Why One Nuke Is Never Enough - Myth of the Overkill

Summary

This video explores the history and evolution of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), highlighting its role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. It delves into the challenges SAC faced, the transformation under Curtis LeMay, and the differing views on nuclear deterrence between LeMay and General Thomas Power, ultimately showcasing SAC's readiness during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Takeaways

• 😀 The video discusses the history and impact of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a powerful military force during the Cold War, focusing on its rise and fall.
• 💥 The Dayton Raid in 1949 highlighted the poor state of the U.S. Air Force, with nearly two-thirds of bombing runs significantly off target, indicating a need for improvement.
• 🌐 The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the Korean War were pivotal events that fueled the Cold War and influenced SAC's development.
• 🔧 SAC faced numerous challenges in the late 1940s, including personnel shortages and inadequate resources, which hindered its operational capabilities.
• 🚀 The B-36 Peacemaker and B-47 Stratojet were notable aircraft that faced significant issues, reflecting the broader struggles within SAC.
• 💪 General Curtis LeMay is credited with transforming SAC into a highly effective force, emphasizing the importance of his leadership in its success.
• 🤔 General Thomas Power, often overlooked or misrepresented, played a significant role in SAC's history and its approach to nuclear deterrence.
• 🔫 The Cuban Missile Crisis showcased SAC's peak readiness, with over 1,400 bombers and 145 missiles ready to launch, demonstrating its strategic capabilities.
• 🤝 The debate between LeMay and others over nuclear deterrence strategies, such as preemptive strikes, highlights the complexity of military thinking during the Cold War.
• 📚 The video recommends books like 'Winning Armageddon' and 'To Rule the Skies' for deeper understanding of SAC and its key figures, suggesting the importance of historical context.

Q & A

What is the significance of the Dayton Raid in the history of the Strategic Air Command (SAC)?

The Dayton Raid in January 1949 was a significant event that exposed the weaknesses of the United States Air Force in the years following World War II. Despite the impressive display of air power, the raid was a disaster, with nearly two-thirds of the bombing runs being significantly off target. This served as a wake-up call for SAC, highlighting the need for improvement in capabilities and marking the beginning of its transformation into a more effective force.

How did the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the Korean War impact the United States' perception of its military readiness?

The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the outbreak of the Korean War were both shocks to the United States, causing a fear that the U.S. was 'losing the peace' despite having won the war. These events led to a sense of urgency in improving the readiness and capabilities of the U.S. military, particularly the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

What were the initial challenges faced by SAC in terms of personnel and resources?

SAC faced significant challenges in terms of personnel and resources in the late 1940s. Authorized to have 43,729 personnel, SAC only had 37,426 in its ranks. Many of the skilled personnel had left the service during the drawdown, leaving behind a large proportion of unskilled personnel. Additionally, the command was inadequate in terms of material, basing, and other resources, which hindered its ability to fulfill its mission effectively.

How did Curtis LeMay contribute to the transformation of SAC?

Curtis LeMay is often credited with transforming SAC into a more effective and powerful force. By the time he left for Washington in the summer of 1957, SAC had become essentially the command he set about to build when he arrived in 1948. Under his leadership, SAC developed the ability to quickly carry out large-scale nuclear warfare in a fairly successful manner.

What was General Thomas Power's role in the history of SAC, and how is he often portrayed in historical accounts?

General Thomas Power is a significant figure in the history of SAC, but he is often overlooked or dismissed in historical accounts. He is sometimes portrayed as a tyrannical sadist, embodying everything wrong with nuclear weapons and the military mind. However, his contributions and the complexities of his character are often overlooked, and he is sometimes seen as merely a carbon copy of Curtis LeMay.

What was the concept of nuclear counterforce, and how did General Power react to it?

Nuclear counterforce is a concept that emphasizes 'restraint' in nuclear warfare, focusing on targeting the enemy's military capabilities rather than civilian populations. When General Power heard about this concept, he reacted strongly against it, arguing that the goal of warfare was to kill the enemy and questioning the need for restraint.

How did Curtis LeMay's understanding of deterrence differ from the traditional view?

Traditionally, deterrence is understood as the active threat of war to prevent conflict. However, Curtis LeMay applied the term to the execution of a preemptive mission itself. For LeMay, starting a war to prevent a larger war was a worthwhile venture, suggesting an interest in correlating the prevention of war with attacking the enemy's offensive force first.

What are the potential problems associated with an overreliance on the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD)?

An overreliance on MAD can result in several problems, including overestimating one's own force or underestimating an adversary's ability to counter it, superimposing one's assumptions of deterrence value on a potential adversary, and aligning goals more with the capabilities one has rather than what is needed or desired. This can lead to a false sense of security and a neglect of other important aspects of deterrence.

How did SAC approach the calculation of its capabilities based on the intended end goal?

SAC approached the calculation of its capabilities by starting with the end goal in mind, asking what was required to achieve that goal and then backtracking from there. This involved identifying targets, establishing margins of error, calculating kill probabilities, and aggregating information to determine the required number of weapon systems per target.

What was the controversy surrounding the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), and how did General Power view it?

The SIOP was the general U.S. plan for nuclear war between 1961-2003. Controversy arose over the plan's requirement for a 90% assurance rate for each target, which was seen as too expensive and requiring the delivery of too many nuclear weapons. General Power believed that the forces assigned to the SIOP should be programmed and that excess forces should be used in the plan to add flexibility.

Outlines

00:00

😌 The Evolution of Strategic Air Command (SAC)

This paragraph introduces the Strategic Air Command (SAC), highlighting its role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. It discusses the Dayton Raid, which exposed the weaknesses of the U.S. Air Force post-WWII, and sets the stage for the transformation of SAC under the leadership of Curtis LeMay. The narrative also touches on the broader historical events that influenced SAC's development, such as the Soviet Union's atomic bomb detonation and the Korean War, emphasizing the shift from a struggling force to a symbol of nuclear deterrence.

05:06

🤔 The Debate on Nuclear Deterrence and the Role of General Power

This section delves into the strategic debates surrounding nuclear deterrence, focusing on the contrasting views of General Curtis LeMay and General Thomas Power. It explores the concept of nuclear counterforce and the idea of restraint in nuclear warfare, as opposed to the aggressive stance favored by LeMay and Power. The paragraph also critiques the historical portrayal of Power, presenting a more nuanced view of his contributions and the strategic discussions of the era.

10:08

📚 Reading Recommendations and the Traditional Concept of Nuclear Deterrence

The speaker provides reading recommendations for further exploration of SAC and General Power's influence, including works by Alberton, Ziarnick, and 21st Century Power. The paragraph then transitions to a discussion of traditional nuclear deterrence, examining the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and its limitations, such as overreliance on best-case scenarios and the potential for misaligned perceptions of deterrence value.

15:10

🔢 Calculating Nuclear Deterrence: Steps and Probabilities

This paragraph outlines the methodical approach SAC used to calculate the required capabilities for effective nuclear deterrence. It breaks down the process into four steps: target identification, assurance of success, kill probability, and aggregation of information. The summary explains how these steps were used to determine the number of weapons needed per target and the associated probabilities of success, including considerations for various stages of weapon deployment and potential failures.

20:14

🚀 The Role of ICBMs and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

The final paragraph discusses the emergence of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and their impact on nuclear deterrence strategies. It contrasts the views of SAC, which saw ICBMs as complementary to their arsenal, with those who considered them a game-changer. The paragraph also touches on the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) and the debates over the cost and effectiveness of achieving high destruction assurance rates. The speaker concludes by inviting viewers to consider the historical and ongoing discussions around nuclear deterrence and the role of SAC.

Keywords

💡Strategic Air Command (SAC)

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was a major command of the United States Air Force that was established to deliver strategic and nuclear weapons if needed. It was synonymous with the Cold War concept of Nuclear Deterrence. In the video, SAC is highlighted as a powerful fighting force that went through a transformation under the leadership of Curtis LeMay, ultimately becoming a symbol of readiness and capability during crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

💡Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear Deterrence is a concept in which the threat of using nuclear weapons is enough to prevent adversaries from taking hostile actions against a nuclear-armed state. The video discusses how SAC embodied this concept during the Cold War, with its readiness to launch nuclear weapons serving as a deterrent to potential enemies.

💡Dayton Raid

The Dayton Raid refers to a simulated bombing attack conducted by the United States Air Forces in Dayton, Ohio, in January 1949. It was a significant event that exposed the inadequacies of the Air Force at the time, with nearly two-thirds of bombing runs being off target. This incident is used in the video to illustrate the initial weaknesses of SAC before its transformation.

💡Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962, over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba. In the video, it is mentioned as a pivotal moment where SAC demonstrated its peak readiness, with a large number of bombers and missiles ready to launch, showcasing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.

💡Curtis LeMay

Curtis LeMay was a general in the United States Air Force known for his role in transforming SAC into a highly effective nuclear deterrent force. The video credits LeMay with significantly improving SAC's capabilities, making it a formidable force during his tenure.

💡General Thomas Power

General Thomas Power was a controversial figure in the history of SAC. The video discusses his role and his often misunderstood contributions to SAC's policies and capabilities. Power is portrayed as having a significant impact on SAC's approach to nuclear deterrence, despite being overshadowed by LeMay.

💡Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy that assumes that if two or more hostile parties are in a state of conflict, the use of nuclear weapons by one would result in the total destruction of both the attacker and the defender. The video discusses MAD as a foundational concept of nuclear deterrence, suggesting that the threat of total destruction prevents the use of nuclear weapons.

💡Preemptive Strikes

Preemptive Strikes refer to military actions taken to prevent an imminent attack by an adversary. In the video, the concept is discussed in the context of nuclear deterrence, with some arguing that the ability to carry out preemptive strikes is part of maintaining a credible deterrent.

💡Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)

The Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) was the general U.S. plan for nuclear war between 1961 and 2003. The video mentions SIOP as a point of contention between different branches of the military, particularly regarding the level of destruction assurance rates required for each target, illustrating the complexities of nuclear planning.

💡Nuclear Counterforce

Nuclear Counterforce is a strategy that involves targeting an adversary's nuclear weapons in a first strike to prevent them from being used. The video references a 1960 briefing where this concept was discussed, highlighting the debate over whether such restraint in nuclear warfare is desirable or necessary.

💡ICBMs

ICBMs, or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, are long-range ballistic missiles that are primarily used for nuclear strikes. The video discusses the role of ICBMs in the nuclear deterrence strategy, noting that while they were seen by some as a game-changer, SAC viewed them as just another weapon system with its own advantages and disadvantages.

Highlights

The Naval Institute Press sponsored the video, offering discounts on their selection.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was pivotal in the Cold War era for nuclear deterrence.

The Dayton Raid in 1949 exposed significant weaknesses in the U.S. Air Force's bombing accuracy.

The Soviet Union's atomic bomb detonation and the Korean War heightened U.S. concerns about nuclear deterrence.

SAC faced personnel shortages and a lack of skilled maintainers post-World War II.

A decade after the Korean War, SAC transformed into a highly capable nuclear force.

The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated SAC's readiness with 1,436 bombers and 145 missiles on standby.

Curtis LeMay is credited with reshaping SAC into a formidable nuclear command.

General Thomas Power's contributions to SAC's capabilities are often overlooked.

Historians have mischaracterized Power as either a sadist or a mere reflection of LeMay.

Power's public clashes highlighted the debate on nuclear deterrence strategies.

Deterrence was traditionally about the threat of war, but LeMay considered preemptive strikes part of deterrence.

Some viewed nuclear war as unthinkable due to mutually assured destruction, implying no one would use nuclear weapons.

SAC's approach to deterrence involved calculating the probability of destruction per target.

The process of ensuring deterrence included target identification, assurance of success, kill probability, and aggregate information.

Gen. Power argued against the myth of overkill, questioning the existence of excessive nuclear firepower.

Administrators opposed SAC's overwhelming nuclear firepower theory due to practical and resource concerns.

SAC advocated for a diverse set of capabilities for flexibility and government deterrence needs.

The Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) was criticized for its excessive resource requirements.

The video offers reading recommendations with discounts from the Naval Institute Press.

Transcripts

This video was sponsored by the  Naval Institute Press, a division of U.S. Naval Institute.

Continue watching how you can save either 25%  or up to 40% on their fantastic selection.  

What do a mock nuclear raid on Dayton, Ohio,  the detonation of the Soviet nuclear bomb,  

the Korean War, and the Cuban  missile crisis all have in common?  

Well, they mark both the rise and fall of one  of the most powerful fighting forces the world  

has ever seen – Strategic Air Command,  or SAC for short. Established to deliver  

strategic and nuclear weapons if needed, SAC  would for a long time be synonymous to the  

Cold War concept of Nuclear Deterrence. But how did it get there? Who made the  

force into what it became? And how do you actually  create deterrence? This is a fascinating topic,  

and some of the answers might surprise you  - so welcome to Military Aviation History,  

I’m Chris and let’s talk  about nuclear deterrence.  

In January 1949, the people of Dayton, Ohio were  witness to an unbelievable spectacle. Throughout  

the day the United States Air Forces simulated  mock bombing attacks, making for an impressive  

display. But behind this show of air power,  the Dayton raid was an unmitigated disaster,  

showing just how far the Air Force had fallen  in the four years following World War 2.  

Of 303 [bombing] runs, nearly two-thirds  were more than 7,000 feet off target.  

The average error was 10,090 ft. Such an  error, even with an atomic bomb over Hiroshima  

would have left the target unscathed.  Roughly five months later, a subsequent‚  

smaller scale mission showed little improvement. The Dayton Raid was a rude wake-up call, and SAC  

would take some years before it showed definitve  improvement in its capabilites. At the same time,  

US the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb,  Joe-1 and the Korea War both proved to be shocks,  

causing the fear that the U.S., as the saying  goes, won the war but was ‚losing the peace‘.  

And yes, the US wasn't the only one to win the war but that was the saying....so hands off those keyboards please :)

[Joe One and the North Korean Invasion]  aided in the implementation of paranoid,  

but generally benevolently intended, deeds that  came to define the duration of the Cold War.  

Had the Korean War not occured, [...] perhaps,  the Cold War would not have become the conflict  

generations knew it to be. In the late 1940s, SACs chances  

of fulfilling their task were about as  high as you winning the Kentucky Derby  

on a lame mule. The problems ran deep, material,  personnel, basing, everything was inadequate.  

Authorized to have 43,729 personnel, SAC  only had 37,426 in its ranks. Furthermore,  

those who left the service during the drawdown  were usually the highly skilled personnel,  

especially aircraft maintainers and repair  specialists. A large proprotion of those who  

remained in the command, which heavily relied  on new technology, were unskilled personnel.  

Some of you might be familiar with the  story of the B-36 Peacemaker and the B-47  

Stratojet, which had their fair share of  trouble – something for a future episode.  

Yet a decade after Joe-1 and the Korean War,  SAC emerged as a completely different force.  

The Cuban Missile Crisis saw the most powerful  fighting force ever constructed in the history  

of warfare reach the peak of its readiness to  go to war. Within 24 hours of the decision to  

act on the crisis, SAC had 1,436 bombers and 145  missiles ready to launch at a moment’s notice.  

At SAC’s peak readiness on 4 November, the  command had [...] almost 3,000 nuclear weapons  

to promise the Soviet Union complete destruction  should deterrence fail. While in DEFCON 2,  

SAC could have launched 92.5 percent of  its weapon systems within one hour.  

So, how did SAC go from a rundown force that  would have managed the incredible feat of  

missing with a nuke, to being ready and able  to employ close to 3000 of those bad boys?  

Curtis LeMay, known for his previous  service in WW2 especially in the Pacific  

is often remembered as the man who made SAC...SAC. LeMay left SAC in a much different condition than  

he found it. By the time he left for Washington in  the summer of 1957, SAC had become essentially the  

comand he set about to build when he arrived  in 1948. The command possessed the ability  

to quickly carry out a large-scale nuclear  war in a fairly successful manner.  

LeMay deserves a lot of the credit, what he did, transforming the force, that's a case study in itself

But ti wasn't just him, for example there is someone else, who is intertwined with the history,

the policies of SAC and the force’s capabilites.  That man was General Thomas Power. You might not  

have heard about him – you are not the only  one – and if you have, then probably not in  

flattering tones. In most accounts,  Power is glossed over or dismissed.  

Historians have succumbed to two different but  serious errors when considering the General  

[Power]. First, popular accounts have portrayed  Power as a tyrannical sadist – the living  

embodiment of everything wrong with both nuclear  weapons and the military mind. […] Second,  

academic accounts recall Power […] as a carbon  copy of Curtis LeMay. He emerges as LeMay’s  

right hand man, […] bested by the ultimate weapon,  the ICBM, […] prompting [SAC’s] slow decline into  

irrelevance as LeMay’s crown jewel tarnished  into a plodding, bureaucratic freak show.  

Power had frequent, public  clashes with politicians  

and administrators that underlined this  reputation. He had a talent for saying things that  

were…let’s say incredibly quotable – something  that both journalists and historians love,  

‘cause you got to build narrative. The most famous  incident is perhaps based on this anecdote:  

[In 1960] a civilian RAND consultant briefed  SAC commanders on a new concept that civilians  

had developed called nuclear counterforce.  Counterforce’s key concept was ‘restraint’  

in nuclear warfare. When Power heard this, […] the  general’s reaction was clear: ‘Why do we want to  

restrain ourselves? Why are you so concerned about  saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the  

bastards. Look, at the end of the war, if there  are two Americans and one Russian, we win’.  

Now before we go on. I am not going to be  defending Power or make some case here for  

‘the military is always right’ like some sort  of corndog holding, chest-pumping macho. What I  

want to make clear is that the disagreement that  LeMay and Power had with others.

It is a good case study to understand two different ways of thinking  about deterrence. One side of the debate was that  

nuclear war was possible, hence options like  preemptive strikes should be considered. For that  

side of the argument, having those  ‘pro-active’ options was part of deterrence.  

While deterrence was traditionally understood to  mean the active threat of war to prevent conflict,  

LeMay seemingly applied the term to  the execution of a preemptive mission  

itself. LeMay’s usage suggested an interest in  correlating the concept of the prevention of war  

with attacking the enemy’s offensive force  first. For LeMay, starting a war to prevent  

a larger war was a worthwhile venture; if  one could be deterred, all the better.  

For the other side, nuclear war was  unthinkable due to mutually assured  

destruction – as such even though we have  these weapons, no one is going to use them –  

because as soon as you do, the others use theirs.

and they considered this in itself deterrence. [A RAND consultant] argued that winning a nuclear  

war was ‘simply nonsense’ and proclaimed that ‘the  real value would be completely lost once they were  

used’ and hence, ‘nuclear weapons required Now, on the surface level, we could argue that  

these views could be compatible, if it wasn’t  for the fact that the capabilities that were  

required in both cases differ strongly. And that  is what I am going to show you now but first…  

as always, I like to give reading recommendations  and today’s come with a special discount from the  

United States Naval Institute Press. In the description you will find a link to the

book catalog from  the Naval Institute Press. Use the code 'MILAVHIS' on checkout, that

give's you a 25% discount, or you can become a  member on their website, which gives you a 40%  

discount on book orders from  their complete selection.

and if you enjoy this video so far, I can not  stress how much I recommend getting Alberton’s  

'Winning Armageddon', to learn about how SAC  got set up by Curtis LeMay. On top of that

Ziarnick’s 'To Rule the Skies' to have a closer examination of SAC during the Cold War and the role of General Power.  

Likewise, if the personality of Gen. Power  interests you, he is a man of strong opinions,  

consider checking out 21st Century Power, where you find more information on this man and even his own writting.

Let us turn to the tradional concept of nuclear deterrence. In a nutshell, the existence of nuclear weapons ensures  

deterrence. Hence capabilities translate  into the end goal of deterrence.  

Considering nuclear weapons just by their basic  force, the concept of mutually assured destruction  

appears sound. Yet there are some problems  associated with this approach. It can result in:  

an overreliance on best-case scenarios: you are  overestimating your own force or underestimating  

an adversary’s ability to counter it. superimposing your assumptions of what your  

deterrence value is on a potential adversary,  an opinion that adversary might not share,  

or you are aligning your goals more along  the capabilities you have, rather than  

want or need. So we have nukes, that’s enough. The problem is that deterrence is more than just  

number of weapons, it’s also about reconnaissance,  defensive measures, command and control  

and more. For example, LeMay made a case  that reconnaissance as part of deterrence:  

We must locate the Tu-4 [Soviet bomber] force  at the outset of hostilities and maintain  

surveillance of its movements if Strategic Air  Command is to deter the launching of an attack  

against the United States and United Kingdom. Power also talked about civil defense and ways  

to mitigate damage from attack,  in his own way of course:  

After a briefer reported that approximately  one hundred million people from the Soviet  

Union could be killed, […] Power interrupted  the speaker: ‘I just want to say that this  

assumes that Ivan just stands there in  the open and stares up at the fallout.’  

Thus, for SAC the approach was to flip the  discussion around asking what capabilities  

are required for the end goal Start out not with asking what you have,  

but what do you want to achieve –  and then you backtrack from there.  

Of course, this also has its problems,  as such an approach might result in:  

continuous undervaluing of existing capabilities  as ‘not enough’, [icon dollar sign]  

overvaluing enemy capabilities even if those  capabilities are inferior, [icon balance]  

an overemphasis of nuclear capabilities over  conventional ones. [icon: shroom over tank]  

The way that SAC calculated its capabilities  based on the intended end goal was this:  

What is the probability of destruction  that is required per target?  

How can you achieve that probability? You can do this by breaking  

down the process into four steps. Step 1 - Target identification: Make a list  

of all the targets and sort them by priority. If your priority is to limit the first strike  

or second-strike potential of an assumed  enemy, you would rank military targets  

like enemy missile silos [x], strategic  bases [x], command and control [x], as more  

important than army bases[x], transportation  and logistics[x], or industrial targets[x].  

Step 2 - Assurance of success: Establish  margin of error you can accept per target,  

Each target you identify will have a margin of  error per weapon system employed against it.  

For example, a weapon aimed at a large, open  target like a strategic bomber base [x] might  

have a higher chance of successfully knocking  the target out, compared to a much smaller,  

hardened, underground missile silo [x]. Yet  the silo might be more important to take out.  

Step 3 - Kill probability: Given the different weapon systems available,  

you’ll need to wargame each weapon system  kill probability from order to launch to  

detonation. Simplified this considers: Pre-launch (e.g. failures in  

communication, confusion, etc.) Launch (e.g. technical failures,  

operational readiness, etc.) Transit (e.g. technical failures,  

computated failures, interception, etc.) Final delivery (e.g. technical failures,  

computated failures, interception, etc.) Detonation (e.g. technical failures,  

insufficient yield for target,  bad intelligence, accuracy, etc.)  

Step 4: Aggregate information  of the previous steps  

You’ll need to establish the required n° of  weapon system per target. Let me give an example.  

Assumption 1: Let us assume that the yield  potential of a weapon to knock out an army  

base is the same as a missile silo per weapon. Assumption 2: Weapon system capable of destroying  

the target has a 50% failure rate  between pre-launch and detonation.  

Obvious solution: Send 2.

Problem: Mathematical kill probability is 75%, since there is a 25% chance both fail. Kill probability goes up:  

87.5% for 3 weapons 93% for 4 weapons  

96% for 5 weapons 99% for 7 weapons  

Now let us return to Step 2: Assurance of success:  

If your acceptable assurance of success is low  for an army base, a 75% kill probability might  

be acceptable. But it is likely that assurance of  success for a missile silo needs to be very high,  

so you double the weapon systems from 2 to four  compared to the army base. That gives you a 93%  

chance on the missile silo but still  leaves 7% that it stays operational.  

Even though of course a similar calculation  has to be made from the other side.  

This is then how Gen. Power countered accusations that there are too many nuclear weapons. He said SAC was not trying to overkill the targets.

On the contrary, he questioned whether the overkill existed considering the problems. And he called this, the Myth of the Overkill.

If only my high school math teacher knew  that his lessons would be useful to me  

two decades later when calculating a simple kill  probability scenario using nuclear weapons...  

Falls sie das hier sehen, es  ist dank ihnen selbst bei einem verlorenen  

Fall wie mir noch was hängen geblieben!  

Administrators understood deterrence. I want to  make this very clear. What they opposed was the  

theory of overwhelming nuclear firepower that  SAC advocated for because, in practical terms,  

as soon as the Soviet Union had some  parity, maybe not in absolute terms  

but enough to pose a clear threat, once the  nukes started flying, the assumption was, and –  

that’s probably correct – that the number  of nukes would be irrelevant because … good  

luck finding another planet. SAC understood this as well,  

but for them deterrence was more than mutually  assured destruction – because they had to plan  

these scenarios, and were developing offensive and  defensive weapons that could change the nuclear  

landscape. The logic of their craft did not  allow them to rely on existing capabilities. The  

emergence of ICBMs are a good example, considered  by many as the ultimate weapon, to either reset US  

dominance, or to provide a cost-effective  means of deterrence. SAC disagreed.  

[To Power] the ICBM was just another weapon  that, however formidable, had its advantages and  

disadvantages and these characteristics gave it a  unique and valuable place in the SAC arsenal and  

American war plans. ‘The hope of developing  weapons against which there is no defense  

and which insures the defeat of an enemy is as  old as man himself. […] The same ingenuity which  

permits man to conceive of radically new ways of  fighting his enemies, also permits him to conceive  

of effective means of defending himself. SAC wanted firepower, flexibility,  

and a diverse set of offensive and defensive  capabilities to give the government the deterrence  

that the government needed – just that SAC had  to account for the practical details which others  

did not have to do. This was not the typical  clash of worlds as one might assume, given  

the popular perception of the civilian – military  divide on these matters. Other branches criticized  

SAC’s plans as excessive too, as the US Air Force  ideal of a 90% assurance rate for each target  

required a huge investment of resources.  The discussions on the Single Integrated  

Operations Plan (SIOP) which was the general US  plan for nuclear war between 1961-2003 show:  

Power believed that the forces assigned to the  Single Integrated Operations Plan should be  

programmed and that excess forces should be used  in the plan to add flexibility. The Navy thought  

that the effort necessary to reach 90% percent  destruction assurance rates for each individual  

target in the SIOP was too expensive and  required delivering too many nuclear weapons.  

Today the SIOP is known not as a triumph of  military planning and the lynchpin of credibility  

of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the Cold War.  It is instead synonymous with military mendacity,  

SAC zealotry, and Air force extravagance. I leave it up to you to  

make your own call on that – let me know what  you thought about this video and topic in the  

description below. Check out the description where  I have posted a link to some of the sources I used  

in the video, don’t forget you can have  a 25% or even 40% discount courtesy of  

the United States Naval Institute Press.  That’s a fantastic selection and offer in  

my mind. Also, a big shout out to Patreon’s  and Channel Members for their support,  

Andrew for reviewing the script, Naval Institute  Press for the pictures and of course all of you  

for watching, surround yourself with friends and  good vibes, have a great day, see you in the sky.