Why the US Lost the Vietnam War (Documentary)

Summary

The video script details the final stages of the Vietnam War, focusing on the fall of Saigon in April 1975. It explores the factors leading to the North Vietnamese victory and the US withdrawal, including military strategies, political decisions, and public opinion. The aftermath of the war is discussed, highlighting the impact on both Vietnam and the US, including casualties, economic damage, and long-term legacies. The script also addresses the ongoing debate about the reasons for the US defeat and the lessons learned from the conflict.

Takeaways

• 🌍 North Vietnamese forces entered Saigon in April 1975, marking the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of Saigon, widely seen as a major US defeat.
• ✍️ The Paris Peace Accords were signed in March 1973, reducing the US military presence to a small detachment, but both North and South Vietnam soon violated the agreement.
• 📉 The US Congress and public sentiment opposed reintervention, leading to legislation that curtailed Presidential powers and cut funding to South Vietnam.
• 📆 The resignation of President Nixon in August 1974 and the subsequent presidency of Gerald Ford saw a promise of continued support to South Vietnam, but it was too late to alter the course of the conflict.
• 🚁 The final evacuation of US personnel and Vietnamese allies from Saigon in April 1975 was chaotic, marked by scenes of desperation at the US Embassy.
• 🔄 The North Vietnamese quickly established control over Saigon, and by May 3, 1975, the entire country was unified under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
• ⚖️ The war resulted in heavy casualties and economic damage for both the US and Vietnam, with significant long-term impacts on Vietnamese society and US foreign policy.
• 💔 The US defeat in Vietnam is often attributed to a combination of military, political, and social factors, including flawed strategies and a lack of understanding of Vietnamese nationalism.
• 📺 Media coverage of the Vietnam War played a significant role in shaping public perception and sentiment, contributing to the growing anti-war movement in the US.
• 🗳️ The legacy of the Vietnam War continues to influence US foreign policy, with debates about the reasons for the US defeat and the impact of the conflict on American society and international relations.

Q & A

What event marked the end of the Vietnam War?

The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, marked the end of the Vietnam War, with North Vietnamese tanks crashing through the gates of the Presidential Palace.

What was the significance of the Paris Peace Accords signed in March 1973?

The Paris Peace Accords aimed to establish peace in Vietnam and end US military involvement, although both North and South Vietnam violated the agreement almost immediately.

How did the Watergate Scandal impact US involvement in Vietnam?

The Watergate Scandal weakened President Nixon's influence, leading to his resignation and limiting the US's ability to reintervene in Vietnam despite Nixon's promise to do so if necessary.

What was the outcome of the Ho Chi Minh offensive launched by the North in March 1975?

The Ho Chi Minh offensive led to the rapid collapse of South Vietnamese forces and the eventual capture of Saigon by North Vietnamese troops.

How did US domestic politics influence the outcome of the Vietnam War?

US domestic politics, including congressional opposition to reintervention and the public's anti-war sentiment, significantly influenced the outcome by limiting military and financial support for South Vietnam.

What were the consequences of the US withdrawal from Vietnam for South Vietnam?

The US withdrawal left South Vietnam vulnerable, leading to the eventual defeat by North Vietnamese forces and the establishment of a unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

What role did the media play in shaping public perception of the Vietnam War?

The media played a critical role by providing graphic coverage of the war, which increased public dissent and contributed to the perception of the war as a defeat, especially following events like the Tet Offensive.

What were some of the criticisms of the US military strategy in Vietnam?

Critics argue that the US military strategy, focused on attritional warfare and 'kill counts,' failed to address the political legitimacy of the North and South Vietnamese governments, contributing to the US defeat.

How did the Vietnam War affect the US's future foreign policy decisions?

The Vietnam War led to the 'Vietnam Syndrome,' a caution towards foreign interventions, which was eventually countered by Reagan's conceptualization of the war as a 'noble cause' and subsequent US military actions in the 1980s and 1990s.

What were some of the long-term impacts of the Vietnam War on Vietnam itself?

Vietnam suffered significant economic damage, forced relocations to 're-education camps,' destruction of agricultural land, and a mass exodus of refugees known as the 'boat people,' particularly after the North imposed a centralized Communist ideology.

Outlines

00:00

📉 The Fall of Saigon and US Defeat

In late April 1975, Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces, marking a significant US defeat despite their military withdrawal two years prior. This event sparks ongoing debates about the reasons behind the US's loss in the Vietnam War. After the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, both North and South Vietnam violated the agreement, leading to continuous fighting. US support dwindled due to public and congressional opposition, and the Watergate scandal further weakened President Nixon's influence. The North's intensified military actions led to the rapid fall of South Vietnam, culminating in chaotic evacuations and the final capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975.

05:03

⚖️ The Cost and Consequences of the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War resulted in significant casualties and economic damage for both the US and Vietnam. While over 58,000 US personnel died, Vietnamese civilian and military casualties were much higher. The North imposed Communist ideologies on the South, leading to forced relocations and economic devastation. The legacy of the war includes increased cancer and birth defect rates due to defoliants like Agent Orange. The North's victory also led to Communist takeovers in neighboring countries and the mass exodus of 'boat people.' The US struggled with the war's high costs and domestic turmoil, questioning the effectiveness and morality of its involvement.

10:05

🔄 The Complexity of US Failure in Vietnam

Debates about the US defeat in Vietnam focus on multiple factors, including strategic errors and political misjudgments. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and others criticized US hubris and the lack of understanding of Vietnamese history. General Westmoreland's attritional strategy is often blamed for failing to address the core political issues. Critics argue that while the US won many battles, they never destroyed the North's ability to wage war. Blame is also placed on civilian leaders and restrictive policies. Public dissent, fueled by media coverage, played a crucial role in pressuring US leaders to end involvement.

15:08

📺 Media's Role in Shaping Public Opinion

The media's portrayal of the Vietnam War significantly influenced public opinion, though it's debated how much it created dissent versus reflecting existing sentiments. Coverage of protests and political scandals like the My Lai massacre and Pentagon Papers contributed to anti-war sentiment. Post-war, some officers blamed the media for losing the war, highlighting figures like Walter Cronkite and Jane Fonda. However, critics argue these figures were scapegoats for deeper failings. The North Vietnamese strategy targeted US public opinion, understanding that human factors, not just military power, were decisive in war.

20:11

🌍 Lessons and Legacy of the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War's legacy continues to impact US foreign policy and military strategy. Despite significant support, South Vietnam never developed strong political legitimacy. The North's clear goals and strategic flexibility contributed to their victory. The war's controversial nature led to the concept of 'Vietnam Syndrome,' limiting US interventions until later conflicts restored confidence. The defeat's politicization prevents learning from past mistakes. Ground News offers a tool to understand media biases, helping readers navigate today's news landscape with greater transparency.

Keywords

💡Fall of Saigon

The Fall of Saigon occurred in April 1975 when North Vietnamese troops captured the South Vietnamese capital, marking the end of the Vietnam War. This event is depicted in the video as a pivotal moment, illustrating the final victory of North Vietnam and the chaotic evacuation of American and South Vietnamese personnel.

💡Paris Peace Accords

The Paris Peace Accords were signed in March 1973 by the US, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, aiming to establish peace and end the Vietnam War. Despite the agreement, both North and South Vietnam violated its terms, leading to continued conflict and ultimately the fall of Saigon.

💡Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was a prolonged conflict from 1955 to 1975 between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and South Vietnam, backed by the United States. The war ended with the fall of Saigon and significant casualties and economic costs for both the US and Vietnam.

💡ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)

The ARVN was the military force of South Vietnam. During the final stages of the Vietnam War, the ARVN struggled to withstand the advances of the North Vietnamese Army, leading to the collapse of South Vietnam and the fall of Saigon.

💡Ho Chi Minh offensive

The Ho Chi Minh offensive was a major military campaign by North Vietnam in 1975, aimed at capturing Saigon. The offensive was highly successful, leading to the rapid collapse of South Vietnamese defenses and the end of the war.

💡US Withdrawal

The US Withdrawal refers to the reduction and eventual removal of American military forces from Vietnam, completed by 1973 following the Paris Peace Accords. This withdrawal left South Vietnam vulnerable to North Vietnamese advances, culminating in the fall of Saigon.

💡Watergate Scandal

The Watergate Scandal was a major political scandal in the United States that led to the resignation of President Nixon in 1974. This scandal weakened US political leadership and impacted the country's ability to support South Vietnam during the final stages of the Vietnam War.

💡Re-education camps

Re-education camps were facilities used by North Vietnam after the war to detain and indoctrinate former South Vietnamese officials and military personnel. The video mentions that approximately 200,000 people were sent to these camps, highlighting the harsh post-war measures taken by the North Vietnamese government.

💡Agent Orange

Agent Orange was a defoliant chemical used by the US military during the Vietnam War to remove forest cover. The video notes its devastating effects, including the destruction of agricultural land and long-term health impacts such as cancer and birth defects among Vietnamese civilians and US veterans.

💡Vietnam Syndrome

Vietnam Syndrome refers to the reluctance of the United States to engage in foreign interventions following the Vietnam War, due to the war's high casualties, expense, and domestic turmoil. This term encapsulates the long-lasting impact of the Vietnam War on US foreign policy and public opinion.

Highlights

In late April 1975, dramatic images from Saigon are beamed across the world as North Vietnamese troops proclaim final victory.

Despite their absence, the fall of Saigon is seen as a major US defeat, sparking long and unresolved debate.

In March 1973, the US, North, and South Vietnam sign a Peace Agreement, reducing US military presence to a small Marine detachment at the US Embassy in Saigon.

Both North and South Vietnam violate the Paris Peace Accords almost immediately.

Congress and the public oppose President Nixon’s promise to reintervene if necessary, and pass legislation limiting Presidential power.

The Watergate Scandal further limits Nixon’s influence, leading to his resignation in August 1974.

In December, North Vietnam captures Phuoc Long, and by March 1975, they intensify operations, expecting victory in 1976.

Thieu orders a retreat from the Central Highlands towards Saigon, but it becomes a rout, leading to the collapse of ARVN units.

Thieu resigns on April 21, and Ford prepares for final evacuations, leading to chaotic scenes at the airport and US Embassy.

On April 30, NVA tanks crash through the gates of Thieu’s Presidential Palace, and the South Vietnamese government surrenders.

The North announces a unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976, with Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

The US involvement from at least 1950 is over, with more than 58,000 US personnel killed and 300,000 wounded.

Vietnam suffers great economic damage, with 10% of South Vietnam’s agricultural land destroyed.

The North imposes a centralized Communist ideology on the South, even concerning some southern revolutionaries.

The Vietnam War’s legacy continues to impact US foreign policy, with debates over its causes and consequences ongoing.

Transcripts

In late April 1975, dramatic images from Saigon  are beamed across the world. North Vietnamese  

troops have entered the South Vietnamese  capital and proclaimed final victory. US  

forces are nowhere to be seen, having withdrawn  two years prior. Still, despite their absence,  

the fall of Saigon is seen as a major US  defeat – a defeat which has spurred long,  

and still unresolved debate. Just  how did the US lose the Vietnam War?

In March 1973, the US, North and  South Vietnam sign a Peace Agreement,  

and the US military presence is reduced to a small  Marine detachment at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. 

Almost immediately both North and South  Vietnam violate the Paris Peace Accords.  

The North still feels it has the  military advantage, while Southern  

President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu refuses to deal  with Communists in a Council of Reconciliation. 

Fighting also continues. South Vietnamese ARVN  forces move into contested zones, although,  

the North avoids large scale combat to  avoid provoking a US return. However,  

it does reequip its units with modern equipment  and heavy weapons and infiltrates more forces  

into the South – in violation of the agreement. A US return though, looks unlikely. Congress  

and the public oppose President Nixon’s promise  to reintervene if necessary. Senators from both  

parties pass legislation limiting Presidential  power, ordering an end to the bombing of  

Cambodia and slashing funds to South Vietnam. The Watergate Scandal – which reveals Nixon  

illegally spied on rivals – further limits his  influence. Facing impeachment, Nixon resigns  

in August 1974, but new President Gerald Ford  promises to continue to support South Vietnam.

„Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency  effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President  

Ford will be sworn in as President  at that hour in this office.” 

The North now steps up military actions,  capturing Phuoc Long in December. The ARVN  

response is lacklustre, so the North intensifies  operations in March 1975. They expect the new  

Ho Chi Minh offensive to be victorious in  1976, but victory comes much, much sooner. 

Following diversionary attacks, the North captures  Ban Me Thuot in a surprise raid. Thieu orders a  

retreat from the Central Highlands towards Saigon,  but it soon becomes a rout. ARVN units collapse as  

the NVA advances along the coast before swinging  towards Saigon. The ARVN hold out at Xuan Loc bu t  

the NVA push them back after 12 days of fighting.  North Vietnamese forces now attack Saigon: 

“There is a strange, sad giddiness in Saigon...  like the feeling one gets when the score is 56  

to 0 late in the fourth quarter and your team  is the one with zero. You aren’t happy about  

the thrashing your team got, but at this  point the most merciful thing is the for  

the game to end.” (Harrison in Yancy 182) There is no US military response, and Thieu  

resigns on April 21. Instead, Ford prepares  for final evacuations. These become chaotic  

scenes as thousands of South Vietnamese civilians  descend on the airport, which is under attack. 

“[T]he airplane started to move with the  door still open. I was looking out the door  

and saw people running around in all directions  shooting crazily into the air. They seemed to be  

in a panic. People all around me on the airplane  started screaming and crying. Some of them started  

praying very loudly.” (Langer 283) The chaos shuts down the airport,  

so civilians surge to the US Embassy  and break in just as the final  

helicopters depart. The US evacuates 1,000  Americans and 5,500 Vietnamese in two days.

“Because to the Vietnamese people, all  the fighting, more than 25 years now. So,  

now that we stop fighting, I am very happy,  very happy for all the young kids, same as me,  

all the people who have been in the army.” Shortly afterwards, North Vietnamese units  

enter Saigon to little resistance. On  April 3 0, NVA tanks crash through the  

gates of Thieu’s Presidential Palace and  the South Vietnamese government surrenders. 

SEGUE By May 3,  

the North clears the final areas of the  Mekong Delta and the war is over. In 1976,  

the North announces a unified Socialist Republic  of Vietnam, with Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

For the US, their long involvement from  at least 1950 is over. For North Vietnam,  

the struggle for independence arguably  started in 1858 against the French. 

Until 1973, 2.7 million US personnel  served in South Vietnam. Of this number,  

more than 58,000 are killed and  300,000 wounded. The cost of 1  

trillion dollars in today’s value also led  to a growing economic crisis in the 1970s. 

Counting Vietnamese casualties is harder.  Fighting and bombing kills up to 2 million  

Vietnamese civilians, and perhaps up  to 1 million North Vietnamese military  

personnel. The US estimates around 250,000  South Vietnamese military killed in action. 

But the Vietnam War’s legacy goes further  than combat casualties. After victory,  

Northern agents forcibly move some Vietnamese into  so-called “re-education camps” - perhaps 200,000,  

though estimates vary. There are reports of  political executions of southern figures,  

but their scale and frequency remain debated.  Vietnam does suffer great economic damage.  

Around 10% of South Vietnam’s agricultural land is  destroyed, including by US defoliants like Agent  

Orange. Some also associate these herbicides  with an increased rate of cancer and birth  

defects among both Vietnamese and US veterans. Meanwhile, the North imposes a centralised  

Communist ideology on the south, even  concerning some southern revolutionaries.  

Not all within the Viet Cong’s Provisional  Revolutionary Government were Communist,  

and some expected a more pluralistic system: “Now, with total power in their hands,  

they began to show their cards in the most  brutal fashion. They made it understand  

that the Vietnam of the future would be a single  monolithic block, collectivist and totalitarian,  

in which all the traditions and culture of  the South would be ground and molded by the  

political machine of the conquerors.” (Ruane 160) Economic restructuring and post-war tension with  

China cause 2 million Vietnamese  to leave by 1979, including many  

ethnic Chinese merchants. Many escape by  sea, becoming known as the ‘boat people’. 

The North’s victory in Vietnam also  coincides with Communist takeovers in  

Laos and Cambodia. By August 1975, the whole  of Indochina is under Communist control.

The legacy of Vietnam also  continues in the US. Even today,  

some struggle to come to terms with the high  casualties, expense and domestic turmoil of  

the war years. There is even debate about  whether the US lost the Vietnam War at all.

Nixon felt his agreement provided  “peace with honor” and later claimed,  

“We had won the war.” Critics though, point out  the Peace Agreement included major US concessions  

while allowing the North to keep military  forces in the south. General Westmoreland  

complained the deal amounted to surrendering  the field to the enemy and the de facto end  

of South Vietnamese sovereignty. Secretary  of State Dean Rusk called it a “surrender”. 

Others, like Nixon’s Secretary of State  Henry Kissinger, point out that Washington  

didn’t really expect the South to last, and the  agreement was designed to cover a US withdrawal  

with some semblance of respectability: “we know the goddamned agreement will  

probably not work, but we’ve got to be in  the position where if it doesn’t it will be  

the result of the other side.” (Daddis 196) At the very least, this was clearly not a  

US victory but a strategic defeat as  historian Gregory Daddis concludes: 

“True, the US withdrawal advanced as a matter of  policy rather than collapse. Yet judged on what  

it left behind, one seems hard pressed to argue  [the US military] “won” its war.” (Daddis 204/205)

So why did the US fail in Vietnam?  Debate also rages on this question,  

with a person's position often differing  based on their professional role,  

political background and beliefs, and  proximity to wartime decision making.

Some see the roots of US defeat in a failure  of execution in Vietnam. This viewpoint often  

suggests US intervention in Vietnam had good  intentions, but practical problems, strategic  

errors and poor judgement hindered operations. Later in life Former Secretary of Defence Robert  

McNamara outlined a long list of causes  for the US defeat, focusing on US hubris,  

a lack of understanding of Vietnamese  history and over-reliance on military might. 

General Westmoreland’s attritional strategy is  often criticised, especially its focus on “kill  

counts”. Critics say this approach, although  gaining many tactical victories for the US,  

failed to address the actual critical element  of the Vietnam struggle – the rival political  

legitimacy of North and South Vietnam. US leaders  disregarded North Vietnam as merely a Sino-Soviet  

puppet, whose forces could be systematically  destroyed as a hostile foreign force. But North  

Vietnam was largely independent and represented  sincere and widespread nationalist aspirations: 

“By wrongly attributing the conflict to external  sources, the United States drastically misjudged  

its internal dynamics. By intervening in  what was essentially a local struggle,  

it placed itself at the mercy  of local forces, a weak client,  

and a determined adversary.” (Hopkins 102) Some US offensive operations are also of  

limited value and rarely developed the political  legitimacy of the Southern government. Even some  

victories are counter-productive. For example, in  May 1969, the 101st Airborne Division stormed NVA  

trenches on Hill 937 – better known as Hamburger  Hill. After seven days of intense fighting,  

the 101st took the hill with 450 casualties, only  to abandon it to the NVA several days later. The  

hill itself held little strategic value and  the battle came to typify wasteful US attacks.  

Or as journalist Jonathan Schell wrote, “The  more we won, the more we lost.” (Daddis 206) 

Regardless, some see consistent US tactical  victory as evidence the US did not lose the  

Vietnam War - but others question this logic.  Firstly, although the US defeated every major  

North Vietnamese offensive and performed  larger scale search and destroy missions,  

most combat in Vietnam was small scale. 96% of  firefights involved less than 200 US soldiers,  

and the North Vietnamese instigated around 75%  of all combat, giving them a distinct advantage.  

There is no reliable data for who “won” these  countless small-scale actions, but the fact the  

US never destroyed the North’s ability to launch  them weakens claims of US military victory. 

And military victories are a  means to political victory,  

not a means to an end themselves. As Prussian  military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claimed:  

“war is the continuation of politics”, and  victory comes not from killing more of the enemy,  

but using force to settle the political questions  over which the war is fought. US battlefield  

successes did not prevent Northern political  victory, as a US negotiator in Hanoi recalled: 

“You know you never beat us on the battlefield,”  I told my North Vietnamese Army counterpart...  

“That may be so,” he replied, “but  it is also irrelevant.” (Langer 282)

But even those who accept this conclusion are  quick to point out the blame does not ultimately  

rest with the common US soldier. Who ultimately  takes responsibility is another hot topic.

President Nixon blamed congress, while some  military leaders blamed the civilian government: 

“In the end, we sent our sons to be maimed  and crippled and to die for naught because  

the political leaders of this country  lost their will. There was no lack of  

courage or skill on the battlefield.  The lack of fortitude was solely in the  

corridors of power in Washington.” (Langer 333) As early as 1967, military officers began to  

complain they were fighting with “one armed  tied behind their backs”. President Johnson  

refused to allow a conventional invasion  of North Vietnam, or Cambodia, and Laos,  

where North Vietnamese forces operated freely.  Westmoreland understood cutting the Ho Chi Minh  

trail in neighbouring countries was vital to  “isolating the battlefield” and did try to  

strengthen border security, but it wasn’t enough.  But even when incursions into Cambodia and Laos  

were allowed under Nixon, they achieved little. Westmoreland and his supporters claim the source  

of the attritional strategy was really President  Johnson’s civilian advisors, the so-called Wise  

Men. They say figures like Robert McNamara,  McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow had a disastrous  

influence by insisting military strategy fit into  new methods of quantitative analytics. It was  

this they argue, not an obsession with firepower,  which prioritised kill counts and an attritional  

strategy. Pacification efforts would require even  more troops and result in lower “kill counts”. 

Some military figures, like Colonel Harry  Summers, while blaming civilian leaders,  

also argue the Joint Chiefs of Staff  provided poor strategic planning and  

failed to adequately brief presidents. Another argument is that Vietnam was lost  

not in the jungle, but on the streets of America.  Public dissent to the war certainly had an impact  

in pressuring US leaders. Public support is  critical in any war, especially limited wars  

in which national survival is not at stake.  It is undeniable public outrage helped end  

US involvement, but where did it come from? One common suggestion is that the US media  

misrepresented the war to the public and gave  small scale tactical events strategic significance  

through graphic reporting and media framing.  Most famously, the photo of Phan Thị Kim Phúc,  

a South Vietnamese girl wounded by napalm,  raised serious questions about US methods.  

General Westmoreland was especially critical  of reporting during the 1968 Tet offensive: 

“... voluminous, lurid and distorted newspaper  and particularly television reporting of  

the Tet offensive, had transformed a  devastating Communist military defeat  

into a ‘psychological victory’.” (Jesser 91) Critical US reports did increase after Tet, but  

before Tet coverage was largely supportive. The  media often promoted optimistic government claims,  

and some news editors suppressed negative stories  to maintain connections in the White House or  

appeal to audiences. Within the Cold War context,  disloyalty was considered economic suicide. 

But the media did play a role expanding the  credibility gap between government claims  

and the reality in Vietnam, resulting  in more anti-war sentiment. However,  

it has been debated how much the media created  this dissent, rather than reinforcing pre-existing  

opinions. By the time media became more critical,  public opinion and civic and political leaders  

had already shifted the conversation – and  the news marketplace. In this sense, instead  

of developing anti-war sentiment, the media may  have simply followed it as a business decision. 

Domestic news coverage of protests and political  revelations may have also been more influential  

than television war coverage from Vietnam.  Covering protests publicised and normalised  

them as a legitimate activity, while major stories  like the My Lai massacre and Pentagon Papers were  

released by American domestic journalists and were  first exposed by ex-military figures. Initially,  

no major news outlet would publish the My Lai  massacre reporting. Overall, viewership of  

television network news was lower than commonly  believed and less than half of TV owners claimed  

to watch it. Susan Carruthers, a professor  specialising in the media and war, concludes: 

“...television may have confirmed  the trend towards disillusionment,  

but many academics are adamant that  television did not set it; indeed it was,  

in fact, considerably to its rear.” Regardless of its actual impact,  

the idea the media lost the war became  attractive to post-Vietnam officers and  

affects US media-military relations to this  day. Some highlight media figures such as news  

anchor Walter Cronkite, or actress Jane Fonda  – who visited North Vietnam – as traitors who  

undermined the US war effort. Others argue  their impact has been grossly overstated,  

and instead they function as easy scapegoats  for deeper military and political failings.

But many of these arguments about  US defeat focus almost exclusively  

on the US itself. But as the saying  goes “The enemy also gets a vote.”

By 1975, revolutionary nationalist forces in  Vietnam had already fought a series of wars  

over 30 years. They gained experience but also  the ideological conviction to see through the  

struggle. Their experiences also taught North  Vietnamese leaders that strategic flexibility  

was essential to defeat a more powerful enemy. North Vietnam shifted regularly from conventional  

to unconventional operations, navigated the  Sino-Soviet ideological split to their advantage,  

and maintained public support through  regimentation and propaganda. The North  

Vietnamese casualty rate was not necessarily  driven by US actions, but North Vietnamese ones,  

as they generally dictated the frequency  and intensity of combat. Their small-scale  

attritional attacks combined with infrequent,  but ambitious offensives were also partially  

designed to weaken US public will. North  Vietnamese Commander-in-chief Vo Nguyen Giap,  

who oversaw the victorious campaign against the  French in 1954, understood that public will was a  

critical US strategic weakness – one which could  be targeted via the battlefields of Vietnam: 

“The war was fought on many fronts. At that  time the most important one was American public  

opinion... Westmoreland did not believe in human  beings, he believed in numbers... He believed  

in weapons and material. Military power is not  the decisive factor in war. Human beings! Human  

beings are the decisive factor.” (Langer 318) South Vietnam also played a key role in the  

outcome. Despite significant US support,  Thieu and his predecessors never seriously  

worked to develop state legitimacy or create  a South Vietnamese identity. Its actions were  

undermined by the Viet Cong, but corruption,  political favoritism and elitism meant ARVN  

pacification efforts were ineffective at best,  and counterproductive at worst. Without a strong  

rural political base from which to develop  the nation, South Vietnam was on shaky  

ground even with massive US military support. North Vietnamese political goals were proactive  

and clearly identifiable for the Vietnamese  population. By contrast, the US’s were vague  

and passive. By fighting to maintain the political  status quo, the US locked itself into a commitment  

which would last as long as the North Vietnamese  were willing to oppose that status quo. Although  

North Vietnamese morale began to suffer from  1968, it was much stronger than US public morale,  

precisely because the stakes of victory or  defeat were higher and better understood.

The Vietnam War remains one of the most  controversial US military actions, and its  

legacy continues to impact US foreign policy. After the war, some claimed a so-called  

“Vietnam Syndrome” would limit future  US foreign interventions. A 1975 survey  

suggested only 36% of Americans believed the  US should keep commitments to other nations.  

But by the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan  conceptualized the war as a “noble cause”  

to restore US confidence. The supposed end  of the Cold War, and US victories in Grenada,  

Haiti, Panama and the Gulf War further diminished  post-Vietnam caution. By 1991, President Bush Sr  

was confident enough to announce, “By God, we’ve  kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” 

The cause of the US defeat was complex  and multi-faceted and not the doing of  

any single group. Debates often also ignore an  effective and long developed North Vietnamese  

strategy which withstood an unprecedented  military onslaught and may have continued  

to do so even if the US had acted differently. “If there is one general historical lesson to be  

drawn from the American experience in Vietnam,  it is that local history and culture set real  

limits on the effectiveness of external  force, no matter how great that force may  

be. The United States had one failed war in  Vietnam, and for a great and wise nation, one  

Vietnam War should be enough.” (Anderson TVW 128) But these lessons may have become muddied. The  

humiliation of the defeat has politicized  the debate as supporters of one argument  

look to shift the blame to others –  whether it's the military, congress,  

media or anti-war groups – or deny defeat  altogether. By failing to come to terms with  

the reality of defeat, the possibility of making  similar mistakes in the future is left wide open.

The media coverage of the Vietnam War was seen  by millions and iconic images like last American  

helicopter to leave Saigon in 1975 were used by  various groups to support their stance on the  

conflict. In today’s media landscape, it can be  a challenge to understand who is behind the news  

and what biases they might carry. Luckily,  there is a way to alleviate that challenge:  

Ground News works to aggregate news articles  from a wide spectrum of news organizations  

to expose bias and provide a more accurate and  transparent picture of what’s really going on  

in the world. Now, whenever I’m reading the  news – or history books for that matter – I  

keep in mind who's presenting the information  and what their biases might be. Importantly,  

it’s not just what they’re telling me, it's  also what they’re not saying. With Ground News,  

this insight is all available in a single  app and website. On Ground News, every story  

comes with a visual breakdown of the political  bias, reliability, and ownership all backed by  

three independent media rating organizations. For example, here is a story about the French  

snap elections. Over 300 news organizations  reported on the story. Of these 37% lean left  

and 35% lean right. Below that you can see the  Reliability and Ownership information. For me,  

comparing sources is crucial in evaluating a  story and Ground News let’s you do that on a  

glimpse via their Bias Comparison Features, but  also by directly comparing headlines. For example,  

this right-leaning outlet notes a far-right  swing and that Macro was 'humiliated' . Another  

right-leaning states that Macron was 'trounced  by populists' . Meanwhile, on the left,  

this headline quotes Macron directly, urging  France to make 'right choice' , while the BBC  

uses another quote - 'act of trust'" With Ground News Blindspot feature  

you can also check for news stories not  covered by other outlets. So, check out  

https://ground.news/realtimehistory or click  the link below to get 40% off their Vantage  

plan – which is how you get unlimited  access to all their features. Not only  

will you be smarter in how you approach the  news, but you’ll also support our channel.

As usual you can find all the  sources for this episode in the  

video description below. Don’t forget to  watch our previous Vietnam War videos.  

If you are watching this video on Nebula or  Patreon, thank you so much for the support,  

we couldn’t do it without you. I’m Jesse Alexander  and this is a production of Real Time History,  

the only history channel that is  voluminous, lurid, and distorted.