Session 2: The Objective in Corporate Finance
Summary
TLDRThis script delves into the core objective of corporate finance: maximizing business value, often translated into maximizing stock prices. It critiques the utopian assumptions behind this approach and explores the potential misalignments between managerial and shareholder interests. The lecture highlights issues like greenmail, golden parachutes, poison pills, and shark repellents, which can undermine true value creation. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding power dynamics within a company, as these can significantly influence corporate decisions and governance.
Takeaways
- 🎯 The primary objective in corporate finance is to maximize the value of the business, focusing on both assets in place and growth assets.
- 📉 In practice, corporate finance often narrows its focus to maximizing stock prices, which can be a pragmatic approach due to the influence of stockholders.
- 🌐 Achieving the utopian condition where maximizing stock prices is the sole objective requires unrealistic assumptions, such as complete power of stockholders over managers, honest and timely information disclosure, and no social costs.
- 🤝 The effectiveness of the linkage between managers and stockholders is questionable, with mechanisms like annual meetings and Boards of Directors often failing to keep managers accountable.
- 💼 Managers may prioritize their interests over those of stockholders, leading to actions like greenmail, golden parachutes, and poison pills that protect their positions but not necessarily shareholder wealth.
- 🏦 The assumption that lenders will not get exploited if they lend money without protection is flawed, as seen in cases like RJR Nabisco's leveraged buyout.
- 📊 The assumption of timely and honest information disclosure by companies to financial markets is often violated, leading to market inefficiencies and misinformed trading.
- 🌐 The belief in the absence of social costs created by companies is unrealistic, as all businesses inherently create social costs that impact society.
- 🔍 Analyzing the power structure within a company is crucial for understanding where decisions are made and whose interests are being served, which can vary from managers to large shareholders or even governments.
- 🛑 The presence of activist shareholders or influential individuals, like Steve Jobs in Disney, can act as a catalyst for change and better represent the interests of smaller shareholders.
Q & A
What is the primary objective of corporate finance?
-The primary objective of corporate finance is to maximize the value of the business, which includes both assets in place and growth assets.
Why does the focus on maximizing stock prices become a narrower objective in practice?
-In practice, the focus narrows to maximizing stock prices because managers of publicly traded companies are often evaluated and compensated based on shareholder wealth, which is commonly measured by stock price performance.
What are the utopian conditions assumed for maximizing stock prices to be the only corporate objective?
-The utopian conditions include total power of stockholders over managers, lenders not getting ripped off even without protection, companies revealing news honestly and on time, rational and cool financial markets, and no social costs created by firms.
How do the mechanisms of annual meetings and Boards of Directors affect shareholder power over managers?
-Annual meetings and Boards of Directors are supposed to give shareholders power over managers, but in reality, they are often ineffective. Most shareholders don't attend annual meetings, and many proxies are not returned, leading to managers having significant control over votes. Additionally, Board members are often chosen by the CEO or are connected to management, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight.
What is the issue with the Disney Board of Directors in 1997 according to the script?
-The Disney Board of Directors in 1997 was considered problematic due to its large size of 17 members, the presence of eight insiders, the chairman also being the CEO, and the majority of outside members having personal connections to the CEO, leading to a lack of independent oversight.
What are some examples of managerial interests overshadowing shareholder interests?
-Examples include greenmail, golden parachutes, poison pills, shark repellents, and managerial ego driving acquisitions that don't make sense from a shareholder perspective.
How can the assumption of companies revealing information honestly and on time go wrong?
-Companies may delay bad news, commit errors of omission, or even engage in outright fraud, which means information does not reach financial markets freely and on time.
What is the significance of the shift in Disney's top shareholders from 2003 to 2009?
-The shift signifies a change in the power dynamics within the company. In 2009, Steve Jobs, who was known for pushing companies to change, became the largest shareholder, which could potentially lead to more proactive management and better alignment with shareholder interests.
Why is the structure of shareholding in companies like Tata Motors and Baidu significant from a corporate finance perspective?
-The structure of shareholding in companies like Tata Motors and Baidu indicates that decisions may be made in the best interest of the group or controlling entities rather than individual shareholders, which can affect shareholder value and influence the company's strategic direction.
What is the implication of the discussion on corporate finance objectives and the distribution of power within a company?
-The discussion implies that while the objective of corporate finance is to maximize stock prices, the distribution of power within a company can significantly influence whether this objective aligns with the interests of all shareholders, and it's crucial for investors to understand where the power lies and how it might affect their investments.
Outlines
📈 Maximizing Business Value in Corporate Finance
The session aims to explore the unique objective of corporate finance, which is to maximize the value of the business. The focus is on how this objective can also be a weakness. The speaker will discuss why corporate finance adopts this objective and how it is often narrowed down to maximizing stock prices in practice. The session will also cover the utopian conditions required for stock price maximization to be the sole corporate goal, and then examine the potential issues that can arise when these ideal conditions are not met. The concept of the financial balance sheet is reintroduced to explain how maximizing the value of assets, both existing and growth assets, is central to corporate finance.
🤔 The Pitfalls of Stock Price Maximization
This paragraph delves into the assumptions behind the utopian world where maximizing stock prices is the only corporate objective. It outlines the four linkages: managers and stockholders, firms and lenders/bondholders, firms and financial markets, and firms in society. The speaker assumes that stockholders have full control over managers, lenders are not exploited, firms are transparent with information, markets are rational, and there are no social costs. The paragraph then discusses the potential for these assumptions to be unrealistic, leading to various problems such as greenmail, golden parachutes, poison pills, shark repellents, and managerial self-interest over stockholder interests.
🏢 Power Dynamics and Corporate Governance Issues
The speaker examines the power dynamics within a company and the implications for corporate governance. They discuss the ineffectiveness of annual meetings and the Board of Directors in holding managers accountable. Examples such as Disney's Board in 1997 illustrate the issues with large boards, insider representation, and conflicts of interest. The paragraph highlights how these governance issues can lead to managers prioritizing their interests over those of the stockholders, and how the lack of stockholder power can result in decisions that do not benefit the company or its stockholders.
🔍 Analyzing Corporate Power Structures
The speaker encourages analyzing the power structure within a company to determine who has the ability to influence its direction. They discuss various scenarios where power might lie with managers, stockholders, or other entities. The speaker uses examples of companies like Disney, Valley, Tata Motors, and Baidu to illustrate different power dynamics and their impact on stockholders. They emphasize the importance of understanding where power resides and the potential influence of activist stockholders or powerful individuals in driving necessary changes within a company.
🛑 The Role of Activist Stockholders
In this paragraph, the speaker highlights the importance of activist stockholders in driving change within companies. They note that while the objective of corporate finance is to maximize stock prices, there are often multiple interests at play. The speaker uses the example of Steve Jobs becoming the largest stockholder in Disney after the acquisition of Pixar to illustrate how the presence of influential stockholders can be beneficial for driving change and challenging the status quo within a company.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Corporate Finance
💡Maximizing Value
💡Stockholder Wealth
💡Utopian Conditions
💡Managerial Interests
💡Golden Parachutes
💡Poison Pills
💡Social Costs
💡Corporate Governance
💡Activist Shareholders
Highlights
The endgame of corporate finance is to maximize the value of the business, focusing on both assets in place and growth assets.
The pragmatic shift in corporate finance objectives from maximizing business value to maximizing stockholder wealth due to managerial accountability to shareholders.
The reliance on stock prices as an objective measure of stockholder wealth introduces a subjective element into corporate finance.
Assumptions for a utopian corporate finance world include total power of stockholders over managers, honest financial market information, and no social costs.
The annual meeting and Board of Directors are ineffective mechanisms for stockholders to exercise power over managers.
Examples of managerial interests overriding stockholder interests include greenmail, golden parachutes, poison pills, and shark repellents.
The potential for managers to act in their self-interest rather than that of stockholders due to the lack of stockholder power.
The risk of lenders being exploited when they lend money without protecting themselves, as illustrated by the RJR Nabisco case.
The assumption of honest and timely information disclosure by firms to financial markets is often violated in reality.
Markets are not always rational or cool, with traders often making decisions based on short-term reactions and bad information.
The acknowledgment of social costs created by companies, contradicting the utopian assumption of their absence.
The process of identifying where power lies within a company and the potential for that power to be misused.
The case study of Disney's board in 1997 as an example of poor corporate governance with too many insiders and conflicts of interest.
The unique corporate structures of companies like Tata Motors and Baidu that can limit stockholder influence and control.
The importance of having activist stockholders like Steve Jobs to push for change and act as agents for stockholder interests.
The evolution of Disney's stockholder list from 2003 to 2009, reflecting changes in power dynamics and potential influence on corporate decisions.
The multifaceted interests at play in modern corporations, beyond the traditional objective of maximizing stock prices.
Transcripts
in this the second session of a
class I hope to talk about the
corporate finance every discipline needs
an endgame and in corporate finance that
endgame is what gives it focus in this
session I hope to look at what makes the
objective in corporate finance so
special and what makes it corporate
finances biggest weakness in this
session we're going to talk about the
objective in corporate finance
essentially let me show you the big
picture of corporate finance because in
a sense it will show you where we're
going with the session every discipline
needs a focus and the focus in corporate
finance comes from the fact that the
objective when you make decisions is
singular it is to maximize the value of
the business so what I'd like to do in
this session is look at why corporate
finance chooses that objective how it
gets narrowed in practice to a much
narrower objective of maximizing stock
prices lay out the utopian conditions
that you need for maximizing stock
prices to be the only objective you need
in a business then drip those utopian
conditions apart by talking about what
can go wrong and then we'll end the
session by leading into what we're going
to do next so let's get the process on
the road to understand the objective in
corporate finance it's best to go back
to the financial balance sheet that we
introduced in the very first session and
if you remember the financial balance
sheet there are two items on each side
there are assets in place and growth
assets on the asset side and debt and
equity on the other side so when you
talk about maximizing the value of the
business you're talking about maximizing
the value of the assets assets in place
and growth assets so put simply if
you're the top manager in a growth
company what I wanted to do is not just
maximize the value of the investments
you've already made but maximize the sum
of the values of the investments you've
made new growth assets you are the
steward of those growth assets so in
perfect corporate finance that's what
we'd like companies to do is to go out
and maximize the values of their
businesses but there are some pragmatic
considerations if you're the managing a
publicly traded company you're hired and
fired by stockholders you answer to them
you want to keep them happy and because
you want to keep them happy your focus
instead of maximizing the value of the
business becomes maximizing stockholder
wealth and here you face a pragmatic
issue if you accept that your job is to
maximize stockholder wealth and you want
to show your stockholders you are in
fact increasing their wealth you want an
objective measure I mean of course you
could hire a consulting firm to come in
and value your business every year but
that's a subjective judgment and people
are likely to disagree so what you'd
like is an objective third-party
estimate of stockholder wealth which
even if wrong is still objective that's
where stock prices come in if you're a
publicly traded company you could
essentially argue to your stockholders
that if your stock price went up
stockholder wealth has gone up and
implicitly you can also argue that
stockholder or stockholder wealth went
out the value of the business also went
up now that takes a whole set of
assumptions along the way but in
practice that is effectively what
happens in most companies when people
talk about maximizing something its
stock prices so let's take that and run
with it let's see what we'd need to
assume about the world for maximizing
stock prices to be the only objective
you need as a company I'm going to call
this a utopian word from its corporate
finance is born and the very fact that I
call it utopian should tell you
something about the assumptions that are
coming
utopia never existed and these
assumptions are blatantly unrealistic
but I'm going to state them anyway so
here are the assumptions you need for
maximizing stock prices to be the only
objective you need as a company I'm
going to state these assumptions in
terms of for linkages the first is the
linkage between managers and
stockholders the second is the linkage
between the firm and lenders /
bondholders the third is the linkage
between firms and financial markets and
the fourth is the linkage between firms
in society
here's what I'm going to assume about
each one I'm going to assume that
stockholders have total power over
managers they can hire them they can
fire them and because they have total
power I'm going to assume that managers
will go out and do stockholders bidding
in other words they will want to keep
stockholders happy at any cost I'm going
to assume that lenders if they lend
money to a company even if they don't
protect themselves will not get ripped
off so what I'm effectively assuming is
even if there are loopholes the size of
a Mack truck borrowers will not take
advantage of lenders why you could tell
it
a story that because if to go back to
those lenders you're not going to rip
them off but it is an assumption the
third linkage firms and financial
markets here's what I'm going to assume
I'm going to assume that companies
reveal news about themselves good and
bad or in a timely way and honestly I
told you that these were utopian
assumptions and I'm also going to assume
that markets are rational and cool the
trading room in this particular utopian
world would be filled with intellectual
people are involved in long discussions
about value nothing like a typical
trading room but in the utopian world
that's what I'm going to assume and
finally I'm going to assume there are no
social costs what a social cost these
are costs that companies create for
society that cannot be traced back and
charged to the company now why am I
making these assumptions I want to make
the world safe for maximizing stock
prices in other words I'm going to take
away all the bad ways in which you can
increase your stock price let's face it
you could increase the stock prices of
your stockholders
by going on going out and ripping off
your bondholders you can increase your
stock price by lying to financial
markets you can increase stock prices by
creating huge social costs you can't do
any of those things in the utopian world
that I've just described so that's the
world from which traditional corporate
finance is born now let's think about
what can go wrong in fact the title for
the slide should really be what cannot
go wrong because in a sense everything
that can go wrong will go wrong let's
take each of the linkages first remember
what I assumed about stockholders and
managers I assume that stockholders have
complete power over managers the two
mechanisms that stockholders have to
exercise power are the annual meeting
and the Board of Directors and neither
unfortunately is very effective at
keeping managers in line first let's
take the annual meeting most
stockholders don't show up at annual
meetings and it's not in their economic
best interest to do so because if you
own a thousand shares showing up an
annual meeting will wipe out a big chunk
of your profits so most of us get
proxies which we can vote even though
we're not at the meeting it allows us to
vote in absentia unfortunately though
most stockholders don't return their
proxies and here's what happens in
companies where proxies don't get
returned in most companies man
just get to vote those proxies
effectively that means at an annual
meeting if you're the if you're the
incumbent manager you might start off
with 45 50 or 55 percent of votes
already in your favor it is very
difficult to get a vote against
incumbent managers at an annual meeting
you think what about the board of
directors well think about it who comes
up with the name so the people who
served in the Board of Directors of a
publicly traded company it's not some
independent group of people who really
don't care about what the top management
thing in most cases either CEO or a
committee that thinks about what the CEO
would like to see there in most
companies the people who serve in the
board of directors are people that the
CEO once in the board fact let me show
you an example of a really bad board
here in my view is one of the worst
corporate boards created and it's
Disney's Board in 1997 they explain why
I think this is such a bad board first
there are 17 members in the board that's
way too many for a board in fact studies
show that once you get past about 9 or
10 members it becomes counterproductive
that's just too many people to make a
decision second eight of the 17 members
in this board are inside us they either
work for Disney or used to work for
Disney in other words they work for the
company that they oversee this is the
board after all that is supposed to keep
an eye on top management the third issue
with the board is the chairman of the
board Michael Eisner happens to be the
CEO of Disney now remember what this
board is supposed to do it's supposed to
keep an eye on the top management and
the person heading the board is the top
manager himself well good luck with that
the fourth and final factor is even if
you look at the nine outside of the
board they're really not outside us they
all have connections to Michael Eisner
in one way or the other in fact as you
go down the list you will see Michael
Eisner zs-- personal attorney on the
board you'd see the head mayor
headmistress of the prayer of the
elementary school that his kids went to
you'd see somebody from Georgetown
University that his son attended in
other words that the tangle of conflicts
of interests here is pretty deep and
this is the board that's supposed to
keep an eye on Michael Eisner
during the 1990s Disney did some very
strange things from a stockholder
perspective and often you'd see people
asking why
the board let michael eisner do that the
answer lies in this particular board
this is the board that is supposed to
keep an eye on Michael Eisner there is
little chance that it will accomplish
that objective
this is a rubber-stamp board and
unfortunately in most companies the
Board of Directors acts as a rubber
stamp for top management so let me go
back to the previous page and and return
to my story stockholders have little
power now over managers because the
annual meeting is not very effective and
the Board of Directors works more for
the managers than it does for the
stockholders so you think so what well
managers given a choice will then put
their interests of a stockholder
interests again I'm going to move
forward a couple of slides to illustrate
some examples of managerial interests
overwhelming stockholder interests here
are five examples of managers putting
their interests of a stockholder
interests the first is what's called
green male what's green male it's just
like black male but it's a lot more
money and it's legal it's often in
response to a hostile acquisition where
the managers do not want the company to
be acquired here's what they do they go
to the acquirer and offer him 50 hundred
150 million dollars more - just go away
often they you stockholder wealth to
fight off the hostile acquisition the
only interest being served in green mail
are the interests of the managers not
the stockholders second is golden
parachutes golden parachutes are special
deals put into compensation contracts by
managers after they've been targeted in
a hostile acquisition the only purpose
again of golden parachutes is to protect
the managers in case the company gets
taken over again stockholder interests
are way down the line the third example
is poison pills a poison pill is
something you introduced into your
company to make it unpalatable to
acquirers basically it makes hostile
acquisitions much more difficult and in
the process makes it less likely that
your stockholders will get a premium on
their stock price the fourth are shark
repellents these are special anti
takeover amendments put into a company
at least on these the stock holders get
to vote but as we said earlier because
most stock holders do not
show up at annual meetings many of these
antitakeover amendments find their way
into the corporate charter here's a
simple one instead of having to acquire
51% to buy a company there are some
companies where that threshold can be
raised to 60 70 or even 80 percent and
finally and here's where you see in
commits managers and stockholder
interests really clash if you're the
acquiring company in an acquisition and
you're using stockholder money to do the
acquisitions the case of many CEOs their
ego and self-interest will drive them to
do acquisitions which really make no
sense from a stockholder perspective but
all of this again relates back to a
fundamental problem which is that
stockholders of little power over
managers so again going back to pages
what can go wrong if stockholders have
little power over managers managers are
going to do things that are not in
stockholders interests and you can't
blame them
self-interest is the dominant paradigm
when it comes to human behavior take the
second linkage I assume that lenders
lend money to a company and they don't
protect themselves what can go wrong
lots as we see in stories that happen
all around us when banks and bondholders
lend money to firms and they don't
protect themselves they are often
exploitive me give you an example RJR
nabisco company they've been around a
long time in the early 1980s a lot of
people who bought our journal Bisco bond
saying hey it's a well-established
company it's got a great reputation what
can go wrong
four years later our Gen abisco is
targeted in a leveraged buyout you think
what's that well KKR a private equity
firm in New York targeted RJR nabisco
and they quadrupled Nabisco's debt in
the process they impoverished existing
bondholders and lenders in fact on the
day of the LBL Nabisco bond prices
dropped by 20% in fact I've introduced a
word into the finance lexicon that I
called Nabisco if you bought if you lend
money to a company and you don't protect
yourself you are begging to be in abbis
code let's take the linkage within firms
in financial markets I assume that firms
reveal information to financial markets
honestly and on time in what universe
the universe that I live in company
constantly delay bad news they might not
lie but there are errors of omission
rather than errors of commission once in
a while you do get companies that cross
the line and commit outright fraud in
other words information does not get to
financial markets
freely and on time and in response
markets are not angelic either the
trading room that I described full of
polite intellectuals well that's not
exactly the trading room you see in the
real world traders tend to be short-term
they tend to be reactive and often they
make decisions on bad information so
markets are not that cool and not that
rational and finally we know that
companies create social costs not just
bad companies but all businesses create
social costs it's unavoidable so the
assumption that there are no social
costs is laughable this is the word we
live in if you go out and our CEOs to
maximize stock prices in this particular
world you can see that terrible things
can happen to companies and terrible
things can happen to people around
companies you can maximize stock prices
by doing all the wrong things that is of
course a problem because traditional
corporate finance put so much weight on
market prices so here's what I'd like to
do I'd like to at least set the process
going by thinking about any company and
I'm going to take my companies through
this process and I'd encourage you to
pick a company in your own and take it
through this process what I'm going to
try to do is look at where the power in
my company lies or put differently if I
as a stockholder in this company
whatever that company might be we'll
have any say in how the company's run
power or Bors a vacuum and in any
publicly traded company it's going to go
somewhere and hear your choices it can
dress with the managers it can dress
with stockholders but it might dress
with inside stockholders we're inside
stockholders well in many big companies
these might be the people own large
stakes of stock and a have a say in the
management of the company it might
sometimes be with outside stockholders
you know in some odd cases it might
dress for the government it might lie
with lenders and even employees might
ever say in how a company is right one
of the first things you do before you
look at the numbers and the companies
look to see
where the power in a company lies so
with my companies let me try here's what
I'm going to do I'm going to take each
of my companies and look at who own
shares in the companies and then ask a
question as a stockholder in that
company can I look at this list and
expect any of the people on this list to
watch out for my interests so let me
start with this me in 2003 I was a
stockholder in 2003 and as I looked at
this list that year my stomach dropped
because out of this out of the 17 top
stockholders in Disney and these were
the 17 top stockholders in Disney 2003
16 were institutional investors mutual
funds and pension funds you're saying so
what well we know how institutional
investors react to disappointment if
they don't like the way a company's run
rather than stand and fight or get the
company to change the way it's run they
walk away this sell and move on so
that's what I'd expect these 16
institutional investors to do they're
not going to be looking out for my
interests the only individual on that
list is Roy Disney and at least in 2003
he was still part of Disney's top
management so I don't have much hope
resting on him either the case of Disney
I'm afraid as an individual stockholder
I don't see much hope in 2003 the second
company I'm going to look at is Valley
valleys two classes of shares and that
already makes me a little unhappy as a
stockholder in Valley
I own the shares with the fuel voting
rights their higher voting ride shares
are basically held by seven entities
which control Valley one of them is an
entity called Valley spar which appoints
most of the directors for Valley they
effectively run the company so as a
stockholder in Valley what do I expect
to do not much I very little power in
the company because those seven big
investors inva in the in the voting
shares will run the company one added
can added feature in valley that might
make it an issue in corporate governance
they have a golden share what's a golden
share a golden shares a share with veto
power and the Brazilian government owns
it what it effectively gives the
Brazilian government the power to do is
make a judgment on big decisions and say
no
again as a stockholder in volley I have
to I've to walking with open eyes and
recognize that sometimes there will be
things that I want violate to do that
they will not be able to do because of
that golden share third case I looked at
Toyota Motors and I looked at the top
stockholders and I noticed quite a few
Tata companies on that list
remember I said Tata Motors was part of
a family group called the Tata Group the
way these companies preserve control for
the families by holding shares in each
other it becomes almost impossible for
outsiders to change the way these
companies are run so the case of Tata
Motors here's what I expect to see as we
go through this process I expect to see
a lot of decisions made by the company
that are in the best interest of the
group but may not be in my best interest
as a Tata Motors stockholder the fourth
company that I looked at was Baidu and
Baidu is a very unique holding structure
when you buy shares and Baidu you're not
buying shares and Baidu the chinese
search engine you're buying shares in
Baidu the Cayman Islands shell company
that company has a legal arrangement
with the operating company in China
allowing it to run the company and
collect the profits but that legal
arrangement might be subject to
oversight by the Chinese government the
Chinese government might decide tomorrow
the day after that that legal
arrangement does not hold up I'm in a
very weak position when it comes to
Baidu because I don't control the real
company and I definitely don't control
the management of the company but that
again is something you have to factor
and when you look at corporate finance
decisions and here's the final slide I
want to show you I showed you what
Disney look like in 2003 fast-forward
six years here's what Disney stopped
seventeen stockholders look like in 2009
notice a very big difference who's on
top of the list Steve Jobs right how did
Steve Jobs become the largest
stockholder in Disney well he owned 60%
of Pixar and when Disney bought Pixar he
became the largest stockholder in Disney
as a stockholder in Disney doesn't
matter to me
I think so I feel a little more
comfortable with these stockholders in
2009 than I did in 2003 not because
Steve Jobs is watching art for me
but because I have a feeling that he
will push the company to change if it
needs change in other words we want
somebody rocking the boat as
stockholders because existing management
is stuck with inertia and as far as I'm
concerned Steve Jobs is going to be my
agent for change in 2009 so what you're
looking at in a company is basically
things that might change the way the
company is run and whether any of the
managers in this company can be forced
to do things differently not because you
own a thousand shares but because
there's somebody on this list who's
activists and enough powerful enough to
make changes so it might be a call I can
it might be a Bill Ackman it might be a
book sure Hathaway but you want somebody
pushing for your interest because you
really don't have the power to make the
change yourself so as we go through this
process remember the objective and
corporate finance might be maximizing
stock prices but there are multiple
interests at play in a modern
corporation thank you
you
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