Is China Really Socialist?
Summary
TLDRThis script explores the transformation of China under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, highlighting how his famous declaration 'Let some people get rich first' signaled a shift toward economic liberalization. It examines the rise of capitalism in China, the implications of consumerism, and the persistence of inequality through policies like the hukou system. The script also discusses the resurgence of Maoist ideology under Xi Jinping, addressing the tensions between reformist and leftist factions, and challenges the popular belief that China 'lifted 800 million people out of poverty.'
Takeaways
- đ Deng Xiaopingâs statement on October 23, 1985, âLet some people get rich first,â marked a turning point in Chinaâs economic transformation and the embrace of capitalism.
- đŒ Despite Chinaâs nominally socialist system, capitalism and consumerism have flourished, with visible signs like the widespread presence of McDonald's, KFC, and luxury goods.
- đ China's real estate market exhibits extreme consumerism, with people buying multiple properties, many of which remain unoccupied.
- đ The hukou system in China restricts social mobility, tying people to their place of birth and limiting access to public services in urban areas for rural migrants.
- đ« While socialism remains a part of Chinaâs official narrative, the countryâs economic policies resemble capitalism in practice, leading to significant class disparities.
- âïž The global financial crisis of 2008 heightened Chinaâs confidence in its own economic model, contributing to a revival of leftist ideals and state interventions.
- đšââïž Xi Jinpingâs anti-corruption campaign sought to purge capitalist elements within the Communist Party, removing millions of officials accused of corruption.
- đ Xiâs policies are seen as a return to Maoist ideals, focusing on centralized power and a more socialist-oriented agenda, contrasting the capitalist reforms of earlier decades.
- đĄ Deng Xiaopingâs reforms were seen as a pragmatic way to modernize Chinaâs economy, but there was always a limit to how far the country would deviate from socialism.
- đ The popular claim that China âlifted 800 million people out of povertyâ is critically examined, with some arguing it oversimplifies the complexities of Chinese history and policy.
Q & A
What significant event occurred on October 23rd, 1985, that some argue marked the death of the Chinese Communist Party?
-On October 23rd, 1985, Deng Xiaoping explicitly described state policy as 'Let some people get rich first,' signaling a shift toward capitalist practices and marking a significant departure from the traditional Communist ideology.
How did Deng Xiaoping's approach to economic reform differ from the original Communist principles?
-Deng Xiaoping's reforms emphasized economic efficiency over ideology, symbolized by his statement 'It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.' This pragmatic approach prioritized wealth creation, leading to economic liberalization and growing inequalities.
How did China's consumerism in the 1980s and beyond reflect a shift toward capitalism?
-China's consumerism exploded with the presence of international brands like McDonald's and KFC, as well as a growing obsession with luxury goods and real estate speculation. This capitalist culture was starkly visible in China's cities and marked a major shift from its earlier socialist policies.
What is the hukou system, and how does it contribute to social inequality in China?
-The hukou system is a household registration system that ties Chinese citizens to their place of birth, limiting their access to public services like education and healthcare if they move to more prosperous areas. This system enforces rigid class distinctions and limits upward mobility.
How did Deng Xiaoping's reforms affect the ideological landscape in China, particularly regarding student support for Communism?
-Between 1986 and 1988, student support for Communism plummeted from 38% to just 6.1%, according to government-sanctioned surveys. This reflects how Dengâs reforms gradually eroded the ideological commitment to socialism in favor of capitalist development.
What was the significance of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 in shaping China's economic policies?
-The 2008 Global Financial Crisis reinforced China's confidence in its own system, as it emerged as the only major economy to grow during that period. This led to a re-evaluation of Western economic policies and strengthened China's belief in its socialist-capitalist hybrid model.
Who was Bo Xilai, and what role did he play in the resurgence of Maoist ideology in China?
-Bo Xilai was a Chinese politician who rose to national fame by promoting Maoist nostalgia through his policies, such as building affordable housing and reviving struggling state enterprises. He symbolized the growing influence of leftist ideology in China and was described as a 'mini-Mao.'
What was the purpose behind Xi Jinpingâs anti-corruption campaign, and how did it relate to the capitalist elements within China?
-Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign aimed to address the entrenched capitalist practices that had infiltrated the Communist Party, such as the second-hand market for cadre positions. It was part of a broader effort to consolidate power and reassert socialist values.
What is the 'implicit agreement' that has allowed the Communist Party to maintain power amidst increasing capitalism in China?
-The 'implicit agreement' refers to the understanding that the Communist Party would make the population rich in exchange for political compliance. However, this strategy has its limits as economic growth cannot continue indefinitely.
How does the video challenge the common belief that China 'lifted 800 million people out of poverty'?
-The video argues that the claim of lifting 800 million people out of poverty is a myth. It suggests that this narrative oversimplifies Chinaâs history and overlooks the darker aspects of its development, which is explored in more detail in the videoâs exclusive Nebula content.
Outlines
đ The Day Capitalism Took Over China
October 23rd, 1985, marks a pivotal moment in China's transformation as Deng Xiaoping declared that some should 'get rich first.' This statement symbolized China's shift from socialism to a more capitalist-driven economy. The country experienced radical economic reforms, breaking away from ideological constraints. Western-style consumerism thrived, epitomized by McDonald's and KFCs, and China's wealth inequality grew. Foreigners often remark that China seemed more capitalist than America. Class distinctions, entrenched by the hukou system, became pronounced. By 1986, support for communism among students fell sharply, and Chinaâs political theater continued despite its capitalist realities.
đïž The Aftermath of Mao's Death
Mao Zedong's death in 1976 plunged China into uncertainty, leading to a succession crisis. His passing allowed Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies to rethink the nation's future, bringing modernization through economic reforms. Dengâs leadership created a more open society but retained key Maoist ideologies. Chinaâs post-Mao leadership recognized the importance of aligning with global capitalism, even if it meant softening socialism at home while maintaining its ideological façade abroad. Deng allowed for limited discussions on Maoâs mistakes, which shaped China's shift from revolutionary socialism to economic pragmatism, all while maintaining Mao's symbolic role in the Party.
âïž Leftist Resurgence and the Global Financial Crisis
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 provided momentum for Chinaâs leftist factions, who blamed economic reforms for destabilizing the socialist project. The Chinese government responded to the crisis by injecting massive credit into infrastructure projects, including high-speed rail and roads, keeping unemployment low. Chinaâs ability to navigate the crisis strengthened the leftists' belief in state control over the economy, and nationalism surged as China emerged unscathed. Bo Xilai, a charismatic figure, became a symbol of the revival of Maoist-style socialism, advocating for affordable housing and support for state enterprises.
đ Xi Jinping and the Anti-Corruption Campaign
When Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he launched a massive anti-corruption campaign targeting millions of bureaucrats. While some saw this as a method to eliminate political rivals, the campaign addressed the deep infiltration of capitalist corruption within the Communist Party. Xi discovered that the Partyâs loyalty had been compromised by economic corruption, with officials trading loyalty for wealth. His campaign sought to restore the Party's control and ideology, echoing earlier socialist ideals. Xi didnât initiate the socialist revival but enabled its resurgence, dismantling capitalist structures within the Party to strengthen its ideological purity.
đĄ The Inevitable Return to Socialist Ideals
Despite Chinaâs economic growth, the Communist Partyâs claim to legitimacy rests not on capitalism but on maintaining its socialist vision. Economic reforms were always a temporary tool to stabilize the Party, which never distanced itself from its Maoist roots. Outsiders misinterpret Chinaâs development as a shift to pure capitalism, but Deng Xiaopingâs reforms always carried an underlying socialist agenda. As economic growth slows, China must justify its one-party rule through socialist ideology, with Xi Jinping solidifying the Partyâs control. The claim that China âlifted 800 million people out of povertyâ is also examined critically, revealing the Partyâs careful crafting of its narrative.
Mindmap
Keywords
đĄDeng Xiaoping
đĄCapitalism
đĄHukou
đĄSocialism with Chinese characteristics
đĄGlobal Financial Crisis (2008)
đĄXi Jinping
đĄReform and Opening
đĄLeftist coalition
đĄClass distinctions
đĄAnti-corruption campaign
Highlights
October 23rd, 1985 marked the moment when Deng Xiaoping explicitly endorsed economic inequality, stating 'Let some people get rich first.'
Deng Xiaopingâs philosophy: it doesnât matter what color the cat is, only that it catches mice â signifying the shift from ideology to pragmatism in Chinaâs economic reforms.
China's rapid transformation in the 1980s led to an economy that appeared more Capitalist than Socialist, evidenced by the proliferation of McDonaldâs and KFC outlets.
China's consumerism surpasses global standards, exemplified by trends like collecting multiple homes and the obsession with luxury goods.
Hukou system enforces strict social immobility in China, where birthplace determines access to public services like schools and hospitals.
By the late 1980s, student support for Communism had plummeted from 38% to 6.1%, showcasing a massive ideological shift.
The Communist Party, post-Mao, maintained a thin veneer of tradition to preserve continuity, while adopting economic policies aligned with Capitalism.
Xi Jinpingâs era represents a dramatic shift, reviving Maoist ideology while clamping down on corruption and reinstating socialist rhetoric.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis reignited Leftist ideologies in China, reinforcing the need for socialist policies.
Bo Xilai, a charismatic politician, tapped into Maoist nostalgia, pushing for policies that resembled âChinese Socialism 3.0â and gained popular support before his downfall.
Xi Jinpingâs anti-corruption campaign purged millions of officials, aiming not just to eliminate rivals but to restore Communist Party discipline and ideology.
Chinaâs reassertion of socialist ideals post-2008 signaled a return to state control and skepticism towards Western economic models.
Deng Xiaoping acknowledged that while reforms opened China to the world, the state could never fully distance itself from Maoâs legacy.
Xi Jinpingâs leadership marks a decisive turn away from Deng's pragmatism, signaling a renewed focus on state socialism rather than market liberalization.
The Communist Partyâs survival is tied to a delicate balance of economic growth and maintaining its ideological legitimacy, as seen in Chinaâs shift after 2008.
Transcripts
In retrospect, some would say, October 23rd, 1985 was the day the Chinese Communist Party
died.
By the mid-80s, virtually every inch of the country had been transformed by well over
a decade of radical economic reform.
But after that day in October, when Deng Xiaoping explicitly described state policy, as quote,
âLet[ting] some people get rich firstâ, the proverbial cat was undeniably and seemingly
irreversibly out of the bag.
It didnât matter what â-ismâ defined its economy, or, in the words of Deng, what
color the cat was, only that it was effective at catching mice, for ideology had no place
in this new China.
Class struggle and collectivization had already given way to new inequalities.
But with Dengâs unequivocal proclamations, gone too was even the façade.
There was nothing especially subtle about it.
Any American visitor to China in the roughly thirty years after 1980 â myself included
â inevitably returns with the same surprised observation: âChina looks more Capitalist
than Americaâ, (and thatâs saying something!).
Most iconically, there are the McDonaldâs.
So, so many McDonaldâs.
And you canât miss the KFCs.
Twice as many, in fact, as in America.
Street vendors everywhere trying to make a buck.
Shopping malls, Apple Stores, and designer handbags.
Chinese consumerism is globally unmatched in its ostentatiousness.
But the culture of Capitalism has seeped much deeper than mere brand names.
The American obsession with buying houses launched the greatest financial crisis of
the 21st century⊠yet is thoroughly put to shame by the Chinese, who âcollectâ
third and even fourth homes â all empty, bought before completion, and likely to never
be lived in by anyone â like the rest of the world collects stamps.
Then there are the class distinctions.
Americans are no strangers to economic inequality.
But, at least in theory, no law stops you from packing up and moving to Beverly Hills.
In China, your place of birth quite literally determines your place in the world.
Household registration â or hukou â means you can move from middle-of-nowhere Gansu
province to cosmopolitan Shanghai â but its public schools, hospitals, and jobs will
forever be legally off-limits.
Place of birth matters everywhere, but only in China do authorities not even pretend otherwise.
And if all that doesnât convince you âSocialism with Chinese characteristicsâ is but a euphemism
for âstate Capitalismâ thereâs plenty more evidence to choose fromâŠ
Starting in 1980, international corporations could buy advertising space in the Communist
Partyâs official magazine â albeit with one exception: Coca-Cola was explicitly banned.
In the two years between 1986 and 88, student support for âCommunismâ fell from 38%
to just 6.1.
And bear in mind, these are officially-sanctioned surveys!
Deng Xiaoping even warned that although China should âmaintain vigilanceâ against the
âRightâ, it should be âprimarilyâ wary of the âLeftâ.
Since the death of Mao, the Communist Party has maintained only the thinnest veneer of
tradition in the interest of continuity â acting out the motions of increasingly-vague 5-year
plans and increasingly-predictable Politburo procedure.
But while the rest of the world has largely played along with this political theater,
weâve all long since realized: underneath this nearly transparent Maoist packaging is
pure, raw, Big Mac-loving, unadulterated Capitalism in all but name.
Then, Xi Jinping happened.
Today, after a decade of this new era, you wouldnât just have to be an optimist to
not see how things have changed, youâd truly have to be living under a rock.
And to notice the similarities between Mao and Xi is to be confronted with an uncomfortable
question: Did this Maoist revival emerge spontaneously, implausibly manufactured by one man alone?
Or, did even the most clear-eyed China-watchers fundamentally misunderstand the past five
decades?
One way or another, a reappraisal is overdue.
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On the 9th of September 1976, China experienced the most traumatic and destabilizing thing
that can happen to a cult of personality â the death of that personality.
With the sole exception, perhaps, of North Koreaâs Kim Il-Sung, no country has ever
had so many of its political eggs in one basket.
China was the Communist Party.
And the Communist Party was Mao.
His complete monopoly on power created a volatile vacuum of power and all but guaranteed a succession
crisis after his fatal heart attack.
How you interpret what happened next is where history diverges.
In one version â the one most of us have come to believe â the death of Mao forced
the Party â indeed, the entire country â to do some serious soul searching.
His absence gave Dengâs generation room to critically re-examine the horrors of the
past quarter century and steer the country in a new direction.
Thereâs simply no denying that the scale and speed of Chinaâs modernization was a
direct result of these reforms.
Had Maoâs 4 confidants not been purged a mere month after his death, the word âTikTokâ
would probably still mean an early-2000s pop song.
You wouldnât know what âShenzhenâ is today.
In a very different version of history, Deng Xiaopingâs greatest innovation is not liberalizing
the Chinese economy, exactly, but knowing the secret passwords to join the globalized,
American-led export market.
In this world, Chinaâs post-Mao leaders realize thereâs a practical limit to the
amount of starvation the average person is willing to endure in the name of peasant revolution.
They realize, after â89, that photographs of tanks do a lot of damage to the national
brand, and firing squads are bad for business.
At home, China maintains the prominence of Mao and continues speaking the language of
Socialism.
But abroad, it emphasizes the ââŠwith Chinese characteristicsâ part.
Itâs a ruse the rest of the world is either too naive to notice or too blinded by dollar
signs to act on.
The truth, it would seem, is an uneasy mix of both.
Though, probably more of the latter.
On one hand, Maoâs death did allow for the entry of a new â previously mythical â âmâ-word
to the governmentâs vocabulary â âmistakeâ.
Accompanying it were âdemocracyâ, âoppositionâ, and even, if you can believe it, âhuman
rightsâ â though its precise definition may have been, shall we say, lost in translation.
Yet, no sooner had Deng uttered these words, when old red lines were redrawn.
In other words, the scope of permissible speech widened by a remarkable degree in a remarkably
short period of time.
But Dengâs âfour cardinal principlesâ still left a lot to be desired.
In the partyâs own words, Maoâs âcontributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his
mistakesâŠâ
Another important thing to note â something we may have dismissed as a mere âhistorical
detailâ for the fifty years between then and now but today in 2022 is clearly anything
but â is the fact that Maoâs death led to the very first policy âdebatesâ in
the PRC.
For the first time in the countryâs history, you could say things like âHmm, maybe Mao
was only 70% correctâ.
Thatâs a pretty big deal!
Much bigger than it sounds.
That 30% tolerance could be the difference between, say, China being comfortable importing
foreign-made mRNA vaccines and sealing its borders shut for years to come.
Anyway, history remembers the victor, and Dengâs Reformist camp was decisively victorious.
But that makes it all too easy to forget that there were other factions.
The more Maoist âLeftistâ coalition slowly faded from the spotlight, but, in hindsight,
never quite disappeared.
Leftists couldnât exactly speak their minds freely, yet still enjoyed some protection
under the banner of the unassailable âGreat Chairmanâ.
Censorship is always a cat-and-mouse game and the more aggressive the cat, the more
clever become the mice.
Political groups in China quickly learned they could get away with just a little bit
more while waving a Little Red Book.
Ultimately, Leftists were at the mercy of the Reformist-led Communist Party, who reluctantly
tolerated their existence, if only as a counterbalance to the right.
But what Deng couldnât have predicted was that several Earth-shattering global crises
many years later would unexpectedly tip the balance, once again, in the Leftistsâ favor
â allowing them to re-emerge from the shadows.
However profoundly the fall of the Soviet Union may have affected the world, it hit
especially close to home in China.
The two countries had long since splintered ideologically but they still had more in common
than not.
With the Russians out of the picture and no other large, industrialized role models to
be found, China was effectively left to carry the mantle of Socialism alone.
This was uncharted territory and the stakes, clearly, were existential.
But what, exactly, was the lesson for Chinese leaders?
While Dengâs Reformers âlearnedâ that the Soviets had liberalized too slowly, Leftists
took away the opposite conclusion â that reform was the problem.
Whatever disagreements lingered, they were thoroughly put to rest after 2008.
Just as the Soviet collapse triggered anxious introspection and delivered a political win
for the Leftist coalition, so too did the Global Financial Crisis reverberate in China.
While Americans were preoccupied with real estate and the rest of the world, with its
second, third, and fourth-order effects, China buckled down for a storm, pumping an unfathomable
amount of credit into its economy in anticipation of hard times to come.
Shiny airports!
Roads.
Roads to the middle of nowhere.
Roads connecting two middle-of-nowheres.
And yes, the colossal High-Speed Rail network the rest of the world marvels at.
But the looming storm never arrived.
Even though many of these roads proved useless and high-speed trains to the desert sat predictably
empty, when the expected alternative was mass unemployment, it felt a lot like a victory.
Not only did China emerge from the global financial crisis unscathed, but it did so
as the only major economy to actually grow.
And by double digits, no less.
In just a few short months, Chinese leaders both lost their reverence for U.S. economic
policy â arguably, U.S. policy period â and gained immense self-confidence in their own
system.
âŠOr rather, re-gained.
The last time China stood this tall was under Mao.
The 2008 Beijing Olympics didnât hurt, either.
Meanwhile, around that same time, the son of a powerful revolutionary named Bo Xilai
rises to national fame precisely by tapping into this Maoist nostalgia.
Bo was not a normal Chinese bureaucrat.
He was charismatic.
He liked the spotlight.
And, most importantly, he was not boring.
This highly unusual personal approach to politics both made him extremely well-liked and probably
led to his ultimate demise.
In short, Bo Xilai was described as a âmini-Maoâ, and his policies as ushering in âChinese
Socialism 3.0â.
He built affordable housing, saved struggling State Enterprises, and helped level the playing
field for poor migrants.
Above all, he proved that Socialism, at least one particular flavor, still had cachet in
China.
Not unlike Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump, his popularity exposed a long-dormant political
segment.
Now, nothing changed overnight.
New McDonaldâs were still being built.
The iPhone was only beginning to achieve velocity â largely built with Chinese manufacturing
and bought by the Chinese middle-class.
But, if you were looking closely, the stage had been set.
The Chinese Leftist movement was making a comeback.
When Xi Jinping inherited power in 2012, he was reportedly shocked to discover CIA spies
working at the highest levels of the Party.
That, of course, was concerning on its own.
But even more concerning was what that meant.
After three decades of market reform, China had become near-fatally Capitalist.
Weâre not talking about D.C. lobbyist Crony Capitalism here.
There was a second-hand market for Cadre positions.
Let that sink in: you could buy your way into the Communist party, albeit under the table.
That was how the CIA allegedly infiltrated the party.
They simply paid.
And if cadres were willing to sell out their country that easily, it goes without saying:
the only chairman these corrupt officials were loyal to was the Mao staring back at
them on banknotes.
Xi was horrified to find China occupied by Capitalists.
As we saw in this earlier video, public-private collusion enabled breakneck economic growth.
It turns out, the right kind of corruption can actually speed up development.
But we see now that it also threatened such necessities to the survival of the Communist
Party as its chain of command.
Xi realized this and launched a multi-year anti-corruption campaign that took down not
hundreds or thousands but millions of bureaucrats across China.
In fact, it never really ended.
Many on the outside interpreted this campaign through the lens of a dictator accumulating
power.
Corruption, after all, is a common pretext for eliminating oneâs rivals.
But this misses the forest for the trees.
Of course Xi Jinping took out some competitors along the way.
But itâs doubtful he identified a million and a half competitors.
And of course heâs trying to consolidate power.
But to what end?
A closer look at history reveals that many of Xiâs signature campaigns began under
his predecessor, Hu Jintao.
Although the ship was turning too slowly for many to notice, the new course had long been
set.
As any Socialist will tell you, Capitalism becomes entrenched.
The âvanguardâ of the proletariat â cadres â tend to⊠lose sight of their comrades
once they own a BMW.
The difference between Hu and Xi is not so much ideology but that only the latter has
the political power to overcome this obstacle.
Xi Jinping didnât instigate the Socialist revival, but he was the first to make it practically
possible.
And he doesnât have much time.
The usual explanation for the Communist Partyâs continued existence amidst a sea of Capitalism
is âperformance legitimacyâ, or the implicit agreement.
âWeâll make you richâ, it goes, âand you wonât challenge our authorityâ.
But perhaps this theory says more about us than it does about China.
If youâre really looking, thereâs a mountain of evidence suggesting sincere ideology was
there all along.
Itâs obvious, in retrospect, that reform had a lifespan.
Economic growth canât go on indefinitely.
Even in a country of 1.4 billion, you can only build so many high-speed trains.
This places the Party on tenuous ground because its legitimacy would be at the whim of volatile
stock markets and real estate bubbles.
But even if growth did continue, the Communist Partyâs unique claim to power would weaken
with each passing year.
While China was âgetting richâ, lots of other countries were getting rich too.
Reform-era China didnât have a compelling source of national pride.
Listen closely and Chinaâs own leaders have made clear that âmaking people richâ was
never its complete strategy.
This emphasis on economic growth was always a temporary and partial measure.
Even Reformers believed in some version of Socialism.
They just disagreed on how best to get there.
Although itâs ruled by a Communist Party, it does not claim to be a Communist State.
Communism, after all, is a Utopian destination that even its most ardent supporters donât
believe is on the horizon anytime soon.
This is the fundamental source of confusion.
Outsiders, even, or especially, experts not familiar with Chinese history, see a country
replete with markets and privately-owned c ompanies.
They see, as we did, that even Communist Party ranks can be bought for cash and conclude
that âSocialismâ is obviously a façade â a misunderstanding which, ironically,
has suited China quite well.
But look even closer and itâs clear that this is itself a façade.
Deng Xiaoping said this explicitly â the state could never truly distance itself from
Mao because he was inseparable from the Party.
The writing has been on the wall, if only we were looking, since 1980 â just 3 years
after Maoâs death.
The party was only ever going to deviate from its origins so much.
And remember, that was the best case, coming from Mr. Reform and Opening himself.
Now, thereâs some truth to the âimplicit agreementâ.
You can easily see how the proletariat would be more or less patient on the path to Utopia
depending on how many Big Macs they can afford.
But while reform could have been much longer, shorter, stricter, or looser, depending on
which coalition won, the existence of the Communist Party requires that it eventually
justify its monopoly on power.
Otherwise, anyone could rule China.
The other common justification for the party is the argument that, despite its âflawsâ,
it did âliftâ 800 million people out of poverty.
Itâs the retort that any critique of China is met with.
But thereâs just one problem: itâs not really true.
Iâve wanted to debunk this myth for years but the only way to do so honestly is with
a rather grim and gruesome inspection of Chinese history, which demonetization makes impossible
on YouTube.
Thanks to Nebula, I was finally able to make this video, which is now my fifth full-length
Nebula-exclusive Original video.
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