Dimensions of Development - Francis Fukuyama
Summary
TLDRIn this GEM conference speech, Francis Fukuyama discusses the multifaceted nature of development, emphasizing its complexity due to the interplay of economic, social, and political factors. He introduces a framework with six key dimensions: economic growth, social mobilization, the state, rule of law, democratic accountability, and legitimacy. Fukuyama challenges the modernization theory, highlighting contradictions such as the tension between a strong state and the rule of law, and the unpredictable link between democracy and good governance. He underscores the importance of national identity for state building, using examples like South Korea's successful development and the challenges faced by countries lacking a cohesive national identity, such as Syria. Fukuyama concludes by emphasizing the intricate relationships between these dimensions and the need for nuanced understanding to foster political order and development.
Takeaways
- 📊 Development is a multifaceted process with economic, social, and political dimensions that interact in complex ways.
- 🌐 Economic growth is just one aspect of development, focusing on increases in per capita output over time.
- 👥 Social mobilization involves the development of social groups and new social relations, leading to a collective consciousness within these groups.
- 🏛️ The state is about power and its accumulation, with Max Weber defining it as having a legitimate monopoly of force over territory.
- 📜 The rule of law is distinct from rule by law, where even the rulers are subject to the law, limiting their power.
- 🗳️ Democratic accountability ensures that the ruler's actions reflect the population's wishes, not just the elite.
- 🔄 Development can occur independently within each dimension, but modernization theory suggests they can mutually support each other.
- 🇰🇷 South Korea exemplifies modernization theory, where economic growth led to social mobilization and eventually democracy and the rule of law.
- 🚫 Contradictions can arise between strong states and the rule of law, and between democracy and good governance, complicating development.
- 🌐 National identity is critical for state formation and social cohesion, with some countries lacking a unifying national identity leading to conflict and instability.
- 🌐 The creation of national identity is influenced by both cultural expressions from the bottom up and nation-building efforts from the top down.
Q & A
What is the main theme of Francis Fukuyama's speech at the GEM conference?
-The main theme of Francis Fukuyama's speech is the complexity of development, focusing on how economic, social, and political factors interact in the development process.
According to Fukuyama, what are the six dimensions of development?
-The six dimensions of development Fukuyama mentions are economic growth, social mobilization, the state, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and legitimacy.
How does Fukuyama define 'economic growth' in the context of development?
-Economic growth, as defined by Fukuyama, refers to increases in per capita output over time, which is typically the focus of economists.
What is social mobilization and how does it relate to development?
-Social mobilization involves the development of social groups and new kinds of social relations, such as when a social group becomes conscious of itself, which is a critical aspect of development.
What is the role of the state in development according to Fukuyama?
-The state, in Fukuyama's framework, is about the accumulation and use of power to enforce laws, protect the community, and maintain domestic order, which is essential for development.
How does the rule of law differ from rule by law in Fukuyama's explanation?
-The rule of law exists when the ruler is under the law and must follow the same rules as everyone else, whereas rule by law is where the ruler simply gives commands that people have to obey without being bound by law.
What does Fukuyama mean by democratic accountability and its importance in development?
-Democratic accountability refers to procedural rules that ensure the ruler's actions reflect the population's wishes and not just the elite. It is crucial for development as it provides a check on power.
How does Fukuyama view the relationship between economic growth and other dimensions of development?
-Fukuyama suggests that economic growth can occur independently or in connection with other dimensions of development, but it does not automatically lead to social modernization or democracy without a balance of power and constraints.
What is the contradiction Fukuyama identifies between a strong state and the rule of law?
-Fukuyama identifies a contradiction where a strong state can sometimes violate human rights or act without restraint in the name of security, thus undermining the rule of law, which is meant to limit power.
How does Fukuyama explain the tension between democracy and good governance?
-Fukuyama explains that while democracy is often seen as leading to good governance, there are cases where increased political participation has actually reduced the quality of government, such as during the spoils system in 19th century America.
What role does national identity play in development according to Fukuyama?
-National identity plays a critical role in development as it provides a sense of belonging and commonality among citizens, which can facilitate social cohesion, state formation, and the legitimacy of institutions.
How does Fukuyama suggest that national identity can be built or reinforced?
-Fukuyama suggests that national identity can be built or reinforced through both bottom-up cultural expressions, like literature and music, and top-down policies, such as promoting a national language and ideology.
Outlines
🌟 Introduction to Development Framework
Francis Fukuyama begins by expressing his pleasure at speaking at the GEM conference, surrounded by old friends. He introduces a complex framework for understanding development, emphasizing its multidimensionality and the intricate interactions between economic, social, and political factors. Fukuyama outlines six key dimensions of development: economic growth, social mobilization, the state, rule of law, democratic accountability, and legitimacy. He explains each dimension, using examples like the development of social classes in capitalism for social mobilization, and Max Weber's definition of the state for the state dimension. Fukuyama warns that his framework will not provide a simple conclusion due to the inherent complexity of development.
🔄 Modernization Theory and Its Contradictions
Fukuyama discusses the modernization theory, which posits that development is a unified process where all six dimensions of development support each other. He uses South Korea as an example where economic growth led to social modernization, democracy, and strengthened rule of law, illustrating the theory's successful application. However, he also points out the theory's limitations, highlighting contradictions such as the potential for social mobilization to undermine political stability, the tension between a strong state and the rule of law, and the challenges of balancing democracy with good governance. He cites examples like the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, and the issues in the Philippines and California to illustrate these points.
🏛️ The Challenge of National Identity in State Building
Fukuyama delves into the critical role of national identity in state building, using Syria as a case study where the lack of a unified national identity contributed to a devastating civil war. He argues that a strong national identity is necessary for stakeholders to prioritize national interests over sectarian or ethnic loyalties. He contrasts this with East Asian countries like China, Korea, and Japan, which had a strong sense of national identity and centralized governments before modernization, facilitating their rapid development. Fukuyama also touches on the ongoing challenges of national identity in developed countries, including Spain and the United States, and the difficulty democratic theory faces in addressing claims of independence within diverse societies.
🌐 Crafting National Identity: Cultural and Political Efforts
In this section, Fukuyama explores the sources of national identity, describing it as intangible and formed by the stories societies tell about themselves. He distinguishes between bottom-up cultural contributions, such as literature and music, which foster a sense of belonging, and top-down political efforts. Using Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Indonesia as examples, Fukuyama illustrates how different approaches to nation-building by early rulers have had lasting impacts on the countries' political stability and ethnic relations. He highlights the importance of a shared national narrative that transcends religion, ethnicity, or race, especially in diverse societies, and warns against political entrepreneurs who exploit smaller identities for mobilization, potentially leading to societal divisions.
📚 Complex Interactions in Development
Fukuyama concludes by reiterating the complexity of development, emphasizing that the six dimensions of his framework interact in intricate ways. He acknowledges the lack of simple solutions or formulas for resolving the challenges associated with each dimension. Fukuyama stresses the importance of understanding the specific linkages between the different aspects of development, particularly in the context of political order. He thanks the audience for their attention, leaving them with a nuanced understanding of development's complexities.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Development
💡Economic Growth
💡Social Mobilization
💡State
💡Rule of Law
💡Democratic Accountability
💡Legitimacy
💡National Identity
💡Modernization Theory
💡Political Stability
Highlights
Development is a complex phenomenon with many interacting dimensions.
Economic growth is increases in per capita output over time.
Social mobilization involves the development of social groups and new social relations.
The state is about power and maintaining domestic order.
The rule of law exists when the ruler is under the law.
Democratic accountability ensures the ruler reflects the population's wishes.
Modernization theory suggests all aspects of development are mutually supportive.
South Korea's development illustrates modernization theory in action.
Social mobilization can lead to political instability if it outpaces political participation.
A strong state can undermine the rule of law if not properly constrained.
Democracy does not always lead to good governance, as seen in historical U.S. examples.
National identity is critical for state formation and social cohesion.
Syria's civil war is partly due to the absence of a strong national identity.
East Asian countries had a coherent national identity before modernization.
National identity can be both bottom-up and top-down, involving culture and political projects.
Investments in nation-building by early rulers have lasting impacts, as seen in Tanzania and Indonesia.
National identity issues are influencing global politics, including in diverse developed countries.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the complexities of development.
Transcripts
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA: So, thank you very much.
It's a real pleasure to be invited to speak at this GEM
conference.
There are a lot of people around the room that are old friends,
and it's really terrific to see all of them.
So I am going to present a framework
for thinking about development.
I've always thought that development
was one of the most complex phenomena,
precisely because it has so many different dimensions that
interact in very complex ways.
And I'm going to present my way of thinking
about how these economic, social, and political factors
interact.
And I'm not going to leave you with a comfortable conclusion,
because I think that this is really
meant to explain in a way, the complexity of how
the development process actually unfolds.
So let me begin.
So, this is the framework that I laid out
in my two political order books, in which I basically
talk about six boxes on this chart, which I think
are six dimensions of development.
Now, you can subdivide some of them,
or you can collapse some of them,
but these are the ones that I think about.
So, economic growth is what economists deal with.
It's increases in per capita output over time.
Social mobilization has to do with the development
of social groups and new kinds of social relations
when a social group becomes conscious of itself.
For example, a classic one was Karl Marx
saying that the origins of capitalism
produce two social classes, the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat, that really did not exist in feudal times.
So that's an example of social mobilization.
And then, I'm a political scientist,
so I get to have three boxes for politics
because I think they're actually quite separate.
So the first box is the state.
The state is about power.
Max Weber's famous definition of the state
was a legitimate monopoly of force over territory.
I think that's actually a good definition.
States are about accumulating and using
power to enforce laws to protect the community,
to maintain domestic order.
The rule of law, as Ricardo indicated,
pushes in the opposite direction.
You can have something that's sometimes
referred to as rule by law, which is where the ruler simply
gives commands that people have to obey.
That's not the rule of law.
The rule of law exists when the ruler himself or herself is
under the law, and therefore has to follow the same rules
that other people do.
And so the state pushes in one direction
towards the accumulation and use of power, and the rule of law
pushes in the opposite direction.
It's a limitation on power, so that the ruler can't
do whatever he or she wants.
And the final box has to do with democratic accountability.
These are simply procedural rules
to try to ensure that what the ruler does
reflects as much of the whole population's wishes
and not simply of the elite that happens
to be running the government.
And so in effect, you've got one institution, the state,
that pushes towards the accumulation of power,
and two institutions, the rule of law
and democratic accountability, that are constraints on power.
And what's difficult about getting to a modern state, that
is to say a modern liberal democracy,
is that you have to find a balance.
If you have a strong state without constraint-- basically
you've got China today, a very powerful modern state,
but no rule of law and no democratic accountability.
At the other end of the scale, you've
got Syria or Libya or some stateless territory that
doesn't have a state at all.
That's an obvious problem.
But that's not the case in most developing countries.
Most developing countries may have
some degree of law, some degree of democratic accountability,
but very weak states.
And so the issue is really not to have
a weak state that can't do anything,
but a strong state that is operating
under those constraints.
Now those arrows are various empirical correlations
between these boxes--
I'm sorry-- a couple more definitions.
So there's the legitimacy box in the middle.
This is a box that I think a lot of economists
don't think a lot about, but I think
it's actually very important.
In fact, Deidre McCloskey has written this very nice set
of books arguing that the whole of modern economic growth
cannot be understood apart from the kind of ideological changes
that took place in Europe in the 17th, 18th centuries,
and I'm going to talk about that at some length in terms of how
states consolidate and how national identity consolidates.
And I think that is a separate dimension.
The thing about these six boxes is
that development can occur in any one of them
separately for reasons that have to do simply with things
going on in that box.
So you can have the state getting more powerful,
you can have the rule of law getting more powerful,
you can have social mobilization occurring.
It may or may not be connected to things
going on in some of the other boxes, but in some cases,
they are connected.
Now you have this thing called modernization theory
that was very popular, really, up until about the 1960s.
And I would say the bottom line of modernization theory
was the following-- it said that development
is a single as a single process, and that all six of these boxes
were mutually supporting, that all good things go together.
So if you have economic growth, you're
going to have social modernization,
you're going to have changes in attitudes,
you're going to have democracy, and all of these things
will mutually interact.
Now, before you dismiss this theory,
there are countries in which something like this
actually did unfold, and this is simply
a diagram of South Korea.
So, in 1954, South Korea had a lower per capita GDP
than the then Belgian Congo.
People thought it had very poor development prospects.
It had, however, a coherent state.
That state could oversee a period
of rapid economic growth.
The economic growth led, by the 1980s,
to a transition from an agrarian to an urban industrial society.
Social mobilization happened.
You had all sorts of new groups like labor unions, students,
NGOs that were pushing then for the democracy box,
and in 1987, South Korea made that transition to democracy.
The democracy strengthened rule of law.
We saw that in the public protests a couple of years
ago that brought President Park Geun-hye
down for corruption charges because civil society was
mobilized to protect the rule of law in South Korea,
and all of that reinforced the legitimacy
of the system itself.
And so that's kind of modernization theory working
on all six cylinders, where in fact these boxes are mutually
supportive.
However, unfortunately, several of the boxes
actually contain contradictions, mutual contradictions,
and this is just a list of four of them.
Let's begin with the first one, social mobilization,
and political stability.
This is the one that my mentor Samuel Huntington wrote
about way back in 1967 in his book, Political
Order in Changing Societies, where you said,
if you get too much rapid social mobilization that
outruns the pace of political participation expanding,
then you're going to get instability.
I think that's essentially what was
going on in Tunisia and Egypt prior to the 2011
uprisings known as the Arab Spring, where you have
a lot of people going to university,
a lot of new middle class people.
They don't have jobs and they don't
have political opportunity, and that actually
is not conducive to stability.
That was Huntington's argument.
So this is, in a way, the diagram
that he was focusing on.
The dotted lines are negative forms
of causality, where social mobilization actually
weakens the state.
It weakens the rule of law.
It may produce democracy, but you don't have a happy outcome
because these different boxes are not mutually supporting.
Now, another contradiction, which
is kind of an obvious one, is between a strong state
and the rule of law.
So obviously, states pursuing terrorists can be too strong.
They can violate people's human rights.
They can act.
They can do extrajudicial killings.
That's what's going on under Duterte in the Philippines.
I would point out, however, that states with respect
to the rule of law can actually be both underconstrained, as
in the Philippines, but they can also be overconstrained.
I'll give you a little example from my home state
in California.
All 40 million of us residents of California
have the right to sue any given infrastructure
project done in the state.
We can sue anonymously for any reason that we want.
And as a result of this rather broad understanding of standing
who has the right to sue, infrastructure projects
don't get built because it's just too damn difficult because
of the litigation.
And I would say there's other democracies.
I would say India is probably one of the foremost ones
that I would say just has too damn much law.
I mean, it's too easy to block things using the court
system, which has got to--
the Supreme Court's got a backlog of 60,000 cases.
So on and so forth.
So, the relationship between strong state and rule of law
can be very problematic.
Democracy and good governance.
This is very depressing in a way to me
because I really like democracy.
I think liberal democracy is a great thing.
There is a theory out there that says that democracy
will automatically lead to good governance,
because if you have enough transparency
and accountability, then people are going to want
to demand clean government.
If they see that officials are corrupt,
they're going to vote them out of office.
It's a nice theory, but I think empirically, it really
has worked in some cases and in many other cases
has not worked.
And I think there are actually cases in which
the expansion of the franchise--
more political participation, in other words,
more democracy-- is actually reduced
the quality of government.
The case that I would cite is actually, again,
the United States, which opened up the franchise in the 1820s
to all white males that previously
had been restricted to only white males with property.
All of a sudden you had millions of people
that had the right to vote in the election of 1828.
They elect a populist named Andrew Jackson,
and he begins a 100 year period in American history known
as the spoils system or the patronage system,
in which every politician basically uses their ability
to distribute jobs in the government and sometimes
outright bribes as a way of motivating people
to go to the polls.
And I would argue that in relatively poor low education
level democracies, opening up democracy is actually
going to have this effect.
And this is really the problem with patronage and weak state
capacity in many places-- in Mexico,
in Brazil in India, Indonesia, and so forth.
And again, this is not an argument
for authoritarian government, but I'm just
pointing out that there is a tension there, right.
There is a tension between democrat-- in fact, just
in South Africa, and it seems to me
that's exactly what's been going on in South Africa.
You actually had a very high quality modern government
that only applied to white people,
and then you open it up to the whole of the society
and the quality of government goes down,
for I think very understandable reasons.
The last issue that I want to focus on,
however, is this question of democracy
and national identity, because I think that, again, this
is an intangible form of state building
that I think is really critical, and unfortunately, in our world
today, it's becoming the central issue that's determining
a lot of global politics.
All right.
And this is the ideas or legitimacy
box which I think is really critical to state formation,
it's critical to social mobilization,
it's critical to the rule of law and it's obviously
critical to democracy.
If you don't have the right ideas supporting what goes on
in these boxes, they're not going
to evolve into strong institutions,
but I'm going to focus on the one that leads from ideas
and legitimacy to the state.
All right.
So the question here--
what's wrong with this country.
This is Syria.
Syria has had a devastating civil war
that is still not resolved.
It's led to the deaths of close to half a million people.
Half the population has been turned into IDPs.
A million of them showed up on Europe's doorstep back in 2015.
Now there's a lot of proximate causes
to why this civil war has been so violent and so neuralgic
and so difficult to solve.
But I think one of the underlying factors
is the fact that the country Syria had no national identity.
There wasn't an idea of something
called Syria to which the different stakeholders
in that country felt greater loyalty than they
did to their particular sect or ethnic group or region
or in some cases tribe.
In particular, the Alawites felt like a beleaguered minority
that was sitting on top of a kind of social volcano,
and if they didn't use the utmost level of violence
to protect their position, they all themselves
would get killed.
And then this leads to everybody feeling the same way,
since they perpetrated a great deal of violence,
and the result is the one that you see.
There are many countries in the Middle East
that are now suffering from exactly this absence
of any sense of state identity.
And you've had several of them--
Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia--
all of these countries, I think, have
the same basic underlying problem that some of them
were colonial creations, some of them
were patched together out of different ethnic groups
or sects, but there is not an overriding
sense of national identity that allows people to sacrifice
the short term interests of their narrow identity group
in favor of something like national interest.
If I had to point to one factor that differentiates
East Asia from this part of the world,
it's the fact that in most East Asian countries,
or at least in China, Korea, Japan,
these issues were solved way before they tried to modernize.
That is to say, they were all coherent nation
states, ethnically coherent nation states,
before the European colonialists ever got there,
and they had centralized governments.
It was a Chinese tradition of centralized bureaucracy.
So having a strong state was always in the cards for them.
And that's why once the economic conditions changed
in the 20th century, such that they had the ability
to take advantage of technology and markets and all the things
that Ricardo was talking about, they just
went to town because they did not
have to solve this national, this underlying
national identity problem, in the way
that so many other countries in other parts of the developing
world have.
And this is a problem that continues in the developed
world.
And so these national identity problems
have really not been settled.
This is a particularly difficult one that's actually
dragging Spain backwards.
The economic threat, I think, will appear,
the political threat is really there right now.
And one of the things that I find particularly difficult
about this question is that democratic theory doesn't
actually give us a normative way of assessing
the claim of a place like Catalonia, as
to what makes it a legitimate claim, when
one democratic entity is trying to break off
from another democratic entity.
Who's right and who's wrong in this kind of a situation?
But obviously there are many other places in Europe
that potentially are going to suffer
from these kinds of claims.
Now, the question then is, where does national identity
come from?
National identity, as I said, is something intangible.
It's basically the stories that people in a society
tell about themselves.
It's the stories that they transmit to their children
about where did we come from, what
do we have in common, what makes us members
of the same community, what allows us to trust one another.
And this is a story that is told both, I think,
from the bottom up and from the top down.
So the bottom up part of it is cultural.
It's basically-- it's poets and filmmakers and novelists
and other people musicians that actually create
a common sense of belonging.
I mean, that's why music is so powerful, actually,
in many national traditions, because it attaches itself
to a kind of deep level of emotion.
There's a famous account of the Philippine--
Filipino novelist Rizal, who in the 19th century
wrote the Philippine's first novel.
Philippines is 11,000 islands scattered all over the Pacific.
Everybody living on one of those islands
had no idea that they had anything
in common with any of the other residents of any
of the other 11,000 islands until Rizal
wrote a book about what it means to grow up on one
particular island of Luzon.
And then, all of a sudden people could say, oh
yeah, that's an experience that's familiar to me,
and that creates a common sense of identity.
So that's the bottom up part of it,
but there's also a top down part.
So this-- again, I've got a couple of chapters
on this in my political order book.
So this is-- there are two [? parralellized ?]
comparisons--
Kenya and Tanzania on the one hand, and Nigeria and Indonesia
on the other.
Now in many respects, the two comparison countries
are very similar.
Kenya and Tanzania, obviously--
it's less obvious in the case of Nigeria and Indonesia,
but they're both oil producing countries.
They're both highly diverse religiously and ethnically,
all right.
And their early rulers faced this question
of national identity.
And what I argue is that in the case of Tanzania and Indonesia,
those early rulers invested in nation building,
strictly speaking, not state building,
but building this kind of national consciousness in a way
that the rulers of Kenya and Nigeria never did,
and that has led to consequences that persist up to the present.
The projects by [? Nayerian ?] in Tanzania
really revolved around language, to make
Swahili the national language of a linguistically very
diverse country.
In Indonesia, it was the promotion
again of a single language, Bahasa, Indonesia,
that replaced Javanese and Sulawesi and all
of the other languages spoken on the different islands.
And then, the production of a kind of--
if you read it as an outsider, it
doesn't seem like it's very serious--
but Pancasila ideology that then gets
taught to schoolchildren all across the Indonesian
archipelago.
And I would argue that the Tanzanian government made
lots of mistakes in economic policy, and politically.
But in this respect, that early investment really
paid off, because they have not suffered
from the kind of ethnic looting and predation
that exists in contemporary Kenya.
In Kenya right now, elections are
all about the major ethnic groups
trying to jockey for power.
One of them gets control of the presidency,
and their ethnic group basically loots the government
for the period that it's in power,
and then it's replaced by another ethnic group that
does the same thing.
Again, there's no larger sense of being Kenyan,
and I think that for all their problems,
Tanzania does not have this same problem.
So this is an issue, unfortunately,
that is dominating world politics now,
because this identity issue is one that is coming to the fore,
not just in poor countries like the ones
here, but in rich ones as well, including the United States,
I'm sorry to say, where we are living
in de facto highly diverse countries in which you have
to come up with a national story that is not rooted in religion
or ethnicity or race.
That's the only way we can live with one another.
And there are a lot of political entrepreneurs
that are working in the opposite direction, that
want to emphasize different, smaller identities that
are pretty good for mobilizing people,
because people can get very angry over some
of these identity issues, but are
trying to drag a lot of countries back into,
I think an earlier period, when Identity was not credal,
and it was not based on ideas.
Something like that is going on in India today,
where you actually had a national identity
since independence that was built
around certain liberal principles in a highly, highly
ethnically and religiously diverse society.
And now, it's being put on a Hindu nationalist basis, which
is fine if you're a Hindu nationalist, but not
so great if you're a Muslim or somebody that's
not part of that community.
So, like I said, I have no formulas
for how to solve any of these problems.
I just think that what I trying to do is
indicate that these six dimensions of development
interact with each other in these highly complex ways,
and you really need to think about the specific linkages
between the different boxes if you're
going to make progress in any of them,
particularly in the political order box.
So, thank you.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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