Why Is Russia on the Brink of Collapse

Summary

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin shocked the world by invading Ukraine, aiming for a swift victory to restore Russia's Soviet-era dominance. However, resistance from Ukraine and substantial Western support have turned it into a prolonged conflict. This video explores how Putin's arrogance has led Russia into a no-win situation, damaging its military, economy, and global standing. With heavy reliance on China and significant demographic challenges, Russia's future remains uncertain. The video delves into Putin's motivations, historical context, and the war's far-reaching consequences.

Takeaways

• 🚀 Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was intended to be a quick operation but turned into a prolonged conflict due to strong resistance and Western support for Ukraine.
• 💸 Western nations have provided over $380 billion in aid to Ukraine, significantly bolstering its defense capabilities.
• ⚔️ Putin's initial plan for an easy victory has devolved into a multi-year war with no clear end in sight, largely due to his arrogance.
• 🇷🇺 Putin's desire to restore the Soviet Union's glory days drives his aggressive actions, but his motivations are also deeply personal and rooted in a desire for power.
• 🏛️ Historical attempts by Putin to control Ukraine politically and economically have repeatedly failed, contributing to his decision to invade.
• 🌍 The war has damaged Russia's international standing, revealing its military weaknesses and causing economic strains due to heavy reliance on oil and gas exports.
• 🇨🇳 Russia's increasing dependence on China for economic support places it in a precarious position, potentially making it a junior partner to Beijing.
• 💀 The demographic impact of the war, with significant loss of life and mass emigration, poses a long-term threat to Russia's stability.
• 🔫 Repeated failures and humiliations in Ukraine have fueled Putin's vendetta against the country, driving his continued aggression.
• 📉 Regardless of the war's outcome, Russia faces severe economic and geopolitical challenges that could undermine its future power and influence.

Q & A

What was Vladimir Putin's primary goal in invading Ukraine in February 2022?

Putin's primary goal was to restore the glory days of the Soviet Union and reclaim Russia's dominance over Europe, starting with the invasion of Ukraine.

How did the Western world respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Most of the Western world supported Ukraine financially and provided military equipment, pledging and providing over $380 billion in aid to help Ukraine resist Russia's aggression.

What historical events influenced Putin's decision to invade Ukraine?

Putin's decision was influenced by his desire to restore the Soviet Union's glory, his view of Ukraine as part of Russia's history, and past attempts to control Ukraine politically and economically, including the 2004 presidential election and the annexation of Crimea.

Why does Putin want to denazify Ukraine, according to his statements?

Putin claims that one of his main goals in the war is the denazification of Ukraine, which he describes as ridding the country of Nazi elements, positioning himself as a savior for Ukraine and Europe.

What were the results of Putin's past political maneuvers in Ukraine?

Putin's past political maneuvers, such as backing Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 presidential election and influencing the 2010-2014 presidency, ultimately failed, leading to significant resistance and political shifts in Ukraine.

How has the war in Ukraine affected Russia's military reputation?

The war revealed Russia's military as outdated and overly reliant on numbers rather than modern equipment and strategy, damaging its reputation as a strong military power.

What economic impacts has the war had on Russia?

The war has led to significant military spending, reliance on oil and gas exports, sanctions, and a potential economic crisis when the war ends, as well as a demographic crisis with many Russians leaving the country.

What role does China play in Russia's current economic situation?

China is a major buyer of Russian oil, accounting for about 50% of its production, making Russia highly dependent on China for economic stability, which could be problematic if China reduces its purchases or faces international pressure.

How has Putin's invasion of Ukraine affected Russia's geopolitical standing?

The invasion has weakened Russia's influence in former Soviet states, galvanized European countries to increase their military budgets, and led to stronger international sanctions and isolation from the global community.

What long-term consequences might Russia face regardless of the war's outcome?

Regardless of the war's outcome, Russia may face a prolonged economic crisis, continued sanctions, demographic decline, and reliance on China, all of which could undermine its efforts to rebuild and maintain its geopolitical position.

Outlines

00:00

🌍 Putin's Decision to Invade Ukraine

In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, aiming for a swift victory. However, resistance from Ukraine, bolstered by substantial Western financial and military aid, turned it into a prolonged conflict. Putin's persistence is driven by arrogance, seeking to reclaim Soviet-era glory and personal power, leading to a devastating war for both Ukraine and Russia.

05:04

🇺🇦 Ukraine's Electoral Battle and Russian Influence

Putin's efforts to control Ukraine date back to the 2004 presidential election, where he supported Viktor Yanukovych amid allegations of voter fraud. Despite Putin's intervention, Yanukovych lost to Viktor Yushchenko, who later survived an assassination attempt allegedly orchestrated by Putin. Subsequent gas crises and political maneuvers further strained Russian-Ukrainian relations, highlighting Putin's relentless but failing attempts to dominate Ukraine.

10:05

🗳️ Putin's Elections and Power Tactics

Since becoming Russia's president in 1999, Putin has maintained power through questionable elections and leveraging wars to boost his image as a strong leader. Despite accusations of election rigging, Putin's popularity remains high, partly due to his portrayal as a wartime leader. His invasion of Ukraine in 2022 appears as another move to solidify his power, driven by a mix of restoring Russia's past glory and personal ambition.

15:06

📉 Economic Strains on Russia Due to War

Russia's economy, heavily reliant on oil and gas exports, faces significant challenges due to the war in Ukraine. Heavy military spending and reliance on limited international buyers, like China, strain Russia's financial stability. Future economic growth is uncertain, as continued sanctions and the costs of war effort threaten to undermine Russia's economic resilience and global standing.

20:09

🌐 Global Perception and Internal Challenges for Russia

Putin's invasion has weakened Russia's influence in former Soviet states and strained relations with the West. Increased military support for Ukraine from NATO countries, coupled with Russia's demographic crisis and economic dependencies, suggests that Putin's actions have significantly harmed Russia's long-term prospects. The global community's reaction indicates a growing resistance to Putin's ambitions, potentially limiting Russia's power.

Keywords

💡Invasion of Ukraine

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia began in February 2022, initiated by President Vladimir Putin. This event shocked the global community and marked the start of a prolonged conflict. The invasion's goal was to quickly secure Kyiv and establish control over Ukraine, but it faced strong resistance and international backlash.

💡Western Aid

Western nations have provided significant financial and military support to Ukraine, amounting to over $380 billion. This aid has been crucial in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian aggression and has highlighted the international community's support for Ukrainian sovereignty.

💡Putin's Arrogance

Putin's arrogance is portrayed as a central theme in the script, driving his decision to invade Ukraine despite the difficulties and international condemnation. His belief in restoring Russia to its former glory and his personal vendetta against Ukraine are depicted as key motivators for his actions.

💡Denazification

Denazification is one of the justifications Putin has used for the invasion, claiming it as a noble cause to rid Ukraine of supposed Nazi elements. This reasoning is discussed in the context of an interview with Tucker Carlson, where Putin reiterated this goal.

💡Managed Democracy

Managed democracy refers to a political system where elections are held, but they are manipulated to ensure a certain outcome, often favoring those in power. Putin's attempts to establish such a system in Ukraine, particularly during the 2004 presidential election, are highlighted as part of his broader strategy.

💡Annexation of Crimea

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia is seen as a significant move by Putin to regain control over Ukraine. This act followed the Euromaidan protests and the ousting of Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych. It marked an escalation in Putin's efforts to dominate Ukraine.

💡Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia by Western nations in response to the invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions aim to cripple Russia's economy and reduce its ability to sustain its war efforts. The impact of these sanctions is discussed, including their effects on Russia's GDP and oil exports.

💡China's Influence

China's influence over Russia is growing, especially as Russia becomes more dependent on Chinese purchases of its oil and gas. The script discusses the potential risks for Russia if China reduces its support, highlighting the strategic vulnerability created by this dependence.

💡Demographic Crisis

Russia is facing a demographic crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. The loss of young lives and the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Russians are contributing to a declining population, which poses a long-term threat to the country's stability and economic future.

💡Geopolitical Isolation

Geopolitical isolation refers to the increasing alienation of Russia from the international community due to its actions in Ukraine. The script explores how this isolation is affecting Russia's global standing and its relationships with other countries, particularly in Europe and the West.

Highlights

In February 2022, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, shocking the global community.

The initial invasion was meant to be a swift operation to secure Kyiv and establish Russian rule over Ukraine.

Despite initial success, Ukrainian resistance fighters pushed back Russian forces.

Most of the Western world supported Ukraine financially and with military equipment, providing over $380 billion in aid.

Putin’s arrogance has led Russia into a prolonged conflict with no clear end in sight.

Putin aims to restore the glory days of the Soviet Union and Russia’s dominance over Europe.

In a 2024 interview, Putin cited denazification as a main goal of the war, claiming it justifies the invasion.

Putin’s attempts to control Ukraine date back to the 2004 presidential election, which saw allegations of voter fraud and failed influence.

Putin has previously tried to control Ukraine through political maneuvering, economic pressure, and assassination attempts.

The Euromaidan protests of 2013 and subsequent ousting of Viktor Yanukovych demonstrated Ukraine’s resistance to Russian influence.

Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a significant but ultimately incomplete victory for Russia.

Russia’s heavy reliance on oil and gas exports makes its economy vulnerable, especially with China and India as primary buyers.

Putin’s war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s military perception and global influence.

The Western world’s increasing military aid and budget expansions show growing resistance to Russian aggression.

Demographic challenges, including a declining birth rate and mass exodus, pose long-term threats to Russia’s stability.

Transcripts

In February 2022, Russia’s President  Vladimir Putin made a decision that  

shocked the global community: He invaded Ukraine. 

That war was meant to be a  smash-and-grab operation,  

with Russia rolling in on tanks to secure  Kyiv before establishing its rule in Ukraine  

as a whole. And it almost worked. Russian  forces managed to enter Kyiv, albeit briefly,  

before resistance fighters pushed them back.  Then, that resistance started gathering steam.  

Most of the Western world supported Ukraine  financially and provided military equipment,  

giving Kyiv the ability to fight back against  Putin’s aggression. To date, Western nations have  

pledged (and provided) over $380 billion  in aid to Ukraine, with more on the way. 

This wasn’t what Putin wanted. What was supposed to be an easy  

victory has devolved into a multi-year war that  looks unlikely to end any time soon. And yet,  

rather than withdrawing from Ukraine and  accepting that it isn’t going to achieve  

the easy victory it anticipated, Russia  keeps pushing forward with the fight. 

Why? Putin’s arrogance. 

That will be the focus of this video, as  we explore how Putin’s arrogance has led  

him into a no-win situation in Ukraine and how  – terrifyingly for the Russian public – Putin’s  

ambition could be the death of his country. But before we can dig into how Putin’s arrogance  

will destroy Russia, we need to learn a little  bit more about the man. Specifically, what drove  

him to invade Ukraine in the first place? Whenever he speaks publicly, Putin offers  

hints to one of the main reasons he invaded  Ukraine. He is, if nothing else, a patriot,  

and he longs for the days when Russia was one of  the world’s most powerful countries. Putin wants  

to restore the glory days of the Soviet Union –  ignoring all of the internal strife that period  

caused in his country – and wishes to restore  Russia’s dominance over the rest of Europe. 

We can see snippets of this agenda coming through  in Putin’s February 2024 interview with Tucker  

Carlson. In this interview, Putin tries to  position himself less as an aggressor to the  

Ukrainian people, and more as a savior to not only  the country but the rest of Europe. Specifically,  

he claims that the denazification of Ukraine  was one of his main goals with the war, with  

Putin telling Carlson “We haven’t achieved our  aims yet because one of them is denazification.” 

A seemingly noble cause. However, in one of the few times when  

Carlson pressed an issue in that interview, Putin  was later asked if he would be satisfied with the  

territory he has now if he wins in Ukraine. Putin  didn’t respond to that question, instead returning  

to his point of denazifying Ukraine. The takeaway? 

Putin wouldn’t be satisfied  with just claiming Ukraine. 

He wants to restore Russia to its former glory. Other parts of that interview deliver a more  

direct throughline into his thinking. At various  points, Putin engages in long and rambling  

diatribes – which he dresses up as history lessons  – talking about how Russia and Europe were in the  

past. Though long-winded, these discussions  revealed that Putin still sees Europe in “old”  

terms, with part of his justification for invading  Ukraine seemingly boiling down to “it was part of  

Russia before, and should be part of Russia now.” To anybody who’d been paying attention to  

Putin’s rhetoric when the war  started, this was nothing new. 

In February 2022, the same month Russia invaded  Ukraine, The Guardian reported on an hour-long  

speech Putin gave in which he delivered  his version of the history of Ukraine.  

Notable snippets from that interview include Putin  claiming that “Ukraine is an inalienable part of  

our own history, culture, and spiritual space,”  as well as claiming that the Bolsheviks made  

a massive mistake when they recognized Ukraine  as a republic. The claims on land kept coming,  

when he also discussed how ceding territory as  part of ending World War I was another mistake,  

along with lamentations of the loss of the  “territory of the former Russian empire.” 

By this point, Putin’s agenda seems clear: He wants a return to the old Russia. 

And to some, that may not be a sign of  arrogance. It’s natural for a patriot  

to want to see his country reclaim the glory  days and take its position as a leader on the  

global stage. However, Putin’s desire to restore  Russia isn’t driven by his love of his country. 

It’s driven by revenge and  a desire for personal power. 

After all, Putin’s February 2022 invasion  of Ukraine is far from the first time that  

he’s tried to control the country. It’s just the  most direct military attempt – he’s made several  

tries at establishing Russian dominance  in Ukraine over the past two decades. 

Take Ukraine’s 2004 presidential  election as an example. 

That election saw Putin’s first real attempt to  create what he calls “managed democracy,” a term  

the Carnegie Endowment for Peace says Putin uses  to describe the type of regime he wants to create.  

In short, Putin doesn’t want full democracy. He  wants a shadow version, in which elections are  

held, but they’re so lopsided toward his agenda  that they may as well not exist. To that end,  

he poured all of his efforts into helping  Ukraine’s then-prime minister Viktor Yanukovych  

secure the country’s presidency. He failed. 

Despite spending an enormous amount of money on  Yanukovych’s campaign, as well as attempting to  

hinder the rest of the world’s understanding  of the election result, Putin couldn’t get  

his puppet into office. Allegations of voter  fraud abounded, with outgoing President Leonid  

Kuchma told that he had to dismiss the Central  Election Commission’s chairman by Charles Tannock,  

the European Parliament’s delegation for Ukraine.  Tannock said the chairman had “clearly not been  

above board,” going on to cite figures that  suggested several parts of the country had  

seen voter turnouts of more than 100%. He added  that absentee ballot abuse, ballot stuffing and  

even intimidation of voters had taken place. Putin even campaigned on behalf of his preferred  

candidate, only to see tens of thousands of  Yanukovych’s opponent’s supporters line the  

streets of Kyiv to protest the official tally that  had placed Yanukovych three points ahead. That  

opponent – Viktor Yushchenko – eventually received  the backing of most of the Ukrainian parliament.  

The country’s Supreme Court ended up annulling  the election result, with Yushchenko coming out  

on top in a fairer vote several weeks later. Putin ended up shooting himself in the foot. 

By so radically backing Yanukovych to the  point that he tried to pull off election fraud,  

Putin ended up with a president in Ukraine  that he didn’t want and one who wouldn’t  

be open to consolidatory talks with Russia.  With his political maneuvering in tatters,  

Putin instead tried to rely on the KGB to get  rid of Ukraine’s president. Putin is has been  

accused of attempting to assassinate  Yushchenko soon after he took office,  

with that attempt failing as spectacularly as his  attempt to influence the 2004 election in Ukraine. 

Putin was humiliated. In particular, his ego  

took a massive shot as the pride he felt as an  astute political leader who could effortlessly  

influence policies in other countries was proven  to be false. His efforts had blown up in his face. 

And he wasn’t going to take  the humiliation lying down. 

Though Putin veered away from trying to kill  Yushchenko after his first assassination  

attempt ended, he still tried to have an  impact on Ukraine’s stability. We see this  

from the multiple gas crises Ukraine experienced  as a result of Russian actions in 2006 and 2009.  

Both years saw Russia cut gas supplies off,  supposedly due to disputes about pricing,  

with the effects of these cutoffs reverberating  far beyond Ukraine. Russia has also spent the  

last 20 years building pipelines that allow it to  circumvent Ukraine, this time creating a situation  

in which it could cut the country off while still  maintaining relationships with other nations. 

You could argue that this attempt to  scuttle Ukraine had a greater impact. 

A year after the second cutoff, Putin finally  got his man – Viktor Yanukovych – in office.  

Between 2010 and 2014, Yanukovych reigned as  president and immediately began making changes  

to the Russian constitution. Putin had what he  wanted, at least for a short time. But then,  

the Euromaidan protests came in 2013 as a direct  response to Yanukovych's refusal to sign a free  

trade agreement with the European Union, or EU.  Instead, Ukraine’s president ignored the country’s  

parliament, which had voted overwhelmingly  to approve the deal, and instead chose to  

create another trade agreement with Russia. As they did following the results of the  

2004 election, Ukrainians took to the streets.  Violent clashes between protestors and Ukrainian  

state forces resulted, with Yanukovych  ultimately being run out of Ukraine. The  

country’s parliament chose to remove him with  a vote of 380 to 0, and Ukraine restored its  

constitution to what it had been in 2004. Putin had once again lost influence. 

Russian media’s cries of a coup fell on deaf ears.  However, the protests and ousting of Yanukovych  

did open the door for Putin to annex Crimea,  taking control of the territory away from Ukraine.  

This was the first sign of the lengths Putin was  willing to go in order to take the entire country.  

But by this point, he was likely no longer as  fueled by a desire to reclaim the former Russia  

as he had been in the past. He had a personal agenda. 

Ukraine had humiliated him multiple times.  It had gotten rid of the leader he wanted  

in power – twice – and survived even when he  cut off gas supplies. Even the annexation of  

Crimea wasn’t the victory Putin had hoped for.  Ukraine still carried on, building stronger  

ties with the West as Putin saw the country  slipping further and further out of his grip. 

His ego couldn’t take it. And in his arrogance, Putin decided  

that he could take Ukraine easier by force rather  than accepting the country as an independent state  

over which he had no real control. In this context, we can start to  

see the war in a different light. While Putin outwardly claims the war  

is about denazification and the restoration of the  “old” Russia, internally there’s a clear element  

of personal vendetta at play. Ukraine spent nearly  20 years deflecting Putin’s influence – political,  

economic, and even military – showing  Putin to be far less powerful as a  

political player than he believed himself to be. And that leads us to the third reason why Putin  

launched his war in Ukraine: Personal power may mean  

more to him than Russian dominance. Putin became Russia’s president in December 1999  

following a surprise address delivered by former  President Boris Yeltsin. It was a rapid rise to  

power for a man who had only been appointed as  Russia’s prime minister four months previously.  

And in May 2000, Putin was inaugurated for his  first full four-year term after just scraping  

through an election with 53% of the nation’s vote. No Russian election has been as close ever since. 

Putin won with 71.9% of the vote in 2004,  with the next election taking place eight  

years later (despite Russia supposedly having  four-year terms). That one was a little closer,  

with Putin taking 63.6% of the vote,  though his nearest competitor – Gennady  

Zyuganov – only racked up 17.18%. Six  years later, Putin won another election,  

this time with 76.69% of the vote, with the most  recent 2024 election seeing him take 87.29%. 

This is Putin’s managed democracy in action  – a system where he appears to compete  

with other candidates in elections  that some accuse of being rigged. 

Putin has now tallied 24 years as the  president of Russia, with no end in sight,  

and he’ll likely try to maintain that position  for the rest of his life. But what’s interesting  

here isn’t necessarily the possible rigging  of elections over the last 24 years. Rather,  

Putin has also used war on multiple occasions  to justify his position as Russia’s leader. 

Open Democracy notes one theory that suggests  the second Chechen campaign of 1999 helped  

Putin achieve his rapid political ascent. From  previously being a relative unknown in Russian  

politics, he rose to become president  less than a year after that campaign,  

gaining a ton of popular support in the process.  While the organization claims that theory likely  

isn’t correct based on opinion polls at the time,  Putin himself may believe that being seen as a  

strong wartime leader helped him to take the  reins of power. Later wars, such as his Georgia  

campaign of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in  2014, may have been less about claiming territory  

for Russia as they were creating a situation in  which Putin could be seen as a strong leader. 

Sew some seeds of chaos and encourage  the people to back their current leader  

ahead of any who might challenge him. Whatever the case may be, it’s clear that  

Putin’s arrogance has led him to believe that he  is the only leader that Russia can rely upon. He  

does everything he can to maintain power, with  his 2022 invasion of Ukraine possibly being the  

latest attempt by him to stir up national pride  so he keeps himself where he wants to be. And it  

appears to have worked – at least if you believe  Russia’s 2024 election results are legitimate. 

By this point, it’s clear that Putin’s arrogance  is fueled by a combination of his desire to return  

Russia to its former glory (and a need to be  seen as the man who did it), a personal vendetta  

against Ukraine, and Putin’s thirst for power. But what Putin doesn’t realize is that very  

arrogance may have placed Russia  on the edge of destruction. 

Let’s start explaining why by taking a  closer look at the impact the Ukraine  

war has had on Putin and Russia as a whole. Putin’s initial invasion was far from successful.  

Though Russian troops managed to enter Kyiv, they  were repelled in what AP News calls a “defeat for  

the ages.” Russia also suffered tremendous  losses to its Black Sea Fleet and may have  

lost as many as 342 planes and 325 helicopters, if  reports from Ukraine are accurate. Its personnel  

losses are at least 85,000, too – with Ukraine  claiming they’re much higher – which has forced  

Russia to engage in a war of attrition in  which it attempts to wear Ukraine down. 

That alone has been damaging to Russia. Though the world still views Russia as a  

strong military power, it’s no longer seen as one  that can roll over a country that’s meant to be  

substantially weaker than it. Granted, Russia  would likely have won in Ukraine already were  

it not for the international aid that has propped  Kyiv up almost since the war began, but Putin’s  

arrogance in assuming he could take Ukraine in  a matter of weeks has instead revealed Russia’s  

military to be outdated and too reliant on numbers  rather than modern equipment and sound strategy. 

In other words, a stronger country than Ukraine  might now feel more confident in its chances of  

winning a war against Russia in the future. And  that’s especially the case after they’ve seen  

Russia lose so much of its modern equipment,  forcing it to repurpose old Soviet hardware to  

keep its war machine churning. It gets worse for Russia. 

Whether it wins or loses the war in Ukraine,  the country as a whole is going to feel the  

negative effects for years to come. A loss would  likely result in it being stuck with the bill  

for rebuilding a country it has spent the last  two years destroying, as well as Russia having  

to deal with being a less capable player on the  geopolitical scale. It would also likely have to  

deal with long-running sanctions in the aftermath  of a loss, such as a potential extension of the  

$60 per barrel cap currently in place on Russian  oil. Then there is the continuation of other  

sanctions that have lowered the country’s economic  gross domestic product, or GDP, forecasts by 7%  

compared to pre-war estimates. And if Putin wins his war? 

He’ll face the exact same problems. Those who oppose him – and Russian  

aggression as a whole – will keep sanctions  in place, potentially for years to come. He’ll  

also still need to spend big on rebuilding  Ukraine. After all, he claims that it should  

be a part of Russia, and he’ll want it to be  a functioning part rather than a ghost country  

that can offer little more than shelled-out  buildings. Worse yet for Putin, his rebuilding  

efforts would likely have to be done under  the shadow of continuous Ukrainian resistance,  

meaning it will likely cost more to rebuild  Ukraine if he wins than it would if he loses. 

Economically, Russia may not be able to  survive no matter the result of Putin’s war. 

That may seem like a strange claim, on the  surface. The International Monetary Fund expects  

Russia’s economy to grow 3.2% in 2024, which is  a full two percentage points higher than the U.K.  

and nearly the same amount higher than the E.U.  Its budget deficit is also much lower than both,  

tracking at 1% of GDP compared to  the U.K.’s 5.1% and the EU’s 2.8%. 

All signs of a thriving economy, right? However, these figures hide the fact that  

Russia’s economy is far from diverse. It relies  heavily on exporting oil and gas, with so much of  

its recent economic growth stemming from the  fact that it’s able to charge so heavily for  

both as a result of the war that Putin started.  So, what happens when the war ends? Russia will  

be forced to pull those prices back down if it  wants to continue selling its main exports, which  

is when the country will have to wake up to the  economic issues that Putin’s arrogance has caused. 

Take how he’s spending the  country’s national budget. 

Russia is dedicating around 40% of  that budget to the wartime effort,  

with total military spending reaching about  5.9% of GDP in 2023. That money is going  

toward paying soldiers, building tanks and  planes, compensating the families of dead  

soldiers, and buying equipment from other  countries that it can use to fund its war. 

When the war ends, that entire economic crutch  crumbles. The thousands who currently have  

jobs in Russian factories building military  equipment will find themselves out of work.  

Russia itself will see that it has very little  left over in the national budget. And as a  

result of a victory, the country would find itself  increasingly isolated from the global community,  

and the West in particular, leaving it  reliant on countries like China to prop it up. 

Speaking of China, Putin also doesn’t realize just  how much control Beijing has over Russia’s fate. 

Take oil as an example. With the rest of Europe  

drastically reducing how much oil it buys from  Russia in the wake of Putin’s war – now only  

accounting for 4.5% of purchases – Russia is  increasingly relying on China and India to  

purchase its products. Together, those countries  now account for 90% of Russia’s crude oil exports,  

which is a clear example of a lack of  diversification. China is the main buyer here,  

with Reuters pointing out that it now buys  about 50% of the oil that Russia produces. 

That’s good news for Russia in the short term. It’s able to keep bringing oil money in even  

as Europe drops from buying 45% of  its production to 4.0%. However,  

it also leaves the country in a position where  it’s increasingly reliant on China to fund its  

economy. That leads to the obvious question: What happens if China stops buying Russian oil? 

That may not be a far-flung question given  China’s recent reaction to threats of sanctions  

being placed against it for doing business with  Russia. Reuters reports that many of China’s major  

banks are pulling back on financing transactions  related to Russia, forcing companies to turn to  

small and less reliable banks or, in some cases,  cryptocurrency to continue doing business. The  

news outlet quotes a banker at one of China’s  “Big Four” when talking about the reason: 

“The main reason is to  avoid unnecessary troubles.” 

In other words – the banks don’t  want to be sanctioned as that  

could affect Chinese trade globally. While this banking shutdown appears to  

be mostly related to consumer goods  and similar types of businesses,  

it shows us what China is willing to do if it  faces increasing international pressure. Who’s to  

say that it wouldn’t stop buying Russian oil – or  reduce the amount it’s paying to meet the $60 cap  

Western nations have placed on the country’s oil  – if it faced a significant amount of pressure? 

Either way, it’s clear that Putin’s arrogance has  placed Russia in a no-win situation with China. 

If it continues relying on China to buy its gas  and oil ahead of practically any other nation,  

it gives Beijing control over its purse strings.  That could be a problem if China decides it wants  

to negotiate lower prices than Russia wants to  charge, especially because Russia is quickly  

losing leverage that would allow it to keep prices  high. And if China keeps pulling out of business  

dealings – as we’re seeing as a result of the  West’s most recent sanctions threats – Russia will  

realize that it’s so dependent on China that it’s  little more than the country’s junior partner. 

Not great for a man who wants to be seen  as one of the leaders of the modern world. 

Certainly not a good outcome for a Russia that’s  already struggling to prop up an economy that’s  

almost entirely dependent on war, oil, and gas. But Putin’s actions haven’t just harmed  

Russia’s economy. They’ve also altered  

the global perception of the nation. We touched on this earlier when we pointed  

out that Putin’s past failed attempts to control  Ukraine ended in failure and exposed him as a less  

effective leader than he believes himself to be.  And even though the world is rightfully wary of  

the threat Russia presents militaristically,  it’s also seeing a Russia that’s struggling  

to defeat a much smaller country, albeit one  that’s being supported by the global community. 

Putin’s arrogance has made Russia look weak. And he has also made himself look like a  

schoolyard bully. That’s according to  the Royal United Services Institute,  

which says that Putin’s repeated threats of using  tactical nukes in Ukraine are the sign of a man  

who’s growing desperate. He wants Ukraine,  the other former Soviet territories, and the  

Western world at large to fear him. Instead, his  actions are waking up many other countries to the  

threat that he presents as Russia’s leader, which  could ironically cause that threat to be limited. 

The reactions seen in former  Soviet states demonstrate that. 

In September 2022, Politico reported on the  many losses of Russian influence across these  

states. For instance, Azerbaijan started  shelling Armenia again during that month,  

breaking a ceasefire that Moscow had  brokered. It was confident enough to  

do that because Putin pulled Russia’s best  troops out of the South Caucasus region,  

leaving the Russian-backed Armenia exposed. In Georgia, the blue and yellow flag of Ukraine  

is often flown in support of the embattled  nation. Putin also saw himself snubbed by  

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev  who went as far as to claim his country doesn’t  

recognize “quasi-state territories which, in  our view, is what Luhansk and Donetsk are.” 

Both are territories Russia  currently controls in the war. 

The point here is that Putin is already struggling  to control portions of his supposed empire, with a  

single war weakening his – and, by extension,  Russia’s – influence in these regions. Again,  

an example of how Russia’s president’s  arrogance is actually weakening his country. 

Even more worrying are the reactions of  the Western world to Putin’s invasion. 

French President Emmanuel Macron has already  claimed that NATO troops entering Ukraine is  

a possibility. And even though the rest of  NATO denies this, Macron hasn’t backed down  

from his comments and even claimed as recently  as May 2, 2024, that there’s still a possibility  

that French troops could enter the country.  Even the many NATO members who won’t commit  

troops are still sending plenty of aid. The  U.K. recently approved $620 million in aid,  

with the United States going 100 times bigger  – it approved $61 billion in aid in April. 

The problem for Russia is that this shows Europe –  and the Western world at large – is slowly waking  

up to Putin’s ambitions. Many countries are now  increasing their military budgets in response  

to Russia’s invasion, ultimately meaning they  would be able to put up a much stronger fight  

if Putin tries to coerce or cow them. Far from  claiming Ukraine as a great victory for Russia,  

Putin has galvanized Europe to the point  where it will now be much harder for  

him to achieve his ambitions of returning  his country to its Soviet-era glory days. 

Instead, Russia will just face stronger sanctions,  a dearth of clients for its gas and oil,  

and will have to confront the fact that its  economy is now almost wholly reliant on a  

combination of war and Chinese money. And then, there’s the last potential  

nail in the coffin: The massive demographic  

damage done to Russia as a result of the war. Russians are leaving their home country at a  

rate of hundreds of thousands. The Economist  says that the outbreak of war led to an exodus  

of 300,000 people, with the BBC saying that  estimates for the numbers since range from  

the hundreds of thousands to several millions. That’s all happening against the backdrop of an  

extended demographic crisis that Russia has  experienced since the collapse of the Soviet  

Union. During the Soviet era, the country’s  birth rate halved due to the uncertainty its  

people had as a result of economic hardship.  Raising those birth rates has been a cause  

close to Putin’s heart since he took power,  and he’s failed every step of the way. 

Our World in Data says that Russia saw just 9.6  births for every 17 deaths in 2021. With the war  

in Ukraine killing so many of Russia’s younger  people, along with hundreds of thousands – if not  

millions – more leaving, there may not be much  of a Russia left by the time the war is over. 

All of this adds up to a country in crisis. One  that, regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends,  

is in dire straits economically and in terms of  its geopolitical positioning. A Russia that’s  

losing people at an alarming rate and one that, as  a result of Putin’s arrogance and actions, could  

find itself playing second fiddle to China rather  than rebuilding its empire in the coming years. 

But what do you think? Will Putin’s  arrogance truly lead to Russia’s downfall,  

or will victory in Ukraine give him the  launching pad to rebuild what he believes  

the country has lost? How long would it take  for Russia to rebuild in the wake of the war,  

especially if it loses? Tell us what you think in  the comments and thank you for watching the video.

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