L'attaque informatique la plus sophistiquée de l'histoire

Summary

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Takeaways

• 😀 The attack discussed is a sophisticated 'Supply Chain' attack targeting open-source software, particularly the XZ compression tool.
• 😀 Jatan, the attacker, deployed a backdoor via packaged versions of software distributed to Linux distributions like Debian and Fedora, not through the source code on GitHub.
• 😀 The backdoor was highly targeted and only installed on specific versions of operating systems, making it difficult to detect and isolating the attack to certain users.
• 😀 The attack involved a complex infiltration over two years, demonstrating high levels of patience and sophistication in the cybercriminal's approach.
• 😀 Jatan employed advanced operational security practices, leaving almost no trace of their identity, making it difficult to pinpoint who was behind the attack.
• 😀 Researchers speculated that Jatan could be a state-sponsored actor, potentially linked to the Russian SVR intelligence agency, based on the complexity of the attack and traces left behind.
• 😀 The attack is compared to the 2020 SolarWinds hack, where attackers infiltrated a widely-used software's update process to distribute malicious code to thousands of clients.
• 😀 Investigations into Jatan’s identity pointed to specific time zone data from their commits on GitHub, hinting that Jatan might be operating from Eastern Europe or even Israel, though it is not certain.
• 😀 Despite extensive efforts to hide their origin, Jatan made critical mistakes, such as inconsistencies in commit timestamps, which led experts to suspect they were located in a time zone corresponding to UTC+2 or UTC+3.
• 😀 The disappearance of Jatan from online traces suggests that they may have successfully covered their tracks or ceased their activities, but experts believe there could be more such attacks lurking in open-source software.
• 😀 The overall risk highlighted is that even with the discovery of this attack, there may be other similar vulnerabilities dormant in software systems, waiting for activation at a later time.

Q & A

What is the primary subject of the transcript?

The transcript discusses a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting open-source software, specifically the XZ compression tool, which was used to infiltrate Linux distributions like Debian and Fedora.

How did the attacker, Jatan, deploy the backdoor in the system?

Jatan inserted the backdoor into the packaged versions of XZ, which were then distributed to Linux distributions. This made the attack more difficult to detect, as the backdoor was not in the original code but in the packaged version sent to users.

What made this attack particularly difficult to detect?

The backdoor was embedded in specific versions of XZ, which were targeted for particular systems. The attack was subtle, as it only deployed if the system matched certain criteria, and it wasn't present in the public GitHub code, but rather in the packaged distribution.

What is the significance of the discovery of the backdoor in test versions?

The backdoor was discovered in test versions before it could be released to the general public, which significantly limited its impact. This discovery was fortunate, as it prevented the backdoor from being deployed on a wider scale.

Why do some experts suspect Jatan may be linked to a state-sponsored attack?

The attack's complexity, the long infiltration period (around two years), and the careful efforts to obscure Jatan's identity suggest that this could be a state-sponsored attack. Such attacks typically require significant resources and planning, often associated with national intelligence agencies.

What role does operational security (obsec) play in the case of Jatan?

Jatan displayed excellent operational security by leaving no personal or identifying traces online, other than what was strictly necessary for open-source contributions. This made it extremely difficult for investigators to trace their true identity.

How did investigators attempt to locate Jatan?

Investigators analyzed the time zones associated with Jatan's commits on GitHub. They noted that the majority of commits were made in UTC+8, but occasional commits in UTC+2 or UTC+3 provided clues that Jatan's physical location might be in Eastern Europe or Israel.

What do the time zone inconsistencies reveal about Jatan?

The time zone inconsistencies in Jatan’s commits suggest that they may have manually altered the time zone of their computer to obscure their location. This raises questions about their true whereabouts, with the UTC+2/3 time zone hinting at regions in Eastern Europe or Israel.

Why is the attack referred to as a supply chain attack?

This is a supply chain attack because the attackers didn’t directly compromise the main operating system or software but instead infiltrated a crucial open-source tool (XZ) used widely in Linux distributions. By modifying the tool, the attackers could potentially infect many systems globally.

What similar high-profile attack does the transcript reference, and why is it relevant?

The transcript references the SolarWinds attack in 2020, where attackers infiltrated a software provider’s update process. This is relevant because both attacks involve compromising trusted software updates to deploy malware, making them sophisticated supply chain attacks likely attributed to state actors.