PHILOSOPHY - Mind: Mind-Body Dualism [HD]
Summary
TLDRIn this philosophical discussion, Alex Byrne from MIT explores the concept of mind-body dualism, the idea that we are not merely physical entities but possess immaterial minds or souls. Byrne introduces the argument with a focus on its implications for the possibility of life after death. Drawing on the work of philosopher Saul Kripke, Byrne presents a simplified version of the Cartesian dualism argument, using the distinction between contingent and necessary truths to argue that one's identity is not identical to their physical body, suggesting the potential for a non-physical aspect of existence.
Takeaways
- 🎓 Alex Byrne, a philosophy professor at MIT, introduces the concept of mind-body dualism, which posits that the mind is not a physical entity but rather an immaterial one.
- 🧠 The mind-body dualism argument is significant for those who believe in the possibility of life after death, as it suggests that the mind could exist independently of the physical body.
- 🗣️ Rene Descartes, a 17th-century philosopher, is a prominent advocate for mind-body dualism, sometimes referred to as 'Cartesian dualism', which he explored in 'Meditations on First Philosophy'.
- 📚 The argument presented is a modern variant of Descartes's original, simplified by philosopher Saul Kripke in his book 'Naming and Necessity'.
- 🤔 The argument hinges on the distinction between contingent truths (which could have been otherwise) and necessary truths (which could not have been otherwise).
- 👤 It is proposed that while you and your physical body ('Bert') are closely connected, you are not identical to Bert, suggesting the mind and body are distinct entities.
- 🔍 The argument uses a thought experiment where one imagines existing without a body (disembodied) or with a different body ('Bertha'), suggesting the mind's existence does not depend on Bert's existence.
- 🚫 The concept of 'modus tollens', a logical rule of inference, is used to deduce that if it's possible for you to exist without Bert, then you cannot be identical to Bert.
- 🌐 The script challenges the viewer to consider the nature of personal identity and the relationship between the mind and the physical world.
- 📖 The discussion is part of a series that aims to explore philosophical arguments in an accessible manner, with the potential for future episodes to cover additional topics like the existence of God.
Q & A
What is mind-body dualism?
-Mind-body dualism is the philosophical view that the mind and the body are distinct types of entities, where the mind is non-physical or immaterial, and the body is physical.
Why is the concept of mind-body dualism important?
-The concept is important because if the mind is not a physical thing, it implies that the mind could potentially exist independently of the body, which has implications for the possibility of life after death and immortality.
Who is Rene Descartes and why is he significant in the context of mind-body dualism?
-Rene Descartes was a 17th-century philosopher who is most famously associated with mind-body dualism, sometimes referred to as Cartesian dualism. He is significant because he provided a philosophical argument for the existence of an immaterial mind separate from the physical body.
What is the difference between truths that could have been false and truths that could not have been false?
-Truths that could have been false are contingent, meaning they depend on certain conditions or circumstances that might have been different. Truths that could not have been false are necessary, meaning they are true in all possible circumstances, such as logical truths or truths of identity.
How does Saul Kripke's argument relate to Descartes' original argument for dualism?
-Saul Kripke's argument is a variant of Descartes' original argument for dualism. Kripke's version simplifies and modernizes the argument, making it accessible for contemporary philosophical discussion while maintaining the core idea of the distinction between the mind and the body.
What is the argument's conclusion regarding the relationship between the individual and their physical body?
-The argument concludes that the individual is not identical to their physical body, suggesting that the individual (the mind) could exist without the body (Bert), which supports the dualist view.
What is the first premise of the argument presented in the script?
-The first premise is that if it's true that you are Bert (your physical body), then it could not have been false that you are Bert, meaning that your identity as Bert is a necessary truth.
What is the second premise of the argument?
-The second premise is that it could have been false that you are Bert, based on the possibility of your existence without Bert, such as being disembodied or having a different body.
How does the argument use the concept of 'modus tollens' to reach its conclusion?
-The argument uses 'modus tollens', a logical inference rule, by presenting two premises: 'If P, then Q' and 'not Q', which logically imply 'not P'. In this case, 'P' is the statement 'you are Bert', and 'Q' is 'it could not have been false that you are Bert'. Since 'not Q' is true (it could have been false that you are Bert), 'modus tollens' leads to 'not P', concluding that you are not Bert.
What is the significance of the distinction between truths about language and truths about the world in the argument?
-The distinction is significant because the argument relies on the idea that truths about identity (like being Barack Obama) are necessary and not about language. This distinction helps to establish that the identity of the mind with the body (Bert) is contingent, not necessary, which supports the dualist position.
How does the script use the example of Barack Obama to illustrate the concept of necessary truths?
-The script uses the example to show that some truths, like the identity of a person, are necessary because they are true in all possible worlds. It contrasts this with contingent truths, which could have been different under different circumstances.
Outlines
🧠 Introduction to Mind-Body Dualism
Alex Byrne introduces the concept of mind-body dualism, the philosophical view that the mind is a non-physical entity separate from the physical body. Byrne explains that if we are not physical, we might be immaterial minds or souls. This has implications for the possibility of life after death, as physical bodies are destructible. Descartes, a famous proponent of dualism, argued for the immortality of the soul in his work 'Meditations on First Philosophy.' Byrne will present a simplified version of Descartes's argument as presented by Saul Kripke, focusing on the distinction between truths that could have been false and those that could not.
🤔 The Argument for Dualism
The argument for dualism is presented by contrasting truths that could have been different from those that are necessarily true. Byrne uses the example of Barack Obama to illustrate that some truths, like identity, are necessarily true and could not have been false. Applying this to the mind-body relationship, Byrne suggests that while it might be true that 'you are Bert' (your body), it could have been false because you could have existed without Bert. This leads to the conclusion that you are not identical to your body, supporting the dualist view that the mind is a distinct, non-physical entity.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Mind-Body Dualism
💡Immaterial Minds
💡Rene Descartes
💡Saul Kripke
💡Cartesian Coordinates
💡Logical Truth
💡Contingent Truth
💡Modus Tollens
💡Identity
💡Immortality
Highlights
Introduction to mind-body dualism by Alex Byrne, a philosophy professor at MIT.
Dualism posits that we are not physical or material things, but rather mental or immaterial entities.
The importance of dualism for the concept of immortality and life after death.
Rene Descartes, the 17th-century philosopher, as the most famous proponent of mind-body dualism.
Descartes' work 'Meditations on First Philosophy' and its promise to demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.
The argument presented is a variant of Descartes's argument by philosopher Saul Kripke.
The argument aims to show that the self is not identical to the physical body, named 'Bert' in the example.
The distinction between truths that could have been false and those that could not have been false.
Logical truths, such as the law of identity, as an example of truths that could not have been false.
The argument's first premise: If it's true that you are Bert, then it could not have been false that you are Bert.
The possibility of existing without a body (disembodied) or with a different body (Bertha) as a counterargument.
The second premise: It could have been false that you are Bert, based on the possibility of existing without Bert.
The use of 'modus tollens' logical inference to derive the conclusion that you are not Bert.
The conclusion of the argument supports the dualist view that the self is not identical to the physical body.
The practical implications of the argument for beliefs about personal identity and the afterlife.
Transcripts
(intro music)
So my name's Alex Byrne.
I teach philosophy at MIT, and today
I'm going to explain an argument
for so-called mind-body dualism,
the view that we are not physical or material things.
And if we're not physical or material things,
the natural alternative is that we're
mental things of some kind.
Immaterial minds or souls,
as it's sometimes put.
Hence the term "mind-body dualism."
On this view, the universe contains
two quite different sorts of things:
physical bodies like stones
and planets and brains on the one hand,
and non-physical minds on the other.
Well why is this view important?
Well, physical things normally
aren't around forever.
If I smash my watch into tiny pieces
or throw it in a furnace, that's the end
of this beautiful piece of Swiss engineering.
The watch doesn't exist anymore.
Similarly if your body is devoured by worms
or consumed in a crematorium,
that's the end of this beautiful piece
of biological engineering.
Your body doesn't exist anymore.
So, if you're a physical thing,
a complicated bag of cells,
then your eventual bodily destruction
means that there's no hope for immortality.
So, if you're invested in the prospect
of life after death, a lot hangs on
the argument for mind-body dualism.
The seventeenth-century philosopher Rene Descartes
is the most famous proponent
of mind-body dualism, and that's why
the view is sometimes called "Cartesian dualism."
You'll remember Cartesian coordinates
from high school geometry,
and Descartes invented those.
His most famous work is called
"Meditations on First Philosophy,"
which was published in Latin in 1641.
And the sub-title promises that the work
will demonstrate the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul.
We can only do so much in a few minutes,
so we'll have to leave the demonstration
of the existence of God
for another episode of Wi-Phi.
Now the argument I'm going to present
is not quite Descartes's argument
as we find it in the Meditations.
It's basically a variant of Descartes's argument,
given by the contemporary philosopher Saul Kripke
in his classic book "Naming a Necessity,"
which was published in 1980.
And what's more, it's a simplified version
of Kripke's argument.
But even with the simplifications,
I think we can see that it certainly
leads to an argument that deserves
to be taken seriously.
All right, so now to the argument.
Let's give your physical body a name.
Call it "Bert."
Everyone, dualist or not, can agree you and Bert
are intimately connected.
Stamp on Bert's toe, and you feel pain.
If you decide to get some aspirin,
that will result in Bert moving
towards the medicine cabinet.
However, that doesn't mean that you are Bert.
And according to the dualist, you aren't.
There are two things here: you and Bert.
And what the dualist argument tries to establish
is that you are not Bert.
More explicitly, you are not identical to Bert.
You are not one in the same thing as Bert.
Okay, so that's the conclusion.
So now, to prepare for the premises of
the argument, we need a distinction,
between truths that could have been false
and truths that could not have been false.
For example, here's a truth:
I am a philosopher.
That truth could have been false.
I could have been a plumber, say.
Plumbing might have struck me as a more
fulfilling and secure career than philosophy,
and I might have studied
for a plumbing certificate instead
of studying for a PhD in philosophy.
Here's another example:
it's true that there were dinosaurs.
But that could have been false.
Evolution could have failed to produce
any dinosaurs, or life might not have evolved at all.
So some truths, then, could have been false.
But some truths could not have been false.
They had to be true, come what may.
For example, here's a logical truth:
either there were dinosaurs, or there were no dinosaurs.
That's true, but it didn't just happen to be true.
It couldn't have been otherwise.
However the world turned out,
that logical truth would have been true.
Here's another example, which is
the relevant one for our purposes.
Imagine that the President of the United States, say,
is sitting opposite us.
I point to him and say, "He is Barack Obama."
That's true.
But could it have been false?
Well, how could it?
How could that very man fail to be Barack Obama?
We have just one thing here:
that man, also known as "Barack Obama."
When I say "He is Barack Obama,"
I'm picking out the same thing twice over.
It's as if I were to say "He,"
pointing at Obama, "is him," pointing at Obama again.
A thing can't fail to be identical to itself.
So "He," here I point at Obama,
"can't fail to be identical to Obama."
So, when I say "He is Obama," what I say
is not just true, it had to be true.
It's one of those truths like that
logical truth I just mentioned.
It could not have been false.
If you're inclined to doubt this,
you're probably thinking of some different,
but related, truth that could have been false.
For example, it's also true that he,
pointing at Obama, is named "Barack Obama."
But that's a truth that could have been false.
He might have had some, different name say Fred Blogs.
But the truth that he is Barack Obama is not the same
as the truth he's named Barack Obama.
The first truth is not about language,
although of course it is stated in language,
like truths in general.
It's just about the man, Barack Obama.
The second truth is about language,
at least in part.
Specifically, it's about the name "Barack Obama."
And of course these are quite different things.
Barack Obama is the president, but his name
has not been elected to any office.
All right, now we're ready for the argument.
Go back to you and Bert, your body.
Imagine I point to you and say "You are Bert."
Suppose that's true.
Then, since it's just like the Obama example,
it's one of those truths that could not have been false.
In other words, if it's true that you are Bert,
it had to be true that you were Bert.
You are Bert, come what may.
So this gives us the first premise
of our argument for dualism.
If it's true that you are Bert,
then it could not have been false that you are Bert.
But hold on.
Couldn't you have existed without Bert existing?
For example, you can imagine being
disembodied, not having a body at all
or you can imagine that you have
another body, Bertha, not Bert.
Imagining these situations is not at all
like imagining, or trying to imagine, say,
a situation in which there's a round square table.
That situation seems obviously impossible,
not a situation that could have obtained.
There could not have been a round square table.
But there seems nothing at all impossible
about a situation in which you exist without Burt existing,
perhaps because you're disembodied,
perhaps because you have Bertha
and not Bert as your body.
This is not the actual situation,
but it seems like a possible situation.
You could have existed without Bert existing.
But if you could have existed without Bert existing,
then it could have been false that you are Bert.
A situation in which you're around and Bert isn't
is a situation in which you aren't Bert.
So this gives us our second premise,
"it could have been false that you are Bert."
So now notice that the second premise
is the negation of the sentence
after the word "then," in the first premise.
So our two premises have
the following abstract form:
"If P, then Q; and not Q."
And premises of this form logically imply,
by a rule of inference called "modus tollens," "not P."
And our two plausible seeming premises, then, imply
"it's not true that you are Bert."
In other words, you are not Bert,
which is the dualist conclusion.
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