminished, but not their income.

The bizarre thing is that after the  effective defeat of the Islamic state  

by around 2017 the budget of the PMF has  effectively doubled from around $1.3bn to  

$3bn today. This force rather than being  demobilised, has doubled from 120,000 to  

closer to 240,000 today, in the face of a  number of prime ministerial missives that  

mandated for the reintegration of these forces  into the army that never happened. They've  

continued to maintain their independent  existences as a separate rival forces.

And it’s not just the state budget  that keeps them afloat - they’ve  

tapped into various money-making opportunities.

They've entrenched themselves within  Iraqi society… scrap metal oil,  

smuggling control of illegal checkpoint,  some on Iraq's borders and inside Iraq,  

reaping millions of dollars. So they've moved  from being totally focused on fighting Isis to  

the point where they are politically significant  economically significant and also they have their  

own social and theological organisation  so, this constitute a holistic movement.

Obviously, a key objective was to protect  

that budget and ensure that they  continue to exist in perpetuity.

It sounds like they have become extremely  influential in Iraq. This sounds also like  

a like an own goal from Iraqi perspective,  having such an influence by another country.

Many observers would tell you that the  leaders of these paramilitary groups are  

among the most powerful figures in the  country. It was the Iranian influence,  

through very powerful figures, through  their ability to lobby, to get to the  

point where they are actually able to play a  role in choosing the subsequent government.

Surely that is not good for Iraq?

It's not good for Iraqi sovereignty.  It's a very dangerous situation going  

forward where in different parts of  the country, the army does not have  

the monopoly on the use of force again. Go  back to that 2017 date, Diyala, Salahuddin,  

Ninawa, all these major provinces across the  centre of Iraq to a large degree came under  

the control of these paramilitary forces as  a result of their involvement in the fight  

against Isis and their progressive seizure  of control. They are the key de facto forces.

They want to get rid of America or  Western forces from Iraqi soil. That  

goes all the way back to 2003. They  also want to be able to show to the  

key figures back in the Quds Force  in Iran they are significant players.

The American forces in the region  may not be numerous nowadays,  

but they are seen as a serious obstacle to  Tehran’s designs. They played a key role,  

for example, in bringing down Iran’s drones  and missiles that targeted Israel this April.

You have a small number of American forces  in the order about sort of 300 to 500,  

forces that have both been able  to largely keep Isis at bay but  

also prevent these paramilitary  forces that are based in Iraq,  

Syria and Lebanon from establishing an uncontested  zone of control all the way through from Tehran  

to the Mediterranean, hence you can see why  they are so keen to get rid of the Americans.

How are they going about reaching that goal? We've seen. Well over 160 attacks from these Iraqi  

entities against American bases and interests. The  death toll I believe is still just three Americans  

and the very low number of US casualties. Tells  you something about the way that these groups  

are trying to show that, yes, we can strike  the Americans with ease at any opportunity,  

but we are also not trying to create  a fire storm for ourselves. From the  

Iranian perspective they'd never want  again to allow an administration to  

come into government in Baghdad that  would be hostile to Iranian interests.

The groups that meant to serve Iran’s  interests became successful in Iraqi  

politics. Has that had any effect on  their loyalty to the Islamic Republic?

So they should not be viewed as straightforwardly  as Iranian proxies, that will always exactly,  

precisely do what they're told and no more.  They have their Iraqi grassroots supporters  

to worry about. They have all these different  competing priorities to pay attention to after  

the 2021 elections. You get this major show  of force between the Sadrist movement and the  

political forces aligned with the PMF contesting  against each other for political power - one which  

is primarily acting on in Iraqi nationalist  basis and the other, which many would argue  

is an agent of Iranian influence. Sometimes  they definitely are acting at the behest of  

Iran and some other times, particularly since  the US killed Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani  

there has been less of a firm Iranian  hand on these paramilitary factions  

and we’ve sometimes seen them  openly defying Iranian orders.

Next stop is Damascus, and our guide here is Amira  Fathallah, one of our top Middle East experts.

The IRGC is essentially the life saver of the  Syrian government. You can't really look at it  

any other way. The Syrian government was faced  with this unprecedented wave of dissent which  

quickly spiralled into civil war in 2011. And  it really looked like it could go either way,  

Syrian President Bashar Assad may have been  forced to leave power or maybe he was going  

to find some way to hold on. And this is  where Iran and specifically the IRGC came  

to his rescue. We wouldn't see Assad still in  power now with such a tight grip on power and  

the territorial control were it not for Iranian  but also of course Russian support. Russia has  

got very strategic naval bases in Syria that  are absolutely critical positions to have in  

the Middle East. Russia crucially brings in air  cover, military capability that is huge, but  

Iran brought the cannon fodder. It  brought these masses of fighters not  

just from Iran but Afghanistan and further  afield to come and fight under this cause.

Tehran seems to have put a lot  of effort into keeping Bashar  

al Assad in power - so what’s in it for them?

If you look at Syria, geographically where  it's located, it’s a very lucrative spot to  

be and to have a close ally there.  Iran operates in the region within  

a framework of this huge power struggle.  Iran looks at countries like Saudi Arabia,  

especially, as a major political competitor in  the region. They have different ideologies and  

they are competing in the same space. Iran  cannot allow the Saudis to take a space if  

it thinks it has a chance to get in there. Not  just the Saudis but anybody, any Western ally,  

and certainly not Israel. So Iran, its  regional policy, is to block the West,  

block Israel and grow influence. Syria was  the perfect arena for this, at this point.

How is this vital help from Tehran  portrayed in the state media?

From Syrian media you don't get any sort of  detail at all. You don't know about exactly  

what these militias are called or where  they are you just hear about the Syrian  

armed forces and the Allied groups.  The Iranian influence is portrayed as  

a political alliance, as this partnership,  but very equal partners in a partnership and  

they're very grateful to Iran and Iran  is very happy to be dealing with Syria.

Amira has been tracking the moves of  the forces helping to solidify Iran’s  

influence in Syria. Sometimes the  clues come from unexpected sources.

You have groups like the Fatemiyoun militia  that is an Iranian-established militia,  

which comprises fighters from Afghanistan,  

then you have militias like the Nujabat  movement, it's actually an Iraqi group.

These groups have bases all over Syria. They  have really tight stronghold in the far east  

of Syria in the province of Deir ez-Zour,  which neighbours Iraq, and there is some  

overlap between the militias and they also  have some strategic sites elsewhere in the  

country including around the capital Damascus in  certain areas where there is a strong Shia history  

or shrine. There is actually an Iranian-backed  militia presence there too, often we know about  

these locations through various sources, but  often we learn about them when you watch where  

Israel is carrying out strikes in Syria. This  is to repel the Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel has carried out strikes on  Iranian-linked targets in Syria for  

years. These hits have intensified since the start  of the Israel-Gaza war. In a serious escalation,  

the Israelis allegedly attacked the Iranian  consulate building in Damascus in April,  

killing at least one senior IRGC commander. That  prompted Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel. In  

the Iranian capital billboards sprung up with the  slogan "Tel Aviv is our battleground not Tehran”

As for Syria, more than a decade after the start  of the civil war, President Assad is in a more  

confident position, looking for new friends to  reduce his reliance on certain foreign powers.  

Having secured territorial control of most of  Syria, Assad has made a comeback on the regional  

scene. Many states in the Arab world in the Middle  East have tried to bring him back into the fold.  

The country that manage to do it was Saudi Arabia.  They did a complete U-turn of their foreign  

policy, rebuilt diplomatic ties with Assad's  government, invited him, and here is a man who has  

not been seen at these summits for over a decade,  making a grand entrance and welcomed by almost  

everyone. This has really reduced their dependence  on Iran. For Iran that's not good because now  

you have a country and it needs to be rebuilt and  having stood by him this whole time Iran is trying  

to say give us reconstruction contracts and what  they publicly say is we would like to increase  

the level of economic cooperation, but Assad now  has oil-rich Gulf friends, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,  

who are also wanting to get a look in on these  reconstruction deals, and who he can turn to.

The friendship with Iran has brought  some unexpected consequences - it has  

even altered Syria’s social fabric in some places.

Some opposition media take a huge interest in  the Iranian presence in Syria and their main  

concern is they feel that these militias and  Tehran are changing the make-up of Syria. They  

are bringing in people into a population who are  not from this country. They are trying to instate  

new traditions, like religious  celebrations that didn't exist  

in certain cities. And that is  the case in some Deir ez-Zour,  

where some of these militias are, where  Sunni Arab tribes form the majority,  

so they pick up these concerns of a shift in  the demographics and in their culture as well.

The UN stopped counting Syria’s war dead years  ago at 300,000. Millions of Syrians have left  

their country, a result President Assad achieved  with Moscow’s help, and with Axis boots on the  

ground. The country has lost huge numbers of  people who have died and been displaced inside  

the country and outside the country, but Assad is  rebuilding on this rubble and not looking back.

Next stop on our tour - Lebanon. It’s home to  Hezbollah, which is considered to be Iran’s  

strongest proxy. Here comes Florence Dixon from  our Middle East team - with the background.

Hezbollah, it means the party of God in  Arabic, which is an indication of its  

guiding religious ideology, but in reality  it's quite a few different things. It's a  

paramilitary group with military capabilities  that far exceed those of the Lebanese army,  

it is also a hugely influential political  force, especially in southern Lebanon with  

seats in Parliament and ministers in the cabinet  and it is also a key provider of social services  

primarily for Lebanese Shiite communities. It  provides things such as healthcare, education,  

so it's deeply embedded in Lebanese society.  It is often called a state within a state. It's  

very open about its ties and its funding from  Iran and that it’s one of the Frontline actors  

in the so-called Axis of Resistance. It shares  a border with Israel, which obviously gives it  

huge prominence and it's often described as the  jewel in the crown of the groups backed by Iran.

Let us look into how Hezbollah, this  powerful Shia political and militant group,  

came about. It’s been proscribed as  a terrorist group by the Arab League,  

the US, UK and EU among others. Its genesis  and rise are tightly connected to Israel.

Hezbollah itself was formed in 1982 in the midst  of the Lebanese civil war and in the wake of the  

Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon and  at a time when the 1979 Iranian revolutionary  

spirit and teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini were  being widely felt across the region. If we go  

to Hezbollah’s official launch in 1985 it said  its objectives were to obliterate Israel from  

existence, get rid of the US and French troops  from Lebanon. So very much branding itself as a  

resistance to colonial forces in Lebanon but it  was also a moment of huge anger and disillusion  

among the population of southern Lebanon,  which is majority Shia and had suffered  

decades of marginalisation from the Lebanese  state. Iran really capitalised and invested  

at this very opportune moment on all the anti-US  sentiment in Lebanon, that anti-Israel sentiment,  

this widespread disillusion, and that's  what gave Hezbollah such momentum. And  

you see them grow in ascendance in  a relatively short period of time  

and that is due to this kind of image  of having quite a disciplined nature,  

this air of legitimacy as well, that they  get from their religious credentials.

Discipline and spirituality alone might not  have been enough for such a breakthrough,  

were it not for the money and the fire  power - gifted by the Islamic Republic.

And they then have this more  material support from Iran as well,  

both financial and in terms of military aid and  also another aspect of the geographical position  

there next to Syria that allowed the passage  of weapons and other materials from Iran to  

Lebanon. Syria’s also allowed key meetings to be  hosted in Damascus, and more recently Hezbollah  

fighters gained combat training in the Syrian  war where they also developed special forces.

Iran’s material support has been a lifeline for  Hezbollah all along. But there was another factor  

that helped the group remain powerful - and it all  goes back to the end of the civil war in Lebanon.

A key moment was in 1989 with the Taif Agreement,  the power-sharing agreement at the end of the  

Lebanese civil war, which called for the  disarmament of all Lebanese militias with the  

exception of Hezbollah because Hezbollah argued  that it should be allowed to continue fighting  

Israel because Israel still occupied 10 percent  of Lebanon. Their popularity rose even further in  

2000 when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon  and Hezbollah got most of the credit for that.

Next step for the Party of God was  to enter the big league of politics.

And then in the 1990s it started to become an  influential political player. It won its first  

parliamentary seats in 1992 and since then it  has been embedded in the political structure  

of Lebanon. The Shia community in Hezbollah  constituencies have to a great extent been  

shielded from the country's numerous crises. And  on many of these occasions Iran sent weaponry,  

it sent aid for reconstruction, sent medical  supplies and even subsidised foodstuffs so  

these communities could bounce back quite quickly.  There's a 2019 report by the US State Department  

which said that in recent years, Iran's  annual financial backing to Hezbollah was  

estimated at $700m, so the overwhelming  majority of its budget comes from Iran.

With all this at their  fingertips, how popular are they?

How Hezbollah is viewed in Lebanon is  interesting because it's very divided  

and I think you could probably say that around  half the population view it as a problematic  

political and military force and blame it for  widespread corruption. The Beirut port blast,  

for example. Hezbollah is seen as obstructing  all of the investigations into that, which  

caused huge public anger and anguish, and also  being responsible for various kind of political  

malpractice and assassinations and persecution  of its opponents. In southern Lebanon it's gained  

a lot of public support. Some members are  given discount cards to go to the supermarket.

Hezbollah is frequently portrayed in the West as  Iran’s proxy but that’s not how it sees itself.

Hezbollah doesn't view itself as a  proxy and they would say that that  

would be a Western orientalist view.  By their accounts they are very much  

a grassroots organisation. It's a  huge military force, it overshadows  

Hamas in terms of its military arsenal.  Experts predict that the group has in the  

range of about 150,000 missiles and rockets at  their disposal that can hit anywhere in Israel.

Hezbollah has a very effective and  vocal media machine, has its own  

TV station Al Manar and it will carry all  the official media and statements, it will  

carry Hassan Nasrallah’s  three-to-four hour speeches.

And then there's a wider network of pro-Hezbollah  outlets, a popular Lebanese-based pan-Arab TV  

station called Al Mayadeen, you have  more influential and highbrow outlets,  

you have Al Akhbar, a really influential  kind of equivalent of a broadsheet newspaper.

Florence compared Hezbollah’s military  arsenal with that of Hamas, so let’s  

look into that group now with Shaina  Oppenheimer from our Jerusalem team.

Hamas is actually an acronym for the Islamic  resistance movement. It emerged from an earlier  

Gaza-based group called Mujama al-Islamiya in  1989, and this is the beginning of the First  

Intifada or Palestinian uprising, and it's really  a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. And  

unlike some of the secular groups that  were popular at the time like Fatah or  

the Popular Front, Hamas really promotes itself  as the defender of Palestinian nationalism, but  

it's through an Islamist lens. And then in 1989  it carries out its first attack in Israel, and  

then it went on to carry out quite a few of those  attacks which really picked up during the Second  

Intifada in the early 2000s. Now a key moment for  the group was in 2006. Israel had already pulled  

out of Gaza, Hamas decided for the first time to  participate in legislative elections, and they won  

and then a year later they seized power in Gaza  after a short round of armed fighting with their  

rival Fatah, so they also have to start providing  a civil service for some two million residents.

Just like the other members of the so-called  Axis of Resistance, Hamas’s declared enemy  

is Israel. And just like Hezbollah, it’s a  proscribed terror group by a number of states.

They are quite clear in calling for the  destruction of Israel. This destruction  

needs to happen through jihad, through armed  resistance. In 2017 they actually revised their  

charter They did tone down some of their language,  they did accept the idea of a Palestinian state  

established along the 1967 borders, but they  didn't mention anything about acknowledging  

an Israeli state. Instead of speaking about  Jews they started to speak about the Zionists,  

and the last thing that is really important to  keep in mind when we're talking about Hamas is  

it is a designated terror group, according to  the UK, US and many other foreign governments.

We have looked into the connection between the  Iraqi Shia groups and the Islamic Republic,  

Assad’s friendship with Tehran  and Hezbollah’s anchor to the  

mothership. The spiritual bond tying  Hamas to Iran on the other hand is not  

obvious as they are on opposite  sides of the sectarian divide.

Hamas always been a kind of outlier in this  Axis of Resistance because Hamas is a Sunni  

group. The Hamas - Iran relationship has always  been a marriage of convenience of the enemy of  

their enemy is my friend. When Hamas started  carrying out attacks which was very soon after  

it was created, you could argue that it has  always worked in favour of Iranian interests.

Hamas has been running the  Gaza strip since 2006 which  

means it has some income in the form  of taxes. What else does it rely on?

A US State Department figure says that Iran  provides for Hamas with about $100m annually,  

which is quite significant, but there are also  allegations that Qatar provides payments on a  

regular basis to Gaza. Where that is going is  up for debate but a lot of it does go towards  

reconstruction efforts, helping pay civil  servants', keeping power plants running, and  

there were even times where they were distributed  as cash payments to civilians. What was actually  

really interesting about these payments is  that for a long time they were supported by  

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who  kind of saw this financial backing of Hamas by  

Qatar as a way of keeping Hamas at bay. He saw  them as a group that maybe wasn't really capable  

of causing significant damage to Israel, maybe  some kind of containable nuisance that we can  

have on our border, and it was also a way for  Netanyahu to ensure that Hamas was strong and  

that it maintained rivalry with the Palestinian  Authority (PA) and this was also a way of taking  

off pressure on Israel to negotiate with the  PA for some kind of permanent resolution.

It seems that the cash flow from Doha  didn’t bother the Israeli government much,  

quite the opposite. We would see Qatari  officials routinely brought into Gaza with  

the help of Israeli intelligence officials  with suitcases of cash, millions of dollars  

in cash. Beyond Qatar Hamas has ties with  Turkey, which has been said to fund Hamas,  

and we've also seen reports that there is  a Hamas network of secret companies that  

are managing about $500m for investments in  companies from places like Turkey and Saudi  

Arabia. Then Hamas also raises its own funds  through cryptocurrency and backchannel money  

laundering. It's also worth reminding people that  at the end of the day they are designated terror  

group. They are militant group but they are still  a governing entity and they do collect taxes.

The other Palestinian territory - the West Bank -  is also worth looking into, in the context of this  

story. Its towns are governed by Hamas’ rivals,  the Palestinian Authority, which is led by Mahmoud  

Abbas and his secular Fatah party. Security in the  territory is mainly under the control of Israel.

What's really interesting and we've seen  this in the past two years is the rise of  

local armed groups in the occupied West Bank.  They've carried out quite a lot of attacks on  

Israeli soldiers. and it kind of set up  the cycle of violence were in response to  

a series of deadly attacks in Israel.  Israeli forces started operating more  

regularly in the occupied West Bank.A lot of  these armed groups are affiliated with Hamas,  

they are affiliated with Islamic Jihad. Some of  them more loosely than others. Israeli officials  

have kind of been quite clear, especially  Netanyahu, in saying that the violence in  

the West Bank and the activities of the  armed groups has been financed by Iran.

Another group that got frequent name checks  in the news for their ability to disrupt an  

important shipping route in the Red Sea - are  the Houthis. They are the next on our list  

of Ais members - and we have just the person to  talk about them - our Yemen expert Sumaya Bakhsh.

The Houthi rebels are an armed group based in  the far north of Yemen in the northern highlands,  

in Saada, that's their stronghold, although they  now control the capital Sanaa and most of Yemen's  

north, which is where most of the country's  population live. In terms of their declared aims,  

since the outbreak of the Israel Gaza conflict  through their attacks on ships in the Red Sea  

they say that they're aiming to exert pressure  on Israel to halt its military campaign in Gaza.

For those with their eyes on the Middle  East, the Houthis are not a new phenomenon.

The Houthi movement was established in the 1990s  but they really came to prominence in 2014 when  

they came down from their northern stronghold  during protests against fuel price hikes came  

into the capital Sanaa and that was really the  beginning of the war in Yemen. Their seizure of  

the capital eventually forced the president  at the time Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to flee  

the following year. Saudi Arabia launched a  military campaign against the rebels who they  

viewed as a proxy of Iran. They both belong  to the Shia sect of Islam and the Houthi  

rebels belong to the Zaidi minority in Yemen and  ideologically they are both staunchly anti-West,  

staunchly anti-Israel. The Houthi slogan  is, death to America and death to Israel.

And what is the Yemeni government's  perception of the Houthi movement?

The Yemeni government sees the  Houthis as a proxy of Iran,  

they describe them as a terrorist militia.  

So let's talk about the Houthi’s relationship  with Iran, what do they say about it?

The Houthis are very open about the fact, they  have good really good relationship with Iran.  

They describe it as a brotherly relationship but  they are also very emphatic about the fact that  

they do not take orders from Iran. However,  the US and Saudi Arabia say that Iran has  

been arming the Houthi rebels, providing  them with ballistic missiles and drones,  

although both Tehran and the Houthis deny  this. They do not take orders from Iran,  

although we have seen reports that  IRGC advisers and Hezbollah advisers  

are present in Yemen and helping the  Houthis with their maritime operations.

On 7 October 2023, thousands of Hamas militants  launched an attack on Israel, which prompted the  

current Gaza war. It was the deadliest attack  targeting Israelis since the inception of the  

Jewish state - at least 1,200 Israelis were killed  and more than 200 people were taken hostage.

As this brutal war in Gaza  enters its seventh month,  

the Hamas run health ministry says more  than 33,000 Palestinians have been killed,  

most of the population has been displaced and  many are facing famine, according to the UN.

For the Houthis, this was a  moment of such significance,  

they decided to take matters into  their own hands and did so by  

shooting missiles at ships in the Red  Sea, demanding an end to the Gaza war.

They gained global visibility and  huge popularity on social media.

The Houthis have a very wide-ranging media  messaging machine. Since the outbreak of  

the Israel-Gaza conflict we have seen a lot  of senior Houthi officials on social media  

gaining large followings with this messaging,  of how that the rebels are the defenders of the  

Palestinians in ways that many Arab governments,  they say, have failed the Palestinians,  

particularly as some Arab countries have  normalised relations with Israel. We also  

see for example, on the Houthis main media outlet,  Al-Masirah TV, widespread coverage of these mass  

protests of tens of thousands of people out  in the streets chanting the Houthi slogan,  

death to Israel and death to America, holding up  the Palestine flag, holding up the Yemeni flag and  

really positioning themselves as defenders of this  cause, that is important for all Arabs, Muslims,  

defending the right of Palestinians  to have their own independent state.

There have been suggestions  that the Houthis might have  

their own reasons for waving the Palestinian flag.

We've seen reports that there has been an  increase in recruitment to the Houthi movement,  

but equally critics of the Houthis say that  their stated aim of defending Palestinians.  

There's a lot of scepticism around  that and critics of the Houthis see  

them as taking this stance for their own  personal gains to gain political standing.

The Houthis are not the only manifestation of the  

tectonic impact the Gaza war has had on  the region. The conflict has brought to  

the surface old cracks in the Tehran-led  alliance. Back to Damascus, with Amira.

When the Gaza war began all of what Iran  would call the Axis of Resistance got behind  

the message that the Palestinian factions are  confronting Israel. There's a small divergence,  

the Syrian government has had huge tensions with  Hamas in Gaza and that's because when the uprising  

broke out in Syria in 2011 Hamas supported it. And  yet Hamas and Damascus are supposed to be allies  

under the Iranian so-called Axis of Resistance.  Syria expelled Hamas from Damascus in 2012 and  

Hamas has slowly been trying to rebuild  that relationship and they came to visit  

Damascus. State media reported all the Palestinian  factions that visited. last on the list was Hamas,  

arguably the most powerful faction. And  this is this is where you read into the  

narrative there's a tiny little crack in  the façade, that tensions still exist with  

Hamas. I think that tells you that Iran can  only hold these groups together for so long.

In the last few decades, Syria has been the  temporary home for a substantial Palestinian  

population - mainly in and around the capital  Damascus. There seems to be a disconnect between  

the declared support for the Palestinian cause and  the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria.

Yarmouk camp is this Palestinian camp and during  the civil war, the pictures of the devastation  

in Yarmouk actually became some of the best  known, like devastating images of complete  

rubble all pouring down a street. There's nothing  left. This is in incredibly densely populated  

area with Palestinian refugees who have been  there for decades, never got a house in Syria,  

never got anywhere to really settle, that  was the Syrian government’s approach.

Since the start of the current war in Gaza,  

Hezbollah, the non-state actor with the  largest military potential in the region,  

has been regularly firing barrages of rockets  into Israel from Lebanon. Yet it has so far  

held off from making any major military moves.  Florence has been watching the tense situation.

They've been issuing claims responsibility for  their attacks on northern Israeli military sites  

since. October saying very much that. This is in  support of the Palestinian people in Gaza. And the  

leader of Hezbollah Hasan Nasrallah has said that  Hezbollah has one hundred thousand forces at its  

disposal which is widely disputed figure, but  it's definitely in the multiple tens of thousands.

So, Hezbollah have made it very clear  that they don't want a full-scale war  

or a full scale escalation on that  Lebanon-Israel border. And you even  

see it in pro-Hezbollah media. They’ll  make it quite clear that Hezbollah is  

carrying out a controlled escalation and is  very careful for it not to get out of hand.

So Hezbollah hasn’t made any sudden moves, for  now. In contrast, for Hamas, the 7 October attack  

seemed to be all about rattling the status quo  at a time when they felt the Palestinian cause  

was undermined by regional powers aiming to  normalise ties with Israel. Initially Iran  

was blamed for the brutality of Hamas in  that attack. Shaina was looking for clues.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran  did help Hamas plan an October 7 attack  

during meetings with officers from the IRGC and  representatives of other groups. Iran has denied  

involvement and Hamas been clear about saying  that this was their own initiative. But we do  

also know from other reporting that Hamas  wanted to spark some kind of regional war,  

they saw more Arab states move to normalise  relations with Israel. They wanted to do  

something that put the Palestinian cause  back at the forefront of people's minds  

and the hope was that the October 7 attack  might start an original war that Hezbollah,  

maybe would've got more involved,  perhaps more Iranian backed groups  

would have gotten more involved. As we know  that didn't really play out in that way.

Israel launched the war against Gaza with  the declared aim of rooting out Hamas. On  

a different front - the social media one  - Hamas seems to have the upper hand.

They've really relied on Telegram over the  past few years and significantly since the  

start of this war, that's where the post these  very slick military style videos showing off  

their capabilities and fighting with Israeli  soldiers. And it's really an attempt to show  

that they're still in Gaza, they are still  putting up a strong fight and they're still  

having some kind of battle successes.  They also talk about what they say are  

crimes by the occupation. They mention  the dire humanitarian situation there,  

the lack of food, water and medicine and basic  needs. In addition to blaming Israel for this  

they actually put a lot of blame on the rest  of the world for allowing this to happen.

Slick PR videos and social media  campaigns accompanied by images of  

the immense suffering of the Palestinians  seem to have enhanced Hamas’ appeal.

A lot of people saying that Hamas is really  an idea and you can't destroy an idea,  

and if history shows us anything it's that  the dire humanitarian situation people are  

experiencing in Gaza right now - this is exactly  the recipe for further radicalisation because  

people don't have a lot to lose. Whenever this  war ends and however it ends people are going  

to be in a very bad situation. A lot of Gaza's  destroyed, people are going to be sleeping in  

tents, for a very long time there is a lot of  sentiment that Iran will be able to exploit.

It sounds like there’s a way Iran could  benefit from the hardship in Gaza. So  

where would an internationally mediated long-term  solution to the Palestinian issue leave Tehran?

The West and the US has been really  pushing for the Palestinian Authority  

to have some kind of governing role  in the Gaza Strip and even possibly  

pushing for international recognition  of a Palestinian state. If that happens  

that would be a big blow to Iran because the  Palestinian cause has always been central to  

Iran's excuse for its regional proxies on its  Axis of Resistance, not only against Zionism  

but also against imperialism and the West. I don't  think Iran would be too happy with some kind of  

outcome of the war that could potentially  lead towards a more permanent solution.

On 12 April - Iran launched an attack on Israel  with more than 300 drones and missiles from its  

own territory. This put the world on high alert.  Let’s bring back Barry Sadid - our Iran expert  

we spoke to in Part One - to  bookend this mini-series - with  

his analysis on the future of the  so-called “Axis of Resistance”.

I want to draw attention to the historical  circumstances that have enabled the Axis to thrive  

in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and so on. These groups  were not responsible, say for the US invasion of  

Iraq, or Lebanon’s civil conflict and the Israeli  occupation. What the IRGC were able to do was  

to exploit instability made by others to create  enduring alliances and proxies in these weakened  

states. Just so, Iran is not the primary mover of  the ongoing conflagration in the region. As Israel  

wages war in Gaza we’re already seeing flashes  of unrest in countries like Egypt and Jordan,  

whose authoritarian governments are caught  between public rage over the devastation of Gaza,  

and their apparent inability or unwillingness  to bring about a ceasefire. These tensions  

have only increased with Iran’s latest assault  exposing Israel’s regional support, with Jordan,  

for example, openly shooting down Iranian drones  and missiles destined for Israel - and this in  

the context of Jordanian protests for Gaza,  and even public offers by Axis members to  

arm Jordanians willing to take on Israel.  The Axis undoubtedly has strategic depth,  

thanks to its religious and ideological core. But  as for its future, as long as these crises and  

tensions persist, the Islamic Republic and its  allies will have the space to grow and thrive.

Thank you to all our speakers: Barry  Sadid, Barry Marsden, Shaina Oppenheimer,  

Amira Fathallah, Florence Dixon and Sumaya  Bakhsh. This episode of The Global Jigsaw  

was produced by Kriszta Satori and hosted by  me Krassi Twigg. The sound engineer is Nigel  

Dix and our editor is Judy King. As always  - thank you for showing an interest - and  

if you find this pod enlightening,  do recommend us to your friends.