Wreckage Of Titan Submersible Reveal How It Imploded

Summary

Scott Manley discusses the ongoing investigation into the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible, which occurred while exploring the Titanic wreck. He shares details from witness testimonies and new footage of the wreckage. Key points include the design flaws of the sub's carbon fiber hull, possible failure points, and testimonies from fired engineers and experts. Manley explores the science behind the sub's catastrophic failure and provides his own analysis on why the implosion likely began at the interface between the carbon fiber and titanium end rings.

Takeaways

• 🔍 The investigation into OceanGate's Titan submersible disaster, which occurred while exploring the Titanic, is now public, revealing detailed testimonies and insights.
• 🛠️ Several key engineers, including one who was fired after questioning design choices, have testified, sharing their concerns about the sub's safety.
• 🚤 The submersible's lead engineer and operations manager, both fired for raising safety concerns, emphasized design flaws, including an incident where the CEO crashed a submarine into the Andrea Doria wreck.
• 📉 The sub’s final moments showed unreliable communications via an acoustic modem, with the last message stating they had dropped two weights, indicating an attempt to slow descent, not an emergency.
• 💥 The implosion was violent and instantaneous, with evidence suggesting a catastrophic failure at the carbon fiber hull’s forward section, which is where water pressure likely penetrated first.
• 🔧 Carbon fiber, used in the Titan’s pressure hull, was questioned for its reliability, despite successful Navy use of similar materials, though design and manufacturing flaws likely contributed to the failure.
• 📹 New footage from an ROV shows extensive wreckage, with the forward carbon fiber pressure hull shattered and the rear sections more intact, indicating the failure started in the front.
• 🧪 Engineering analysis, including finite element studies, predicted buckling in the pressure hull, but real-world construction flaws may have exacerbated the structural weaknesses.
• 🔩 A key interface between the titanium rings and the carbon fiber hull may have been the weak point where the failure began, possibly due to mismatched compression properties between the materials.
• ⚠️ Cost-cutting, regulatory sidestepping, and poor-quality control during manufacturing—such as improper humidity control during carbon fiber layup—likely compounded the risks and led to the disaster.

Q & A

What is the focus of the investigation mentioned in the transcript?

The investigation focuses on the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible during its expedition to the Titanic wreck.

Who were the key witnesses mentioned in the testimony so far?

Key witnesses include a lead engineer who was fired for questioning design decisions, David Lockridge (a Scottish submersible expert), and Tim Catterson, who managed the launch of the submersible.

What incident involving the CEO Stockton Rush was highlighted by David Lockridge?

David Lockridge detailed how CEO Stockton Rush crashed a submarine into the wreck of the Andrea Doria, a prior incident involving poor operational decisions.

What are the suspected causes of the Titan submersible’s failure?

The suspected cause is the failure of the carbon fiber pressure hull, potentially due to a weak interface between the carbon fiber barrel and the titanium end rings, causing the vessel to implode under extreme pressure.

What was unusual about the communication system on the Titan submersible?

The submersible used an acoustic modem, sending clicks through water to communicate with the ship. Communication was unreliable, with the last message indicating the sub had dropped weights to slow its descent before contact was lost.

What did the first footage from the ROV reveal about the submersible wreckage?

The ROV footage revealed the tail cone of the submersible, which was largely intact. It also showed the shattered carbon fiber around the pressure hull, suggesting a failure at the front of the pressure vessel.

What evidence suggests that the failure started at the front of the submersible?

Debris patterns indicated that the failure began at the forward bulkhead, with the carbon fiber being pushed backward into the tail cone. This suggests that water entered from the front, causing the implosion.

Why was carbon fiber considered a poor material choice for the Titan’s pressure hull?

Many experts believed that using carbon fiber was risky because it is less predictable under high pressures, unlike steel or titanium. There were concerns about manufacturing imperfections and stress at the interfaces.

What was unusual about the oxygen scrubber design used in the Titan submersible?

The oxygen scrubber was a homemade design involving a plastic container with a small fan to blow air over the absorbent material, which raised safety concerns.

What role did cost-cutting and regulatory avoidance play in the Titan's failure?

Cost-cutting and regulatory avoidance were significant contributors to the failure. CEO Stockton Rush ignored warnings, fired engineers who questioned safety, and implemented substandard designs to reduce costs.

Outlines

00:00

🔍 Investigating the Titan Submersible Disaster

The speaker, Scott Manley, begins by discussing the investigation into the Titan submersible disaster that occurred over a year ago near the wreck of the Titanic. The testimony of several witnesses has revealed new details, such as the firing of a lead engineer who questioned design decisions and the testimony of submersible expert David Lockridge, who highlighted operational failures. Manley expresses his fascination with engineering disasters and the learning opportunities they present, discussing the instantaneous nature of the sub’s failure and the initial certainty that no survivors would be recovered.

05:01

🛠️ Submarine Design and Failure Speculation

Manley goes on to describe the design of the Titan submersible, which consisted of a carbon fiber pressure section and titanium hemispheres. He explains that while carbon fiber was deemed risky by many, the U.S. Navy had successfully used it in the past. The key questions in the investigation center on where the failure occurred—whether it was in the carbon fiber or other parts of the sub. The recent release of documents and engineering studies suggest the likely failure point was a buckle in the middle of the vessel, but imperfections in translating designs to working products are always a concern.

10:02

📡 Unreliable Communications and ROV Footage

This section explains the unreliability of communications between the submersible and the surface ship, using acoustic modems to send data. The final message sent from the sub indicated the dropping of weights, but nothing indicated an emergency. Manley details new footage from an ROV showing the wreckage of the sub, including the nose cone and shattered carbon fiber pieces. The implosion likely began at the forward dome, with water rushing in and pushing debris towards the rear of the sub, resulting in the catastrophic failure.

15:03

⚠️ Analysis of the Sub’s Implosion

Manley provides a technical breakdown of how the implosion may have occurred, speculating that the failure began at the forward bulkhead. He suggests that once a crack forms, water rushes in, causing rapid destruction, particularly in the carbon fiber hull. He contrasts his theory with previous simulations, which often showed the failure in the middle of the sub due to peak stress. Manley believes this new evidence will lead to revised analyses and discusses the epoxy interface used between the carbon fiber and titanium sections of the sub.

🧩 Design Flaws and Subpar Materials

In this section, Manley discusses concerns about the materials and construction of the submersible, such as the quality of carbon fiber and the possibility of improper environmental conditions during assembly. He references a 300-page study on the U.S. Navy’s use of similar materials and how differences in compression moduli between carbon fiber and titanium can create stress points. Manley also criticizes the design of other key systems, like the atmosphere scrubber, and expresses concern over the numerous cost-cutting measures implemented by OceanGate's CEO.

💡 Final Thoughts on the Sub’s Failure

Manley concludes by reflecting on the various corners cut in the design of the Titan submersible and how these decisions likely contributed to its failure. He highlights the troubling nature of seeing photos of the construction process and describes one particular design flaw involving the layup of carbon fiber in a spiral pattern. Despite being intrigued by the new information, he expresses discomfort with learning through such a tragic disaster and acknowledges that further details will likely emerge from the ongoing investigation.

Keywords

💡Titan Submersible

The Titan submersible was a submersible vehicle developed by OceanGate that tragically imploded while on a mission to explore the Titanic wreck site. It is central to the video's narrative, which investigates the failure of the Titan's carbon fiber pressure hull and the subsequent investigation by authorities.

💡Carbon Fiber Pressure Hull

The carbon fiber pressure hull is a cylindrical component of the Titan submersible designed to withstand extreme underwater pressures. The video highlights this as the most likely failure point in the sub’s catastrophic implosion. Carbon fiber's application in submersibles is discussed in detail, including concerns about its suitability for deep-sea missions.

💡Implosion

An implosion occurs when external pressure exceeds the strength of a vessel, causing it to collapse inward. The Titan submersible experienced an implosion due to the failure of its pressure hull at extreme depths, leading to the instantaneous destruction of the vessel and loss of life. The video explores how this process occurred and its brutal consequences.

💡Finite Element Analysis

Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is an engineering simulation method used to predict structural behavior under stress. The video references FEA studies that modeled the Titan’s structure, particularly predicting how the pressure hull might buckle under deep-sea pressures. Despite FEA showing the design could work on paper, real-world imperfections led to failure.

💡Titanium Hemispheres

Titanium hemispheres were used on each end of the Titan’s carbon fiber pressure hull. These titanium components, designed to withstand the pressure at extreme depths, are contrasted with the weaker carbon fiber material. The failure of the carbon fiber at the interface with these hemispheres is highlighted as a potential cause of the implosion.

💡Acoustic Modem

An acoustic modem is a communication device that transmits data through water using sound waves. In the video, the Titan's unreliable communication system, which used acoustic modems, is discussed as one of the challenges in monitoring the submersible's status. The last message sent via this modem indicated that weights were dropped before contact was lost.

💡Epoxy Glue Interface

Epoxy glue was used to bond the carbon fiber hull of the Titan to the titanium end rings. The video explains that the glue layer was crucial for the structural integrity of the vessel but may have been a weak point in the design. The potential for uneven application or subpar glue quality is considered a contributing factor to the sub’s failure.

💡Stockton Rush

Stockton Rush was the CEO of OceanGate and the person responsible for the design and development of the Titan submersible. He is mentioned in the video for his role in making controversial design decisions and dismissing safety concerns raised by engineers and other experts, which may have contributed to the tragedy.

💡Buckling

Buckling refers to a structural failure where a material collapses under compressive stress. In the case of the Titan, finite element analysis predicted that the most likely failure mode would be buckling of the pressure hull. The video discusses how buckling of the carbon fiber mid-section was considered a likely cause of the implosion.

💡ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle)

An ROV is an unmanned, remotely controlled underwater vehicle used to explore deep ocean environments. The video mentions how ROVs from Pelagic Research were used to recover footage of the Titan wreckage, providing crucial visual evidence of the failure points in the submersible’s design.

Highlights

Investigation into OceanGate’s Titan submersible incident has begun after over a year of speculation.

The lead engineer was fired after raising concerns about design decisions despite his experience working on the space shuttle solid rocket boosters.

David Lockridge, a Scottish submersible expert, was also fired after repeatedly confronting the CEO, Stockton Rush, over safety concerns.

CEO Stockton Rush previously crashed a submarine into the wreck of the Andrea Doria, raising further questions about his competence.

The testimony by Tim Catterson, who was involved in the operation, details how communication with the Titan submersible was lost just before disaster struck.

The implosion was instantaneous due to extreme water pressure, described as a transition where human biology turns into physics.

New footage from an ROV shows the failed pressure hull and parts of the submersible, giving clues to the cause of the disaster.

Initial assumptions pointed to the carbon fiber pressure hull being the point of failure, as carbon fiber was seen as a risky choice for deep-sea submersibles.

The US Navy had previously tested carbon fiber submersibles, but OceanGate’s design was criticized for potential flaws in how materials like carbon fiber and titanium were integrated.

The ROV footage suggests the implosion began at the front of the pressure vessel, causing carbon fiber to be pushed back and crushing everything inside.

The failure likely occurred at the interface between the carbon fiber barrel and the titanium end rings, potentially due to poor material integration or stress at the joints.

David Lockridge highlighted potential construction issues, such as humidity and substandard prepreg carbon fiber material being used in building the hull.

Poor construction practices, including potential excess stress at the joints and mismatched material compression properties, may have contributed to the failure.

Footage of the epoxy glue interface between carbon fiber and titanium shows concerns about the build quality of the vessel.

Stockton Rush's cost-cutting decisions, including a homemade CO2 scrubber and avoidance of regulatory oversight, raise further concerns about safety and design integrity.

Transcripts

hello it's Scott Manley here it's been

over a year since ocean Gates Titan

submersible was crushed while visiting

the wreck of the Titanic and now we are

finally getting a look at the

investigation that has been going on

into what happened for the last couple

of days I've been watching and listening

to Witnesses who have been testifying

before uh you know US Coast Guard uh

inquiry I think we've got like another 9

days wor of testimony and a lot of

witnesses but the ones we've seen so far

are well they've been they've told me a

lot and this is I'm fascinated by the

way things fail but we have the lead

engineer who was fired after questioning

some of the design decisions his

background by the way includes work on

the space shuttle solid rocket boosters

and then yesterday we had uh David

Lockridge who's a Scottish submersible

expert who ran their operations uh right

up until the point he get fired for you

know embar ing the CEO a little too many

times he went into detail on how the CEO

Stockton Rush crashed a submarine into

the wreck of the andread DOR and then

there's Tim catterson who he put the sub

in the water he watched it go down had

breakfast came back and found out they'd

lost Communications he ended up sticking

around throughout the search and rescue

and recovery and I'm sure you know that

I am fascinated by engineering disasters

and you know understanding why things

failed does a lot is a lot to do with

how I learn how things work and so yes I

have a you certain you know let's say

morbid Fascination about how exactly

this failed obviously very early on uh I

was sure this was going to be a failure

and it was going to be recovering not

bodies but remains with water pressures

of 400 atmospheres or thereabouts the

failure of the submarine would have been

mercifully instantaneous

at the time I believe the phrase that I

used was that you know humans in this

situation stopped being biology and

started being physics and honestly that

was paraphrasing

XKCD but even with this knowledge that

the implosion of the submersible would

have been violent and instantaneous that

still left a lot of questions about

exactly how this would happen would it

was the implosion a failure in the

carbon fiber around the middle at the

ends was it the the window which of

course was not rated to those depths

what exactly happened and we didn't have

any clues we had some pictures of

wreckage well now we actually have

footage from an ROV from pelagic

research these uh this this was actually

I believe the second ROV the first one

was from a different uh ship and it was

not able to handle the depths and got

crushed but this shows us the footage

which was the moment where they were

absolutely sure there was no recovery

possible showing the T tail cone from

Ocean Gate submersible damaged but

actually largely intact and many people

have been pointing out the ratchet strap

which is wrapped around it and it seems

to have worked just fine so this was a

non-pressurized section in the hull that

contained support equipment it contained

like batteries it contained

Communications it powered the thrusters

and in front of that was actually the

pressurized section this section didn't

fail this was just separated from the

rest when the pressure vessel in front

of it had a catastrophic failure the

basic design had a cylindrical carbon

fiber pressure section with titanium

hemispheres on each end the service

module on the back and then around this

there were the thrusters the landing

gear uh and various other pieces of

hardware and the general assumption was

that the carbon fiber had failed why

because everybody thought that carbon

fiber being used in a submersible was a

bad idea albeit despite the fact that

the US Navy had in fact successfully

built a carbon fiber submersible that

went to deeper depths for many more um

voyages the advanced underwater search

system was basically a one-off carbon

fiber pressure Hull vehicle and they had

been testing it because they wanted to

consider moving larger submersibles to

um you know Carbon Fiber based system

because it would be easier to build that

kind of stuff I believe this also used

titanium hemispheres at each end so

there was a lot of detail out there on

how this thing gets built as part of the

hearing they've also posted a number of

other documents online giving us new

details into you know the this the work

that was done including a bunch of

engineering studies finite element

analysis looking at the structure and

specifically saying well you know the

failure mode The Logical failure mode

would be a collapse a Buckle in the

middle of the vessel and sure well this

shows the could work on paper

translating the paper into a working

product sometimes leads to imperfections

anyway one of the important things they

also published was the transcript it and

they did it in the form of an animation

showing basically the final um you know

desent and what is important to take

away from this is that this wasn't

something where they thought there was

something going wrong if there it was

that wasn't evidence in any of the

communications what we do see is the

communications were really unreliable

this is via an acoustic modem basically

it's making click sounds that are

traveling through the water to the ship

up top and the messages are piggybacked

on top of this there's also some

Telemetry being sent up and that's how

they know the depth that it's at now the

last message that was sent says dropped

two weights and then a few seconds later

contact is lost this was at a depth of

33 346 M they still had a few hundred M

to go towards the bottom this wasn't an

emergency situation if they were wanting

to come back up they would have dropped

more weights no this was just to slow

their descent so that they wouldn't come

to the bottom you know and potentially

Bang into things I I mean to be clear we

can't know for sure maybe the hull was

making weird noises and people were

asking to go back up and he just said oh

we'll drop a couple of Weights we don't

honestly know but now as of a few hours

ago we have the first footage from the

ROV showing the failed pressure Hull and

this does show probably where the

failure began to happen so what we're

seeing here that is the nose cone that

is the Sor of the front hemisphere there

we saw that come up to the surface

without the window in it it doesn't look

like the windows there but there is the

main pressure Hull and around it you can

see shattered pieces of carbon fiber

composite you can also see the rear uh

hemisphere you can tell it's the rear

hemisphere because it has the anchor

points for the the tail cone there so if

we pause it like first of all you can

see that a lot of the carbon fiber

composite has essentially been pushed

back inside that tail cone and yes that

is where the occupance would be and and

you can imagine with that pressure

pushing that material in very quickly it

would just be a mess like the human

brain works on orders of a fraction of a

second this would take milliseconds the

the the brain simply wouldn't perceive

this happening before it stopped

functioning so now in front of the rear

Dome you can also see the titanium ring

which was interfaced to the barrel

section to the the carbon fiber section

now if you compare this to the nose it's

just sitting there like on its own

there's very little debris around it so

this is telling me that the failure that

happened was at the front of the

pressure module so the water is all

flowing in from one end carrying the

debris down and the other end is more or

less just kicked off by the rebound

that's why it's kind of clean also we

know that it wasn't the window that

failed because if the window had failed

you would have water flowing in and then

you would basically have the uh Hull

getting blasted outwards instead we see

uh carbon fiber being pushed into the

rear of that hemisphere that means it

was an implosion of the carbon fiber

vessel starting at the forward Dome and

the difference is so Stark this leads me

to believe that this is actually a

failure at the interface between the uh

carbon fiber barrel and the titanium

rings which are used to mount on the end

plates now notably nowhere in this

footage do I see any sign of that

forward ring it was clearly kicked away

from this and moved sufficiently fast

that it it's fallen out of sight and to

be fair it is probably more you know

like aerodynamic hydrodynamic I guess

than those big spherical end caps so

it's likely that it moved a bit further

after the initial event and given that

the event probably began around that

ring I could see it getting pushed a bit

faster I suspect we're going to get more

details on this uh in coming days I I'm

pretty sure there will be some evidence

on the forward ring which was absolutely

brought to shore okay so just to explain

what I I just said the this is what I

think actually happened I think the

failure begins somewhere along this

front bulk head right somewhere between

these two things and you got to imagine

yes that there is a bulk head here sorry

they have a sphere right here right and

you've got the window on the front and

somewhere around this

circumference water basically starts

pushing in or it breaks or there's a

crack and the cracks once a crack starts

it propagates backwards right you get

water will start pushing its way in and

you got imagine that this stuff starts

getting pushed in all the way around

right so the water is pushing this in

and as it runs down you're going to have

these cracks and more stuff is going to

get pushed backwards like this as the

sides get squished inwards right so this

is what's happening now equally you got

the water is kind of rushing into this

Gap here and it fills this Gap and will

pop this window out that's why it's not

in there there and the pressure will

also just knock this entire section off

on its own right the water's like flying

backwards it smashes into this bulkhead

obviously everything in here gets

smashed up against this bumps into this

and the tail will get detached off on

its own as it recoils so what you're

left with is the hemisphere the

ring and uh a whole bunch of carbon

fiber debris and whatever is left left

inside this all shattered that's what I

think this is showing this is why I

think we have a failure here if we had a

failure in the middle then this sort of

failure process would would propagate in

both directions and you would have

carbon fiber debris in here and in here

right that is my conjecture I should

also point out that this is radically

different from all the other uh Ocean

Gate Titan failure simulations and

there's been a lot of these on YouTube

using a very sophisticated techniques I

will say great work but they all show a

failure in the middle of the vessel

because that's where the peak stress is

so now I'm sure we'll see some of these

people redo their work with the new

knowledge that we have gained in the

last uh you couple of days and so we do

actually have footage of the

installation of these titanium end Rings

the end rings that act as the interface

to the hemispheres and the way this

works it is literally like an epoxy glue

that gets laid on along the end of this

you don't want it to be too thick it has

to be a nice thin even layer and then

you have to do the same to your titanium

rings and you see that they have a

Groove which more or less matches to the

dimensions of the uh the carbon fiber

pressure Hull and then of course you got

to line this up drop it in there and it

will stick in place and that's your

interface and if you're sitting there

looking at this and saying well that's

obviously a newbie stake they shouldn't

have done that this is pretty much what

the US Navy did on their design so um

it's not necessarily bad but I think the

problem is a little more subtle than

this being a dumb idea so there's like a

300 page paper on that US Navy submarine

design and they actually test models to

destruction but they they point out that

when they did the test of Destruction

they did it using steel end plates and

if if I remember correctly they go into

some detail pointing out that you have

to match basically the compressive modu

so in engineering you have like the

modulus of compression and tension

basically how much force you put on it

changes the length of something so

modulus of compression is just like how

much it changes when you apply a certain

pressure and you need to have the

titanium section and the carbon fiber

section both agree rough on how much

they Flex when pressure is applied

otherwise what will happen is you will

get a transfer you will get extra stress

at the joins like over the last year

we've heard a lot of stories about how

the carbon fiber composite used in this

may have been you know a little cut

price that they might have bought some

prepreg cheap from boing that was passed

at sell by dat that they might not have

you know controlled the environment

during the the layup as well as they

could have there could be excess

humidity that there might have been

there might have been no like testing

that was performed and so if this was

even you know off by a few percent then

that could well add up to extra stress

at these interfaces that M might

accidentally or might ultimately explain

why we got this failure here of course

it could just be that the glue was crap

and that fell apart but you know I'm

trying to find um interesting answers

let's say and yeah interesting is one

way of describing some of the photos

that we saw of the construction like

this jubia o-ring design uh these were

brought out by David this is a piece of

carbon fiber composite which was cut off

the end on the right there that is

showing light from a flashlight shining

through this now to be fair this is from

the end piece of the very first one that

they did when you are like laying up a

cylinder right you're basically running

this stuff in a spiral pattern it's like

a ribbon you're laying as a spiral

pattern and as you get to the end you

have to change direction and when you

change direction then the layup doesn't

quite lay flat so you get a little

excess at the end where things aren't

quite as good as they should be and of

course you then fix this by just cutting

off those end pieces and they gave out

those end pieces to uh like friends

people that were involved and of course

that doesn't it doesn't look great but

that was an end piece so hey you know

maybe it's okay how about this this was

uh Stockton's idea for how they would do

atmosphere scrubbing as I'm sure you

know the human body metabolizes its food

and it you're exhaling excess carbon

dioxide and water and if you're not

dumping the atmosphere overboard you

need to scrub that out so you have

things like lithium hydroxide and you

will blow air over it and it will absorb

it well his homade oxygen scrubber

design was a you know a plastic

container with uh a base that was

instead a grill of metal you would put

your absorbent in that and then there

was like a little PC you know computer

fan at the top that would blow air

through it I'm not sure how well this

would work but frankly I'm just

terrified that that was you know what

their prototype was I mean people are

making jokes about the video game

controller but actually I don't have a

problem with that at all it was the

multitude of other Corners which were

cut in the name of cut

costs compounded by his uh continual

efforts to sidestep regulations and fire

anybody who thought they knew better and

disagreed with the designs so look I'm

sure we're going to find out a whole lot

more in the coming days I know I'm going

to be listening I'm sure some of you

might start but uh I I I'm sure some of

the people will tell me all sorts of

fascinating and new interesting things

but I wish I didn't have to learn things

this way I'm Scott Manley fly safe

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