GM Recall : The Switch From Hell - the fifth estate

Summary

The Fifth Estate investigates General Motors' deadly secret involving defective ignition switches in their compact cars, particularly the Chevrolet Cobalt. The documentary reveals GM's internal knowledge of the fatal flaw since 2001, their decision not to recall the vehicles, and the tragic consequences, including numerous deaths. It questions the role of Transport Canada in vehicle safety, highlights the corporate culture prioritizing cost over safety, and the lack of legal power to enforce recalls, suggesting a systemic issue in the auto industry's approach to safety.

Takeaways

• 🔍 The 'Fifth Estate' investigation uncovers General Motors' (GM) deadly secret regarding the ignition switch defect in their Chevrolet Cobalt cars.
• 🏁 GM made a business decision to not fix the safety defects, prioritizing cost over customer safety, which led to fatalities.
• 💔 The tragic death of Dany Dubuc-Marquis in Quebec and Brooke Melton in Georgia highlighted the fatal flaw in GM vehicles that could have been addressed over a decade ago.
• 🔧 A 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, was identified as the critical part that, if fixed, might have saved lives, but GM chose not to incur the cost.
• 📋 Transport Canada's role in vehicle safety is questioned, as they did not take immediate action on the GM ignition switch issue despite early warnings.
• 🤔 The script raises concerns about corporate greed and the safety of millions of motor vehicles, as well as the effectiveness of regulatory bodies.
• 🛠️ Mechanic Charlie Miller's examination of the ignition switch revealed a design flaw that could cause the key to easily slip from the 'on' to 'accessory' position, disabling critical safety features.
• 🆚 A comparison of old and new ignition switches showed a significant difference in the force required to move the key, indicating a deliberate change by GM that was not communicated to customers.
• 📉 The economic downturn and GM's financial struggles seemed to take precedence over addressing the ignition switch issue, delaying necessary recalls and repairs.
• 📖 Internal GM documents and testimonies revealed a corporate culture that downplayed safety issues and even conducted cost-benefit analyses on the value of human life versus the cost of recalls.
• ⚠️ Despite knowing about the defect since 2001, GM did not issue a recall until 2014, and only after significant public and legal pressure.

Q & A

What was the central issue with General Motors' Chevrolet Cobalt?

The central issue with the Chevrolet Cobalt was a defective ignition switch that could move from the 'on' to the 'accessory' position, causing a loss of power, steering, and anti-lock brakes, leading to fatal accidents.

How did the defective ignition switch in the Cobalt affect safety?

The defective ignition switch could cause the car to stall, disabling power steering, power brakes, and anti-lock braking systems, and preventing airbags from deploying, which resulted in a higher risk of fatal accidents.

What was the cost of the part that General Motors failed to replace, which could have prevented these accidents?

The part that needed replacement was a 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, which if fixed, could have prevented the ignition switch from moving to the 'accessory' position.

Why did General Motors not disclose the ignition switch defect to the public?

General Motors did not disclose the defect because they made a business decision that it was cheaper to pay for damages in lawsuits than to recall and repair the vehicles, which would have cost them more financially.

What role did Transport Canada play in the handling of the GM ignition switch issue?

Transport Canada was criticized for not taking proactive measures to address the issue. They only became aware of the problem when GM announced the recall in February 2014, despite evidence suggesting they had knowledge of the issue earlier.

How did the Melton family react to the official story of their daughter's accident?

The Melton family did not accept the official story that their daughter's accident was due to a driving error. They believed it had to be a mechanical failure and sought the help of an automotive detective to uncover the truth.

What was the significance of the discovery by engineer Mark Hood regarding the ignition switch?

Mark Hood discovered that the newer ignition switch had a plunger that was 1.6 millimeters longer than the defective one, making it harder to move the key from 'run' to 'accessory' or 'off'. This change was made without informing customers or issuing a recall.

What was the role of Charlie Miller, the mechanic from Merigold, Mississippi, in the investigation?

Charlie Miller was an expert witness in automobile lawsuits. He found that the ignition switch in Brooke Melton's car had moved to the 'accessory' position, causing the loss of power, and that the switch was easily jostled out of position.

What actions did General Motors take after the ignition switch issue became public?

After the issue became public, General Motors recalled millions of vehicles, admitted to at least 29 fatalities related to the ignition switch, and faced congressional investigations, a Department of Justice investigation, and a fine from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

What was the impact of the ignition switch scandal on General Motors' corporate culture?

The scandal revealed a corporate culture that prioritized cost over safety and penalized employees for speaking up about problems. GM dismissed 15 employees, including Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer responsible for the ignition switch, as a result of the scandal.

What were the legal implications for General Motors in the U.S. and Canada?

In the U.S., GM faced congressional investigations, a Department of Justice investigation, and a $35 million fine for not disclosing the ignition switch defects. In Canada, Transport Canada did not take any official action against GM, but the company still faced criticism for not addressing the issue sooner.

Outlines

00:00

🚗 Deadly GM Cobalt Secrets Revealed

The script begins with an introduction to a shocking revelation about General Motors (GM) and its handling of a deadly safety defect in the Chevrolet Cobalt model. The narrative focuses on the tragic consequences of GM's decision not to fix a known issue with the ignition switch, which led to numerous accidents and fatalities. The story highlights the case of Dany Dubuc-Marquis, a young man whose life was cut short due to the defect, and raises questions about corporate responsibility and the role of Transport Canada in vehicle safety.

05:02

🔍 Uncovering the Faulty Ignition Switch

This paragraph delves into the investigative journey of the Melton family, who sought to uncover the truth behind their daughter's fatal car accident involving a GM vehicle. The narrative introduces Charlie Miller, a mechanic, and Mark Hood, an engineer, who together discovered the ignition switch's critical flaw. The switch, a mere 57-cent piece, was found to be the pivotal component that could cause the vehicle to lose power, steering, and brakes, leading to catastrophic accidents. The summary also reveals GM's knowledge of a safer ignition design used in newer models but not implemented in older vehicles, exposing a disregard for consumer safety.

10:05

🏁 GM's History of Safety Concerns

The script provides a historical context of GM's safety issues, dating back to the 1960s with the Chevrolet Corvair. It outlines the company's portrayal as an iconic automobile manufacturer and its subsequent exposure by consumer advocate Ralph Nader for design flaws. The narrative moves through time, discussing GM's reluctance to address safety defects in its vehicles, including a service bulletin that acknowledged the ignition switch issue without a formal recall. The paragraph also introduces Ray deGiorgio, an engineer who internally referred to the ignition switch as 'the switch from hell,' foreshadowing the internal knowledge of the defect.

15:05

📉 Financial Priorities Over Safety

This section of the script discusses GM's internal cost-benefit analysis regarding vehicle safety. It reveals the company's prioritization of financial considerations over the lives of its customers, with a focus on the 2008 economic downturn and GM's bankruptcy. The narrative describes how GM's corporate culture discouraged speaking up about safety issues and how the company rationalized not disclosing the ignition switch defect as it was deemed a 'customer convenience issue' rather than a safety hazard.

20:05

📜 Deceptive Practices and Legal Consequences

The script uncovers GM's deceptive practices, including a secret replacement of the defective ignition part in newer models without informing customers or initiating a recall. It details the legal pursuit by attorney Lance Cooper, who deposed key GM engineers, revealing their knowledge and denial of the ignition switch issue. The narrative also highlights a critical document that surfaced after a GM engineer's testimony, which contradicted his claims of ignorance about the part change, implicating GM in a cover-up of the defect.

25:06

🇨🇦 Transport Canada's Inaction Questioned

This paragraph raises questions about the role and effectiveness of Transport Canada in vehicle safety regulation. It contrasts the U.S.'s proactive approach to automotive safety with Canada's reactive stance, suggesting that Canada often follows the lead of the U.S. in safety recalls. The narrative points out that Transport Canada was aware of an accident involving a defective GM ignition switch months before the official recall but did not act on this information, leading to further fatalities.

30:07

🚨 The Ignition Switch Recall and Its Aftermath

The script describes the aftermath of GM's delayed recall of vehicles with the defective ignition switch, which承认ably led to numerous fatalities and injuries. It details the media coverage, public outcry, and the legal and congressional investigations that ensued in the U.S. The narrative also addresses the lack of official action by Transport Canada and the discrepancy in the statements of Canadian officials regarding their knowledge of the issue prior to the recall.

35:08

🛑 The Tragic Impact of Delayed Action

This section of the script highlights the tragic consequences of GM's and Transport Canada's delayed response to the ignition switch issue. It tells the story of Danylo Kulish, whose death in a crash involving a GM vehicle with the defective ignition switch occurred after the known issue but before the recall. The narrative emphasizes the families' frustration with GM and Transport Canada, and the latter's perceived lack of independence and proactivity in ensuring vehicle safety.

40:08

🌐 The Broader Implications and Future Concerns

The script concludes with a broader discussion of the implications of GM's negligence and the regulatory shortcomings in the automobile industry. It suggests that without prioritizing safety and without stronger regulatory oversight in Canada and the U.S., similar tragedies could occur in the future. The narrative ends with a note on GM's dismissal of employees involved in the ignition switch scandal and the skepticism surrounding the company's claims of executive ignorance.

Keywords

💡General Motors

General Motors (GM) is a multinational corporation that designs and sells vehicles and vehicle parts. It is a central entity in this video script as it is responsible for the production of the Chevrolet Cobalt, which is highlighted for having a deadly ignition switch defect. GM's corporate culture and decisions, particularly around safety and cost, are a major theme of the video.

💡Ignition Switch

The ignition switch is a critical component in vehicles that allows the engine to start and run. In the context of the video, the ignition switch of the Chevrolet Cobalt is identified as defective, causing the engine to stall and leading to fatal accidents. The script discusses how GM knew about the defect but chose not to recall the vehicles due to cost considerations.

💡Defective

The term 'defective' refers to something that is broken, not functioning properly, or unsafe. In the video, the ignition switch of the Chevrolet Cobalt is described as defective, which is a central issue as it led to numerous accidents and fatalities that GM allegedly ignored for years.

💡Recall

A recall in the automotive industry refers to the manufacturer's action to take back a product due to safety concerns. The video discusses GM's delayed recall of millions of vehicles equipped with the defective ignition switch, which is a key point of controversy in the narrative.

💡Safety Defects

Safety defects are flaws in a product that pose a risk to the user's safety. The video emphasizes GM's knowledge and subsequent inaction regarding the safety defects in the ignition switch, which is a central ethical and legal issue explored throughout the script.

💡Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is a process used to compare the costs and benefits of a project or decision. The video script reveals that GM allegedly performed a cost-benefit analysis on the ignition switch issue, determining it was cheaper to pay out lawsuits than to fix the defect, showcasing a significant ethical dilemma.

💡Transport Canada

Transport Canada is the Canadian government department responsible for transportation policies and programs. The script questions the effectiveness of Transport Canada in regulating vehicle safety and its knowledge and response to the GM ignition switch issue before the public recall.

💡Corporate Greed

Corporate greed refers to the excessive pursuit of profits by corporations, often at the expense of ethics or public safety. The video suggests that GM's inaction on the ignition switch defect was driven by corporate greed, prioritizing profits over consumer safety.

💡Liability

In legal terms, liability refers to the responsibility for a wrongful act, typically resulting in damage or injury. The video discusses GM's potential liability for the accidents and deaths caused by the defective ignition switch, including punitive damages to penalize the company for its negligence.

💡Engineer Ray deGiorgio

Ray deGiorgio is a GM engineer who played a pivotal role in the development of the Cobalt's ignition switch. The script mentions him as having referred to the ignition switch as 'the switch from hell' and implicates him in the cover-up of the defect, leading to his dismissal by GM after the issue became public.

💡Airbag Non-deployment

Airbag non-deployment occurs when airbags do not inflate during a crash, which can lead to more severe injuries or fatalities. The video script connects the defective ignition switch to airbag non-deployment in several accidents, emphasizing the severity of the safety issue.

Highlights

General Motors (GM) made a business decision not to fix a known safety defect in their vehicles, prioritizing cost over customer lives.

The defective ignition switch in GM's Chevrolet Cobalt and other models was identified as a potential issue as early as 2001 but was not addressed until a recall in 2014.

A 57-cent piece, the detent plunger, was the critical component that, when faulty, could cause the ignition to switch positions and disable crucial safety features.

GM's internal culture discouraged speaking up about problems, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability regarding safety issues.

The story of Dany Dubuc-Marquis, a 23-year-old whose death in a Cobalt crash raised questions about Transport Canada's handling of vehicle recalls and safety.

Investigations revealed that GM had secretly replaced the defective ignition part in newer models without informing the public or addressing the older vehicles.

Engineer Mark Hood discovered that the newer ignition switches had a plunger 1.6 millimeters longer, preventing the key from slipping into the 'accessory' position.

GM's lack of disclosure about the ignition switch defect and their decision not to issue a recall until 2014 has been linked to at least 29 fatalities.

Transport Canada's response to the GM ignition switch issue was criticized for being reactive rather than proactive, with no official action taken against GM.

The regulatory power of Transport Canada is limited compared to the U.S., lacking the authority to order recalls and relying on manufacturer cooperation.

GM's history of safety issues dates back to the 1960s with the Chevrolet Corvair, and has continued with various models, including pickup trucks with side saddle gas tanks.

Internal GM documents and testimonies revealed a pattern of ignoring safety defects until they became publicly and legally unavoidable.

The Melton family's pursuit of justice for their daughter Brooke, who died in a Cobalt crash, led to the exposure of GM's negligence and the ignition switch defect.

Mechanic Charlie Miller's examination of the Cobalt's ignition system provided critical evidence of the defect and GM's failure to address it.

GM's cost-benefit analysis of safety recalls revealed a corporate culture that calculated the expense of fatalities against the cost of repairs.

After the ignition switch scandal broke, GM dismissed 15 employees, including Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer associated with the defective part, though senior management claimed no knowledge.

Critics argue that safety should be the top priority for the auto industry, but the lack of stringent regulations and proactive oversight may lead to future safety crises.

Transcripts

(♪♪)

>> Bob: On this edition of

"The Fifth Estate"...

>> I have a warning for you

tonight.

>> Bob: It was General Motors'

deadly secret.

>> What happened to this GM

car?

Crappy little Cobalt.

>> Bob: Now, a startling look

inside the GM culture that put

a price on their customers'

lives.

>> GM made a business decision

not to fix the safety defects.

>> Bob: The dead Canadian who

might have been saved.

>> He died for a 57-cent piece

that should have been fixed

over ten years ago.

>> Bob: And the life or death

question, what's Transport

Canada doing to protect you?

>> It's incumbent upon the

manufacturer to let Transport

Canada know about a defect in

a timely fashion.

>> That's right.

>> Is almost a decade-and-a-half

in timely fashion?

>> Bob: I'm Bob McKeown.

This is "The Fifth Estate."

Ahead, the story of the switch

from hell.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: You may not know his

name yet but Dany Dubuc-Marquis

of Quebec's eastern townships

will be a pivotal figure in

this story.

At 23, he was all you'd want a

young man to be.

Good son.

Great friend.

The favourite camp counsellor.

Passionate about everything he

did.

Studying to be a Special Ed.

teacher, he and his college

class were soon to depart for

summer school in Belgium.

But then in June 2013, on this

highway near Granby, Quebec,

Dany's Chevrolet Cobalt left

the road and crashed.

His father Normand got the

phone call every parent dreads.

(speaking in French)

>> Bob: As you'll see, how and

why Dany Dubuc-Marquis died

should be a cautionary tale

for Canadians.

It raises questions about

corporate greed but also about

the safety of Canada's 23

million motor vehicles, and

specifically how Transport

Canada handled the recall of

millions of General Motors

cars and the fatal flaw that

GM hid from Canadians and

Americans for years.

For General Motors, it all

began to go wrong along a

stretch of highway in Georgia

on March the 10th, 2010.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: At the wheel of her

Chevrolet Cobalt was Brooke

Melton, a pediatric nurse

outside Atlanta.

It was her 29th birthday and

she was driving down this

two-lane highway to meet her

boyfriend for dinner.

When suddenly her car veered

across the centre line and an

SUV travelling in the opposite

direction smashed into the

Cobalt, demolishing it.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: Later that night,

Brooke's mother and father,

Beth and Ken, were contacted

by the local hospital.

>> And the surgeon got on the

phone with me and told me how

bad Brooke's accident was and

that she would not be able to

recover, she had a broken

neck, and, um, there was nothing

that she could do for her.

>> Bob: The police said her

death was a tragic accident

caused by a driving error on

wet pavement.

But Brooke's dad just couldn't

bring himself to accept the

official story.

>> Brooke was so conscientious

in her driving.

I know that's easy to say for

a parent about their child,

but she was.

She was very conscientious.

And very careful.

That's why I knew it had to be

something else.

I knew it had to be a mechanical

failure somewhere.

>> Bob: The Meltons were also

convinced that Exhibit "A" was

the twisted hulk of Brooke's

car.

Her 2005 Chevy Cobalt, but

they needed someone to unlock

the mysteries it held, an

automotive detective to

discover what really killed

their daughter.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: It would be a circuitous

path that brought them to this

unlikely place, the little

town of Merigold, Mississippi,

population 439.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: There's only one garage

in Merigold, mechanic Charlie

Miller started it 30 years ago.

He's since earned a reputation

as the go-to expert witness in

hundreds of American automobile

lawsuits.

>> They wanted to know the

truth, no matter what the

truth was, they needed to know

why their daughter died.

>> Bob: And immediately,

Charlie Miller knew something

was very wrong when he

downloaded the data from the

Chevy Cobalt's computer.

>> The engine went from around

2,000 rpm to 0 in one second.

As a mechanic, you know that's

impossible.

>> Bob: What's more, Miller

learned that Brooke Melton's

ignition switch had somehow

moved from "on" to the

"accessory" position, apparently

with disastrous consequences.

>> And what that told me as a

mechanic, that if this switch

moved from "on" to "accessory,"

she had no anti-lock brakes, she

had no electronic power

steering, and she had no engine

control at all.

>> Bob: Miller also noticed

how easily the Chevrolet

Cobalt's key could be moved

from the "on" position to

"accessory" with just the

slightest jostle, without even

knowing it.

>> It seemed too easy to me,

it seemed very easy to move.

I could tell the difference,

it was very obvious.

>> Bob: But was that a problem

unique to Brooke Melton's car?

To find out, Miller went to

the local junkyard to get

another used Cobalt ignition

so he could compare the two.

And?

>> It was weak, as I would

turn it, just like hers.

It was very close to hers.

It didn't have as much force

as I thought it should.

>> Bob: So that means both of

the old ignitions malfunctioned.

But what would happen if he

compared them to a brand-new

Chevy Cobalt ignition?

Miller got one from the local

GM dealer.

It had the same GM part number

as the old ones so it should

have performed exactly the

same.

But it didn't.

>> And when I installed that

new switch, the effort to turn

this key went up dramatically.

It would click in place, it

was harder to move it out of

position.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: The question was why?

Enter Mark Hood, an engineer

from Pensacola, Florida.

Hood's specialty is failure

analysis.

Investigating events like

bridge collapses and plane

crashes.

Now his assignment was to

explain the mysterious loss of

power in the Chevy Cobalt in

which Brooke Melton died.

>> This is an actual ignition

switch assembly.

>> Reporter: This is how a

Cobalt ignition switch works.

>> Clutch in.

(engine starts)

>> Bob: When you insert the key,

it turns what's called the

ignition column.

At the far end is a part

called the detent plunger

which goes up and down like

the top of a ballpoint pen.

As it does, it rotates the

cylinder that moves the

ignition key from "on" to

"accessory."

If that tiny spring-loaded

plunger, a 57-cent piece, that

determines how easily the key

will move.

So what was going on inside

the Cobalt's ignition switch,

causing the older ignitions to

let the key slip into the

"accessory" position with such

tragic consequences?

Atlanta attorney Lance Cooper

set out to piece together that

puzzle for the Meltons.

He says he'll never forget the

phone call he got from

engineer Mark Hood.

>> He says, "Lance, you're not

going to believe what I just

found," and I said, "What?"

And he said, "They changed the

switch."

I said, "What do you mean they

changed the switch?"

And he said, "They changed the

newer switch to make it harder

to turn the key from 'run' to

'accessory' or 'off'."

>> Bob: Hood had made a

crucial discovery.

The plunger from Brooke Melton's

ignition, the one that

malfunctioned, was

infinitesimally shorter than

the new part that worked just

fine.

>> And on this card, I taped

down a 2005 detent plunger and

a new replacement detent

plunger and you can see the

difference in length between

the two detent plungers.

>> Bob: That difference is a

mere 1.6 millimetres, just the

thickness of a quarter, but

it literally would be the

difference between life and

death for Brooke Melton.

And even more disturbing, when

hood discovered both ignition

switches had the same part

number, he knew General Motors

had put the new improved part

into its new models but left

the old defective part in its

older cars.

However, GM never told its

customers either about the

change, or the danger.

Attorney Lance Cooper.

>> What's the plausible

explanation, what's the

benefit to the company of

doing that?

>> Well, the company doesn't

want you to know that they've

changed the switch because if

you know they've changed the

switch and the old switch

harms or kills someone,

they'll be held responsible

for that.

Not only responsible for the

death but under U.S. law, liable

for punitive damages to punish

them for their bad conduct.

♪ Can you imagine when this

race is won ♪

>> Bob: When we come back,

selling cars with dreams of

graduation and the prom.

And keeping secrets about the

ignition switch from hell.

>> We certainly did not approve

the detent plunger design

change.

>> I asked him as many different

ways as I could whether he knew

of a change, whether GM knew

of a change.

He said I don't know, GM

doesn't know.

(♪♪)

(♪♪)

>> Bob: The aftermath of a

crash is always horrifying.

29-year-old Brooke Melton of

Georgia and 23-year-old Dany

Dubuc-Marquis of Quebec died

in their Chevy Cobalts but for

GM, safety problems go back

for half a century.

>> First of the 1960 compact

cars, the Chevrolet Corvair,

was revealed today.

>> Bob: As these Vintage

commercials show, General Motors

portrayed itself as an iconic

company.

It's automobiles symbols of a

prosperous North American

middle class.

>> The Corvair will be in mass

production within a few weeks,

at a new ten acre additiion...

>> Bob: Though GM long touted

its commitment to safety,

consumer advocate Ralph Nader

exposed design defects in its

first generation compact car,

the Chevy Corvair, that Nader

called unsafe at any speed,

as he told the CBC.

>> Well, then surely they did

the right thing, they found

out there was something wrong

with the car and they fixed

it.

>> The question is why did it

take them four years to find

out, this is my point.

Either it's sheer callousness

or indifference or they don't

bother to find out how their

cars behave.

>> Bob: Thanks to Ralph Nader's

campaign, it wasn't long before

the U.S. passed its first

legislation to mandate standards

of automotive safety and to

compel car makers to disclose

safety defects.

>> We have this exposed bit of

metal here instead of padding

as exists on the other model.

>> Bob: But the questions about

safety problems at General

Motors have resonated ever

since.

What did GM know, when,

and what did GM do or not do

about them?

In the 1970s and '80s, GM's

defective design of so-called

side saddle gas tanks made

its pickup trucks especially

vulnerable to fire and

collisions.

>> The fuel expulses from the

tank violently, gets ignited,

there's an immediate Holocaust

and the people in the pickup

burn to death.

>> Bob: GM motors stopped

manufacturing the trucks but

though hundreds of people

died, the worst fire hazard in

U.S. automotive history,

GM somehow made a deal to avoid

a recall, paying a $51 million

settlement instead.

The result is that GM vehicles

with those explosive gas tanks

remain on the road even today.

(♪♪)

♪ Can you imagine when this

race is won ♪

>> Bob: In recent years,

General Motors has refocused

on its compact car business.

With inexpensive automobiles

and ads aimed at young,

often first-time drivers.

♪ Forever Young ♪

>> Introducing the Saturn Ion,

specifically designed and

engineered for whatever's next.

>> Bob: After the Saturn Ion

came the Chevrolet Cobalt

marketed to the same youthful

demographic.

The two cars were different on

the outside but much the same

underneath.

Including the ignition switch.

>> Chevy Cobalt, an American

revolution.

>> Bob: And we now know that

General Motors insiders soon

seemed nervous about the

Cobalt's ignition.

In 2001, with the car still in

development, the engineer in

charge wrote an E-mail

complaining the design of the

ignition switch had failed

miserably.

When he ordered it to be

manufactured anyway, he called

it the switch from hell.

That GM engineer's name was

Ray deGiorgio.

You'll be hearing about him

again.

So by 2001, General Motors

knew the Chevy Cobalt ignition

switch was a problem.

In 2005 when the car went on

sale, the New York Times

reporter reviewing it told a

strange story about the test

Cobalt stalling after the

ignition switch had mistakenly

been bumped into the accessory

position.

Eventually the complaints and

the crashes were more than GM

could ignore but despite the

law requiring car companies to

publicly disclose safety

defects, GM didn't.

The company somehow

rationalized that a loss of

power, even at high speed,

wasn't really a safety issue

but more of a customer

convenience issue.

And there was no recall.

Instead, what General Motors

did was send this service

bulletin to its dealers in

Canada and the U.S.

Telling them the Cobalt

ignition could be rotated out

of position in an especially

heavy key ring, but no warning

about the deadly possibilities

if it was.

And no indication that General

Motors was about to secretly

replace that tiny but

defective ignition part, the

detent plunger that was too

short to keep the ignition key

in place and could cause

high-speed crashes.

But still, with no disclosure

of the defect and no recall.

According to auto industry

critic Clarence Ditlow, GM has

long been keenly aware of the

cost of recalling and repairing

its vehicles.

>> They certainly do a cost

analysis.

They've done cost benefit

analysis of what it would cost

to save a life.

>> Bob: A case in point, the

memo from a GM engineer in the

'70s that was infamous for its

callous calculation of the cost

per car at which it no longer

made financial sense for General

Motors to try to save a life

with a part change or recall.

How much was too much?

Incredibly, that prohibitive

amount was just $2.40 per

vehicle.

So it's worth it to pay the

damages of a lawsuit when

somebody dies in a fire because

of a faulty part?

>> That's right.

>> Rather than recall and repair

the part in the first place.

>> It's cheaper to pay the

lawsuit than it is to put the

safety into the vehicle.

>> Shares of General Motors

fell sharply today after the

brokerage firm Goldman Sachs

urged investors to sell the

stock.

>> Bob: And as the world

economy began its downward

spiral in 2007 and 8, financial

considerations apparently were

far more pressing than fixing

those troublesome ignition

switches.

>> The idea of having to recall,

you know, hundreds of thousands,

possibly millions, of cars to

make their repair was going to

cost the company money at a time

when it didn't have money.

>> Bob: Mary Ann Kellar is a

long-time auto industry analyst

who has written two books about

General Motors and its culture.

>> You don't speak up in

meetings, you don't talk about

the problem.

If you do talk about the problem

and become very aggressive

about it, you're branded a

disgruntled employee and your

career ends.

Simple.

>> Guys, you are looking at

GM's CEO Dan Ackerson,

he has just driven the first

Volt up on to the stage here.

>> Bob: After all the attention

to bankruptcy and bail-outs,

GM was intent on shifting the

spotlight, here announcing a new

electric car.

But it still couldn't escape

its past.

April 2013, Detroit, Michigan,

a meeting room at the Westin

Hotel.

Lawyer Lance Cooper

representing Brooke Melton's

family in their suit against

General Motors started taking

depositions.

On the hot seat, the GM

engineer who supervised

development of the Cobalt

ignition switch, Ray deGiorgio.

Remember, he called it the

switch from hell.

>> Primarily, I was the project

engineer for the ignition switch

in that vehicle.

>> Bob: You'll also recall

Lance Cooper's team had

discovered that GM secretly

replaced the defective part

called the detent plunger in

newer models of the Cobalt.

But asked whether he'd approved

the change, engineer DeGiorgio

denied any knowledge of it

whatsoever.

>> We certainly did not approve

a detent plunger design change.

>> I asked him as many different

ways as I could whether he knew

of a change, whether GM knew

of a change.

He said "I don't know, GM

doesn't know."

He said "I've spoken with the

supplier, they don't know of

any change, there was no

change ever made."

And then we presented him with a

photograph showing the change

and his position was "I don't

know anything about this."

>> Did you ever authorize --

>> Bob: Ray deGiorgio was then

asked by the General Motors

lawyer if he had approved that

new ignition switch.

Again, he denied it all.

>> Absolutely not.

>> So if any such change was

made, it was made without your

knowledge and authorization?

>> That is correct.

>> Bob: But after DeGiorgio

made those claims he knew

nothing, this document surfaced,

a letter from GM to the supplier

called Delphi that made the

controversial ignition switches.

It was dated 2006, but only

came to light eight years later,

after Ray DeGiorgio's testimony.

It's a requisition from GM

ordering the new changed

ignition switches.

It was approved and signed by

none other than Ray deGiorgio.

And a month-and-a-half after

DeGiorgio testified, Lance

Cooper deposed another key

engineer for the Chevy Cobalt

named Gary Altman.

Listen as Altman is asked

about the role of money in

GM's refusal to disclose that

ignition defect and order a

recall.

>> GM put its profits over the

safety of Brooke Melton,

didn't it?

>> Object to form.

>> It made a business decision

not to fix this problem and

five months later, sold her a

vehicle with the problem,

didn't it?

>> Object to form.

Argumentative.

Lack of foundation.

>> You can answer.

>> That is what happened, yes.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: It was a truly stunning

moment.

For all of GM's corporate

culture, the admission under

oath that General Motors

intentionally ignored a fatal

safety defect for years simply

because it would cost less.

>> Then he was asked, therefore,

GM made a business decision not

to fix these safety defects,

and he had to acknowledge yes.

>> Safety defects which cost

lives.

>> Sure.

That's the whole point, is

once you know there's a safety

defect -- this isn't a mirror

that's, you know, rusting too

early or something.

This is an engine stalling

problem and that's the whole

point we were making to them

was this is a safety defect

and ultimately, he and the

other engineers, when that

question was put to them, they

had to acknowledge, yes, it is

a safety defect.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: After the break, when it

comes to GM, have Canadian

vehicle safety regulators been

asleep at the switch?

>> Did Transport Canada know

that this was an issue before

February the 10th, 2014?

>> Please define "issue".

(♪♪)

>> Bob: Every year in Canada and

the U.S., millions of vehicles

are recalled for a variety of

reasons.

The public seldom knows about

most of them.

But what happened in February

2014 was different.

Not only did General Motors

announce that almost a million

of its compact cars had a

defective ignition switch, but

that a growing number of its

customers had lost their lives

because of it.

The media took notice.

>> What happened to this GM

car?

778,000 being recalled of

these crappy little Cobalts.

>> This is CNN breaking news.

>> Bob: As the story unfolded,

GM would exponentially

increase the number of

recalled vehicles.

>> Word of a massive recall

from General Motors, more than

1 million vehicles are

affected and here's the issue,

it's an ignition problem.

>> Bob: And the death toll has

kept mounting, too.

Grieving families gathering

outside the embattled

company's headquarters in

Detroit.

General Motors now admits the

ignition switch is related to

at least 29 fatalities.

In all, GM has received claims

for over 150 deaths and more

than 700 serious injuries.

Figures that keep going up.

In April 2014, Mary Barra, the

new General Motors CEO, but

long-time CEO employee, was

summoned to Washington,

to Capitol Hill to testify.

Finally answering questions

about the deadly ignition

switches that could have been

asked, indeed should have been

asked, a decade before.

>> Was there a culture in GM at

that time that they would have

put cost over safety?

>> Again, we're doing a complete

investigation but I would say,

in general, we've moved from

a cost culture after the

bankruptcy to a customer

culture.

>> Ms, Barra, GM knew about the

defect in the ignition switches

as far as 2001, 13 years before

the recall, correct?

"Yes" or "no" will work.

>> The investigation will tell

us that.

>> Bob: There's no question

that General Motors has taken

its licks in the U.S.

Its CEO has twice been summoned

to testify on Capitol Hill.

There are two on-going

congressional investigations

and another with the

Department of Justice.

And the National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration

has fined GM the maximum

allowed by law, $35 million

for not publicly disclosing

the defects in its ignition

switches.

But here in Canada, our safety

regulators at Transport Canada

have taken no official action

against GM whatsoever.

Though almost 400,000 Canadian

cars are on that GM ignition

switch recall list.

And listen to federal Transport

Minister Lisa Raitt in the

House of Commons explaining

exactly when her department

first learned of the GM ignition

switch problem.

>> Transport Canada was not

aware of an ignition switch

issue prior to receiving its

first notice from GM Canada in

February.

>> Bob: So Raitt told Parliament

that Transport Canada didn't

know about the ignition switch

issue until the rest of us found

out, when GM announced that

massive recall.

That was February 2014.

The problem, as we're about to

show you, is that that appears

not to be true.

Remember, it was June 2013

when 23-year-old college student

Dany Dubuc-Marquis died in

the crash of his Chevy Cobalt.

That was eight months before

GM announced its recall.

Dany's dad Normand told

Transport Canada his son had

been drinking heavily with

friends that fateful night.

But when he saw the fatal wreck,

he immediately noticed something

else that troubled him.

Within days, Quebec police

contacted Transport Canada

investigators at their lab at

the Ecole Polytechnic in

Montreal.

They wanted to know, with such

severe frontal damage, why

didn't the airbags deploy?

And Transport Canada learned

something else.

At some point after Dany's

Cobalt left the road during

what investigators call the

collision event, the ignition

somehow moved from "on" to

"accessory."

How did that happen?

According to documents obtained

by "The Fifth Estate,"

Transport Canada investigators

would soon identify a possible

link between those two

suspicious events.

Two weeks after Dany died, an

internal E-mail to verify

if the fact that the ignition

switch was in the "accessory"

position could have influenced

anything with the non-deployment

event.

The next week, a phone call

from Transport Canada to

discuss the possible influence

on the air bag system of the

ignition switch in the

"accessory" position and in

October, a note about the

sharing of complaints,

presumably including the

ignition switch issue with the

vehicle manufacturer, in other

words, General Motors.

But again, listen to Lisa Raitt

months later denying any

knowledge of the defective

switch or the role it played

in Dany Dubuc-Marquis' death.

>> There was no connection made

to that previous accident that

the honourable member referred

to that happened unfortunately

in June of last year.

>> Bob: But Lisa Raitt's own

departmental file showed

Transport Canada had indeed

investigated that connection.

Lisa Raitt declined our request

for an interview.

However, Transport Canada

did make available its

director-general of motor

vehicle safety, Kash Ram.

Did Transport Canada know that

this was an issue before

February the 10th, 2014?

>> Please define "issue."

>> Bob: Well, you might ask

Lisa Raitt that.

Here's what she said in

Parliament, "Transport Canada

was not aware of an ignition

switch issue prior to receiving

its first notice from GM Canada

in February 2014."

So that's what the minister

says, is she correct about that?

>> Yes, in terms of a defect --

>> Bob: No idea it was an issue?

>> No.

>> Bob: But again, Transport

Canada's own documents leave

little doubt they knew the

ignition switch of Dany

Dubuc-Marquis' Chevy Cobalt

might have played a role in

his death.

That would seem to show within

a couple weeks of that crash,

Transport Canada knew there

could be a problem with that

ignition switch.

>> Now, what we determined in

a number of collisions is that

the switch had moved from

"run" to "accessory."

What we don't know in many

cases today is what caused

that switch to move.

At the time, it was reasonable

to believe that one contributor

could have been a bumping of the

switch.

We have seen that before in a

number of cases.

There was no reason to rule

out that the bumping of the

switch could have caused it.

>> Bob: Transport Canada was

seemingly on the verge of

figuring out the role of the

ignition switch in Dany

Dubuc-Marquis' death.

They knew the ignition had

mysteriously moved somehow to

the "accessory" position but

rather than take the next step

and hone in on proving why it

moved, Transport Canada

apparently said, well, he

might have bumped the switch,

and that's where they left it,

effectively shutting down

their investigation.

And Transport Canada sent

Dany's Cobalt to a local

junkyard where it would remain

for months until after the GM

recall in February.

According to Clarence Ditlow

of the U.S. Centre for Auto

Safety, Transport Canada is not

known as an especially proactive

organization.

>> We look at Transport Canada

from time to time just in terms

of are they doing the same

recall in Canada, are they

investigating in Canada the

defects that are being

investigated here and when it

comes to recalls, it looks

like Canada is a hand-me-down

country.

>> Bob: What do you mean by

that?

>> They get recalls handed

down from the U.S.

I mean, the best that Canada's

going to get in terms of recalls

is what the U.S. does and if

the U.S. misses it, Canada is

going to miss it.

And then sometimes Canada

doesn't even act.

>> Bob: When we return, the

life or death stakes of a

recall that comes too late.

>> He died for a 57-cent piece

that should have been fixed

over ten years ago.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: The city of Detroit,

Michigan, look its best from

high above after years of

lay-offs, bankruptcies and

recalls.

But Detroit remains the capital

of the American automobile

industry which de facto

makes it the capital of Canada's

automobile industry.

Even the minister in charge

of Canadian auto safety

acknowledges crucial decisions

for Canada, like those

concerning the ignition switch,

are made in executive suites

south of the border.

>> Mr. Chair, the timing of

when the parent company knew

of this defect is actually

under investigation by U.S.

authorities.

We know that GM Canada does

not act independently of its

parent company and decision

making like this recalls is

centralized as it is with

other manufacturers.

>> Bob: And not only do American

car companies like GM call the

shots for their Canadian

subsidiaries, but the laws

governing motor vehicle safety

in Canada are far weaker than

those in the U.S.

American regulators can order

the recall of cars with safety

defects.

In Canada, Transport Canada

has no such power.

The best it can do is to

request a recall, which the

manufacturer can refuse.

The result could be years

spent in court.

And under the Motor Vehicle

Safety Act, Transport Canada

can only regulate GM Canada

which almost everyone agrees

mostly rubber stamps corporate

decisions that are made in

Detroit.

We asked Kash Ram, Transport

Canada's director-general of

motor vehicle safety, what GM

Canada told them about the

switch from hell.

Did GM Canada ever let you

know that there was a problem

with those ignition switches?

>> GM Canada did not say that

there were problems with the

ignition switches, no, they

did not.

And GM Canada did not admit to

a problem until such time that

the recall was decided upon by

the parent firm, GM U.S.

>> Bob: But under the Motor

Vehicle Safety Act, GM Canada

is obliged to disclose a

safety defect in a timely

fashion.

"Timely" meaning what?

>> Well, "timely" meaning upon

becoming aware.

Now, it will depend based on

circumstances, in some cases

it's days, typically it's

days, upon determining, upon

becoming aware that there is a

safety-related defect.

>> Bob: Is almost a

decade-and-a-half in timely

fashion?

>> They have admitted fault,

but we have to see -- we have --

it has to be evidence-based.

>> Bob: Has General Motors

Canada owned up to the fact

that before that recall in

February 2014, they knew about

the ignition switch issue?

>> At this point in time, we

have no evidence to suggest

that GM Canada did not comply

with its obligations under the

Canadian law but it's not

closed yet.

We continue to scrutinize

their actions.

>> Bob: But there is evidence

that the GM Canada head office

in Oshawa knew of the ignition

switch problems long before

February.

GM Canada president Kevin

Williams declined our

interview request.

But according to a written

statement to us, GM Canada

participated in company meetings

in mid-December 2013 when the

ignition switch issue was

raised.

So that was two months before

the recall.

But then there's this,

from 2005, almost a decade

earlier, the service bulletin

sent by GM to its dealers in

Canada and the U.S.

Remember, that was when

General Motors in the U.S.

was about to secretly replace

the defective part without

letting its customers know.

Among the cars with that

ignition defect, the Chevy

Cobalt, the Saturn Ion and

another GM compact, the

Pontiac Pursuit.

Automotive watchdog Clarence

Ditlow asks how could GM

Canada not know about that?

>> The Pontiac Pursuit is on

that bulletin.

That's sold only in Canada.

You know, here's a bulletin

that says the ignition goes to

the "accessory" position and

GM Canada doesn't know about

it on a Canadian car sold in

Canada?

No, I don't believe that.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: So if GM Canada had done

more to get those dangerous

cars off the road when it first

learned of the ignition switch

problem, what difference might

it have made?

Well, consider a case we

discovered that took place in

Montreal in March, six weeks

after the recall.

55-year-old Danylo Kulish was

on the way to pick up his

girlfriend at Trudeau Airport.

He was driving his 2006 Saturn

Ion when it happened.

His younger brother Taras.

>> And it was a clear day,

there was no snowstorm.

He was driving southbound on

Highway 13.

And lost control.

He went straight into the

cement pillar that divided the

highway and the exit so the

pillar that's right there, he

went right in.

Full frontal crash.

>> Bob: Danylo Kulish was

pronounced dead of massive

internal injuries.

The Kulish family says no one

told them about the GM recall

until after his death.

>> My sister was watching TV,

and she saw a report, a TV

report, on this woman who was

holding a picture of her

daughter who she said died in

a Saturn Ion the same type of

situation.

>> Bob: It soon became clear

Danylo's crash looked very

much like the others involving

GM vehicles with defective

ignition switches.

>> Bob: No skidmarks?

>> No skidmarks which implies

he did not brake or could not

brake because the three things

that happen is you lose power

steering, any kind of power

steering, you lose your power

brakes, and the airbags don't

deploy upon impact.

>> Bob: And the clinching

detail, they say investigators

told them the ignition was

found in the "accessory"

position.

Kash Ram insists blame for the

death of Danylo Kulish lies

not with Transport Canada but

how long it took GM to admit

its mistakes.

>> They say if Transport Canada

had taken more of an interest

in this, had taken the

Dubuc-Marquis crash seriously

or more seriously, he might be

alive today.

What would you say to them?

>> I can't speak to the family.

It's a tragic loss when anyone

dies in one of these crashes.

It's very unfortunate, I can't

speak to GM's action in that

regard.

You'll have to ask GM why that

was the case.

>> It angers me because why

should we be waiting for

anything from the United

States?

I mean, Transport Canada

should be its own independent

organization and should be

able to react accordingly to

what is going on here and

they're just -- they're

nowhere to be seen or found.

>> Bob: It's a sentiment shared

by the family of Dany

Dubuc-Marquis.

They wonder about the

premature end to Transport

Canada's initial investigation

of Dany's death.

Whatever GM decides about any

claims for compensation from

the Dubuc family, for its part,

Transport Canada insists it

did a good job.

>> GM can speak for themselves

in terms of the evidence they

have in hand.

We speak based on the very

close, very careful assessment

we have done of these crashes.

>> Bob: Though Dany's dad

Normand is critical of

Transport Canada, he maintains

the real blame belongs to

General Motors.

And after all the promises

about a new customer culture,

the Kulish family got this

letter addressed to Danylo and

sent after the crash that

killed him.

In it, GM CEO Mary Barra

apologized for what she called

the inconvenience or frustration

caused by how the ignition

switch problems were handled.

By then, Danylo Kulish had

been dead for five months.

>> He died for no reason.

He died for a 57-cent piece

that should have been fixed

over ten years ago.

And would have cost them

hardly anything if they would

have just done the right thing

from day one.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: But the lesson of the

General Motors ignition switch

is that, inevitably, it will

happen again.

>> The problem is that in

North America, you know,

safety is not job number one

for any of the car companies.

And the regulatory agencies

either here in the U.S.

or Canada are not up to the

job of policing the auto

industry.

>> Bob: So until safety does

become job one for the

automobile industry, with 23

million motor vehicles in

Canada and without Canadian

laws that can assure they're

safe, the next switch from

hell may already be somewhere

out there on the road.

(♪♪)

>> Bob: A final note on our

story.

After General Motors admitted

the pattern of incompetence

and neglect which allowed that

defective ignition switch to

remain hidden for so long, it

dismissed 15 of its employees,

including the engineer

responsible for the switch

from hell, Ray DeGiorgio.

But GM insists no one in a

senior executive position had

any knowledge of what was

going on, which, given GM's

corporate culture, some

critics find hard to believe.

♪ ♪