Unforgivable!! The Tragic tale of Air Algérie Flight 6289

Summary

On March 6, 2003, Air Algerie Flight 6289 crashed after an engine failure during takeoff from Tamanrasset Airport. The crew's inadequate preparation and non-adherence to standard procedures, such as not retracting the landing gear and the captain's sudden takeover, contributed to the tragedy. The flight, operated with a 20-year-old Boeing 737-200, had a takeoff weight close to its maximum, exacerbating the situation. Despite the captain's inexperience on the aircraft type, he failed to identify the problem and follow proper emergency protocols, leading to the aircraft's rapid descent and crash, resulting in 102 fatalities and a sole survivor.

Takeaways

• 😨 The flight was delayed due to a hydraulic pump issue, highlighting the importance of pre-flight checks and maintenance.
• ✈️ The aircraft was a 20-year-old Boeing 737-200, indicating that age can be a factor in aircraft performance and safety.
• 🔥 The left engine's high-pressure turbine blades fractured due to thermal fatigue, underscoring the need for regular engine inspections.
• 📉 The aircraft was close to its maximum takeoff weight, which could have affected its performance during the emergency.
• 🛫 The first officer was left to complete pre-flight preparations alone, emphasizing the necessity of teamwork and communication in flight operations.
• 👨‍✈️ The captain's lack of recent experience on the 737 and his distraction during the flight contributed to the inadequate handling of the emergency.
• 🛑 The crew failed to follow standard operating procedures, such as retracting the landing gear and using correct engine thrust settings after an engine failure.
• 🚨 The captain took control from the first officer without fully understanding the situation, demonstrating the potential dangers of non-standard cockpit responses during emergencies.
• 🔇 The lack of effective communication and crew resource management (CRM) in the cockpit was a significant factor in the accident.
• 🔥 The aircraft's impact and subsequent fire resulted in a high number of fatalities, illustrating the critical nature of quick and correct emergency response.

Q & A

What was the date of the Air Algerie flight incident described in the script?

The incident occurred on the 6th of March, 2003.

What was the issue that caused the initial delay of the flight?

The flight was delayed almost three hours due to a problem with the system B hydraulic pump.

How old was the Boeing 737-200 aircraft involved in the incident?

The aircraft was almost 20 years old at the time of the incident.

What was the significance of the left engine's status in the story?

The left engine had clocked over 30,000 hours, and its high number of hours, along with cracks in the high-pressure turbine blades, played a crucial role in the engine failure during the flight.

Why did the captain not attend the initial briefing with the rest of the crew?

The captain did not attend the initial briefing because he arrived later when the issue with the hydraulic pump had been resolved.

What was the impact of the high temperature and high altitude on the aircraft's performance?

The high temperature and high altitude affected the aircraft's performance by increasing the density altitude, which reduced the air density and thus the lift and thrust, requiring a higher speed and longer takeoff distance.

Why was the first officer preparing to operate as pilot flying for the first flight?

The first officer was preparing to operate as pilot flying for the first flight because the captain arrived later and she had completed all the pre-flight preparations by herself.

What was the takeoff weight of the aircraft, and how did it compare to the maximum takeoff weight?

The takeoff weight of the aircraft was 48,708 kilos, which was only about 800 kilos away from the aircraft's maximum takeoff weight.

What was the role of the purser in the cockpit, and why was his presence unusual?

The purser, who is the most senior cabin crew member, was present in the cockpit during takeoff, which is unusual as his role requires him to be in the cabin to guard the main emergency exits and help organize any issues that might arise.

What was the sequence of events that led to the aircraft's stall and crash?

The aircraft's stall and subsequent crash were caused by a combination of factors: an engine failure, the captain taking over controls without properly identifying the problem, failure to retract the landing gear, and the aircraft's rapid descent due to the captain maintaining a high pitch attitude without enough speed.

What were the recommendations made by the investigation after the accident?

The investigation recommended increased Crew Resource Management (CRM) training for all pilots at Air Algerie, more focus on conformity of engine failure training, and the implementation of a better flight safety program to monitor and analyze flight data.

Outlines

00:00

🛫 Flight 6289: The Tragic Beginning

The script opens with a suspenseful narrative about the critical moments in a pilot's career, leading to a tragic incident on Air Algerie Flight 6289. The flight, operated by a Boeing 737-200, was scheduled for a domestic route with a crew of six, including two pilots. The aircraft, despite being nearly 20 years old, was in good technical condition. However, a delay due to a hydraulic pump issue and the absence of the captain from the pre-flight briefing set the stage for potential problems. The first officer, who had less experience on the 737 than the captain but was more senior, was left to handle pre-flight preparations alone, including calculating for the impact of high density altitude due to the airport's high elevation and increasing temperatures.

05:02

📞 Pre-Flight Preparations and Personal Distractions

The narrative continues with the first officer's diligent preparations, which included fueling the aircraft and calculating takeoff weights. Meanwhile, the captain's delayed arrival and subsequent engagement in unrelated conversations with the male purser, instead of assisting with preparations, raised concerns about the cockpit's focus on safety. The purser's decision to stay in the cockpit during takeoff, a deviation from standard procedures, is highlighted as a significant oversight. The script also touches on the purser's personal call home, which was misinterpreted by the media, and the boarding of passengers, one of whom would later be the sole survivor due to not fastening his seatbelt.

10:04

🛫 Departure and the Engine Failure

The script describes the commencement of the flight with the crew failing to adhere to standard operating procedures, including an incomplete pre-takeoff briefing. As the aircraft began its takeoff roll, an engine failure occurred in the left engine due to undetected cracks in the high-pressure turbine blades. The first officer's reaction to the yaw caused by the engine failure was to apply rudder correction, but the captain's delayed response and lack of situational awareness led to a series of critical errors.

15:07

🚨 Crisis Management and the Tragic Outcome

The engine failure led to a rapid series of events where the captain's decision to take control without understanding the situation, coupled with the crew's failure to retract the landing gear and manage the aircraft's configuration, resulted in a stall. The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, with the right wing and rear of the aircraft hitting the ground first, leading to a massive explosion and fire that claimed the lives of all but one on board. The sole survivor was the conscript who had not fastened his seatbelt and was ejected from the aircraft during the impact.

20:09

🔍 Investigation and Recommendations

The investigation into the accident revealed that the loss of engine thrust during a critical phase, failure to retract the landing gear, and the captain's unprepared takeover were the primary causes. Contributing factors included substandard flight preparation and poor crew resource management. The report recommended enhanced CRM training, standardized engine failure training, and the implementation of a robust flight safety program to monitor and analyze flight data to prevent similar incidents.

25:11

🌟 Conclusion and Call to Action

The script concludes with a personal reflection on the importance of following standard operating procedures, emphasizing their potential to save lives. It also encourages viewers to subscribe to the channel for updates, support the sponsor, or join the Patreon crew, highlighting the community aspect of the channel.

Keywords

💡GPWS

GPWS stands for Ground Proximity Warning System, an aircraft system designed to alert pilots when there is a risk of collision with the ground or an obstacle. In the context of the video, the GPWS is mentioned as 'Don't sink,' indicating a warning that the aircraft is in a descent rate that could lead to a crash. This system is crucial for flight safety, particularly during critical phases of flight such as takeoff and landing.

💡Density Altitude

Density altitude is the effective altitude adjusted for temperature and humidity, which affects aircraft performance. It is a critical factor in determining takeoff and landing distances, as well as climb and descent rates. In the video, the first officer considers density altitude due to the high temperature and altitude of Tamanrasset Airport, which can impact the aircraft's ability to generate lift and thrust, thus affecting its takeoff performance.

💡Hydraulic Pump

A hydraulic pump is a mechanical device used to transfer energy into hydraulic fluid to provide mechanical force or to control movement. In the video, a problem with the system B hydraulic pump caused a delay for the Air Algerie flight, highlighting the importance of hydraulic systems in aircraft for functions such as flight control and braking.

💡JT8D-17A

The JT8D-17A is a type of turbofan engine used in commercial aircraft, including the Boeing 737-200 mentioned in the video. These engines are significant for their role in providing thrust for the aircraft. The script mentions that both engines were in check, indicating that they were functioning correctly, but the left engine's high hours of operation foreshadowed potential issues.

💡First Officer

The first officer is the pilot who is second in command on a flight and is responsible for assisting the captain. In the video, the first officer is depicted as having to handle pre-flight preparations alone due to the captain's delayed arrival, which is unusual and potentially unsafe. This role is crucial for the operation of the flight, especially in emergency situations.

💡Engine Failure

An engine failure refers to a complete or partial loss of thrust from one or more engines during flight. In the video, the left engine experiences a catastrophic failure due to fractured turbine blades, leading to a loss of thrust. This is a critical event that requires immediate and correct response from the flight crew to ensure the safety of the aircraft.

💡CRM

CRM stands for Crew Resource Management, which is a set of training procedures focused on optimization of crew interactions and utilization of available resources in the cockpit. The video suggests that poor CRM was a contributing factor to the accident, as the captain and first officer failed to effectively communicate and manage the emergency situation following the engine failure.

💡EPR

EPR stands for Engine Pressure Ratio, which is an indicator of engine thrust output. In the video, the first officer briefs that an EPR of 2.18 is required for takeoff, indicating full thrust. This is an important parameter for pilots to consider, especially under high-density altitude conditions where additional thrust may be necessary.

💡V1, Rotate, V2

V1, Rotate, and V2 are critical speeds in aircraft takeoff. V1 is the speed at which the aircraft must decide to take off or stop, Rotate is the speed at which the pilot initiates the takeoff, and V2 is the minimum speed to safely continue the takeoff in the event of an engine failure. These speeds are crucial for ensuring safe takeoff performance, as highlighted when the first officer calls out these speeds in the script.

💡Stick Shaker

The stick shaker is a warning system in aircraft that vibrates the control stick to alert pilots of an impending stall. In the video, the stick shaker activation indicates that the aircraft's speed has decreased to a dangerous level, which is a critical warning that requires immediate corrective action to prevent a stall and potential crash.

Highlights

The flight was delayed due to a hydraulic pump issue, highlighting the importance of pre-flight checks.

The aircraft was nearly 20 years old, emphasizing the need for rigorous maintenance on older planes.

The left engine's high hours and potential maintenance history played a crucial role in the incident.

The captain's late arrival and the first officer's solo pre-flight preparation underscored the impact of team coordination on flight safety.

The significance of density altitude and its effects on aircraft performance were discussed, indicating the need for accurate performance calculations.

The first officer's handling of pre-flight checks without the captain present raised concerns about procedural adherence.

The captain's inexperience on the 737 type compared to the first officer was noted, suggesting the importance of cockpit crew experience balance.

The purser's decision to stay in the cockpit during takeoff was criticized, highlighting the necessity of crew following their designated roles.

The departure briefing was interrupted, pointing to a lack of focus on critical pre-flight procedures.

The aircraft's takeoff weight was close to maximum, nearly 800 kilos away, which could have implications on performance.

The captain's decision to allow the purser to stay in the cockpit for takeoff was questioned, reflecting on the cockpit's sterile environment during critical phases.

The left engine's failure during takeoff due to turbine blade fractures was a pivotal moment in the flight's tragic outcome.

The crew's lack of preparedness for engine failure procedures was evident, showing the necessity of regular and effective training.

The captain's takeover of controls without understanding the situation was a critical error, demonstrating the importance of clear communication and role understanding in the cockpit.

The aircraft's configuration and handling post-engine failure indicated a stall, highlighting the crew's failure to manage the crisis effectively.

The sole survivor, ejected due to not wearing a seatbelt, illustrated the life-saving importance of following all safety protocols.

The investigation's recommendations for improved CRM training and flight safety programs underscored the need for ongoing aviation safety enhancements.

Transcripts

(suspenseful music)

- [Petter] As a pilot, you train your entire career

for that one moment, that one time

when fate, circumstance and bad luck comes together

to force you to save the day.

- [GPWS] Don't sink.

- But what happens if you, in that moment,

haven't prepared at all

and instead is completely caught off guard?

Stay tuned.

On the 6th of March, 2003, an Air Algerie crew

consisting of two pilots and four cabin crew

were preparing for a two-leg domestic flight

starting in Tamenghasset, Algeria

and then continuing via a short stop

in Ghardaia to their final destination, Algiers.

The flight had been delayed almost three hours

due to a problem with a system B hydraulic pump

but the Boeing 737-200 that they were gonna fly

was in an otherwise seemingly good technical shape.

It was a reasonably old bird

which had been delivered new to Air Algerie

back in December of 1983,

meaning that it was almost 20 years old

but it was maintained according to the maintenance handbook

and had no open defects on the day of the flight.

It was equipped with two

JT8D-17A ducted low bypass turbofan engines

which were both also in check

but had a lot of time on them

with the left engine having clocked over 30,000 hours

and the right close to 23,000.

And the status of that left engine

will come to play a really important role in this story.

Anyway, because of that delay,

the captain had not turned up

to the briefing along with the rest of the crew.

Instead, he would arrive a little bit later when the issue

with the hydraulic pump had been solved.

This meant that the first officer,

who had turned up on time, was left to complete all

of the pre-flight preparations by herself.

This included checking the weather for the two flights

which was fine but the temperature

was steadily getting higher

and since Tamanrasset Airport was situated quite high up

at an altitude of around 4,500 feet,

the density altitude was now becoming a factor.

Density altitude is the altitude

the aircraft performance is calculated on,

corrected for temperature

and it can have a major impact on,

for example, the climb or takeoff performance

as well as the landing distance required.

Because since air with higher temperature

has less density, it means that,

effectively, there's less air molecules

moving around the wings as well as through the engines,

causing less lift at a given speed

as well as less thrust.

This means that the aircraft in hot weather will need

to accelerate to a higher speed

using less available thrust before it can take off,

which will mean a longer takeoff distance

or less ability to carry weight.

With a delay, the aircraft would now depart

around 14:00 which was the hottest time of the day

with temperatures around 25°C.

Now that might not sound like much

but at this higher airport altitude,

it can actually make a big difference,

especially with a heavy aircraft.

But these calculations would have to be checked

before departure anyway and if the aircraft

was too heavy, well then, there was always the possibility

of just offloading some bags or cargo

so the first officer wasn't too worried about that.

She instead continued to look through

the briefing material and there was nothing in the NOTAMs

or flight plans that stood out to her.

The first officer was 44 years old

at the time of this flight and had amassed

a total flying time of 5,219 hours

of which 1,292 had been flown on the 737-200.

The captain that she was now waiting for

was 48 years old and had 10,760 hours

but he had only been a captain

on the 737 for around 1,100 hours.

So he actually had less experience

on the type than the first officer did.

And curiously, he was also operating

as a first officer on the Boeing 767

within the same company

and had been flying around 31 hours on that type

during the 30 days before this flight.

The first officer and the cabin crew

eventually started walking out to the aircraft

and also started preparing it for departure.

Naturally, since she was the only pilot there,

the first officer prepared herself

to operate as pilot flying for the first flight

and completed all of the initial setup

and walk around by herself.

She also asked the fueler to uplift 4.6 tons of fuel,

bringing the departure fuel up to close to 10 tons.

And this fuel, together with the 97 passengers

would bring the aircraft up to a takeoff weight

of 48,708 kilos which was only

about 800 kilos away from

the aircraft's maximum take-off weight.

That's worth keeping in mind.

Eventually the captain turned up

and agreed to allow the first officer to fly the first leg.

And while she continued to prepare everything,

instead of helping out, he instead started talking

to the male purser about some other unrelated stuff.

The purser had, by the way,

called home a bit earlier and told his 17-year-old son

that he would be home late due to some technical issues

they were having with the aircraft.

And this call would later be very misinterpreted

by the local press.

Anyway, eventually the maintenance team

had completed the work on the hydraulic pump

and the cabin crew started boarding the 97 passengers

who were scheduled for the flight.

In reality, there had actually been 100 passengers booked

but three of them had encountered

some type of document issues

during the checkin process

and had therefore been denied to travel.

Among the passengers who were allowed to board

were a 28-year-old conscript who had been assigned a seat

in the very last row in front of the aft galley.

He was not paying much attention

to the safety briefing that the cabin crew were giving

and instead decided to just relax

without fastening his seat belt,

something that will have

profound consequences for him later on.

In the cockpit, the first officer

had now completed the setup

and the performance calculations as well.

When the load sheet arrived, she had spotted several mistakes

including a one-ton discrepancy

between the calculated and actual fuel as well

as some passenger number mistakes

but that had now been corrected.

Since everything was now done,

she started the departure brief

by calling out the takeoff speeds

which included a V1 decision speed of 144 knots,

a rotation speed of 146 knots

and the single-engine climb speed, V2 of 150 knots.

Now these were quite high speeds

for a 737-200 but like I mentioned before,

that was due to both the high-density altitude

and weight of the aircraft.

Because of this, she also briefed

the captain that they would need to use

an engine-pressure ratio,

EPR of 2.18, which basically meant full thrust.

After she had called that out,

she tried to continue the brief but was interrupted by the captain

who wasn't interested in hearing the rest at all.

And instead he just continued

his conversation that he was having with the purser

who was still present in the cockpit for some reason.

This meant that the rest of the briefing

was never done and instead, the before-start checks

was eventually completed

and the first officer called up the tower

to advice that they were now ready for push and start.

And at some point around here,

the captain had also decided

that he wanted his friend, the purser,

to stay in the cockpit for the takeoff

so that they could continue their conversation.

This meant that the purser would now be occupying

the middle jump seat in the cockpit

instead of his cabin jump seat

as the aircraft started taxiing out.

Now those of you who are frequent viewers of my videos,

because you have subscribed to the channel

are probably starting to squirm

a bit in your seats now and that's for very good reasons

and I'll tell you all about them after this...

I don't like the feeling of being spied on

and I don't think that anyone really does

but the sad reality is that your personal information

is likely being sold to someone online right now

and that's because companies known as data brokers can scoop up

everything about you including your personal address, email,

contact details, family members

and even your financial information

and then sell it to the highest bidder

which tend to be some really nasty people.

The good news is that you have

the right to tell these companies

to delete all the information they have on you

but the bad news is that you have to do so manually.

That's why I'm so proud to present today's sponsor, Incogni,

which offers a personal information removal service

who can do this for you.

Incogni will reach out to all of these data brokers on your behalf

and then make sure that they comply

and remove everything.

I am using Incogni myself

and have already seen a quite significant reduction

of spam mail and garbage in my inbox

and it turns out that there was

actually 51 different data brokers

who were selling my data.

To try Incogni for yourself, you just have to click

on the link here below, which is incogni.com/pilot

and use the code Pilot.

During the Black Friday week,

this will give you an incredible 60% discount

on the annual plan so take your chance now.

Thank you, Incogni. Now let's continue.

At time 14:08:36, the crew

had completed their push back and startup procedures

and received an instruction from the tower to start taxiing out

towards the holding point for Runway 02.

The surface wind was reported as 330°

at 12 knots, meaning a slight cross wind from the left

but otherwise the weather was absolutely perfect.

As the aircraft started taxiing out,

the first officer continued to try and follow

the standard operating procedures

but the captain and the purser

were seemingly not interested in that at all

and this just makes my blood boil.

Because first of all, in a Boeing 737,

there are four cabin crew members for a reason.

The idea is that they should guard

all of the main emergency exits

in case of an evacuation and also

to help organizing and deal

with any issues that might arise in the cabin.

The one in charge of that work is the purser

who is the most senior cabin crew

and he's also the number three

in the chain of command after the captain and the first officer.

So for the purser to choose

to stay in the cockpit during one of the most critical phases

of any flight is just completely unacceptable.

And secondly, from the start of the pre-flight briefing

and until we pilots complete

the last shutdown checklist of the day,

our focus must be solely on the safety of the flight.

Now can we chat a little bit

about unrelated stuff during the flight?

Well, of course we can, especially up in the cruise

but during the briefing and during

the sterile phases of flight, absolutely not.

And there are very good reasons for this.

If we look at what happened so far,

in this example, the fact that the departure briefing

was interrupted by the captain indicates that he didn't see

that briefing as having any great significance

but the problem is no matter how used

you might be with flying a specific departure,

dealing with an airport, the briefing forms

a hugely important role in providing focus

and facilitating crew resource management.

During the first light of the day,

we tend to always conduct an emergency brief

and touch drill all of the items

that needs to be done in case something goes wrong.

This will wake up the muscle memory

and bring any rusty procedures back into focus

and it will clarify the roles of each crew member

in case something unexpected happens.

This emergency briefing is then repeated again

in a shortened form during the taxi out

to make sure that this is the last briefing

that we hear before departure.

And on top of all of that,

there is also often special engine failure procedures

that differ between each airport

and must be followed in case an engine failure occurs.

These can be either company-specific

or airport-defined and in case

of Tamanrasset Airport, the procedure from Runway 02

was to climb straight ahead

to the TMS VOR

and then turn left to a heading of 239°

and climb to above the minimum sector altitude

of 5,036 feet.

None of that had been briefed

prior to the engine start

and as the aircraft was now taxiing out

towards the holding point,

the captain and the purser again ignored it

and instead just continued their private chat.

Obviously, we don't know

what the first officer was thinking at this point

as the aircraft was taxiing out

but I doubt that she was very impressed with it.

And even if she was mentally briefing herself

about how to fly the departure

and what to do in case of an emergency,

this would be of little help

if the captain who was the pilot in command

was not prepared and we will see

what I mean by that very soon.

Eventually, the aircraft reached the holding point

and at time 14:12:30, the first officer called up

the tower and advised them

that they were now ready for departure.

The tower controller responded

that they were cleared to line up and take off Runway 02

with a surface wind of 330° at 12 knots

and as soon as this was heard,

the crew verified that flaps one

was set for takeoff and the first officer

read back the clearance as they

started lining up on the runway.

Now what no one knew at this stage

was that inside of the left engine,

a big problem had already started developing.

Several small cracks had started

to form on the blades of the high pressure turbine

situated just behind the combustion chambers.

These cracks had been forming due to thermal fatigue

and had been covered with a layer of old coke

which is a type of black solid residue

formed when oil oxidizes and breaks down

from extreme temperatures.

And this had allowed the cracks to go unnoticed

and it is possible that they had started

to form after the last engine overhaul.

No one will ever really know.

In any case, the pilots knew nothing about that

and the captain now finished lining up

the aircraft with the center line

and moved the engine thrust levers

up to around 1.2 EPR to stabilize them.

The first officer called out stabilized

which prompted the captain

to then set take off thrust and the two engines

now roared into full thrust as the first officer called out,

"I have controls."

The aircraft started accelerating down the runway

and initially, everything looked completely normal.

The captain called out, "You have uh, 90, uh 100."

And then a few seconds later, "V1, rotate."

The first officer responded by rotating the aircraft

nice and slowly with around 3° per second

up to an initial attitude of around 18°.

The aircraft had accelerated

to a speed of 160 knots at this point

and about five seconds into the flight,

the first officer asked for gear up.

But almost exactly at the same time as she did that,

several of the blades inside of the left, number one engine,

high-pressure turbine, suddenly fractured.

When they did so, it led to an immediate loss of thrust

from engine number one

as the turbine slowed down dramatically.

This also meant that the second stage turbine blades

behind the first, sustained severe damage from the debris

and since there was now no first stage

to push the air out, the second stage

received all of the hot air coming directly out

of the combustion chamber with now nowhere to go.

Without the normal cooling from the airstream,

those blades now started melting down from

the incredible heat and this whole process

all happened within a few seconds.

Now this was not great

but it was far from catastrophic either.

The failure was contained inside of the left engine

and there was no fire and the right engine

was still providing full take-off thrust.

This is a scenario that all pilots

train to handle every six months and although extremely rare,

it is well within the performance of the aircraft

as long as it's handled promptly

and in the correct way

but here the results of the crew's poor preparation

would start to really show its true effects.

As the engine failure happened, the aircraft veered about 12°

to the left due to the effect

of asymmetric thrust from the still working right engine

and the now dead left engine.

The first officer reacted to this

by pushing right rudder and correct the aircraft

back to the right again and remember,

she had already called for the gear

to be retracted just a second

before the engine failure occurred

but the captain had either missed this completely

or become so surprised by the sudden loud bang

and the yaw that he completely forgot about it.

The first officer let out a few exclamations

as she was now struggling with the crippled aircraft

and she also called, "What's going on?"

Now in a functioning cockpit,

this failure is supposed to be followed

by some very defined actions.

The pilot flying needs to concentrate

on flying the aircraft and getting it climbing safely

away from the ground.

The pilot monitoring, on the other hand,

should be making sure that the aircraft is climbing safely

and then support the pilot flying

by retracting the gear once a positive rate of climb

has been confirmed and then cancel

any warnings who might be distracting.

The first 400 feet after takeoff

should be dedicated to only fly the aircraft

and making sure that the configuration is correct

and that the aircraft is climbing safely.

Once above 400 feet, the pilot flying should call

for heading select and state

the malfunction while still concentrating

on handling the aircraft.

The pilot monitoring should then start trying

to diagnose the failure and do any memory items

that might need to be done

in a quick but controlled way

whilst also verifying these actions

with his colleague.

This case is actually a great example of why

we have memory items as a severe damage like this

where the engine is essentially melting down,

can be stopped from getting worse

by moving the engine start lever to cut out

to stop the flow of fuel but did this happen, you think?

No, unfortunately it did not.

Instead, the captain, only five seconds

after the failure occurred took controls from the first officer

and continued to pitch up towards 18°.

So here some of you might think

that this would be a logic thing to do by the captain,

after all he is the pilot in command

so it is his prerogative to take controls

especially if the first officer is struggling

but it is important to remember a few things first.

Number one, the captain had no idea, at this point,

what was actually causing the handling problems

for the first officer.

Now he'd heard a bang and felt a yaw but he had not

had enough time to actually assess the situation.

Number two, the first officer who was asking what was going on

was actually handling the situation

according to her training and in a quite good way.

It is profoundly hard to take controls

during an emergency which is including handling difficulties

when you haven't been handling

the aircraft from the very beginning.

An engine failure or flight control problems

can manifest themselves in very different ways,

depending on what's causing them.

So trying to shift controls at a very low altitude

can be hard even if you know what's going on and this captain

did not know that.

The aircraft was still climbing at this point

and the first officer had called for gear up

so the best thing to do here would have been for the captain

to follow the procedures who had been created

for exactly this scenario but, unfortunately, as we know

these procedures had not been briefed earlier

so the captain now found himself in control of a situation

he had not mentally prepared for,

flying an aircraft with an unknown fault

at an altitude of only 300 feet.

He just continued pitching for the normal takeoff attitude,

which with a failed engine and a fully-loaded aircraft

with the gear still hanging out,

meant that the speed now started decreasing rapidly.

During the next few seconds,

the captain shouted to the first officer several times

to let go of the controls which she read back

that she had already done.

She also offered to retract the landing gear but got no reply

from the captain who was likely

now so deep down into the stress cone

that he didn't didn't even hear her.

This meant that the gear was never retracted

and with the configuration they were now in,

they would have needed to pitch down substantially

to keep the speed and to still climb.

The normal pitch attitude after an engine failure

once the gear is up would be around 12°

but the aircraft was still maintaining

around 18° at this point.

Now even with the gear out,

the performance of the aircraft

would have allowed for a climb of around 150 feet per minute

if the speed was capped at V2.

This would have increased to around 450 feet per minute

if the gear was actually retracted

but, unfortunately, there was now also another issue

because at some point, during the initial seconds

after the failure, the thrust on the remaining engine

on the right side had also been reduced.

We don't know if this happened

when the captain took over the controls

or if it was a knee-jerk reaction

to the yaw by the first officer

but the combined effect of the fully-loaded aircraft

with one failed engine and the other working

below full thrust and the gear still hanging out

was that this aircraft was now quickly approaching a stall.

The captain continued to call

for the first officer to remove her hands

which she responded that she had already done.

Now it is possible that he felt some resistance in the controls

and assumed that this was caused

by inputs from the first officer

or she might have just instinctively

kept her hands on the yoke.

We don't really know but we do know

that the first officer now took up her hand mic

and called air traffic control saying,

"We have a small problem."

And only one second after that call,

the first stick shaker activation

could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder,

lasting for about one second.

Now the first officer should not have concentrated

on communicating with air traffic control at this point.

Instead she should have been monitoring

and calling out the speeds and altitude tendencies

that she could see from her instruments.

But the fact that she had been turned

from pilot flying to pilot monitoring

without any type of formal handover

had likely disoriented her and, at least, she was trying

to do something by calling air traffic control

and suggesting the gear to be retracted.

The aircraft reached its highest altitude

of 390 feet about 12 seconds after the engine failure occurred

and at that point, the speed had degraded so much

that the stick shaker now started working continuously

and it continued doing so for the rest of the flight.

The captain did not verbaIize this warning in any way.

He just continued to pitch with the same attitude

as the aircraft now started

descending rapidly towards the ground.

In the tower, the controller had seen the initial yaw

of the aircraft and had recognized

that they were in some deep trouble.

He immediately pushed the accident alarm

which alerted the airport firefighters

who now started rushing out towards the runway end.

In the cockpit, the stick shaker was now also accompanied

by a GPWS, "Don't sink," warning

and the right wing now started to slowly drop,

likely due to the impending stall.

At time 14:15:18, Air Algerie Flight 6289

touched down just beyond the end of Runway 02

with the back of the aircraft

and right wing hitting the ground first.

The huge amount of fuel inside of the wing

was almost immediately ignited

turning the aircraft into a fireball

as it broke into several pieces

sliding through an airport perimeter fence

and over a road before it finally came to a halt.

The majority of the aircraft was almost immediately

consumed by the fire and there was not much

the firefighters could do when they reached the wreckage

only about three minutes after the alarm had been sounded.

Out of 97 passengers and six crew members,

102 of them perished immediately

which meant that there was only one survivor.

This was the 28-year-old conscript

that I mentioned earlier.

Because he hadn't fastened his seat belt,

he was ejected from the aircraft

as it started break breaking apart

and that likely saved his life.

He was still seriously injured and lay in a coma for several days

before eventually waking up and that means that he

and the three passengers who missed their flight,

should consider themselves very, very lucky.

The investigation concluded that the accident was caused

by a loss of engine thrust during a critical phase of flight

followed by a failure to retract the landing gear

and the captain taking controls

without being properly prepared or having identified the problem.

The below-standard flight preparation,

the fact that the failure happened

just as they were about to retract the gear

and the non-existing CRM

after the failure also contributed to the accident.

There were four different recommendations

as a result including increased CRM training

for all pilots at Air Algerie, more focus on conformity

of engine failure training as well as the implementation

of a better flight safety program

who could monitor and analyze flight data

to identify dangerous trends.

And from a very personal note,

this is exactly why following

and respecting standard operating procedures

is so important.

You never know when they might save your life

just like you will never know

when I release my next video

unless you have subscribed to the channel.

You can support me by supporting my sponsor,

getting an awesome t-shirt

or joining my fantastic Patreon crew.

Have an absolutely fantastic day

and I'll see you next time, bye-bye.