Ukraine Has an Easy Button. Will the U.S. Unlock It?

Summary

The video script discusses the strategic implications of a 'line on a map' in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It explores why Ukraine has not targeted exposed Russian military assets, despite having the capability to do so, due to the U.S. policy restricting aid from being used against targets within Russia's internationally recognized borders. The script delves into the U.S.'s escalation concerns, Russia's exploitation of the policy through new tactics, and recent shifts in U.S. rhetoric that suggest a potential policy change. It also highlights the vulnerability of Russia's military if the U.S. were to alter its stance, and speculates on the possibility of misleading Russia into thinking the U.S. is considering such a change.

Takeaways

• ⚔️ Russia is leaving military targets exposed, daring Ukraine to strike.
• 🪖 Various Russian military units, including tank regiments and motorized rifle brigades, are positioned close to the Ukrainian border.
• 📍 Ukraine has not targeted these units due to restrictions imposed by the United States, which are based on international boundaries.
• 🇺🇸 The U.S. has prohibited Ukraine from using American-supplied weapons on Russian soil to avoid escalating the conflict.
• 🎯 Despite the prohibition, Ukrainian weapons could theoretically target these exposed Russian units effectively.
• 🚫 The primary reason for this restriction is to avoid escalating the conflict to a point where Russia might retaliate against American assets.
• 📈 The U.S. policy balances the benefits of supporting Ukraine with the risks of provoking a stronger Russian response.
• 💣 Russia has adapted to the U.S. restrictions by using glide bombs and cross-border attacks to maintain pressure on Ukraine.
• 🔄 There are indications that U.S. policy might be shifting, as recent statements suggest a more flexible stance on targeting.
• 📡 The changing dynamics on the ground, including Russia's exploitation of the restriction, may force the U.S. to reconsider its approach.

Q & A

Why is Russia leaving its military targets exposed to Ukraine?

Russia is daring Ukraine to hit these targets, knowing that Ukraine is restrained by international borders and the potential consequences of crossing them without approval.

What is the significance of the 'magic button' mentioned in the script?

The 'magic button' is a metaphor for the ability of Ukraine to destroy Russian military targets with advanced artillery, which they currently refrain from using due to political and international constraints.

What does the script imply about the international border between Russia and Ukraine?

The script suggests that the international border acts as a powerful deterrent for Ukraine to attack Russian targets, despite their vulnerability, due to the potential for escalated conflict.

Why has the United States adopted the 'don't-cross-the-line' policy?

The United States has adopted this policy primarily due to escalation concerns, aiming to prevent further Russian advancement into Ukraine while avoiding direct confrontation that could lead to a larger conflict.

How does the script describe the current stance of the Biden administration on providing military aid to Ukraine?

The Biden administration currently provides a steady stream of military aid to Ukraine but restricts the use of these weapons to not cross into internationally-recognized Russian territory.

What is the script's explanation for the difference in risk postures between Ukraine and the United States?

Ukraine, already engaged in the conflict, does not internalize much risk, whereas the United States is cautious about the potential for Russian countermeasures and the risk of escalation.

How has Russia adapted its strategy to exploit the 'don't-cross-the-line' policy?

Russia has started using glide bombs and cross-border infantry attacks, allowing them to attack from a safe distance and use their border as a staging area for offensives.

What is the significance of the HIMARS launch platform in the context of the script?

The HIMARS launch platform, with its long-range capabilities, represents a significant military advantage for Ukraine if restrictions were lifted, as it could target and destroy key Russian military assets.

What recent changes in U.S. rhetoric suggest a potential shift in policy?

Statements from U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others, indicate a possible reconsideration of the 'don't-cross-the-line' policy, hinting at a more flexible stance on how Ukraine conducts its war.

What is the script's final conspiracy theory note regarding the U.S. and Russia?

The script suggests that there might be a strategic advantage for the U.S. to give the impression of considering policy changes, even if no actual changes are being made, to prompt Russia to pull back its forces.

Outlines

00:00

🗺️ Geopolitical Constraints in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

This paragraph discusses the strategic positioning of Russian military targets near the Ukraine border, which are unguarded and tempting targets for Ukraine. However, Ukraine has refrained from attacking these targets due to the international border, which acts as a powerful deterrent. The United States plays a significant role in this situation, as it currently restricts the use of U.S.-provided weapons to within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. This policy is driven by escalation concerns, where the U.S. is cautious about provoking Russia while still supporting Ukraine. The paragraph also hints at potential changes in U.S. policy, suggesting that the status quo might not hold.

05:02

💣 Exploiting Incentive Structures in Warfare

The second paragraph delves into how Russia has adapted its military strategy to exploit the 'don't-cross-the-line' policy enforced by the United States. Russia uses glide bombs, which can be launched from a safe distance and still reach Ukrainian targets, and cross-border infantry attacks to maintain pressure on Ukraine. This strategy allows Russia to capture territory and inflict damage without directly provoking the U.S. or NATO. The paragraph also discusses the potential military advantage that Ukraine could gain if the U.S. policy were to change, highlighting the capabilities of the HIMARS launch platform and its potential impact on Russian military targets.

10:06

🛑 Shifting U.S. Rhetoric and Policy on Ukraine

This paragraph examines the recent shifts in U.S. rhetoric and policy regarding the conflict. It suggests that high-level policymakers, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, may be reconsidering the strict border rule. The paragraph outlines statements from U.S. officials that seem to indicate a potential policy change, moving away from the strict adherence to the border rule. It also discusses the possibility that the U.S. might be spreading the risk by allowing other countries to use weapons in Russia and that Russia's response to such actions has been limited, which could influence U.S. decision-making.

15:10

🚨 Potential Consequences and Strategic Deception

The final paragraph speculates on the potential consequences if the U.S. were to change its policy and allow Ukraine to target Russian military assets more directly. It suggests that Russia is in a vulnerable position due to its deployment strategies, which rely on the current U.S. policy restrictions. The paragraph also introduces a 'conspiracy theory' that the U.S. might be feigning a policy change to deceive Russia into pulling back its forces. It ends with a humorous hypothetical scenario where Ukraine could exploit a loophole in the rules to attack Russian targets.

Keywords

💡Military targets

The term 'military targets' refers to locations or objects that are of strategic importance to a military force and are thus targeted for attack or defense. In the video's context, it discusses how Russia is leaving its military targets exposed, almost challenging Ukraine to attack them. This is significant as it sets the stage for the discussion on the strategic decisions and rules of engagement being considered by the involved parties.

💡Internationally-recognized border

An 'internationally-recognized border' is a boundary between two or more territories that is acknowledged by the international community. The video talks about the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the importance of this border in determining military actions and the rules set by the United States regarding the use of weapons within Ukraine's territory.

💡Escalation concerns

Escalation concerns refer to the worries about a situation becoming more intense or severe, particularly in terms of conflict. The video discusses how the United States is cautious about the risk of escalating the conflict with Russia by carefully considering the level of support provided to Ukraine and the restrictions placed on military aid.

💡Incentive structure

The 'incentive structure' is the framework of rewards and punishments that influence the behavior of individuals or entities. In the script, it is mentioned that Russia has taken advantage of the incentive structure put in place by the United States' policy, adapting its military strategy to exploit the restrictions and limitations set by the U.S.

💡Glide bombs

Glide bombs are a type of aerial bomb that can glide to a target after being released from an aircraft. The video explains how Russia has been using glide bombs as part of its new strategy, allowing them to attack targets from a safer distance and with a seemingly endless supply due to their cost-effectiveness.

💡Cross-border attacks

Cross-border attacks involve military operations that are launched from one territory into another. The script describes how Russia is using its side of the border as a safe harbor to stage and launch these attacks, which has implications for the strategic balance in the conflict.

💡HIMARS launch platform

The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a light multiple rocket launch system used by the U.S. military. The video uses HIMARS as an example of a system that could potentially inflict significant damage on Russian military targets if the U.S. policy restrictions were to be lifted or altered.

💡Plausible deniability

Plausible deniability is a diplomatic doctrine where a government can plausibly deny complicity in an action, usually one that is controversial or illegal. The video suggests that the U.S. might be setting up a scenario of plausible deniability, where they could claim that they advised against crossing the border but continued to provide weapons if Ukraine chose to do so.

💡Policy change

A 'policy change' refers to a modification or reversal of an existing policy or plan. The script discusses indications that there may be a shift in U.S. policy regarding the use of American weapons in Ukraine, with high-level policymakers potentially advocating for a more aggressive stance.

💡Vulnerability

Vulnerability in a military context refers to weaknesses or exposed positions that can be exploited by an adversary. The video highlights how Russia's current strategy has inadvertently created vulnerabilities that could be targeted if the U.S. were to change its policy and allow Ukraine to strike across the border.

Highlights

Russia is leaving military targets unguarded, daring Ukraine to attack.

Ukraine has not hit these targets due to the international border and U.S. policy.

The U.S. has a rule not to cross the internationally-recognized border with Russian territory.

The U.S. policy is driven by escalation concerns and the desire to avoid provoking Russia.

Ukraine's perspective is that it does not internalize risk as the war is already ongoing.

The U.S. is balancing the benefits of Ukrainian survival against the costs of Russian reprisals.

Russia's new strategy involves using glide bombs and cross-border infantry attacks to exploit U.S. policy.

Glide bombs allow Russia to strike targets from a distance, avoiding the danger zone.

Russia uses its border as a safe harbor for staging cross-border attacks.

The U.S. policy has effectively locked Ukraine out of using certain weapons against Russia.

The U.S. is considering changing its policy due to Russia's exploitation of the current rules.

U.S. officials' recent statements suggest a potential shift in policy regarding Ukrainian strikes.

The U.S. may be setting up plausible deniability for Ukraine to strike Russian targets.

Other NATO members have shown willingness to use weapons in Russia, spreading the risk.

Kyiv's refinery campaign has not led to significant Russian escalation, suggesting a potential shift in U.S. policy.

The U.S. could unlock Ukraine's ability to strike Russian targets, causing significant damage.

There is a strategic incentive for the U.S. to make Russia believe it might allow strikes, even if it doesn't.

A hypothetical scenario where Ukraine annexes a corridor into Russian territory to justify strikes.

Transcripts

Right now, Russia is just leaving military targets  out in the open, daring Ukraine to hit them.

This is the location of a relatively  unguarded Russian tank regiment. 

A couple of kilometers to the west  sits a motorized rifle brigade. 

Now to the southwest a few more kilometers  we have a motorized rifle division. 

Further west, a regiment of  the motorized rifle variety. 

If jump much further west, here is  our second motorized rifle brigade. 

And lastly to the north, a final  Russian motorized rifle regiment. 

Oh, there are also some airfields  and other things nearby, 

but I need to draw the line somewhere. 

Anyway, each of these represents a prime  target for Ukrainian artillery to hit.

And, moreover, with only a slight exaggeration,  

Ukraine has a magic button  that can destroy all of them.

Yet Ukraine has not hit it. So why not?

Well, the answer is one of mankind’s  most powerful artificial creations: 

the all-mighty line on a map. You see, by international standards,  

this is Russia. And this is Ukraine.

And the only thing stopping  Ukraine from crossing that line 

is the thumbs up from a man 7800  kilometers away in this building here.

But we are starting to get some  indications that this could be changing.

That’s why today we will discuss why  the United States has adopted this rule, 

how Russia has taken advantage of the  incentive structure put in front of it, 

the weird public messaging that suggests that  Washington may have plans to alter the policy, 

and the vulnerable position that Russia will  find itself in if that indeed does happen.

But we begin with why the rule exists in the first  

place. And we can summarize  that with just two words:

escalation concerns.

Ukraine and the United States agree that  

Russia should retreat back to the  internationally-recognized border,

but the disagreement is in how much  risk to take on in pursuit of that goal.

Ukraine, with Russia slowly  capturing more territory,

and incurring losses from Russian  artillery strikes on cities,  

basically does not internalize any risk  at all because the war is already ongoing.

The United States, in contrast,  has an active interest 

in not letting Russia advance  past Ukraine’s boundaries.

In the meantime, Washington also benefits from the  

Kremlin incurring military costs as the  war drags on. Thus, we get a spectrum

of possible risk postures that  the United States could adopt.

At the moment, the Biden administration  has set the cutpoint about here.

This represents a steady stream of military aid,  

but with the restriction that the weapons cannot  be used in internationally-recognized Russia.

So, on the map, 

Luhansk, Donetsk, 

Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, 

and Crimea all day. 

But anywhere over here, steer clear.

Now, nothing in principle  stops Ukraine from taking  

an already-delivered shipment of  weapons from the United States

and forwarding it to, say, Rostov-on-Don.

The consequence, though, is that Washington  could then cut future assistance.

Indeed, the threat to do so has thus  far kept Ukraine in line with the line.

From the White House’s perspective,  the basic idea is that, 

the further that the United States participates, the probability that Russia will engage in some  

type of countermeasures against  American assets increases.

And, even if the likelihood  of runaway escalation is low, 

that is something that Washington wants to avoid.

Now, three things go into why the White  House has selected this particular policy.

First is how much it values the benefits  of Ukrainian survival versus the costs  

associated with Russian reprisals.  Those who place more weight on Ukraine

would want to shift things to the right, 

while someone who does not care  at all would fall down here.

Much of the controversy surrounding  the White House policy seems to argue  

that Biden does not care much about Ukraine—

not when push comes to shove, anyway.

And maybe that is the case.

But an alternate hypothesis  points to the second factor, 

which is the expected response from Russia.

Imagine that the CIA placed a report  on Biden’s desk indicating that the  

probability of a Russian response as a  function of U.S. actions looked like this.

Then crossing this particular threshold here brings about substantially greater danger 

than tiptoeing up to the line.

If so, then this policy looks very attractive.

Now, we do not know what this function actually  looks like. And that is kind of the point.

It may very well be that this  is what the intelligence says,  

outsiders do not really know, and the White  House would like to walk past that line

but the CIA is recommending otherwise.

The point is that these two possibilities  look very similar from our perspective,

and the observational equivalence there does  not really penetrate the public discourse on  

the subject. After all, subtlety 

and public discourse rarely go together.

Instead, the discussion seems to focus on  all the various actions that the West has  

taken so far that have not triggered  any serious consequences from Russia,

despite having broken the red lines  that the Kremlin had made earlier.

And be that as it may, we just do not know  what the intel says about the next one.

Everything can be fine here  given what has been done before 

only for the intel to suggest something much  

worse at the next step. More on that in a minute.

The third point is the military  advantage it affords Ukraine.

That is changing right in front of us, though,  

and necessitates a deeper dive. More on that, also in a minute.

On that theme, let’s look at what Russia  has been up to lately. And actually,  

I could have otherwise made this subtitle

“incentive structures matter”.

How fun!

In both war and peace, people are smart enough to  

strategize in response to the  rules put in front of them.

Create a bad incentive structure,  and you will pay the price.

Now, in peacetime, that might  just cost you some money—

like when in 1860, U.S. Congress  began paying a set amount

for each mile of track laid down for  the first transcontinental railroad,

and so the Union Pacific  Railroad Company’s vice president

Thomas Durant ordered track designers to create 

unnecessary curves in the pathway, just so he  could charge Uncle Sam more money. Of course, 

that example is fun and silly,  if expensive to taxpayers.

In contrast, if you get the  incentive structure wrong in war, 

you are liable to increase the body count.

Right now, the United States is  confronting that problem in Ukraine.

The don’t-cross-the-line policy has been  in place since the start of the war, 

but recently Russia has adopted a new  strategy that exploits the restriction.

The basics of the adaptation involve two things: 

glide bombs and cross-border infantry attacks.

Glide bombs are explosives that standard  Russian military aircraft can fire off  

from high altitude. The bombs then  take advantage of the elevation

to let gravity and glider wings  deliver them to their targets.

Tactically, the advantage here is that glide  bombs can easily travel beyond 50 kilometers.

Kharkiv is about 30 kilometers from the border, so Russian planes can stay far away from the  

danger zone and still be  able to hit their targets.

Financially, glide bombs can be fashioned out of  

stockpiles of old Soviet weapons and  do not burn through pricey propellant.

As a result, Russia has a  seemingly endless supply of them.

The second half of this is how Russia  has prosecuted its northern offensive.

We have covered exactly what  is happening there previously.

But the main point is that Russia is using its  

side of the border as a safe harbor to  stage and launch cross-border attacks.

This has allowed Russian forces to capture  small sections of Ukraine north of Kharkiv,

and it is giving Russia the  range to pound the city itself,  

though it has not yet led  to the substantial losses

that the West feared when the offensive began.

Nevertheless, this has resulted in a situation  

where some prime Russian targets are  essentially sitting out in the open.

Yet Kyiv cannot do anything about them because  Washington has kept the easy button locked.

To be clear, easy in this context  does not mean “easily win the war”.

Rather, we are talking about easily  inflicting significant damage on Russia’s  

military capacity and destroying the entire  premise of the northern Russian offensive.

As an example, take the HIMARS launch platform.

If you want to avoid a throughout  breakdown on the subject, 

here is a crash course.

The common GMLRS delivery system  has a range of 70 kilometers 

The cluster munition version  of ATACMS goes 160 kilometers. 

And the unitary warhead version  of ATACMS goes 300 kilometers.

In other words, each system can easily  hit the targets lined up along the border, 

never mind support systems  and airfields further back.

Now, to be clear, the effect of the White House’s  restriction is not as significant as it may seem.

Bombs, to some extent, are  fungible. The U.S. weapons used  

inside of Ukraine’s borders free up Kyiv  to redirect its own weapons into Russia—

for example, the drones currently targeting  Russian refineries and weapons factories  

may have otherwise been needed domestically.

The thing is, though, that GMLRS and ATACMS can  just do some things better than the alternatives.

To continue with that example, oil  refineries are soft targets that  

relatively small drones can  cause significant damage to.

Harden targets may simply  need the bigger HIMARS boom.

Put differently, Russia has a ton of  vulnerabilities ready for the West to exploit— 

if Washington is ready to gamble on escalation.

Indeed, it seems as though something  like that might be in the works. 

Remember that third component  behind the wisdom of the decision? 

The difference in military utility  between having the rule and not? 

Well, the White House adopted the  policy before Russia was exploiting it.

Back then, the difference was  notable but not substantial. 

But we are no longer living in that world.

Correspondingly, we are starting  to hear changes in U.S. rhetoric—

changes that have been loud enough  to be heard over Secretary of State’s  

Antony Blinken shredding it up in  Kyiv’s underground music scene.

The first indications came during that very  trip to Ukraine on May 15, where he said that

“The United States has not encouraged  or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine,  

but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for  itself about how it's going to conduct this war.”

The media immediately picked up  on a seeming departure away from  

the strict line-based rule and  began to ask for clarification.

And that’s where the fun began.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary  Sabrina Singh then said that

“The Pentagon believes that the equipment,  [that is] the capabilities that the DOD is  

giving to Ukraine should be used to take  back Ukrainian sovereign territory.”

Asked whether it is a binding commitment  Ukraine must make to stay within the line, 

Singh chose to describe it as a “request”.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that

“Our expectation is that they continue  to use the weapons that we provided  

on targets inside of Ukraine.”  Emphasis there on “expectation”.

It feels as though Washington is setting  up a plausible deniability defense:

“We told them not to do it. So sorry that they  did. Sure would be a shame if they did it again.”

And afterward the United States  would keep sending weapons anyway. 

Boom goes the dynamite.

Then a report came out from

the New York Times that Blinken’s visit  to Kyiv led him to change his mind,  

and that he was now lobbying for a policy  change from within the White House.

He is not alone among high-level policymakers. 

Republican Speaker of the House Mike Johnson told Voice of America that he is onboard.

So, yes, the leading Republican has become more  hawkish than the leading Democrat on the issue.

In addition to Russia exploiting the policy,  

Washington’s push to make the pivot may be  based on learning how Russia has responded  

to recent related events specifically  on targeting inside of the border.

The United Kingdom approved the use of  British weapons in Russia a month earlier.

Freshly minted member of NATO Finland  has been good with this since February.

At the beginning of May,

either Latvia’s foreign minister or  FM radio (not sure which) cryptically  

indicated that approval from some  states was also happening in private.

In other words, the risk is being spread out.

Meanwhile, Kyiv’s refinery campaign that started  at the beginning of the year and has kept marching  

forward since then has not led to a clear or  significant escalation by Russia in Ukraine.  

If American weapons were used on military  targets, unlike civilian infrastructure,  

why should Washington expect any worse? Also,  yes, this took me forever to originally animate,  

so we are going to keep seeing it every  time that I have an excuse to show it.

Anyway, this may be a part of the  plausible deniability framing,  

where the Kremlin knows that  U.S. weapons are being used

but simply does says nothing about it.

The idea there would be that the Kremlin figures  

that engaging the United States  would do more harm than good

and thus keeps silent on Washington’s true role 

so that the Russian public does  not put the Kremlin in a corner.

Something like that happened but  in reverse during the Korean War, 

when the Soviet Union went a step  further by flying active missions, 

and Washington kept quiet to prevent the conflict from spiraling into something much worse.

In any case, Russia has put  itself in a vulnerable position— 

again, pending the U.S. okay.

It is not like these targets  are completely defenseless, 

but Russia has leveraged Ukraine’s handcuffs  to deploy everything in this manner.

To draw a comparison, on New Year’s Eve 2022, inside of this building here 

in Makiivka, Donetsk, Russian soldiers began  

calling their friends and family as the clock approached midnight.

Ukrainian intelligence picked up on the chatter, 

woke up the HIMARS, and four minutes later 

somewhere between 89 

and 610 Russian soldiers were dead, depending on whom you ask. Fast forwarding,

Ukraine knows where a lot of  similar facilities are today.

Thus, if Washington picks up the  phone and unlocks the easy button,

and if Ukraine can discreetly coordinate  a bunch of its HIMARS launchers,

Russia could find itself having its single  worst day the invasion since it began.

Final conspiracy theory note. There is  a clear incentive to trick Russia into  

thinking that the United States is  considering giving the green light,  

even if there is no real discussion about it.

That might convince Russia to pull  back even if it would not be necessary.

In other words, we can’t 100% trust  that Blinken isn’t playing us, 

that Austin isn’t trying to be tricky, or that Singh means what she says.

unless is singing the praises

of one of my books on the war. That’s assuming  she has ever read any of them. I have no idea.

Regardless, you can check the video description  for more information on those books.

And if you enjoyed this video, please like,  

share, and subscribe, and I will  see you next time. Take care.

You know, if life were an absurdist comedy, there  would be a simple solution to Ukraine’s dilemma.

Ukraine would hold a ceremony annexing a  20-kilometer corridor into Russian territory.

Then, with the new lines in place, off go the explosions.

When Washington gets mad, Kyiv points out that  they were merely following the rules: bombs  

only on Ukrainian soil.

Hey, if you wanted something else,  

you should have been more specific by  what you meant when you said “Ukraine”…