Peter Pomerantsev - Imperial Ambition, Autocracy and the Compulsion to Humiliate Drives Russia's War

Summary

En este profundo análisis, Peter Pomerantsev, periodista británico nacido en la Unión Soviética, desentraña las complejidades del liderazgo autoritario de Putin y el impacto de la propaganda rusa tanto dentro como fuera de sus fronteras. Con su historia personal entrelazada con la política rusa, Pomerantsev ofrece una visión única de cómo la narrativa del Kremlin ha influido en la sociedad rusa y global, destacando la resistencia ucraniana frente a la agresión rusa. A través de este diálogo, se exploran las dinámicas de poder, la manipulación mediática y la necesidad de una respuesta democrática robusta para contrarrestar la influencia autoritaria y asegurar la estabilidad regional.

Takeaways

• 🌍 La narrativa de Putin sobre el liderazgo autoritario y la agresión hacia Ucrania ha resonado con una parte de la población rusa, a pesar de las consecuencias negativas a largo plazo.
• 📚 Peter Pomerantsev, un periodista nacido en la Unión Soviética, ha escrito extensamente sobre la desinformación y la propaganda rusa, ofreciendo una perspectiva única basada en su experiencia personal y familiar.
• 🏛 La cultura rusa, influenciada por un pasado de liderazgo fuerte y autoritario, enfrenta el desafío de desentrañar su complejo legado histórico y la influencia continua de la propaganda.
• 🌏 La invasión de Ucrania por Rusia en febrero de 2022 es vista como un reflejo de los patrones autoritarios y agresivos de Rusia, que tienen profundas raíces históricas y culturales.
• 📘 Las obras de Pomerantsev sobre la propaganda rusa ofrecen una visión crítica sobre cómo los medios y la narrativa del Kremlin afectan tanto a Rusia como a nivel global.
• 🤔 La experiencia de Pomerantsev como refugiado político y su posterior vida en el Reino Unido ilustran la complejidad de la identidad rusa y la diáspora, así como la influencia de la propaganda en la percepción de la realidad.
• 💡 La industria de medios en Rusia, especialmente la televisión y el entretenimiento, refleja la tensión entre el control estatal y el deseo de creatividad y expresión personal.
• 🎭 Los programas de entretenimiento en Rusia ofrecen una ventana hacia la adaptación cultural y la aceptación de ciertos valores, mientras que simultáneamente evitan la política directa.
• 🔍 La propaganda y las narrativas del Kremlin no solo están dirigidas a moldear la opinión pública dentro de Rusia, sino también a influir en las percepciones y políticas a nivel internacional.
• 🌐 La resistencia y respuesta a la propaganda rusa, especialmente desde Ucrania, subraya la importancia de la conciencia crítica y la solidaridad internacional frente a la desinformación y la agresión.

Q & A

¿Por qué Putin es considerado un líder autoritario?

Putin es visto como un líder autoritario debido a su modelo de liderazgo que se basa en la intimidación, la violencia y la perpetuación del poder personal, lo cual ha llevado a tragedias, humillación y violencia en la sociedad rusa.

¿Cómo ha influido el deseo ruso por líderes fuertes en la política del país?

El deseo de los rusos por tener líderes fuertes y una estabilidad social y política superficial ha llevado a la elección y mantenimiento de Putin en el poder, lo que ha resultado en consecuencias negativas a largo plazo para el país.

¿Qué papel juega Peter Pomerantsev en la discusión sobre la propaganda rusa?

Peter Pomerantsev, como periodista británico nacido en la Unión Soviética y experto en propaganda rusa, contribuye a la discusión ofreciendo una perspectiva crítica sobre cómo Rusia utiliza la propaganda para influir tanto internamente como en el ámbito global.

¿Cuál fue la experiencia de Pomerantsev con la sociedad rusa?

Pomerantsev experimentó la sociedad rusa desde dentro, trabajando en la industria televisiva y observando de primera mano cómo el estado retomaba el control de los medios y fomentaba una cultura de entretenimiento que evitaba la política, lo que reflejaba un compromiso cínico con el régimen.

¿Cómo afecta la propaganda rusa a la percepción pública y la cohesión social?

La propaganda rusa, según Pomerantsev, juega con los traumas y deseos de la gente, validando emociones negativas como el odio y ofreciendo una visión del mundo conspirativa que justifica acciones autoritarias y desestabiliza la cohesión social.

¿De qué manera la invasión de Ucrania por Rusia refleja problemas más profundos en la sociedad rusa?

La invasión refleja un trauma profundo y un deseo de dominio y venganza arraigados en la historia rusa, manifestándose en una política exterior agresiva que busca afirmar su poder a expensas de la soberanía y la estabilidad de sus vecinos.

¿Cuál es el impacto de la narrativa de victimización en la política exterior rusa?

La narrativa de victimización permite a Rusia justificar sus acciones agresivas como defensivas, proyectando sus propios deseos de dominación y venganza sobre otros y evitando la responsabilidad por sus acciones.

¿Cómo ha respondido la comunidad internacional a la propaganda y las acciones de Rusia?

La comunidad internacional ha mostrado un apoyo renovado a la democracia y a Ucrania, buscando maneras de contrarrestar la influencia rusa y asegurar la estabilidad regional a largo plazo mediante la disuasión y el refuerzo de la seguridad colectiva.

¿Qué estrategias sugiere Pomerantsev para enfrentar el desafío de la propaganda rusa?

Pomerantsev sugiere la necesidad de instituciones y políticas que se enfoquen en la seguridad de la información y en contrarrestar la influencia autoritaria, aprendiendo de la experiencia ucraniana en la creación de resiliencia democrática.

¿Cuál es el papel de Ucrania en el contexto de la lucha contra la propaganda rusa?

Ucrania se ha convertido en un símbolo de resistencia y en un campo de pruebas para estrategias innovadoras contra la propaganda y la influencia rusa, mostrando la importancia de la resiliencia democrática y la innovación política.

Outlines

00:00

🔍 Putin's Ascension and Authoritarian Leadership

The paragraph discusses the rise of Vladimir Putin as Russia's president and the attraction of his strongman rhetoric. It highlights the Russian penchant for authoritarian leaders and the unforeseen consequences of this preference. The narrative then transitions to the creation of the 'Silicon Curtain' podcast, which aims to explore propaganda, narratives, and their societal impact. The guest, Peter Pomerantsev, a British journalist of Soviet origin, is introduced, emphasizing his expertise on Russian disinformation and propaganda.

05:04

🌍 Peter Pomerantsev's Personal Connection to Ukraine

This section delves into Peter Pomerantsev's personal history and family's connection to Ukraine. Born in Kyiv in 1977, Peter's family was forced to leave the USSR due to his father's dissident activities. The conversation touches on Peter's experiences growing up as a political refugee in Europe, his eventual settling in London, and his later return to Ukraine as an adult. The discussion highlights the deep familial ties to Ukraine and the personal implications of his family's exile.

10:05

🎥 Peter's Career and Observations on Russian Society

Peter Pomerantsev shares his experiences working in the Russian television industry and observes the state's increasing control over the media. He discusses the shift in Russian society towards a dictatorship and the awareness among Russians of the potential for their rights and possessions to be abruptly taken away. The conversation also covers the Russian mentality of always preparing for the worst and the cultural tendency to oscillate between victimhood and aggression.

15:09

🏰 The Russian Empire's Legacy and Trauma

The discussion转向俄罗斯帝国的历史遗留问题和深层文化创伤。分析了俄罗斯对权力和统治的渴望，以及这种渴望如何影响其国内外政策。提到了俄罗斯社会和政治文化中的攻击性，以及这种攻击性如何与历史创伤和自我毁灭的帝国主义行为相联系。彼得还探讨了俄罗斯文化中的羞辱和受害情结，以及这些情结如何体现在俄罗斯的宣传和政治行为中。

20:10

📺 The Impact of Russian Propaganda on Society

This section examines the impact of Russian propaganda on its society, particularly how it validates and amplifies existing sentiments of humiliation and aggression. It discusses the role of propaganda in providing a license to express taboo feelings and the state's use of shock jocks to maintain a certain level of fear and division. The conversation also touches on the Russian public's consumption of propaganda, highlighting the selective belief in state narratives and the underlying conspiratorial worldview promoted by the state.

25:10

🌟 The Role of Ukrainian Resilience and Propaganda Countermeasures

The conversation shifts to discuss Ukraine's resilience and its innovative approaches to counter Russian propaganda. It emphasizes the need for democracies to learn from Ukraine's experience and build defenses against information warfare. The discussion also considers the broader implications for the 21st century, with the emergence of an authoritarian network and the importance of ensuring the security and stability of nations like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

Keywords

💡Liderazgo autoritario

El liderazgo autoritario se refiere a un estilo de gobierno en el cual una sola persona o un grupo reducido tiene el poder absoluto, sin una participación significativa del pueblo o contrapesos efectivos. En el contexto del vídeo, este concepto se relaciona directamente con la figura de Putin y su gestión como presidente de Rusia, destacando las consecuencias negativas de tal liderazgo, como la tragedia, la humillación y la violencia.

💡Propaganda

La propaganda es el uso de medios y técnicas de comunicación para influir en la actitud de una comunidad hacia alguna causa o posición, no siempre ofreciendo una imagen completa o veraz de la realidad. En el vídeo, se discute el papel de la propaganda rusa en la manipulación de narrativas y en el mantenimiento del poder de Putin, así como en la justificación de acciones contra Ucrania.

💡Desinformación

La desinformación consiste en la difusión intencionada de información falsa o engañosa. Se menciona en el vídeo en relación con las estrategias de Rusia para confundir y manipular tanto a su propia población como a la comunidad internacional, especialmente en temas relacionados con su política exterior y acciones militares.

💡Trauma histórico

El trauma histórico se refiere al impacto psicológico a largo plazo en una sociedad debido a eventos pasados traumáticos. En el vídeo, se argumenta que Rusia arrastra un trauma profundo debido a su historia de autoritarismo y violencia, lo cual influye en su política actual y en la mentalidad de su población.

💡Silicon Curtain podcast

Mencionado en el vídeo como una plataforma dedicada a explorar problemas relacionados con la propaganda, las narrativas y las técnicas que amenazan a las sociedades. El podcast sirve como medio para discutir y diseminar información sobre cómo estos elementos pueden influir en la percepción pública y en la estabilidad política.

💡Peter Pomerantsev

Un periodista británico de origen soviético destacado en el vídeo por su experiencia y trabajo en desentrañar las tácticas de desinformación y propaganda de Rusia. A través de sus libros y su trabajo, Peter aporta un análisis crítico de cómo Rusia manipula la información para consolidar su poder y afectar la política global.

💡Cultura política rusa

Refiere a las características y prácticas que definen la gestión política y social en Rusia. En el vídeo, se analiza cómo la cultura política rusa, caracterizada por el autoritarismo y la nostalgia por líderes fuertes, ha contribuido a la situación actual, permitiendo la perpetuación del poder de Putin.

💡Censura

La censura es la supresión de palabras, imágenes o ideas que son consideradas ofensivas, dañinas, inconvenientes o peligrosas por las autoridades o por grupos con poder. El vídeo menciona el caso del padre de Peter Pomerantsev, quien fue arrestado por diseminar literatura anti-soviética, ilustrando la represión de la libertad de expresión en Rusia.

💡Invasión de Ucrania

Refiere al acto de agresión militar por parte de Rusia hacia Ucrania, mencionado en el vídeo como un ejemplo de cómo las ambiciones autoritarias y la manipulación propagandística de Rusia tienen consecuencias devastadoras para la paz y estabilidad regional. Este evento es utilizado para discutir la importancia de entender y combatir la desinformación y la propaganda.

💡Fetichismo por líderes fuertes

Este concepto hace referencia a la admiración y la preferencia excesiva por líderes autoritarios, percibidos como capaces de proporcionar estabilidad y dirección firme. En el vídeo, se critica cómo esta tendencia en la sociedad rusa ha facilitado el ascenso y la permanencia de Putin en el poder, a pesar de las consecuencias negativas para el país y su población.

Highlights

Putin's ascent to power in Russia and his authoritarian leadership style.

The impact of Russia's actions on Ukraine and the global perception of Russian leadership.

The creation of the Silicon Curtain podcast to explore propaganda, narratives, and societal threats.

Peter Pomerantsev's background, his family's exile from the USSR, and his insights into Russian media and disinformation.

The contrast between Russian and Ukrainian identities and cultures, emphasizing Ukraine's forward-looking perspective.

The role of propaganda in Russia, its impact on society, and the challenges of combating disinformation.

The discussion on the future of Russian politics, society, and its relationship with the international community.

The exploration of Russian literature and culture, and their influence on national identity and political narratives.

The importance of understanding and resisting the narratives and strategies employed by authoritarian regimes.

The need for a global response to the threats posed by authoritarian propaganda and information warfare.

The potential for democratic societies to learn from Ukraine's resilience and strategies against Russian aggression.

The discussion on the long-term security of Ukraine and other countries vulnerable to Russian aggression.

The significance of maintaining democratic values and institutions in the face of external and internal challenges.

The importance of international solidarity and cooperation in supporting countries like Ukraine against authoritarian forces.

The exploration of potential policy and institutional responses to the challenges posed by propaganda and disinformation.

Transcripts

So after Putin was foisted on Russians in 2000 as their new president,

they also chose to elect him.

His direct and course language threats and intimation of violence

attracted people and continued to do so for over 20 years.

Russians' fetish for strong leaders and superficial social and political

stability has now backfired spectacularly. Once he had ascended to power,

we should not have been surprised that he stayed and refused to move on.

Putin's model of authoritarian leadership always leads to tragedy and blood

humiliation and violence.

So we get to February 22nd when Russia dragged Ukraine and the world

into its deep-rooted trauma and hell.

The Silicon Curtain podcast has been created to explore issues around

propaganda, narratives and techniques and the threat they pose to societies.

If you like the material we create, then please like,

and subscribe and share around with your friends and network.

Our guest today is ideal to talk around propaganda narratives,

their mechanisms, and how they work.

Peter Pomerantsev is a Soviet born British journalist, author,

and TV producer.

He's a senior fellow at the Institute of Global Affairs at the London School of

Economics, where he co-directs the Arena program.

He is also an associate editor at Coda Media.

He's written two books about Russian disinformation and propaganda.

Nothing is true and everything is possible. 2014,

and this is not propaganda, 2019.

Peter was born into a Russian speaking Jewish family in Kiev in

1977. In 1978,

he moved with his parents to West Germany after his father broadcaster and poet,

Igor Pomerantsev was arrested by the KGB for proliferating anti-Soviet

literature. Then later moved to Munich and then London,

where Igor Pomerantsev worked for the BBC World Service.

Peter, I've long wanted to have you on the channel and

quiz you because you have a unique experience of Russia and of course the

Russian informational space and media. Well, let's start,

for everyone in the audience who might not be aware,

you've written two fantastic books. We'll put links to those in

the video description afterwards, that you have a strong family connection,

don't you, to Ukraine. Could you describe a little bit about yourself,

that would be of interest to the audience?

Well, well, my, my connection to Ukraine is, is around, I don't know,

quite deep, around six foot deep. The, the, the depth of a grave, really.

I mean, I'm from Ukraine and, and, and all my ancestors are are buried there.

And I was born there, I was born in Kyiv in 1977,

but my parents were political dissidents. And in 1978, they were,

um, thrown out of the U S S R. Uh,

my father had been arrested for the heinous crime of giving censored

books to his friends, for which in those glorious days of the Soviet Union,

you got seven and five. So seven years prison, five years Siberia.

But, um, or you were, or you were thrown out or you were, uh, exiled.

Um, which, which might sound like a, a strange choice for people,

but actually a lot of people wanted to stay and fight the good fight.

And quite a lot of my, my,

my dad's friends who were arrested with him stayed and have gone on to have

important political careers in Ukraine. He, he was a poet.

He wasn't that interested in the political career. And he decided to leave,

um, which really means leaving and never seeing your family again,

never seeing your friends again, never seeing where you were raised again, um,

with $200 they think you were allowed to take. So it's, uh, it's,

it's Europe political refugee. Um,

but after my fa uh, family left the Soviet Union, my father, quite quickly,

well, after a couple of years wandering around Europe,

got a job at the B bbc and I, I grew up accidentally British.

I'm very British as you can hear, but it's a complete accident,

which I've always been very aware of.

I could have been a little German if my dad had elected to do the PhD at M's.

University. He'd been offered, or a Little American,

which is what most of my father's friends, cuz many of them emigrated, uh,

became. Um, and I, I live in Washington, DC maybe I've got there now.

So it really was just cause the b BBC gave my dad an offer. I mean,

the British were actually taking Soviet refugees then very, very strict quotas.

That seems odd. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Very good.

There was a tiny Soviet emigrate community in London, the the,

I kind of grew up in, but it was tiny. Um, and,

and nothing like growing up in New York, in the Russian community. So, uh,

that probably ized me more. I don't, I don't know. Um,

I didn't have anything else. Um, and I only really went back to Ukraine, um,

after I,

I think it was either just before I went to see university or just after,

I can't remember now. These either 18 or 22. One of the two I have to,

I have to recall, let's go through my notes. Uh, but really very late,

probably 18. It was probably, no, I think it was after I was 22.

I was 22 when I went to u to to Ukraine for the first time. And,

um, and, and, uh,

it felt uncannily like coming home. I I Which year was that?

See, I don't, it couldn't have, it must have been one of my universities.

It kind of been I 22. I was younger. Mm-hmm.

I was younger because I remember wandering around and,

and still being amazed at still being really shy

around women.

Cause I'd been in all boys school by the time I'd finished university that

shyness had gone. So I must have been a bit younger. ,

I'm just thinking of myself at that age. Yeah. Uh, I was talking about awkward,

so I, I dunno. But, but we're talking about, um, uh, late nineties,

late nineties. Mm-hmm. and a quick visit. Um,

so we still have family there. Um, we still have family there lots. So,

um, that's where I went and, and I just always felt uncanny at home in Kyiv,

really in, in Odessa. Um, which is where most of my family is from.

My father grew up in Chev in the west of Ukraine, where I still have family.

But, but then I, I, I lived in Moscow from 2001, 2010. I was very,

you know, I wanted a, an adventure somewhere after university. Um, you know,

and Moscow was one of the places to have that adventure. It was a, uh,

it was a city already brimming with evil, really.

Which I try to then describe in my book. But at the age of 22,

evil feels like fun.

It, it's mentally stimulating, even if it's not an ideal holiday destination.

Yeah.

I, I, I don't, I mean, I left,

I was there nine years and I left for many reasons. I mean,

nine years is more than enough in one place. But, but, um,

and I left cuz it was already, I left in 2010.

It was already clear for me that something was deeply,

deeply wrong in this society. And it was heading towards dictatorship. Um,

there you can already see the science. Um, um, but,

but I also left because cuz I had kids and, um,

I didn't want my kids growing up in that environment.

So I took them back to London.

Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Uh, and I can absolutely appreciate that.

And there were many people who, who asked me, including friends in Russia,

you know, why did you choose to go back? Cause I, I studied, um, in,

in Russia and then went to live after my university degree.

And many people were saying, well, look, you make,

you can make a lot more money here. You could get on a lot faster.

You could buy your own apartment far quicker. And, um,

I seem to remember at the time telling people that everything you earn,

everything you invest in,

everything you create could be taken from you in the bat of an eyelid.

And that was met with derision. And of course,

this year we're seeing that not only are people's livelihoods and everything

they've accumulated, uh,

and invested their lives in being taken away from them almost instantaneously,

they've now got their lives being taken away through the enforced conscription.

I mean, does any of this come as surprise to you from your experiences?

Um, what a good question. I still think there's shock.

I still think there's shock among, um,

among some people. But to be honest, when I was there,

I was very much an expat and a westerner would, you know,

I could speak decent Russian. So I had a sort of insight into the society. But,

you know, the Russians never, you know, always treated me.

They'd always assume like I'd been,

I'd sort of immigrated in the nineties rather than the seventies.

But they very much saw me as, as not having grown up there.

They could sense that straight away. Um, but, um, my,

so I was quite naive there the first year as a, I kind of brought, brought into,

especially in the first years, the idea that Russia was,

was moving towards being a democracy, uh, of sorts. And to be honest,

it was my Russian friends in the arts in business

who were always telling me, you don't get it.

This is gonna become a full on dictatorship again.

They were always hedging their bets.

So you're just saying that people knew that people always knew everything could

be taken away and they were always hedging their bets.

That's why so much more Russia. Um, they were, they were,

they were always very aware. They were always very keen to get second passports.

Always very keen to have a backup plan. They're like, you can't,

the the people who in charge are bad. No,

that doesn't mean that most of 'em still didn't think that Putin would invade

Ukraine or anything. You know, they, they thought simply cuz that's, uh,

in many ways, you know, not,

not an irrational thing to do in terms of winning,

not in terms of ethics, but just in terms of winning. You know, it's,

it's an irrational thing to do. So,

so many of them were surprised that he did something so unwise. But, um, no,

my Russian friends were the ones who were always like,

this can disappear in a second. And always knew it.

It was actually the Westerners who kept on believing in it and who kept on

investing in it and would buy apartments.

And then thugs would come up and take the apartment away and they'd been shot.

They're like, but there's a rule of law. And,

and the thugs would like where the rule of law, um, and then be like,

I'll tell the mayor I went to a party with the mayor. They're like, no,

where from the mayor . Like, um, so,

so as the Western to naive the Russians always got it, uh,

and exploited it and always had a plan B.

And you, you, you worked in the media, didn't you? You worked, uh,

within the television industry.

So you must have seen at close quarters how the Russian state was

clawing back control, uh, of, of the media.

Yes. I was there from 2000, 2010. The first four years I did lots of things.

I was very young. I went to film school there.

I worked on b b and discovery documentaries about Russia. Then 2006,

2010, I, I worked basically a production company set up by a British guy, um,

which made western entertainment formats for Russian entertainment tv.

So reality shows. So the company I worked for made Top garden, uh, top,

top gear, top that.

Right top.

Slightly different format. No, they made like top gear and stuff like that.

Yeah. Uh, come dine with me, all those sort of things,

which was really interesting.

So I was actually much more exposed to the entertainment side and most of the

networks that I worked with were pure entertainment networks. So,

so the state was pretty hands off on that actually.

A lot of people were kind of flooding away from news into entertainment and

glossy magazines. Cuz you could still have,

you still have complete creative freedom there. Um, so no,

it was a very strange compromise in the sense that you could do whatever you

liked as long as you, you know, these were entertainment channels,

so you weren't gonna do politics anyway,

but as long as you didn't touch politics.

So we were doing very subversive stuff about, you know,

trying to sort of mainstream, um, L G B T people,

like getting them on screen. So,

so everybody was re really into that kinda social change. Um, but yes,

political change was being cut off and then the fact that people were pouring

into Glossy magazine.

So Esquire became the magazine for a while because all these great journalists

couldn't write for the main, for the sort of, couldn't work on TV news anymore.

So they came and worked for these glossy magazines. So in that sense,

there was like, you know, the state was saying, this is ours.

The main TV channels are ours, the news is ours. Don't touch this.

And it came by stages, you know, first they got rid of one channel,

then another channel, then there was still pockets of good current affairs left.

And slowly every one of those would be destroyed. So it happened in stages.

And I think some of the last stuff was around when I was leaving, like 2010 ish,

uh, this couple of, um,

like I think Rent TV was still going and had still had good news there. Um, and,

and they edit up and edited up and edited up over, over between 2001, 2010.

But they were allowing you to have a lot of freedom in, in the arts,

a lot of freedom in entertainment where you could do, you know, very,

very interesting things. And that was the deal. And frankly,

a lot of people were happy with the deal.

I remember talking with a lot of my Russian friends and they were like, well,

you know, not a bad deal. Made tons of money. Um,

I wasn't making any money, but, but you know,

definitely Russian producers and stuff who are, and they're like, you know,

we stick out of their business. They stick out of our business. And,

and that was a sort of a very cynical compromise. Um,

the lines had become very blurred.

Former dissidents were working with the Kremlin.

The Kremlin was working with the reality show producers.

Everything was sort of mixed up socially. People go to the bars. Um, and,

and I mean,

that was the world I tried to describe in my first book because of course,

underneath this sort of lush cynicism was a deep, deep,

deep moral depravity. And beneath that, this sort of

larva of trauma that was just waiting to explode.

Now it has, and by trauma,

I mean sadism and masochism, and all those sort of things. Deep.

Deep, deep seated trauma. Um, and you know, I,

it's not pushing it too far to say that you can trace this trauma all the way

back to, to the Middle Ages and the Mongol hde, which basically, you know,

raped the country for decades or centuries in a row.

And then what Russians inflicted on e on each other and,

and now subsequently their neighbors. Um, I think that is,

that is quite misunderstood, isn't it?

How traumatized and deeply confused perhaps

and even a little lost Russians are because you, you describe in your book, uh,

I think very interestingly, the fact that people would try on new ideas,

new identities in the way that other people would try on new clothes and styles,

um, almost sort of post-modern post-truth, you can be anything and,

and nothing at the same time.

Yes. Um, which,

which reveals a kind of a horrible moral emptiness at the, at the core of it.

Um, you know, there's, um, so, you know,

I I wouldn't be too pitying. I mean,

and in Russia is strange in that it is often both the perpetrator and the

victim. But you know, when we look at the biographies of, of mass murderers,

they often have some pretty messed up childhood. So,

so let's not start absolving the Russian states and,

and Russian political culture and to a certain extent, you know,

um, Russian social culture in, in being, uh,

an aggressive because they didn't, they didn't just do it to themselves.

This is an empire that, that has never, for a moment,

not for a moment

wanting to be anything but an empire and which seizes its

divine rights to genocide others.

And so this is not just an internal trauma. Um,

what's interesting is that they like locked their own people up as well. But,

but, you know, so did the Nazis. The Nazis had, you know, arrested many, many,

many Germans and put them in concentration caps, you know,

even as they turned on the Jews. Um, so these things often go together, um,

internal and external. But, but what was really, really

striking in my time in Russia, and,

and this was actually apparent not even for my TV work so much,

but I used to just do little projects for the European Union and stuff when I

was there, um, to, when I was at film school,

I kind of funded it by working as a consultant for,

for various EU development programs.

And I remember sort of going to the regions a lot and drinking with

people in, you know,

regional businesses and regional administrations and,

and from the early two thousands when I was going there, I mean,

few drinks in and be like, oh, we're taking it all back. This is all ours.

Let's, let's divide Europe together, us and the eu. And I'd be like, well,

actually the EU is not about empire building despite what some people in Britain

say. It's, you know, it's, it's, it's about some rules and all this stuff.

And they're like, yeah, yeah, whatever. We'll make up some rules. Well,

let's carve up Europe together.

Let's get rid of the Americans or with the Americans.

Let's carve up Europe together.

Not for a moment did they stop thinking about the world as a

dog eat, dog place where might is, right.

And not for a moment did they relinquish their belief that their rights

is to crush others. And, and that was,

that never went away. There was,

I don't really think there was a romantic moment when that went away. Um,

I think even in, in the early 1990s when there was,

there weren't democratic aspirations.

I don't think there was any serious aspirations to get over the legacy of being

an empire. Um, so, and,

and we can tie that to trauma. Humiliated cultures wanna humiliate others,

you know, we could get into the political psychology that informs this need to

crush others in a way that does not reflect rational self-interest. Yeah.

This is not a sort of like, oh,

let's expand our economic mite by creating these India companies sort of empire

building. This is completely self-destructive empire building. Um, you know,

it's what psych analysts would call secondary narcissism when you want things

you don't need and that actually destroy you because there's some deep, deep,

deep lack of something, you know, attention,

love, self-respect in the middle of it all, and often very self-destructed.

I think this is what we also have to understand.

We talk of Russia as living off, you know,

empire building, but this is not 19th century empire building,

Al France and Britain, which is deeply,

which is embedded in a theory of rational self-interest. This is,

this is a self-destructive empire building, which is much weirder,

pulling everybody down to your own level,

sucking them into the vortex of your own hell. Very, very different to,

to the classic ideas of empire building. And, um,

that's something that's gonna take a, a hell of a lot to, to, um, to get over.

I was gonna try and unpick that because there's a, there's a curious similarity,

uh, or maybe not so curious at all. Um,

one of the Nazi propaganda techniques was also the sort of sort of play the

aggressive victim. And that's something I think you see very closely in, in,

in the Russian character, whether it comes through in terms of sort of, uh,

you know, passive nostalgia and a sense of loss of, of the Soviet Union,

whatever,

or as we're seeing currently now an extremely aggressive victimhood that is

blaming everyone for the aggression that is actively in convicted.

And it's not just a conceit, is it? I mean,

it worked in Germany because of the deep-seated sense of, uh,

betrayal after the first world war that was then sort of leveraged.

And in Russia, it get the impression that they have this sense of loss,

a sense of lost potential,

which is potentially quite rational because there are several points in Russian

history where they could have taken alternative turn,

where things could have turned out potentially differently or not taken

the worst possible route,

which seems to know the feature of Russian history going for the,

the absolute sort of worst case scenario each time.

And I think Russians have this deep sense of, of a lost utopia. Um,

but the way it comes out, as you say, is in this aggressive victimhood, which,

um, I don't think too many people realize that,

that that characteristic is not just a propaganda conceit,

but it it exists inside millions of people's heads. It's extremely toxic.

Yeah. Look, propaganda only works and it, when it,

when it reverberates with what people, with, with,

with people's traumas and desires and often unspoken desires. I mean,

look, the victimhood thing, we saw Milosh, which would do this as well,

the Nazis.

Famously every Hitler speech or global speech starts with the whole world,

especially the Jews have conspired against us and forced us into this war. Same,

you know,

the Russians was like the main Russian propaganda as we have no choice.

We were forced into this by the great conspiracy. Um, I mean,

there's several things to think about here. Uh, firstly,

I think Eric from the great German psych analyst talked about the victim

narrative in German, in Nazi propaganda,

basically saying that this is the classic thing of like, when they're,

when when bullies claiming victimhood, what they're actually saying,

this is what we want to do to you. Yeah. This is, they're preparing the ground.

Say, we are the victim, we have been victimized, therefore I'm gonna crush him.

You know, it's the bully preparing the ground. Uh, we can also talk about, look,

it's very classic as well, or among, among mass murderers.

They always have a victim complex. They were hurt, they were wounded.

They had to go and kill all those women. I mean, this is classic, deeply,

deeply, deeply deranged behavior. Um,

it's about not taking responsibility as well, which is always a,

a very big sign of a Sikh culture. Um,

al also like, it's, it's the geopolitical reflection of,

of the internal reality. When you live in Russia,

you're a humiliated all the time. You're humiliated by the states,

by your teachers, by your husband. It's a culture that is built on humiliation,

uh, deeply reflected in the literature. And, um, and,

and in a way that ref that that internal humiliation is then sort of projected

onto the outward. You know, so you don't say, you know, you come home,

you've been spent your day be humiliated by bureaucrats, cops, your boss,

et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. You come home full of resentment.

And then on the TV Putin's saying, ah, it's Obama,

who was in a humiliating your day.

So it's a way of actually just exporting internal tensions as well.

But every Putin speech, like every Hitler speech, um,

and often many Trump speeches, uh, really goes through one rhythm.

He will start off as the humiliated Russian, every man, we,

his body even does this and does this sort of face the sad face of Tu.

Um, and we've been humiliated. We've been humiliated. And you'll also say, yes,

I've been humiliated. And through the speech he'll grow and grow and grow.

In the end, he is, you know, a, the, the,

the God of wrath and anger humiliating others.

So you go on this emotional journey from a,

a sort of depressed state to a state of dominance. And look, this is,

you know, many psychos have analyzed Hitler speeches. They did the same trick.

Putin does this kind of like slightly crappy Putin version of it,

but it's very effective. And, and he's good at that.

He performs every stage of the Russian, every man, I mean,

the stories he tells himself, the way he was a taxi driver in the nineties,

that's, that's quite clever. It relates to so many people who,

who had to go through many transformations in the 1990s,

which they may have found humiliating. So again,

he's playing into that sense of humiliation and then taking revenge.

Did that actually happen? I cannot imagine him driving a taxi. I mean, well.

I mean like, but maybe a couple of times people like, did like, you know,

do everyone's doing a bit of everything to get by. Um, but,

but I think the way he raises it is on purpose, of course,

to identify himself with the humiliate in 1990s.

Well, this, it, I mean, back in the nineties,

everyone needed to earn a little bit of money because, you know,

you weren't getting your pager wages. If you had a car,

you had to fill it with fuel. If you rent money, well,

what are you gonna do with your car? It's gonna sit there.

So you'd stop and you'd pick anyone up.

You'd be able to go onto the street and flag a car down.

I got a ride with cops sometime quite worried that I might not get home.

But now the cops running a bit of money on the side by uh Exactly.

Giving people a.

Lift. Exactly. So, so, so he was like basically a bodyguard. So why, why not?

Um, I think, I think it's quite interesting cause you, you know, so as I said,

I worked in entertainment tv,

so one of the formats that the company I worked for tried to make was called

Faking It, which is a very famous B B C and, uh,

or Channel four entertainment show from the nineties. And then from 2000, sorry.

And basically you take a person or a celebrity and they have to learn a new

profession in like two days. So like, you take a, you know, a truck drive,

they have to learn to become a chef. And you know,

the celebrity ones were very famous.

They take a footballer and they had to learn how to be an engineer in three

days. And they had to like convince a panel that they've done it.

So they tried to do that show in Russia and everyone was like, hold on,

we just do this all the time. This is just like normal. What's what, where's,

what's the show? We don't get it. This is like, all of us did this all the time.

Where's the entertainment venue?

We've all been through 30 professions in the 1990s to survive complete flop.

. Yeah. What formats do work though? Cause that,

that's quite interesting. I mean, which ones did transition?

Sure. So that's a really good question. So I can tell you what, what,

what didn't work, uh, apprentice Complete Fail. Even though the, again,

it was the company I worked with made it, um,

apprentice was a complete fail because they had a real oligarch,

proper oligarch, patan, like proper scary oligarch. Not like Trump,

who's a like, you know, a con man. They had a proper oligarch, proper.

Money, a gold plated toilet. Oligarch. Yeah.

No, no. Patan is a real oligo. Yeah. Um, so they got like a good casting,

you know, you always get like,

basically the way it works is you buy the rights and like, um,

can't remember who makes the Apprentice. So BBC or so, I can't remember that.

But you have like, producers come over and, and,

and basically babysit the Russian production company through all the stages.

So very well made, very well edited, great music, great storylines,

complete and utter fail because that's not how Russians thought. You make money,

you don't make money by having up, oh,

I've got this very clever business idea and I'm gonna sell it.

That's not how it works. You make money by extortion. Um,

having connections in government corruption, sleeping your way up. You don't,

if you have a brilliant business idea, you end up in jail, you know, cuz the,

the, the bad boys come and take it away from me. So apprentices complete fail.

Um, the ones that did well were stuff like Survivor.

So put people on Desert island, uh, torch them and Russians are like, oh yeah,

this sort of reflects our experience, the Gulag humiliation.

So anything based on humiliation and getting people to survive in extreme

conditions, Russians are like, yeah, we know that we're up there. So they very,

very well.

That's very telling, isn't it? And um, I remember, cause I,

I used to translate and, and teach English for, uh,

finished business people, um, in St. Petersburg. Um,

and they had all sorts of incredible stories there.

The president of the company was, was blown up and there all sorts of fun stuff.

Um, but, uh, they also describe a story of when finished business. No.

So a finished businessman would invite or they would be asked by Russian

business people to come out and see how their businesses function, you know,

and of course many of these businesses been built up over generations,

whether it be fish farms or whatever.

It requires consistent investment year after year. Uh,

and not taking too much out of the business, uh, in order for it to, to succeed.

And of course, you know, the Russians come out, uh, and and are horrified,

absolutely horrified at the idea that you can't make a,

a quick profit out of it. In I'm constantly asking questions, well,

what if we kill all the fish and create another business or do something else?

And they just don't get that idea of generational investment.

Because they knew that they're sitting on a powder keg and,

and you have no rights. And they were right. That's what I mean. My,

my Russian friends look, many of them are shocked about the invasion, but,

but they always told me,

they always knew that you better sell all your fish , you know,

you better, you better be in a position to sell your fish at any point.

They always knew something bad was gonna happen.

And they never bought the idea that Russia was in a part reform.

The only people who bought it was stupid foreigners like me.

And even f even stupid foreigners like me could tell by,

well 2008, the invasion of Georgia was like, one was a massive wake up call.

And, but then the second arrest of ha kovski,

the second trial was just so perverse that you were like, whoa,

there is something dark going on. It was way beyond,

it was so clinically perverse and purposeful perverse,

um, that, that, that it was, um, yeah,

you could tell there was just some, some sickness was starting to, to to,

to infe what seemed to be hard, tough, rational men.

There was also something very, very off.

As well. Was that before? Because part of the ho's uh, lawyer, no, sorry,

it's Bill Brown, wasn't it's Bill Brown's lawyer who was, uh, you know,

tortured. And so that was.

Happening at the same time. But when, when, when, like, so, but that's,

that's exactly what happened. Mm. But Veev, who was president when I was there,

came in saying, he's gonna investigate it. He was like, what a disgrace.

We don't, you know, he took br aside at first. We forget this first.

It was gonna be, you know, the new Russian government came in in 2008.

Medvedev pro Natto pro west, visiting Twitter offices. Um, you know,

we forget there was this moment in 2008 when, when, when Russia was like,

had put into place the president that was meant to be prowe.

Now he's the most revo, ridiculous comedically,

um, anti-western. Um, um, little, little, little twerp. But,

but then he was the opposite and it was all this hope and he went,

saw a bomber and it was great and all that crap. So, so we forget. No.

So Medvedev said he would investigate this. He said this was a disgrace,

this was terrible that lawyers were being killed. And.

Then I think the most cynical nineties head on, I was looking at that thinking,

no, I don't, don't buy a single word of that.

But they actually Bill Brown's lawyer, who, uh, incredibly intelligent, uh,

man, not only did was he was he horrifically uh,

obviously murdered within the prison system. They then put him on trial,

didn't they? Even though he was dead, they posthumously prosecuted him.

And at that point it gets medieval, doesn't it?

I'm not even sure that Stalin prosecuted a dead person. Yeah.

There's an empty chair now. I wrote about it. It was, yeah, it was, was,

I'm not sure. I'm not sure why Medieval.

It's more like something outta some sort of like bizarre comedy horror.

No, no. But with, with a, I mean, why me? For me, it's not medieval.

It's like this like out of some sort of like absurdist play about, you know,

an absurdist satire about dictatorships and they're like, oh, let's play it.

Or the, well, the Rio trial as well, which was consciously a trial of witches.

You know, they were being on trial for being witches. Uh,

that was sort of playing in medievalism. But, but yeah, it all,

I remember writing about these things and,

and often I'd get sort of notes from readers saying,

cause that time I was writing already in good notes from readers saying, well,

this can't be true. And, and, and I always said, when you,

when you live in Russia and then you realize that Bill Gogo are,

are realists and you know, yeah. You live, yes, you live in this surreal space.

But also cuz it's a very literary culture, even its sads are played out with,

with a lot of literary, well,

it's just somebody's thinking about it as a story at the same time. Mm-hmm. Um,

and we can spend a lot of time thinking why that is. But um, yeah,

almost literary references are,

are one of the few common signifiers that pull this chaotic culture together.

One of, one of the few things, isn't it culture and also the,

the backwards looking nature.

And I've spoken to so many Ukrainians now who talk about Ukrainian culture being

essentially a forward looking, quite a dynamic and innovative culture.

Russian culture is as extraordinarily backward looking nostalgic,

um, in many ways idealistic.

And I think you can see that in the Russian opposition.

Sometimes you want to tear your hair out that the, the, there's a lack of,

of maturity. There's a lack of, um,

even reflection there and a lot of naivety despite facing,

you know, I mean, if I ever get 'em on the channel,

I'll put these questions to them. Uh, no success so far. Um, but you know,

they're facing, uh, uh, the Siia key an organization which is a,

a cross between, you know, the worst of the mafia and the Ss.

And yet they're coming to it with a, a near childlike innocence in some,

in some cases.

Yeah. I, I mean, I don't know. I, I, I I,

these terms Russian liberals and Russian opposition,

I don't find they're very useful. You have sort of break it down.

There's different ones doing different things and all of them politically

impotent mm-hmm. . Um, but, but they,

I I don't like lumping them all together. Uh, it's very true.

If you look at the literature, uh, so Ur good Fred of mine,

who's the head of Ukrainian pen points this out to me.

If you look at the Russian literature of the nineties and two thousands,

even the very good ones like Soak, they're very good at sort of deconstructing,

you know,

the feces of of Russian and Soviet's culture.

The literally Soak is probably the most important.

Russian writer has a book about a pieces of walking around town. I mean,

literally. So, so, so my my main reference, if Feces is not, is not,

uh, facetious, um, so, but they're very good at that Malia of all these writers,

they're very good at like, you know,

almost like these sort of doctors looking at a decomposed corpse and sort of

prodding it and making sort of rye remarks about it.

But none of those books have a capacity for imagining the future.

While the Ukrainian church is often full of sadness and despair in the works of

Shadan and Andrew Hovi always has a glimmer of the future.

It's quite almost americany about it sometimes. There's always a vision,

you know, a sad one, one through tragedy with Shadan is often,

it's often a road. Actually he writes it,

roads play a very big role in his books. But, but you know,

there's a sense of a journey to somewhere. Not always clear where to,

but there is a journey somewhere.

There's a vision of somewhere that we're trying to get to. Even,

even when it's through tears. There.

Is even that most famous passage,

probably one of the most famous passages in Russian literature about the Troyer,

you know, heading off who knows where. But that's written by Ukrainian. I mean,

that's go rather than.

That's funny as well. Yeah. That, that's a very good point. Yeah. Yeah.

There's a lot to sort of d d de de sort of deconstruct about the Ukrainian

impulse in, in, in Russian literature. It would be very,

very interesting to start passing that apart. Um, again,

there's so much to do on, on on the cultural front. Um, and again,

um, Russian intellectuals who are mo you know,

most of the ones certainly that I I know are very anti Putin,

have never really tried. I mean there has been no,

and I really hope this changes now.

There's been no attempt to understand the imperial, um,

structures and underlying patterns in, in high Russian culture.

There's only really one book about it written by a Polish American,

which costs $150.

She's a professor at Florida University or something like that. Um, but,

but Russians haven't, it's been interesting cuz cuz you know, in in England,

America one can sometimes say goes too far. But what, when I was at university,

all we did was deconstruct power an empire in English literature. I mean,

that's kind, kind of sometimes got a bit boring, but, but that's all we did.

You know, like, you know, I think we were Delta Jane Austin's hidden imperial,

um, imperial patterns by the end, uh, because she doesn't talk about the empire,

you know? But, but in everyone I like, you know, that's all we did. We,

we looked at power and, and power empire essentially. You, and.

There's only one person who regularly talks about this stuff. And, um,

he does have a, you know, quite a strong audience, albeit with the intelligent,

that's Victor, uh, shin Roic,

who of course has that Jewish perspective as well. I would say, you know,

you're, you're slightly on the edge of society.

You're able to take a step back and you're able to look at things in a more

analytical way.

And he regularly talks about the decolonization fragmentation and he,

he deconstructs these kind of things. Um,

that's great also for Dsky Jewish as well. I mean,

there's a pattern perhaps of that slightly more rational way of looking at

Russia's history. You, you, you can't be purely Russian to do it.

Well, nobody is really, very few people are, but, but, but I think, I think,

you know, you really need to, you know, you always have good individual voices,

but, but, um, um, there hasn't become a,

a mainstream of, of Russian literary criticism or something,

uh, even though it's staring us in the face in many ways, in,

in toll story in Pushkin. And, and, and, um, so,

so, so I really hope that starts now. I hope the Russian intelligence here,

um, who do exist, I mean they're mostly abroad now, really start taking on that,

that burden, um, because it's, it's strange. I mean,

whatever you might think of woke or, or all these things,

it's good that American, British,

French intellectual classes spend a lot of our time

deconstructing our own, our own evils that are encoded within even, you know,

our most glorious whatever culture. It's good that we do that.

I think a sign of a healthy society in Russia, there is this still this,

this tradition of deifying dead writers, which again, smell,

it's like the literary version of, of the Death cult of Stalin. And it's like,

ah, let us pray to the corpse of Pushkin. It's like, no,

can we stop praying to corpses where the liberal corpses or illiberal corpses,

can we just stop praying to corpses?

Can we understand what we need to learn from them? Understand what they did,

Robin, can we move on? Um, which is what normal cultures do. Uh,

and I always found that weird, this bizarre deification of, of, of pastor,

of Pushkin kin pushkin is everything to us

kind of creepy. Um, so I think there's a lot of work to do,

and we're talk about political opposition and all that kind of stuff that's

really hard in a dictatorship,

but there is absolutely nothing stopping a new generation of, of,

of Russian thinkers really getting to grips with the,

I'm gonna call it evil. With the evil or the prejudices.

The prejudices that lead to evil that are, that are,

that are there even within,

within what's thought of was the humanistic tradition of, of Russian culture.

Another thing to get to grips, I think, and uh, and,

and this sort of emerges from some, some of the stuff you said earlier,

and obviously from, from, you know, reading and rereading your books many times,

and that is the extraordinary com compartmentalization.

Cuz if you look at much of Russian propaganda, um, you know,

speaking to experts on Russian propaganda, you know,

we tend to think quite naive that people will watch these agitation formats,

they'll listen to s and simin and they'll believe word by word.

But that's not how it works, is it? I mean, first of all,

not everyone watches these programs or even knows who say simmon is.

Um, but secondly,

it's an entertainment format so people will know they're being lied to. Um,

and,

but they'll listen to it and they'll take away from it what they want to take

away from it.

The things that sort of maybe pander to their desires and whatever.

And the rest is almost like background noise.

As shocking as it is to ask cuz most of what's being said on these programs just

reeks of immorality and toxic attitudes and, you know,

layers of lies upon lies. Um, and yet they, they,

they spew out ideas that even in the same sentence will contradict each other.

And to our minds, that kind of jars,

but it doesn't quite seem to necessarily jar seeing all these

conflicting narratives, uh, to, to every Russian.

Um, yeah, they're complete. Well firstly, you know, the, they're kind of Billy,

which is a lovely Russian word. They're kind of this nonsense of, of arguments.

It's something you hear in Russia all the time. Um, so, so that's not,

no one's looking for ideological consistency in the first place. Um,

they've grown up with so many different belief systems and paradigms that, that,

you know, being consistent doesn't really,

isn't really a value. Uh, no one's looking for consistency, um,

doesn't reflect their lives. But you're quite right. Look, I mean,

it's not that unusual. I mean, I live in America, it's shock shocks. I mean,

the point of these shows say really outrageous, scary things that get,

get the audiences in they're shock shocks. I mean, um, so,

so in that sense, if you know the American experience,

then it's not that much of a, not not that new.

Um, what's interesting is that it's sponsored by the states,

supported by the states, you know, and and pushed by the states.

So these kinda shows, they get around 30% in they are quite famous,

these presenters. They do have, they, they do have very high profiles. Um,

they're not, they're not, but, but the shows are, are watched around 30%. Uh,

the ratings are dipping at the moment. Uh,

so that means they have to get more and more and more and more shocking.

So yeah, people watch it as as dark entertainment and,

and as a license to hate. Really that's what they're doing.

They're giving you a license to hate. That's what a lot of propaganda does.

It allows you to articulate and express taboo feelings that

enormous society need to hide. And suddenly it's okay to hate,

to want to murder. You know, that's, that's what propaganda,

that's the propaganda trigger propaganda to take what you feel already and,

and steer it and, and validate it, and then make it profitable to the,

to the people doing it. Um, so yeah, no, no,

no one's really like following every word, but there is a consistent worldview,

which is a conspiratorial worldview that is consistent. The conspiracy changes,

the nature of the conspiracy changes. One day it's nato,

then it's the British Secret Service, then it's the Jews,

then it's someone else. I mean, but the conspiratorial worldview is there.

The way that kind of excuses, responsibility is that,

um,

that we live in a doggy dog world where Putin might be a son of a,

but he is our son of a is there. Um, so, so,

so there are kind of underlying worldviews which are fairly consistent even

though, um, you're quite right. The, the, you know, one minute, you know,

we wanna make peace. The next one wanna make war.

One minute we're invading Ukraine to get rid of Nazis,

then we're doing it because of nato. It, it's always changing. So yeah, it's,

it's, it's pretty chaotic.

Uh, put has a, a sort of problem though, doesn't he?

Because a lot of the propaganda effort, uh, until recently internally,

has been to stoke aian difference is to make sure people are apolitical,

don't group together, don't take action, don't believe in anything,

don't even believe there's such a thing as objective truth.

And a lot of it's there to say, look, you know, um,

it might be bad here and we might be a, you know, a,

a a a load of the world's worst, you know, ahas, but it's like that everywhere.

So don't, don't think there's, there's somewhere else better Now.

Suddenly he's needing to pivot now suddenly he's needing people to take action

to, uh, uh,

follow through on their nationalistic feelings and go and fight on

Ukrainian soil. That's kind of changing the dynamic, isn't it,

of his informational regime.

Yeah, it is. Um, and I think they're going, I I think they're in a very,

very vulnerable place. You're quite right. It's not just that, I mean,

without a doubt,

it's these going from propaganda of apathy to trying to stoke motivation.

It's not that much motivation, let's be honest.

It just needs enough soldiers to go and die. I mean, still,

they're still quite happy for the recipe to be, to be apathetic.

There are no signs of the war in Moscow, by the way. There are no posters,

nothing as if it doesn't exist. So, no, no, for a lot of people,

he's still trying to keep them in a sort of like, stay at home, drink your beer,

you know, whatever, uh, stare, stay and watch some TV shows.

But he does need at least a certain amount to be mobilized.

And he's trying to instill this patriotic education, which by the way is,

is failing largely. Like people aren't attending these courses. Um,

so you're right, they're in a vulnerable place,

but they're in a vulnerable place for another reason as well, uh,

which is deeply related. I mean, the deal was always propaganda on tv,

buy into it to a certain extent,

but definitely play into it, but then get on with your personal life.

Now that's changing. Uh,

it was basically a system that was also based on a pyramid of corrupt mutual

interest. You know,

you could always make your money in different ways throughout the system,

and they kind of let your loan to do that.

And you could be as corrupt as you needed to be,

as long as you swore feely when it mattered. That was the deal. And,

and that's being replaced with something which is much more Stalinist,

something, which you're quite right,

requires motivation and pulling together and sacrifice.

And it's very unclear whether they're gonna be able to manage that. I mean,

they're still very much in transition.

And we'll see that's a fairly big transitional moment and we'll see how,

how that plays out for them.

And it's a time where Putin himself is physically weakening and uh,

also potentially sort of strategically weakening within society,

or rather within the elite, which is far more important. So it is a,

a pivotal moment. I mean, I know we're, we're sort of running out of time,

but one, one question I wanted to throw at you,

which sort of looks at the sort of slightly bigger picture outside of, of, uh,

Moscow.

Cause it's really easy to get obsessed with Russia and forget that actually,

you know,

Ukraine is a victim here and Ukraine has developed extraordinary techniques and

resilience to counter Russian propaganda.

And one of the reasons actually I changed this channel was,

was actually so we could learn from the Ukrainian experience so that we in the

West could adapt and learn to fight it.

And you wrote a fascinating article recently, which suggests that despite the,

you know, the general hostility towards Putin,

there are aspects of his narratives,

aspects of his projection that are still, you know,

getting into our heads and we have to fight that. So I'm interested to hear,

hear your view on that.

I've been running a lot since the war started, so that can be, um, um,

I don't know which particular piece you're referring to.

I think this was like from three weeks ago. You must write a lot, you .

Um, I think.

Yeah, but, but no, no, but yeah, I mean, yes. Um, but I, I mean,

I'm happy to answer that question even without referencing the piece. Um,

I think, um, so yeah, I get asked a lot cause I sort of focus on propaganda.

Um, so yeah, asked a lot about like, you know,

which Kremlin disinformation is really important and I don't think we're into

that. I don't think that's the important thing now. I mean,

obviously they're putting out stuff about, you know,

atrocities or stage and all this sort of nonsense,

which works with a tiny bunch of people. But there is a bigger one,

a bigger narrative, which I think is, is there,

which is kind of the inevitability of Russia that, you know,

we're always gonna be addicted to its oil.

We're always gonna be addicted to its gas.

We have to make peace with it cuz big and strong and forever and whatever

happens, we're gonna have to bend the knee. And,

and that's very prevalent. I think that goes very deep also because it's, it's,

it's a tough question. It's not easy to cut yourself off from Russia.

I think Germany has proved that it can become an independent of Russian energy

within one year, which is pretty stunning. Um, we need a lot more than of that.

We, we need to really cut Russia off like an abusive partner or an abusive

neighbor. Um, and it will be expensive. It will be tough, but it's really,

really important. Um, you can't stick around an unreliable,

abusive and psychotic sort of partner.

So, and you have to, um, I mean they'll carry on as well. Um,

mounting information, assault,

because it's unlikely Russia will suddenly become a liberal democracy.

It's unlikely it'll suddenly forgo, uh,

attacking or trying to control and coerce its neighbors.

So it does look like we need to build our defenses up for, for the long term.

Cuz this problem won't go away.

No, it won't go away. And, and depending on how well they do, you know,

there'll be a lesson for China obviously. And,

and we're seeing in Russia and China combine forces in the information space,

uh, supporting each other's narratives and so on.

That doesn't mean they're allies, uh, but, but they do,

they are sort of partners of convenience. Um,

and we've seen them joined by Iran and,

and I think that authoritarian network will expand.

So yeah, no, no, it's gonna be a pretty bumpy 21st century. Um, on the upside,

I think we've seen democracies pull together for the first time.

I think Ukraine has reminded so many people of, of why,

why our political values exist, um, that they're worth fighting for. So,

so Ukraine is a huge inspiration for us all apart from just being the frontline,

the frontline in this battle. Um, so,

so I don't think we should be scared of Russian anyway. Um,

I do think obviously we,

we do need to start thinking of once Ukraine has won the

wars to the extent that, that it wants to and can,

how do we guarantee its security? So Russia can't do it again. We, we have the,

the work assumption has to be that whoever is in charge in of Russia,

they're gonna try this again in two years or 10 years. It doesn't matter.

And the question is how do we make Ukraine, Moldova,

maybe Georgia,

if Georgia wants to as secure as Poland and Estonia mm-hmm .

That's the only way it's gonna happen. I mean,

Kazakhstan seems to have the protection of China now,

which is why Russia sticks out, sticks out of that. But um, um,

that's really the question we need to start answering.

And whether that's de facto NATO entry, deur,

NATO entry, something else.

The only way this calms down is if Russia know that the deterrence is so big

it's not worth the effort. Um,

Poland and Estonia used to be as vulnerable as Ukraine. They're not anymore.

So that's what we've gotta get to. And even though that, you know,

there's gonna be a lot of people who push back against that,

that's also better for our security's cheaper cuz things are more stable and

yeah, we don't know what's gonna happen in Russia.

We're gonna make sure that it can't attack Ukraine and others again.

And I think that ha reminded us,

and especially Ukraine's experience has reminded us that democracy isn't

inevitable and isn't eternal. Uh,

that actually requires in an enormous amount of thought to continuous work,

to evolve it. Um, and that it could, it could, it could disappear.

And to an extent, you know,

this will upset maybe some of my audience cause I know I've got a mixed

audience, but even the Trump experience suggests that, uh,

representational democracy, um, you know, will,

will come under threats. Uh, and we, we have to, uh, you know,

build in resilience and a consciousness of that.

Yes, no, I agree with those words. I just wonder what it means in practice,

.

That that should be the subject of a net conversation.

I've got through about a quarter of my questions, ,

and I know we've almost reached the end. Uh, cuz I know you have to pop off. Um,

this was, I think our audience are actually gonna love this. I mean, it was, uh,

something I was looking forward to for a very long time. And, uh, uh,

I'm deeply grateful that you've, uh,

spent the time to share your experience with.

Us. Uh, great questions and we should continue. I agree. I mean,

I completely agree with you Jonathan. I, I, I, I wanna starting what that means.

What is, I mean, what I'm thinking about,

what does it mean in the information space? What sort of policies do we need?

What institutions do we need? In the second World War,

the British had the political warfare executive that dealt with

propaganda, essentially good propaganda, maybe propaganda for good, but,

but it thought about information security and influence in the

Cold War. The US had the US Information Agency. Um,

what would be the versions today? You know, um,

we keep on waiting for media to solve this issue.

And I I don't think that's media's job.

No. In fact, the Ukrainians that I've spoken to have showed me that,

you know, they all said exactly the same thing. There was a problem,

it was obvious,

it was right in front of their faces and they were waiting for government to

solve it. And then they realized that,

that no one was gonna come and bail them out.

So you have this extraordinary sort of self-generating, uh,

people grasping authorities and say, no, I'm gonna solve this problem.

I'm gonna figure out a way to do it. And not all those solutions worked,

but I think that that for me is a real lesson of what, uh, you know,

certainly the Myan generation seems to have done is they've gone out and they've

innovated a bunch of sort of political journalistic techniques, um,

to, to create the freedom we see here and not turn it into a Belarus,

which is the alternative path. Uh, I think that Ukraine could have gone down.

Yes, that too. Um, I mean,

Ukraine is an example of inspiration in so many ways, in, in that way as well.

Thank you so much, Peter This's been a real pleasure. Bye love. Thank.