What JFK tried to do before his assassination w/Jeffrey Sachs | The Chris Hedges Report

The Real News Network
29 Sept 202350:10

Summary

TLDRThe transcript is a detailed discussion on John F. Kennedy's efforts to build a sustainable peace with the Soviet Union, as chronicled by Jeffrey Sachs in his book 'To Move the World.' It covers Kennedy's campaign to curb the arms race and his attempts to end the Cold War through diplomacy, highlighted by his implementation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The conversation delves into the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy's struggle against war-advocating figures within his administration, and the significant impact of the lies told by the CIA. It also touches on the post-WWII tensions over Germany, the near nuclear catastrophes, and Kennedy's powerful speech on peace that resonated with Khrushchev and led to a peace agreement. The summary concludes with a critique of the US's current approach to foreign policy, particularly regarding NATO enlargement and the conflict in Ukraine, contrasting it with Kennedy's diplomatic strategies and the consequences of not learning from past peace efforts.

Takeaways

  • 📚 Jeffrey Sachs' book 'To Move the World' chronicles John F. Kennedy's efforts to curb the arms race and build ties with the Soviet Union from October 1962 to September 1963.
  • ✊ JFK's vision for peace with the Soviets was not shared by many within his administration, especially the military, reflecting the internal struggle between diplomacy and war.
  • 🗣️ Kennedy's famous inaugural address included the line, 'Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate,' highlighting his commitment to peace through dialogue.
  • 📉 The Bay of Pigs invasion was a significant failure that led to increased tensions with the Soviet Union and a critical shift in Kennedy's approach to foreign policy.
  • 🤔 Kennedy recognized the danger of unchecked CIA actions and their propensity for misinformation, which contributed to the deterioration of US-Soviet relations.
  • 🚫 The absence of a peace treaty post-WWII and the subsequent Cold War were rooted in a dispute over the future of Germany, leading to a remilitarized Western Germany and heightened Soviet fears.
  • 🔄 The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point for Kennedy, leading to a secret deal with Khrushchev to remove missiles from both Cuba and Turkey, and a deeper understanding of the need for diplomacy.
  • 🌟 Kennedy's speech on peace is considered one of the most courageous acts in political history, advocating for a reevaluation of the US position and the recognition of common interests with the Soviets.
  • 🔄 The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was a direct result of Kennedy's push for peace and marked a significant step towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  • 🔄 The end of the Cold War was facilitated by diplomatic efforts from both Reagan and Gorbachev, with Gorbachev unilaterally disbanding the Warsaw Pact and receiving promises from the US not to expand NATO eastward.
  • ⚔️ The US's continuous expansion of NATO and aggressive foreign policy post-Cold War has been viewed as a provocation by Russia, leading to increased tensions and the current conflict in Ukraine.

Q & A

  • What was the main focus of John F. Kennedy's last battle before his assassination?

    -John F. Kennedy's last battle was focused on building a sustainable peace with the Soviet Union and curbing the arms race.

  • Which book by Jeffrey Sachs chronicles Kennedy's efforts to end the Cold War?

    -Jeffrey Sachs' book titled 'To Move the World' chronicles Kennedy's efforts from October 1962 to September 1963 to curb the arms race and build ties with the Soviet Union.

  • What significant treaty did Kennedy implement in 1963?

    -Kennedy implemented the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

  • What was the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how did it influence Kennedy's perspective on the Cold War?

    -The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation in 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba. It influenced Kennedy's perspective by making him realize the urgency of diplomacy and the dangers of unchecked military escalation.

  • What was the context of the Bay of Pigs invasion and how did it affect Kennedy's trust in the CIA?

    -The Bay of Pigs invasion was a failed military operation in 1961 by the CIA to overthrow the Cuban government. It led to a disastrous outcome and significantly undermined Kennedy's trust in the CIA.

  • What was the significance of Kennedy's speech on peace and how was it received by the Soviet Union?

    -Kennedy's speech on peace was significant as it was a call for reconsideration of the U.S. position towards the Soviet Union, emphasizing common interests and the possibility of cooperation. It was well-received by the Soviet Union, with Khrushchev considering it the finest speech by an American president since FDR.

  • What was the role of Ted Sorensen in Kennedy's speech?

    -Ted Sorensen was a key advisor to Kennedy and played a significant role in crafting the speech, contributing to its elegiac and compelling nature.

  • How did Kennedy's approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis differ from that of his military advisors?

    -Kennedy's approach was more diplomatic and cautious compared to his military advisors, who were pushing for an immediate and aggressive military campaign against Cuba. Kennedy sought a negotiated settlement, which eventually led to the removal of missiles from both Cuba and Turkey.

  • What was the impact of Kennedy's assassination on the progress made towards peace with the Soviet Union?

    -Kennedy's assassination cut short the progress made towards peace. The hardliners regained control in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev, and the momentum for peace that Kennedy had built was lost.

  • How did the U.S. approach to NATO enlargement contribute to the tensions with Russia?

    -The U.S. approach to NATO enlargement, particularly the expansion into Eastern Europe and the inclusion of countries bordering Russia, was seen as a provocation by Russia. This contributed to rising tensions and a renewed sense of threat from the West.

  • What were the key points of the proposed U.S.-Russia security agreement that Putin put on the table in December 2021?

    -The key points of the proposed U.S.-Russia security agreement included NATO not enlarging to include Ukraine and the removal of missiles that were pointed at Russia.

Outlines

00:00

🌟 JFK's Vision for Peace with the Soviets

The paragraph discusses President John F. Kennedy's efforts to establish a sustainable peace with the Soviet Union, as detailed in Jeffrey Sachs' book 'To Move the World.' It highlights Kennedy's campaign to curb the arms race and build ties with Nikita Khrushchev, as well as the challenges he faced from within his administration and the military. The Cuban Missile Crisis is emphasized as a turning point for Kennedy, leading to his realization of the importance of diplomacy and negotiation.

05:04

🚩 CIA's Deception and the Tense US-Soviet Relations

This paragraph delves into the CIA's culture of deception, which included misleading President Eisenhower about the U-2 spy plane's vulnerability and the subsequent fallout with the Soviet Union. It also touches on the lack of a peace treaty post-World War II, the division of Germany, and the formation of NATO, which heightened Cold War tensions. The discussion underscores the precarious state of US-Soviet relations during Kennedy's presidency.

10:09

🔥 The Cuban Missile Crisis: Averting Nuclear War

The focus of this paragraph is the Cuban Missile Crisis, where Kennedy's decision-making process is explored. It details the initial consensus for military action against Cuba and the pivotal suggestion by Adlai Stevenson for a diplomatic resolution. The paragraph also reveals the secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev to remove missiles from both Cuba and Turkey and the risks of miscalculation that nearly led to nuclear war.

15:15

🕊️ Kennedy's Pursuit of Peace and Distrust in the Military

This paragraph reflects on Kennedy's shift towards peace following the Cuban Missile Crisis and his growing distrust of the military and the CIA. It discusses Kennedy's recognition of the need for diplomacy and his efforts to communicate with the American public about the possibility of peace with the Soviet Union. The paragraph also highlights Kennedy's speech, which is described as a courageous act of leadership.

20:18

🗣️ Kennedy's Speech on Peace and its Impact

The paragraph emphasizes the content and impact of Kennedy's speech on peace. It outlines the speech's message of common humanity between the US and the Soviet Union, the potential for cooperation, and the rational pursuit of peace. The response from the Soviet leader Khrushchev and the subsequent signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are also covered, showcasing the power of diplomacy over conflict.

25:20

🔄 The Power of Words and Leadership in Diplomacy

This paragraph discusses the eloquence and persuasive power of Kennedy's speech, its influence on the Soviet leadership, and how it was disseminated widely, even in Soviet media. It also touches on Kennedy's grassroots approach to gaining public support for the peace treaty and the successful ratification of the treaty by the US Senate. The paragraph concludes with Kennedy's address to the UN General Assembly, where he emphasized hope and the potential for collective action towards peace.

30:23

🔍 The Conspiracy Against Peace and the US Security State

The paragraph explores the conspiracy theories surrounding Kennedy's assassination, suggesting that rogue elements within the US government may have been involved. It criticizes the US security state, the CIA, and the influence of neoconservatives on foreign policy. The discussion also covers Kennedy's insights on avoiding confrontations with nuclear adversaries and the US's approach to the war in Ukraine.

35:24

📜 Broken Promises and NATO's Expansion

This paragraph examines the history of NATO enlargement and the US's broken promises to Russia, particularly regarding the eastward expansion of NATO. It discusses the Soviet Union's dissolution, the US's hegemonic ambitions, and the subsequent inclusion of several countries into NATO. The paragraph also addresses Russia's reactions to NATO's expansion and its warnings against the US's actions.

40:31

🚨 US Aggression and the Lead-up to the Ukraine Conflict

The paragraph details the US's role in the Ukrainian conflict, starting with the overthrow of the neutral Viktor Yanukovych government. It discusses the US's support for a Russophobic regime in Ukraine, the Minsk agreements, and the refusal of the US and Ukraine to implement them. The paragraph also highlights the US's military support for Ukraine and its rejection of negotiations with Russia.

45:33

🤝 The Failure of US Diplomacy and the Onset of War

This final paragraph characterizes the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an avoidable conflict that arose from a failure of US diplomacy. It argues that the US ignored opportunities to negotiate with Russia and instead escalated the conflict through military and economic means. The paragraph criticizes the US's refusal to acknowledge Russia's security concerns and its insistence on NATO enlargement. It concludes with a call for diplomacy and negotiation to prevent further escalation.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation in October 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba. It is considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war. In the video, this event is highlighted as a pivotal moment that led JFK to reevaluate the U.S.'s approach to the Soviet Union and seek peaceful resolutions to conflicts.

💡Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was an agreement signed in 1963 that prohibited all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It was a significant step towards controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of nuclear fallout. In the video, this treaty is presented as a direct result of Kennedy's efforts to curb the arms race and build ties with the Soviet Union.

💡Cold War

The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the United States and its allies (NATO) and the Soviet Union and its allies (Warsaw Pact) from the end of World War II until the early 1990s. It was characterized by political, economic, and military rivalry, but did not result in full-scale fighting between the two superpowers. The video discusses the efforts made by JFK to end the Cold War through diplomacy and peace negotiations.

💡Arms Race

The arms race refers to the rapid development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by nations, particularly during the Cold War. It represents a competition for military and technological superiority. In the video, JFK's efforts to curb the arms race are emphasized as a critical aspect of his foreign policy, aiming to reduce tensions and the risk of nuclear conflict.

💡Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the practice of conducting negotiations and managing relationships between countries, with the aim of maintaining peaceful relations and resolving conflicts without resorting to violence or war. In the video, diplomacy is highlighted as a key tool that JFK used to navigate the tense relationship with the Soviet Union and to work towards peace.

💡Nikita Khrushchev

Nikita Khrushchev was the leader of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, serving as Premier and later as General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1953 to 1964. He played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and subsequent negotiations with the United States. In the video, Khrushchev is portrayed as a counterpart to JFK in the quest for peace and the reduction of Cold War tensions.

💡Peace

Peace refers to the absence of conflict and the presence of harmonious relationships between individuals or groups. In the context of the video, peace is the ultimate goal that JFK pursued through his efforts to end the arms race, negotiate with the Soviet Union, and promote a new approach to international relations.

💡Military-Industrial Complex

The military-industrial complex is a concept that refers to the relationship between a nation's military establishment and the industries that supply it with weapons and other war materials. It suggests that these two entities have become deeply intertwined and may push for policies that favor their own interests, potentially at the expense of peace and diplomacy. In the video, the military-industrial complex is criticized for its influence on U.S. foreign policy and its role in perpetuating conflict.

💡NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement refers to the process of adding new member states to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is a military alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe. The enlargement has been a point of contention, especially when it comes to countries that are geographically close to or were previously part of the Soviet Union. In the video, NATO enlargement is portrayed as a provocation to Russia and a factor in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

💡Détente

Détente is a period of easing of international tensions, particularly in the context of the Cold War. It refers to a series of efforts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce tensions and the risk of war, often through diplomacy and arms control agreements. In the video, détente is mentioned as a period following the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Highlights

John F. Kennedy's last battle was an effort to build a sustainable peace with the Soviet Union, which was cut short by his assassination.

Jeffrey Sachs' book 'To Move the World' chronicles Kennedy's campaign to curb the arms race and build ties with Nikita Khrushchev from October 1962 to September 1963.

Kennedy implemented the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, but faced opposition from cold warriors, including some within his administration and the military.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a pivotal moment where Kennedy battled against military figures like Curtis LeMay, who advocated for a hot war.

Kennedy's vision for peace was not shared by many, leading to a change in his approach towards the end of his presidency.

Kennedy's inaugural address included the famous line, "Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

The Bay of Pigs invasion was a disaster that led to a tense exchange with Khrushchev, highlighting the need for improved relations.

Kennedy administration's lies to the Soviets, including the U-2 spy plane incident and the Bay of Pigs, were destructive to building relationships.

The absence of a peace treaty post-WWII and the dispute over Germany's future were fundamental to the start of the Cold War.

Kennedy's speech, which advocated for peace and negotiation, was a courageous act that reshaped the perception of the Soviet Union among Americans.

Kennedy's approach to peace was rational and humanistic, emphasizing shared interests and the avoidance of confrontations that could lead to nuclear war.

The speech had a profound impact on Khrushchev, who called it the finest by an American president since FDR, and led to a peace agreement.

Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 cut short his quest for peace, and the hardliners in the Soviet Union regained control afterward.

The US has continued to push NATO enlargement despite warnings from Russia, contributing to the current tensions and war in Ukraine.

Kennedy's approach to diplomacy and peace stands in stark contrast to the current US stance, which has led to a failure in negotiations and an escalation of conflicts.

The war in Ukraine is seen as avoidable and a result of the US refusing to negotiate and pushing for a confrontational stance against Russia.

The US's actions, including economic sanctions and military support to Ukraine, have been perceived as an attempt to force Russia into submission rather than seeking a diplomatic resolution.

Transcripts

play00:21

(Singing) 

play00:34

John F. Kennedy's last battle, cut short by  his assassination, was the effort to build a  

play00:39

sustainable piece with the Soviet Union.  Jeffrey Sachs, professor of economics at  

play00:44

Columbia University in his new book, To Move the  World, chronicles the campaign by Kennedy from  

play00:50

October 1962 to September 1963 to curb the arms  race and build ties with his Soviet counterpart,  

play00:58

Nikita Khrushchev. Sachs looks at the series of  speeches Kennedy gave to end the Cold War and  

play01:04

persuade the world to make peace with the Soviets. Kennedy implemented the Partial Nuclear Test  

play01:09

Ban Treaty in 1963, but Kennedy's vision was not  shared by many cold warriors in the establishment,  

play01:17

including some within his administration  and especially within the military. 

play01:22

Joining me to discuss To Move the World: JFK's  Quest for Peace is Professor Jeffrey Sachs.  

play01:29

I want to begin with the Cuban Missile Crisis  because this is a moment that you write about  

play01:34

in your book where Kennedy is battling in  particularly the military, figures like  

play01:40

Curtis LeMay was the head of the Air Force, who  want to engage in a hot war to essentially bomb  

play01:46

Cuban missile bases and I believe even Soviet  ships. And this I think kind of precipitated  

play01:56

the change that came about within Kennedy. Let me say first what a pleasure it is to be  

play02:05

with you and how good it is to talk about  these issues on their 60th anniversary,  

play02:11

because they are completely alive today in  the context of the war in Ukraine as well,  

play02:18

where the US and Russia are in effect at war.  And I'm afraid our leaders are not learning  

play02:26

the lessons that Kennedy learned and espoused. I think even before the Cuban Missile Crisis,  

play02:33

it's worth saying that Kennedy came into office in  January 1961, intent on peace, but found himself  

play02:42

at the brink of nuclear annihilation just a year  and-a-half afterwards. And that was not only  

play02:51

shocking, but rather a sign of how extraordinarily  dangerous the world was and continues to be. 

play03:02

So Kennedy came in January 1961, not aiming  for war, but aiming for negotiation and peace.  

play03:11

And remember in his inaugural address, he had the  famous line, "Let us never negotiate out of fear,  

play03:18

but let us never fear to negotiate." And he knew the dynamics of how things can  

play03:24

get out of hand. He understood that the world was  dangerous and he was going to avoid it. And yet  

play03:32

the first year was a massive debacle because  the CIA came to him and said, "Mr. President,  

play03:39

now you have to implement the invasion of  Cuba." And he had serious doubts about it,  

play03:46

but like most presidents and certainly  most presidents in their first months,  

play03:52

he kind of went along and said, okay, you can  do it, but I'm not going to give air cover. 

play04:00

And some flaky set of decisions  from the CIA and Kennedy  

play04:07

had them go forward. And of course the Bay of  Pigs invasion of Cuba was itself a debacle,  

play04:15

a disaster. It led to a horrible interchange  with Khrushchev who wrote in a private channel  

play04:22

to Kennedy, "Stop this piracy of people in your  government." And Kennedy wrote back brazenly, "No,  

play04:30

it's not my government. This is independent of  the United States." And Khrushchev wrote back in  

play04:35

effect, don't lie to me like that Mr. President. I want to stop you there because you write  

play04:40

in the book about two times the Kennedy  administration lied to the Soviets and how  

play04:48

destructive that was to building relationships. Actually the first lie came when the Soviet Union  

play04:57

shot down a CIA spy plane, the U-2 spy plane with  Gary Powers, just on the eve of what was supposed  

play05:04

to be a summit between Eisenhower and Soviet  party chairman Nikita Khrushchev. And the CIA  

play05:13

lies for a living. We know this. But it lied to  the president of the United States also saying,  

play05:19

Mr. President, don't worry, they can't shoot down  the spy plane. It's too high. And if they do shoot  

play05:24

down the spy plane, it's designed to disintegrate.  And if it doesn't disintegrate anyway, the pilot  

play05:30

is going to take his cyanide pill. There's  no way anything can happen to embarrass you. 

play05:35

And of course they shoot down the spy plane,  they get the wreckage, they get the pilot alive,  

play05:40

Gary Powers, they don't announce that. They  say, we have been spied upon, and downed the  

play05:48

plane without revealing those details. And Eisenhower comes out and says, no,  

play05:54

no, no, no, this is a weather craft that went off  course from Turkey. And then the Soviets reveal,  

play06:03

we have the fuselage, we have the pilot who  has told us about his spy mission. Direct,  

play06:09

blatant lies. Then soon after this comes  the direct blatant lies of the Bay of Pigs. 

play06:18

It's dangerous. And this is the CIA, by the  way, and it's the CIA still today in my view.  

play06:25

It is lying and unaccountable and really never  called to task for these lives because the public  

play06:35

doesn't know them, doesn't understand what's  going on. But from the Soviet US point of view,  

play06:41

within months of the Kennedy  administration, this air was poisoned. 

play06:47

And there was one other thing that was  absolutely precipitating all of this, which was,  

play06:54

and very fundamental and completely never  discussed in America almost at all, but there  

play07:00

had been no peace treaty at the end of World War  II and the Cold War emerged in fact over a bitter  

play07:08

dispute between the Soviet Union and the United  States about the future of Germany. The Soviet  

play07:15

Union had lost more than 20 million people in the  war and did not want to see German remilitarized. 

play07:22

The United States, on the other hand, decided that  the three occupied regions from the western side,  

play07:30

the US, French and British regions would form  a single new Federal Republic of Germany.  

play07:39

The remaining fourth part, the Soviet-occupied  part, would become the German Democratic Republic,  

play07:46

the GDR. But the western side would become  the bulwark of a new military alliance, NATO,  

play07:54

and it would be remilitarized.  And the Soviet Union said, no,  

play07:58

we just lost more than 20 million people,  now within a few years you're remilitarizing. 

play08:05

Well, of course the United States never listened,  never negotiated, and at the end of the 1950s,  

play08:10

took another step. Eisenhower was flirting  with the idea, maybe we should just give our  

play08:16

allies control over nuclear weapons as well so  we can reduce the US troops numbers in Europe.  

play08:26

Eisenhower was very frugal. He was  a fiscal conservative and he wanted  

play08:30

to bring troops home and use the nuclear shield. And so there was, at the end of the 1950s, lots of  

play08:37

talk about nuclear sharing and this was freaking  out the Soviet Union also. And the United States  

play08:45

doesn't know how to talk to anybody. There's no  diplomacy, there are mortal enemies, there's no  

play08:50

one to negotiate. And so the situation by the  time Kennedy came in was completely fraught,  

play08:55

then came the Bay of Pigs. Then Khrushchev  said, okay, we need to teach Americans a bit  

play09:02

of their own lessons. We'll put missiles in Cuba. And Khrushchev had a quite remarkable exchange  

play09:11

with Andrei Gromyko, his foreign minister. Gromyko  said, "No, what, war?" And Khrushchev said, no,  

play09:17

not war. Just basically teach these  Americans about their arrogance. They  

play09:23

have missiles in Turkey. We're going to  put missiles in Cuba, nothing about war. 

play09:28

But of course everything immediately spiraled  out of control when the missile placements were  

play09:37

discovered and the subterfuge that the Soviets  were using to place the missile systems in  

play09:45

place. And it was like the subterfuge of the  United States doing what it did on it's side.  

play09:51

Things get out of hand. And as soon as Kennedy saw the U-2 spy plane  

play09:57

over Cuba taking these pictures of missile sites,  he convened an executive committee, ExComm, and it  

play10:09

was almost unanimous. Well, we got to shoot down  these sites, we have to take them out before they  

play10:15

can be deployed. And it was unanimous essentially  that there needed to be an immediate war and the  

play10:23

joint chiefs were told to go off and plan the  military campaign against Cuba. Would it be an air  

play10:29

campaign? Would it just be to take out the sites?  How many troops would be needed? And so forth. 

play10:33

Kennedy, interestingly, to make a very long  story short, had lunch by coincidence with  

play10:40

Adlai Stevenson, the US Ambassador to the  United Nations, on the first day of the  

play10:46

Cuban Missile Crisis when Kennedy had seen the  pictures. And Adlai Stevenson said to Kennedy,  

play10:54

well, of course you need diplomacy to end this and  exchange the missiles with the Turkish missiles. 

play11:01

Kennedy was shocked because no  other advisor had said anything  

play11:06

about diplomacy. It was basically unanimous  for a military approach, which by the way  

play11:16

almost surely may be too strong, although I'm  not sure it is, but most likely would've led to  

play11:24

nuclear annihilation. Because our doctrine was  that if we were attacked by a nuclear weapon,  

play11:33

we would give a full response. By the  way, full meaning not only the Soviet  

play11:40

Union but Eastern and Central Europe,  China, hundreds of millions of people  

play11:45

killed. And now we learned afterwards from  the nuclear winter, maybe all of humanity  

play11:51

perishing from starvation afterwards. But Stevenson laid the idea of maybe  

play11:59

a negotiated settlement. Well, to make a  long story short, as people know, Kennedy  

play12:07

really almost alone though with this hint from  Stevenson and then with his brother Robert  

play12:16

pushing and Ted Sorensen pushing and a few others  pushing, turned the tide over a few days that,  

play12:25

don't do something precipitous, let's try  to figure out what's in Khrushchev's mind. 

play12:32

And Kennedy came to realize, because he had  people like the Air Force head, Curtis LeMay, who  

play12:40

just wanted nuclear war it seems or first strike  against the Soviet Union, that he was surrounded  

play12:47

by a lot of hotheads who could end the world.  And he realized Khrushchev probably was as well.  

play12:55

And the two of them came to realize,  we better tamp this down. And they did. 

play13:03

And they agreed on a deal of this removal of  missiles both from Cuba and from Turkey. The  

play13:13

big mistake Kennedy made, and I always think it's  unfair to call it a mistake because he saved the  

play13:18

world, so you get a lot of credit for that. But  the mistake he made was insisting that the deal  

play13:23

be secret so that it looked to the American people  like he had simply faced down the Soviet Union and  

play13:30

they had backed away. Because it wasn't known that  the removal of the American missiles were part of  

play13:37

an exchange, and that wasn't known for decades  actually. Well, just to come to the book... 

play13:44

Let me just stop you there because right  in the preface, and I didn't know this,  

play13:50

you talk about once that machinery  begins to be put in place,  

play13:55

a human error can trigger a nuclear catastrophe.  You write one Alaska-based US Air Force pilot  

play14:05

had not gotten the message. This was not to send  flights over Cuba. And after taking off to collect  

play14:13

air samples to check on Soviet nuclear testing,  the pilot had become disoriented and inadvertently  

play14:18

flown his plane into Soviet airspace. Soviet  fighter jets scrambled to intercept the U-2  

play14:24

while, due to the high alert status prompted  by the crisis, the US plane sent to escort  

play14:29

it back to base were armed with nuclear  warheads and had the authority to fire. 

play14:33

Yes, and actually that was one of the  episodes that brought us to the brink of  

play14:40

nuclear annihilation. But there was one even more  dramatic, which was that after the agreement was  

play14:47

reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev, there  was a disabled submarine in the Caribbean that  

play14:55

was part of a squadron and it was the one in that  squadron that carried nuclear tipped torpedoes. 

play15:03

And when that disabled sub rose, normally  the US might drop depth charges on the  

play15:14

submarine to get it, to force it to rise. But  a jackass, I think is the right technical term,  

play15:20

dropped live hand grenades as he was flying over  this rising submarine and the skipper thought,  

play15:30

our sub is under attack, there must be war. This was a Russian submarine? 

play15:35

Sorry, Russian submarine, that was my point,  disabled Russian submarine, excuse me. And they  

play15:41

thought they were under attack and that there must  be a war at the surface. It was disabled and out  

play15:45

of communication. And so the captain of the vessel  ordered that the nuclear tipped submarine be  

play15:56

loaded into the torpedo bay and that it be fired. And if it had been fired, under US nuclear  

play16:05

doctrine, being attacked by a nuclear  weapon, including a nuclear tipped torpedo,  

play16:11

under US doctrine would have launched that full  scale response that would have destroyed humanity.  

play16:19

And the order to fire was countermanded at the  last moment by virtue of the fact that there  

play16:27

happened to be a Soviet party official who was  senior to the captain of the vessel who said,  

play16:34

I don't think it's a good idea.  We should rise without firing. 

play16:39

And they did, and it turned out there wasn't a  war on the surface and there wasn't a need to  

play16:46

launch the torpedo. We came within a second  of ending the world and that was after the  

play16:54

agreement had been reached between the USSR and  the United States. And Martin Sherwin, the late  

play17:04

historian who now people know as the person who  co-wrote the great book American Prometheus on J.  

play17:12

Robert Oppenheimer, wrote this story in his  wonderful last book before he passed away,  

play17:21

Gambling with Armageddon, which is a history of  the Cuban Missile Crisis. Absolutely phenomenal. 

play17:27

As is American Prometheus. And they're both  great books. He wrote that with Kai Bird,  

play17:32

of course. You can visit that submarine.  I think it's in San Francisco. I did. The  

play17:38

Russian Submarine is a museum. So Kennedy walks away from this  

play17:43

horrified at how close the world came to  nuclear Armageddon, but he also walked away  

play17:50

with a deep distrust of the military. And I want  to talk about the decision to give this speech,  

play17:59

which I had not read in full until I read it  in your book and then went and listened to it. 

play18:04

It has to be one of the most courageous acts by a  politician, you could argue perhaps since anything  

play18:15

FDR did. And it's utterly remarkable. And what's  frightening or disturbing is that I can't see any  

play18:23

political figure giving a speech like that again.  So let's talk about how Kennedy changed and what  

play18:31

he set out to do. And of course it was all cut  short by his assassination in November of 1963. 

play18:39

I think first it's fair to say that being  president of the United States is a tough job  

play18:46

and it's impossible to do right in the early days  and early years because you don't get it. And our  

play18:54

security state in the United States, which was  created by the National Security Act of 1947,  

play19:00

which created a secret security state and a  private army of the United States called the CIA,  

play19:08

which is one half its function,  because it does intelligence and  

play19:12

it does private warfare of the United States. And the whole apparatus is secret and largely  

play19:20

out of control. And it is absolutely out of  control by any public understanding or scrutiny  

play19:28

or accountability or congressional oversight  today as it was in the early 1960s. Well,  

play19:35

Kennedy came in with a lot of energy and  idealism and brilliance and he stumbled  

play19:42

terribly in the first year with the Bay of Pigs  Cuban invasion and then in the second year,  

play19:51

the near disaster of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And my view is he had the potential for  

play20:00

greatness at the beginning and  by his third year he had become  

play20:07

a magnificent politician and statesman of the  first order. One of our truly great presidents.  

play20:17

Not so much in the first two years, although the  potential was there, but the growth that came  

play20:25

through this set of trials was extraordinary. Already after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy was so  

play20:34

disturbed by the CIA that he was  beside himself about how they had led  

play20:43

the US and his administration and himself  personally into this awful debacle. He didn't  

play20:51

trust the CIA. After the Cuban Missile Crisis  and after hearing people like Curtis LeMay even  

play21:00

essentially calling Kennedy a traitor for not  launching the war or a coward and feeling all  

play21:06

of this pressure for war, he was profoundly  disturbed and profoundly moved and profoundly  

play21:12

scared at how fragile the world was. And he  was determined to do something in 1963. And he- 

play21:22

Let me just interject. He fired Dulles and he  fired Bissell. So he actually took on the CIA  

play21:29

establishment and triggered deep animus. And I  want you, as you go on, to talk about this speech,  

play21:38

but one of the things I found fascinating from  your book is how few people he informed about  

play21:44

what it was he was about to say. And we have  about nine minutes left, so I want to make  

play21:46

sure we talk about the content of what he said. So Kennedy wanted to say to the American people,  

play21:53

peace is possible, even with the Soviet Union,  even with the other side. And the whole content  

play22:01

of the speech is they are human beings like  we are. They want to live, they want to  

play22:11

protect their children, they want to have  a future. And this speech is unbelievable  

play22:19

because it's the only foreign policy speech I  know of anywhere where it is not telling the  

play22:27

other side what to do, not making threats, not  reveling in glory, not saying we are number one,  

play22:35

not saying they are evil, but saying to the  American people, we need to reconsider our  

play22:43

own position. And remember today we're told every  day by the completely irresponsible, reckless and  

play22:51

ignorant mass media like the New York Times, I'm  going to say because it's terrible, and like the  

play22:59

Washington Post and others, there's no one to talk  to. There's no one to negotiate with over Ukraine. 

play23:04

And in the Cold War in 1963, it was even more like  that. The Cuban Missile Crisis had just occurred.  

play23:12

Could you even imagine negotiating with the  Soviet Union? And Kennedy's whole message is we  

play23:18

can negotiate. They want the same things. They too  will abide by treaties as long as those treaties  

play23:26

are also in their interest and they can be relied  upon to abide by treaties that are in their  

play23:32

interest and also in our interests. There is a  benefit of cooperation. This is rational. In fact,  

play23:40

the pursuit of peace is the rational end  of rational men, says President Kennedy. 

play23:46

I just want to read a couple sections because it  is an absolutely remarkable, and as you point out  

play23:52

through Sorensen, beautifully elegiac and just  gorgeously written, but these are some of the  

play24:00

things, just I want to read three short sections. "I speak of peace," this is Kennedy,  

play24:04

"as the necessary rational end of rational  men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is  

play24:10

not as dramatic as the pursuit of war. And  frequently the words of the pursuer fall on  

play24:15

deaf ears, but we have no more urgent task." And then he says, "So let us not be blind to  

play24:22

our differences, but let us also direct attention  to our common interests and to the means by which  

play24:28

those differences can be resolved. And if we  cannot end now our differences, at least we can  

play24:33

help make the world safe for diversity. For in  the final analysis, our most basic common link  

play24:39

is that we all inhabit this small planet. We  all breathe the same air, we all cherish our  

play24:45

children's future, and we are all mortal." And just to conclude, he asks in the speech,  

play24:51

"What kind of peace do we seek? Not a PAX  Americana enforced on the world by American  

play24:56

weapons of war, not the peace of the grave or  the security of the slave. I'm talking about  

play25:01

genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life  on earth worth living. The kind that enables men  

play25:08

and nations to grow and to hope and to build  a better life for their children. Not merely  

play25:13

peace for Americans, but peace for all men  and women. Not merely peace in our time,  

play25:19

but peace for all time." That was incredible. It gives you goosebumps. Of course, I've listened,  

play25:25

I don't know how many dozens or hundreds of times  to the speech. I've made my family listen on so  

play25:31

many occasions. But the words are thrilling.  The words are mesmerizing in their beauty.  

play25:41

And Ted Sorensen has a big hand in that as  well and in their ability to make change. 

play25:50

And I think one of the things that Kennedy  also says in here, which is incredible,  

play25:56

is his advice on leadership. And I don't have  exactly the words here, but to paraphrase, he  

play26:04

says, by defining our goal more clearly, by making  it seem more manageable and less remote, we help  

play26:12

all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to  move irresistibly toward it. So the goal of peace,  

play26:18

if made to be manageable, practical, like a  treaty, to stop atomic testing, stop atmospheric  

play26:30

testing of nuclear weapons, is a practical,  manageable step and people draw hope from it. 

play26:37

So the speech was so riveting and powerful. By the  way, kept completely outside of the bureaucracy,  

play26:45

was essentially hidden from the security  apparatus, from the State Department,  

play26:50

the CAA, even the White House. Only Sorensen and  Kennedy worked on it basically until the last  

play26:56

moment. Then they said, I'm giving this. Kennedy  said, I'm giving it, so it could not be vetoed by  

play27:02

state or by the Defense Department or the National  Security Council or anybody else. And he gave it. 

play27:08

And what is amazing, absolutely  amazing is that Khrushchev heard it,  

play27:15

was carried away, summoned the US envoy,  Kennedy's envoy to Moscow, Averell Harriman,  

play27:24

and said, "This is the finest speech by an  American president since FDR. I want to make  

play27:30

peace with your president." The words were so  powerful, the motivation, the ideas were so  

play27:37

powerful. Kennedy disseminated the speech through  Pravda, Izvestiya, on- [inaudible 00:27:44] 

play27:40

Isn't that hilarious? Pravda reprinted it. Exactly, and broadcast the speech. And  

play27:49

within a few weeks they had signed  the agreement. Within a few weeks.  

play27:55

Absolutely an astounding achievement.  Then Kennedy, just to say he was also the  

play28:03

grassroots politician, he was a political  guy to the core. He went out to campaign  

play28:09

for it. And so he took his tour around the  United States, the joint chiefs, oh, well,  

play28:16

we don't know this is... They come to testify in  Congress and try to knock down this agreement. 

play28:22

And Kennedy carried the American public  overwhelmingly and then won a decisive  

play28:29

victory in the Senate 60 years ago just now for  the ratification of this treaty. And this is,  

play28:38

the time when we're talking is the time of the UN  General Assembly. Kennedy went to tell the leaders  

play28:46

what this meant in another completely  magnificent address. And he said,  

play28:57

"This is not the end of conflict, but it is  a ray of hope piercing through the clouds." 

play29:03

And he ends his address to the world leaders  assembled in front of him in the chamber of  

play29:12

the UN General Assembly. Kennedy, having brought  peace, brought hope, and all the world leaders  

play29:19

assembled in front of him. And he says to them  that Archimedes is said to have told his friends,  

play29:27

"Give me a place to stand and I can move the  world. Fellow leaders of the world, let us  

play29:36

see if we can take our stand here in this place,  in this time, to move the world towards peace."  

play29:44

And you just can't get better than that.  The idealism, the hope, the practicality,  

play29:52

and Kennedy infused the whole world  with it. And then they killed him. 

play29:58

And we've lost it. We've lost it. And they killed him because, I'm  

play30:04

personally convinced after having studied this in  depth for decades now, and now we have the report  

play30:11

completely debunking the Warren Commission with  the magic bullet being no magic bullet at all, but  

play30:18

a bullet that the Secret Service pulled out of the  back of Kennedy's seat and put on the stretcher,  

play30:22

debunking the entire forensic basis of the Warren  Commission. I'm pretty convinced that it was rogue  

play30:30

elements within the US government itself. Well, Alan Dulles- 

play30:34

Alan Dulles, the CIA. Can't get more evil than that. 

play30:37

Exactly. We don't know exactly who, but this was a  conspiracy and it was a conspiracy against peace.  

play30:44

And our security state is in full force. Our  president, in my view, is not in control,  

play30:54

and in any event has been a hardliner and a  cold warrior, whatever you want to call it,  

play31:00

well past the Cold War. These neocons don't understand  

play31:06

peace, they don't understand negotiation, they  don't understand diplomacy, they don't understand  

play31:12

the nuclear threat. And one other point, Chris,  of the speech that I think is so pertinent and  

play31:20

completely neglected. Kennedy says, "Above  all, while defending our own vital interests,  

play31:27

nuclear powers must avert those confrontations  which bring an adversary to a choice of either  

play31:34

a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt  that kind of course in the nuclear age would be  

play31:41

evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy  or of a collective death wish for the world." 

play31:48

And the US has gone out to humiliate Putin  and to defeat Putin, and Russia has 6,000  

play31:58

nuclear weapons. What are we doing? What are  we thinking? Of course, I take it a little bit,  

play32:05

even a step back. I think this is, I call it the  war of NATO enlargement because I think the entire  

play32:13

war in Ukraine came because the United States so  recklessly and imprudently kept pushing, pushing,  

play32:21

pushing NATO enlargement, Russia saying, stop,  it's a red line, stop. And then not to Ukraine,  

play32:29

for heaven's sake, not to Ukraine our 2,300  kilometer border, not to surround us in  

play32:36

the Black Sea, and the US is deaf to this. And then trying to humiliate Putin and doing  

play32:43

exactly the opposite of what Kennedy said. And I  take it seriously when Kennedy says in that remark  

play32:50

about not pushing a nuclear power to a corner, he  says, "above all," as if that's the synthesis of  

play32:58

what he's learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Above all, don't humiliate a nuclear adversary.  

play33:06

And our people don't even know it. We don't have  diplomats and we don't have a president in my view  

play33:14

that understands the job of keeping the foot  on the brake. So it's a very dangerous time. 

play33:19

In this last part, I want  to ask you what happened.  

play33:22

So you have this incredible moment in American  history. Of course, Khrushchev doesn't last  

play33:30

much longer. After Kennedy's assassination, the  hardliners regain control in the Soviet Union.  

play33:37

What happened? Just run through that  historical period to where we are now. 

play33:42

Of course it's complicated, but there was a  period of detente and of arms agreements. The  

play33:51

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963,  which we've been discussing, led directly  

play33:57

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty a few  years later. A really momentous achievement to  

play34:05

not stop nuclear proliferation, but definitely  to slow it down dramatically. Because Kennedy  

play34:15

rightly worried about 30 or 40 nuclear-powered or  nuclear weapons countries by the time we are now,  

play34:22

and it is around 10. Absolutely not safe and  in control, but not the mass proliferation. 

play34:32

And the Treaty of 1963 played a critical part in  that. Detente came, we had our ups and downs. We  

play34:41

had huge tensions in the early 1980s when Reagan  proposed to put intermediate range nuclear weapons  

play34:52

into Europe and the Cold War intensified, heated  up again. Then came Gorbachev, and Gorbachev was  

play35:05

a great statesman, the greatest of  our age of that time, a man of peace. 

play35:13

And he and Reagan actually realized the  potential for peace and negotiated an end  

play35:24

to the Cold War. And quite remarkably,  it was Gorbachev who unilaterally said,  

play35:33

in 1990, I will disband the Warsaw Pact military  alliance of the Soviet Union. And James Baker III,  

play35:43

the Secretary of State of George Bush,  Sr., who had followed Reagan as president,  

play35:49

of course. Baker ran to assure him, we  will never take advantage of your decision,  

play35:55

President Gorbachev, we will  not move NATO one inch eastward. 

play36:00

And this was repeated by the German government  that was interested in German reunification. And  

play36:06

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the foreign minister  of Germany, promised no NATO enlargement.  

play36:13

Of course, as soon as the Soviet Union  ended at the end of 1991, the US cheated  

play36:22

and it cheated till this day. And despite vast  documentary evidence, we have a lot of people,  

play36:29

oh, we never promised anything. It's true  Gorbachev didn't get it in writing in a treaty,  

play36:35

because they weren't making treaties. They were  arranging the end of the Cold War. But Gorbachev  

play36:42

was promised, and those promises were sheer lies. I just want to interject. I was there. I covered  

play36:48

the unification of Germany. I covered the  East German revolution, the revolution in  

play36:53

Czechoslovakia and Romania, and they could not  have unified Germany without Soviet acquiescence. 

play37:01

Of course. And Gorbachev said, this is important  for us, you will not take advantage of us. It was  

play37:08

very, very clear. And I was there as an economic  advisor to Gorbachev's team and then to President  

play37:16

Yeltsin's team and to President Kuchma's team  of Ukraine. I saw these events also very,  

play37:22

very close up, and we had a chance for peace. And the United States said, well, it's not  

play37:29

peace we want. We want unipolarity. We want  world hegemony. We're now the most powerful  

play37:36

country in the world. We won. You lost. We're  going to even take out every ally you ever had,  

play37:42

whether it's Syria or Iraq or Libya or Serbia or  others. We're going to go in one by one and clean  

play37:50

up the act because we can do it with impunity.  Now, who are you? You're a defeated power. 

play37:56

And so the United States treated Russia with  contempt, engaged in regime change operations  

play38:03

all over the region, usually with some mix  of CIA background and National Endowment  

play38:12

for Democracy and NGOs pouring in money and  mucking up the local politics to get someone  

play38:19

that would be compliant with the United States. And Russia kept saying, wait a minute, wait a  

play38:25

minute, you promised and you keep moving eastward  towards us. Clinton started the process of NATO  

play38:32

enlargement. His own secretary of defense, Bill  Perry, was aghast and thought about resigning,  

play38:38

said, this is going to mess up everything. Of  course, the very architect of containment policy,  

play38:45

George Kennon, who invented containment in  1947 in his long telegram and in his foreign  

play38:52

affairs article said, you start NATO enlargement,  you're going to have absolutely a new Cold War. 

play39:01

But American politicians cannot hear anybody's  concerns, and the arrogance is breathtaking,  

play39:09

and the ignorance is breathtaking in  my view. And the power of the military  

play39:14

industrial security state in the United  States is awful and breathtaking as well.  

play39:21

So under Clinton, three countries joined  NATO, and then under Bush Jr., 2007,  

play39:29

seven more countries, the three Baltic  states, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,  

play39:34

Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. And Russia's now being cornered by the advancing  

play39:42

NATO. And Putin says in 2007 at the Munich  Security Conference, stop. Stop. You promised  

play39:51

in 1990 no advance, and now all you're doing is  advancing your military. And in 2002, by the way,  

play40:00

the United States unilaterally pulled out of the  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and started to put  

play40:06

in ageist missiles on Russia's borders, nearby  Russia in Poland and Romania in particular. 

play40:14

So Putin says, stop this. And what does the  United States do in response? Bush Jr. instructs  

play40:23

his ambassador to NATO, interestingly, Victoria  Nuland, who was Cheney's foreign policy advisor,  

play40:30

then US Ambassador to NATO, then suddenly  is Hillary's foreign policy advisor. Then  

play40:35

suddenly the Assistant Secretary of State in  2014 when the US was part of the overthrow of  

play40:43

the Ukraine government to get someone that was  suppliant to the US desire for NATO enlargement. 

play40:50

And so the tensions kept rising until 2014,  the United States participated in a regime  

play40:58

change operation, very typical, overthrowing  a Ukrainian president that wanted neutrality,  

play41:05

Viktor Yanukovych. And at that moment, Putin said,  

play41:09

you're not getting our naval base in Crimea, and  took back Crimea because it was not going to fall  

play41:16

into NATO hands. And the Russian part of Ukraine,  ethnic Russian part of the Eastern Donbas,  

play41:28

was aghast at the Russophobic regime that  had come into power with the US connivance in  

play41:36

February 2014, so it called to break away. And it required a treaty, two treaties,  

play41:43

in fact, Minsk I and Minsk II, to try  to make peace within Ukraine itself.  

play41:49

And the idea of the Minsk II agreement was that  the eastern part of Ukraine, which is ethnically  

play41:56

overwhelmingly Russian, would have autonomy within  Ukraine, a federal Ukraine. And the United States  

play42:04

opposed federalization, and the Ukrainians  opposed it. They signed the treaty. The US  

play42:10

Security Council endorsed the treaty, and they  blew it off, the Ukrainians and the Americans.  

play42:15

Forget it. We don't have to implement it. So by the time Biden came in 2021,  

play42:21

Minsk had fallen apart. The US was arming Ukraine  to the teeth. Biden came in full cold warrior,  

play42:30

we're going to expand NATO to Ukraine. Yes  we are. And Putin said, no, you're not.  

play42:38

And in December 17th, 2021, Putin put on the  table a draft US Russia security agreement  

play42:49

based on NATO not enlarging to Ukraine, and  these missiles not being pointed at Russia. 

play42:58

And I called the White House at that point to  senior official and said, "Negotiate. You've  

play43:05

got a basis to avoid war." No, don't worry. But  anyway, NATO enlargement is none of Russia's  

play43:13

business. That's the formal policy of the United  States of America. It's mind mindbogglingly  

play43:20

stupid. NATO enlargement is not part of Russia's  business? Well, whose business is it part of? 

play43:26

I want to insert there that  Victoria Nuland, of course,  

play43:29

is part of the Biden administration back at the  State Department, number one, and I want to ask- 

play43:36

She keeps getting promoted as we get deeper and  deeper into war. It's unbelievable. But that's the  

play43:45

deep state. Is she Republican? Is she Democrat?  Doesn't matter. She's for war. That's it. 

play43:50

Right. Well, the Democratic  party has become more fervently  

play43:54

the war party than even the Republican party. If you look at the base, the Democrats are  

play44:00

the war mongerers. The Republicans want peace.  It's amazing. It's something that's absolutely  

play44:06

astounding. But basically the American public, as  usual, has been lied to again and again and again,  

play44:12

told that there's no predicate to this  war. There's no basis of negotiation.  

play44:17

They have no idea that Russia has tried  to negotiate all the time throughout. 

play44:22

But the US attitude is we don't have to talk to  them. And if you don't talk to them, you end up  

play44:27

with war. Whereas Kennedy's whole point was, we  can negotiate with the other side. That was the  

play44:34

whole point that brought Kennedy's achievement  of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban treaty. 

play44:40

Well, it's kind of chronicle of a  war foretold because William Burns,  

play44:43

we know from released cables, sent cables back  from, he was the ambassador in Moscow saying,  

play44:51

it doesn't matter where you are on the political  spectrum in Russia, you don't essentially turn  

play44:58

Ukraine into a hostile entity on Russia's border.  And he's ignored. I just have one last question. 

play45:04

Just to say, by the way, because that  memo, which is entitled, "Nyet Means Nyet." 

play45:11

Yes. And saying it's not just Putin,  

play45:13

it's all the Russian [inaudible 00:45:18] class. That's right, that's right. 

play45:17

The only reason we saw it is WikiLeaks.  Because our government is so secretive,  

play45:24

the American people are not told anything  about what's going on. And your former paper,  

play45:30

it is the New York Times, right? Yes. 

play45:32

They're not... I love the New York Times.  It published the Pentagon Papers. Now it's  

play45:37

completely in the hands of government.  It doesn't question a word. Weird. 

play45:42

I have one last question- And alarming. Please. 

play45:45

How, well, we'll have to do a show on the  deterioration of American journalism. As you know,  

play45:53

I'm a very strong supporter of Julian. So how,  especially having worked in Russia, how do you  

play46:02

characterize the Russian invasion of Ukraine? I characterize it as occurring in the eighth  

play46:10

year of a war that started with the overthrow  of Viktor Yanukovych and escalated after that  

play46:16

as totally avoidable. Because if Biden had  negotiated with Putin in December 2021,  

play46:26

the war would've been avoided. I regard it as an attempt at the  

play46:33

beginning to force Ukraine to the negotiating  table. And within a few days of the launch of the  

play46:40

so-called special military operation, which was  not an invasion at the scale to take over Ukraine,  

play46:49

it was a military operation to push Ukraine to the  negotiating table. Within a few days, Zelenskyy  

play46:56

said, we can negotiate. A few more days, he said,  we can be neutral. We need security guarantees,  

play47:03

but we can be neutral. I know because I've  spoken to the people that were involved in the  

play47:10

negotiations in March 2022 that these negotiations  were making tremendous progress on the basis of  

play47:18

Ukrainian neutrality and non-enlargement of NATO. And we know that one day the negotiations stopped.  

play47:28

The Ukrainians walked in to the Turkish mediators  and said, we're not negotiating now. We're taking  

play47:35

a break from negotiating. They stopped. Why?  The United States told them, you don't need to  

play47:42

negotiate. You need to defeat Russia. You don't  need to accept neutrality. We've got your back. 

play47:47

And the United States pushed Ukraine into an  escalating war thinking that the combination  

play47:55

of economic sanctions and HIMARS and  other wonder weapons would force Putin  

play48:01

to back down. Putin didn't back down. In  fact, he mobilized in the summer of 2022.  

play48:07

So America's game of chicken didn't exactly  work. It led to another round of escalation. 

play48:12

And it's especially led to a bloodbath, completely  predictable, because Americans have refused,  

play48:19

and by Americans, I mean Biden, our president  who's responsible and his team, have rejected  

play48:27

negotiations at every turn. And they  tell us, which is a lie, that there's  

play48:33

no one to negotiate with and that Russia's not  interested in negotiating, and that's a lie. 

play48:38

The difference is Russia's interested in  negotiating an end to NATO enlargement,  

play48:44

and the United States is interested in going  wherever it pleases. No other country, even not  

play48:50

even a nuclear superpower allowed to have a red  line on their side in their neighborhood. Whereas  

play48:56

we are in the 200th anniversary of the Monroe  Doctrine. So we said 200 years ago, no one in the  

play49:06

Western atmosphere should meddle, and Russia's not  allowed to say we don't want your military on our  

play49:13

border. No, that's not Russia's business. So this  is a massive, colossal failure of US diplomacy. 

play49:20

Great. I want to thank the Real News Network  and its production team, Cameron Granadino,  

play49:25

Adam Coley, David Hebden, and Kayla Riveaa.  You can find me at chrishedges.substack.com.

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