One year on: How Russia's war changed the global economy | Business Beyond
Summary
TLDRThe Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly impacted the global economy, prompting a reassessment of geostrategic risks. It has strained energy and food supplies, leading to inflation and highlighting vulnerabilities in defense capabilities. The war has accelerated the energy transition and renewable investments, while also forcing Europe to compromise on climate goals. It has also led to new alliances and trade relationships, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains and local production.
Takeaways
- š The Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly impacted the global economy, highlighting the importance of geostrategic risk in business and policy decisions.
- š Countries are reevaluating their energy security, with a focus on diversifying energy sources and accelerating the energy transition.
- š The war has exacerbated food price inflation, leading to higher global food costs and potential shortages, particularly affecting poorer countries.
- š Sanctions on Russia have been implemented by Western allies while trying to mitigate their own economic repercussions.
- ā½ļø The United States and Germany have taken steps to reduce dependence on Russian energy, such as releasing oil reserves and building LNG infrastructure.
- š¢ The EU has prohibited seaborne crude oil imports from Russia and, along with the G7, has instituted a price cap on Russian oil.
- š± The conflict has spurred a push for renewable energy, as countries seek to diversify their energy supplies and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
- š”ļø The mild winter of 2022 helped prevent aę“äø„éē energy crisis, but future weather patterns could challenge energy security.
- š¾ The war has disrupted global food trade, with Ukraine's grain exports stalled and alternative suppliers like India unable to fully compensate.
- š« The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in the defense industry's ability to supply weaponry andå¼¹čÆ, prompting a rethink of military preparedness and supply chain resilience.
Q & A
What was the immediate global economic impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
-The invasion sent tremors across the global economy, highlighting geostrategic risks and causing concerns about energy and food supplies, exacerbating inflation, and creating gaps in essential sectors like ammunition.
How did the invasion affect energy demands and supplies?
-Countries were afraid they wouldn't meet their energy demands, leading to efforts to diversify energy sources and accelerate the energy transition towards renewables.
What measures did the United States take in response to the energy crisis caused by the invasion?
-The United States released two million barrels of oil from its strategic petroleum reserve to mitigate the energy crisis.
How did Germany respond to the energy supply issues post-invasion?
-Germany rushed to build liquified natural gas infrastructure to reduce dependence on Russian energy, albeit slowly.
What sanctions and measures were implemented against Russia's oil and gas industry?
-Since December 2022, seaborne crude oil imports from Russia to the EU were prohibited, and the EU and G7 instituted a price cap for Russian oil.
How did the war impact food prices and global food security?
-The war in Ukraine, known as the bread basket of the world, made already-high food prices climb even higher, sparking fears of food shortages.
What was the role of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in alleviating food supply concerns?
-The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Turkey, helped restart stalled Ukrainian exports, providing some relief to global food prices.
How did the war affect the production and trade of fertilizers?
-There was a lack of exports from Russia and Belarus, and the impact on natural gas supplies to Europe caused a spike in the cost of producing fertilizers, nearly shutting down 70% of fertilizer production in Europe at one point.
What are the implications of the war on military equipment and defense production?
-The war has highlighted vulnerabilities in the capabilities of weapons-producing countries in the west, with the United States and European allies struggling to ramp up production of defense materials.
How has the war influenced global trade relationships and economic ties?
-The war has created new alliances and galvanized existing ones, while entrenching differences, leading to a rethink of previous arrangements through the lens of geostrategic risk.
What are the potential long-term effects of the war on global economic behavior?
-The war might ensure that the lesson of closer trade and economic relations not leading to peace sticks, leading to more cautious investment, more local production, and less reliance on fragile supply chains.
Outlines
š Geopolitical Impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian War
The script discusses the global economic repercussions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, emphasizing how it has become a wake-up call for policymakers and business leaders about the enduring nature of geostrategic risks. The war has raised concerns about energy supply and demand, food security, and the need for new alliances. It has also exposed deficiencies in critical sectors such as energy and defense. The economic ties are being restructured, with an emphasis on new economic relationships that Russia might forge with countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Despite the human cost, the response has been a mix of sanctions against Russia and efforts to protect economies from the fallout of these sanctions. The IMF suggests that global conditions are improving, but the ongoing war poses a continuous threat to the world economy.
āļø Energy and Climate Challenges Post-Invasion
This section delves into the energy crisis triggered by the war, with a focus on Europe's scramble to secure alternative energy sources and the acceleration of renewable energy initiatives. The mild winter of 2022 provided some relief, but the potential for a harsher winter and increased global energy demand could strain supplies. The war has also affected climate goals, with countries like Germany turning to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and the EU reclassifying natural gas as green energy. The discussion highlights the tension between energy security, affordability, and sustainability, and the possibility of Russia's hydrocarbons making a comeback in Europe.
š¾ Global Food System Disruptions
The paragraph highlights the impact of the war on global food systems, with Ukraine, known as the 'bread basket of the world,' experiencing export blockages that led to soaring global food prices. The script discusses the failure of India to fill the export gap due to a smaller-than-expected harvest and subsequent export ban, which further spiked prices. The Black Sea Grain Initiative helped resume Ukrainian exports, but the effect on global food costs has been limited. The war has also affected the production and cost of fertilizers, leading to potential reductions in fertilizer usage and impacts on the next agricultural season. The script emphasizes the pre-existing frailties in the global food system, with the war exacerbating these issues, particularly for poorer countries.
š”ļø Defense and Military Supply Chain Struggles
This section examines the war's effect on military equipment and the defense industry. It points out the strain on the US and European defense industrial bases due to the need to supply Ukraine and the potential for their own conflicts. The war has underscored the vulnerabilities in weapon production capabilities in the West. The discussion includes the example of the US sending a significant number of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, equivalent to years of production, and the challenges in ramping up supply. The script also considers the implications for countries that rely on Russia's defense industry, suggesting a shift towards seeking alternative sources due to underwhelming performance.
š Rethinking Global Economic Relationships
The final paragraph synthesizes the discussion on energy, food, and defense, emphasizing how the war has forced a reevaluation of global economic relationships through the lens of geostrategic risk. It suggests a shift towards more cautious investment, local production, and a reduced reliance on fragile supply chains. The script notes that while established global commerce chains are unlikely to be completely dismantled, new investments may be redirected. The war has challenged the belief that economic interdependence prevents conflict, and the script concludes by suggesting that the end of the war and a focus on solving smaller, manageable problems could be a way forward.
Mindmap
Keywords
š”Geostrategic risk
š”Energy demands
š”Food price inflation
š”Sanctions
š”Renewables
š”Liquefied natural gas (LNG)
š”Price cap
š”Defense industrial base
š”Fertilizers
š”Deindustrialization
š”Trade relationships
Highlights
Russia's invasion of Ukraine caused global economic tremors and raised geostrategic risk awareness.
Countries faced challenges in meeting energy demands and feeding the world due to the conflict.
The war highlighted gaps in essential sectors such as full-fledged systems and ammunition.
New alliances were created and existing ones were galvanized, while differences were entrenched.
The global economy has been impacted, with a focus on how geopolitical risk is remaking trade relationships.
The human cost and scale of suffering cannot be framed in purely economic terms, but financial considerations did influence the response to Russian aggression.
Western allies have been balancing sanctions on Russia while protecting their own economies.
The International Monetary Fund reported improving global conditions as inflation starts to slow.
The United States released oil from its strategic petroleum reserve following the invasion.
Germany rushed to build liquified natural gas infrastructure to reduce reliance on Russian energy.
The EU prohibited seaborne crude oil imports from Russia and instituted a price cap.
Sanctions and measures may have acted as a drag on Russia's tax revenues from oil and gas.
The war has accelerated the push for renewable energy sources globally.
The war forced compromises in European climate goals, such as recognizing natural gas as green energy.
The fear of not meeting energy demands has led to efforts to diversify and speed up the energy transition.
The war in Ukraine has made grain stuck in ports, leading to higher global food prices and fears of shortages.
The Black Sea Grain Initiative helped restart Ukrainian exports, but had a limited effect on global food costs.
The war's impact on fertilizers has led to a global spike in prices, affecting this season's usage.
The war has led to alternative trade corridors and supply-diversifying measures in agriculture.
The global food system was already broken before the war, and the conflict has added an additional layer of failure.
The rise in food prices has disproportionately affected poorer countries.
The war has necessitated the use of military equipment, highlighting vulnerabilities in the capabilities of weapons-producing countries.
The war has forced a rethink of previous arrangements through the lens of geostrategic risk.
The established chains of global commerce are unlikely to be easily undone, but investment is becoming more cautious and local.
Semiconductors have been identified as particularly strategically important for localization.
The war might ensure that the lesson about economic dependency not leading to peace is learned.
The war has put paid to the notion that mutual economic dependency unites countries.
The war in Ukraine has shown that a world at war is a world divided into camps, making solving global problems more difficult.
Transcripts
Russia's invasion of Ukraine sentĀ tremors across the global economy.Ā
It brought home to a lot ofĀ policymakers and businessĀ Ā
leaders that geostrategic risk is here to stay.
It left countries wondering howĀ to power homes and industries.
We were very afraid that we won'tĀ be able to meet our energy demands.
And made feeding the world harder.
We were in an extended period of food priceĀ Ā
inflation and the war reallyĀ exacerbated a lot of that.
It highlighted gaps in essential sectors.
From full-fledged systems to ammunition, thatĀ capacity is actually not there right now.
It created new alliances and galvanizedĀ existing ones - while entrenching differences.
If we think about a multi-yearĀ Ā
war, it's going to be interesting to thinkĀ about the sort of new economic ties thatĀ Ā
Russia builds to certain key countriesĀ in Asia, in Latin America and Africa.
We will look at what one year of war in UkraineĀ has done to the global economy so far - andĀ Ā
how a rude awakening to geopolitical risk isĀ remaking trade relationships around the world.
Thatās all coming up on Business Beyond.
First things first. The human cost and the scaleĀ of suffering that Russia wrought when it attackedĀ Ā
Ukraine a year ago cannot be framed in purelyĀ economic terms. But financial considerationsĀ Ā
did figure heavily in how the community ofĀ nations responded to Russian aggression.
Their balancing act was to advance sanctions onĀ Russia while protecting their own economies fromĀ Ā
the consequences of punishing a key tradingĀ partner and a major food and energy supplier.
Fast forward to today and Ukraineās WesternĀ allies say that has been working - to aĀ Ā
degree anyway. The International MonetaryĀ Fund said global conditions are improvingĀ Ā
as inflation starts to slow - aĀ far cry from initial fears thatĀ Ā
the war in Europe would plunge theĀ world into a prolonged recession.
In 2022, the world got a little bit lucky.Ā There was a comparatively mild winter, whichĀ Ā
meant that the energy demands weren't as high asĀ they could have been. The world dodged a bullet toĀ Ā
some extent in that some of the most negativeĀ effects that could have transpired didn't.
But the war is ongoing. And that the worldĀ economy isnāt struggling as much as it couldĀ Ā
have - doesnāt say that much about the level ofĀ struggle still to come. While some of it can beĀ Ā
addressed through policymaking - not everythingĀ can. But letās look at what HAS been done.
Following the invasion - the UnitedĀ States released two million barrels ofĀ Ā
oil from its strategic petroleum reserve.Ā Europeās biggest Russian energy client,Ā Ā
Germany, rushed to build out liquifiedĀ natural gas infrastructure in a bid toĀ Ā
wean itself off the now problematic supply -Ā albeit slowly. Since December 2022, seaborneĀ Ā
crude oil imports from Russia to theĀ EU have been prohibited. For WesternĀ Ā
shippers still trading Russian oil, the EUĀ and the G7 have now instituted a price cap.
Some analyses point to these sanctionsĀ and measures and say theyāve acted asĀ Ā
a drag on Russia's tax revenues fromĀ oil and gas - even as Europe continuedĀ Ā
to import Russian energy in theĀ months following the invasion.
But Russian aggression also established theĀ need to find additional energy sources - andĀ Ā
is therefore helping to ramp upĀ renewables use around the world.
The fear of not being able to meet our energyĀ demands has really implied an enormous effortĀ Ā
both to diversify, so find providers elsewhereĀ and speed up the energy transition. Now,Ā Ā
the first is not necessarily part of the greenĀ transition because we're still consuming fuelsĀ Ā
that are not renewable. But the second isĀ and you really see that the investments thatĀ Ā
are made in the European Union but alsoĀ worldwide are really being accelerated.
The war also forced compromises in EuropeanĀ efforts to achieve key climate goals. LikeĀ Ā
Germanyās rush to forge ahead with new LNG importĀ infrastructure, and the EU deciding to recognizeĀ Ā
natural gas as a form of green energy -Ā even if itās technically a fossil fuel.
Would Europe have put naturalĀ gas in the green taxonomy inĀ Ā
the absence of this war? I do think thatĀ particularly when it comes to natural gas,Ā Ā
I think that there had been a lot of debate inĀ the west when we thought about our climate goals,Ā Ā
whether natural gas played a role in theĀ transition. And I think this is now settled.
But not everything is. Remember when weĀ said earlier that some things might beĀ Ā
beyond policymakersā control? If a mildĀ winter in 2022 helped keep energy demandĀ Ā
in check and reserves full, moreĀ severe weather ahead could reviveĀ Ā
fears over energy supply and securityā¦.alsoĀ depending on where that severe weather is.
I think it's going to be very challenging.Ā With China reopening in particular. One ofĀ Ā
the things that Europe benefited from was alsoĀ you had warmer winters in Asia. There wereĀ Ā
volumes not needed in Asia. If we do see,Ā for example, more Chinese demand for gas,Ā Ā
what does that do in terms of supply into Europe? If you do get a colder winter, I think it's goingĀ Ā
to be much more challenging. And allĀ the conversations that we were havingĀ Ā
about potential deindustrializationĀ of Europe because of an energy crisis,Ā Ā
those type of concerns may materializeĀ again if these factors come to play. Ā
Some say those supply concerns couldĀ even herald the comeback of RussianĀ Ā
hydrocarbons to Europe. Speaking at theĀ Atlantic Councilās Global Energy Forum,Ā Ā
Qatarās minister of State for Energy AffairsĀ expressed difficulty imagining a world without it.
I donāt think some of the countries thatĀ were depending on 100 percent or, you know,Ā Ā
a very large percentage on Russia willĀ not go back to 100 percent or 80 percentĀ Ā
or maybe 50 percent. They will diversifyĀ and theyāll learn from that situation,Ā Ā
and probably have a much bigger diversity.Ā But the Russian gas is going to come back,Ā Ā
in my view, to Europe. Is it next year?Ā Is it in five years? I donāt know.
A colder winter - an increase in energy demandĀ around the world - could threaten to take theĀ Ā
discussion back to where it was a year ago, whenĀ the war started. And the longer the conflictĀ Ā
persists, the more peopleās willingness toĀ live with high energy costs will be tried.
To me this is a question about howĀ do you manage the energy trilemma,Ā Ā
which is sustainability, affordability and access.Ā Ā
And I don't think we've really had a testĀ yet. Like, if we do face significant energyĀ Ā
shortages next year, I think you can see EuropeanĀ consumers saying, well, the most important thingĀ Ā
for me is access and price. And so, I think that'sĀ always going to be the challenge for governments,Ā Ā
is how can you deliver reliable, affordable energyĀ at the price that consumers are willing to pay?
The warās impact on the affordabilityĀ of energy has fed into another,Ā Ā
already complicated accessĀ issue - the cost of food.
Russiaās invasion of Ukraine - knownĀ as the bread basket of the world - madeĀ Ā
already-high food prices around the worldĀ climb even higher - as grain sat stuck inĀ Ā
Ukrainian portsā¦.sparking fears of food shortages.
Early hopes that India would step inĀ and fill the export gap with its ownĀ Ā
wheat failed to materialize. Thatās after aĀ record-breaking heat wave made for a smallerĀ Ā
crop than expected - and the Indian governmentĀ instituted an export ban. Triggering even moreĀ Ā
price spikes. But a measure of relief cameĀ when the so-called Black Sea Grain InitiativeĀ Ā
brokered by Turkey between Russia and UkraineĀ helped restart the stalled Ukrainian exports.Ā Ā
But thatās had a limitedĀ effect on food costs worldwide.
We're in a particularly in wheat particularlyĀ Ā
tight period and we sort of measure that asĀ your ending stocks divided by your total use,Ā Ā
particularly among major exporters. So that'sĀ at the tightest period it's been since 2008,Ā Ā
I believe. So, you have this as a backdrop. That'sĀ why prices are elevated. So, if you have a weatherĀ Ā
problem, on top of that, you'll see, you know,Ā anywhere from 20% to 40% increases in price.
The Food and Agriculture OrganizationāsĀ cereal price index shows a decline fromĀ Ā
post-invasion heights. But thereās even moreĀ reason to assume these levels will not hold.
The other big impact of the war that hasn't evenĀ been fully realized is the impact on fertilizers.Ā Ā
So, you both had a lack of exports fromĀ Russia and Belarus as well as the impactĀ Ā
on natural gas supplies to Europe causing a bigĀ spike in the cost of producing fertilizers. So,Ā Ā
there were those stories that nearlyĀ 70% of fertilizer production in EuropeĀ Ā
at one point was shut down. But the mainĀ point is that you had this huge spike inĀ Ā
fertilizer prices globally and that's goingĀ to impact fertilizer usage for this season.
As with energy - the war has led to alternativeĀ trade corridors and supply-diversifying measuresĀ Ā
in agriculture. And as with energy,Ā Russiaās status as a supplier forĀ Ā
fertilizer and agricultural products has becomeĀ a liability in a changed geopolitical landscape.
Brazil, for example, wants to institute a policyĀ of being much more self-sufficient in fertilizerĀ Ā
production. They were exposed and very concernedĀ about their ability to import from Russia. AnotherĀ Ā
example of a change in policy was China importingĀ corn from Brazil. They hadn't ever previouslyĀ Ā
imported corn from Brazil. They had imported fromĀ the Ukraine and the US. And when the Ukraine wasĀ Ā
cut off from them, they panicked, and they'veĀ become a structural, very large importer of corn.
But amid all the shifting of grain supply - itāsĀ Ā
important to remember the globalĀ food system was already broken.
The impact of the war in Ukraine isĀ an additional layer to existing longĀ Ā
standing failures in the global foodĀ system. / /The rise in food pricesĀ Ā
has hit several poorer countriesĀ harder than the global average.Ā Ā
For example, in Ethiopia, food prices haveĀ increased by 44% and our colleagues in SyriaĀ Ā
are telling us that food prices have increasedĀ by 92% over the last year in the country.
Before the Ukraine war started, almost a 10thĀ of the global population did not have enoughĀ Ā
food to eat. A hunger situation in places likeĀ the horn of Africa already made dire by climateĀ Ā
change - has been compounded by a war thatāsĀ made food more expensive on global markets.
Having looked at how food and energy resourcesĀ around the world have been changed by the war,Ā Ā
thereās one resource whose use is actuallyĀ necessitated by it - military equipment. PerĀ Ā
one estimate, Ukraine is firing more than 5000Ā artillery rounds every day. And the war hasĀ Ā
highlighted vulnerabilities in the capabilitiesĀ of weapons-producing countries in the west.
The ability for the United States as well asĀ European allies to really ramp up productionĀ Ā
of defense materials from full-fledged systems toĀ ammunition, that capacity is actually not thereĀ Ā
right now. And what we're seeing is considerableĀ strain in the US defense industrial baseĀ Ā
in terms of being able to really produceĀ the kinds of systems and materials thatĀ Ā
the US. Military would need in aĀ conflict of its own, for example.
The Stockholm International Peace ResearchĀ Institute has highlighted this point asĀ Ā
well - giving the example of 8, 500 JavelinĀ anti-tank missiles the US has sent Ukraine.Ā Ā
Thatās equivalent to at least four yearsĀ of production - and ramping that up takesĀ Ā
time - with supply issues - especially inĀ raw materials - slowing down the process.
Suffice to say, the Russian invasion has madeĀ especially the US and Europe think about notĀ Ā
just their ability to support a war effortĀ like Ukraineās - but also their capacityĀ Ā
to adjust to a situation where they mightĀ themselves embroiled in conflict elsewhere.
I think what that would mean then, of course,Ā is that the United States would redirect itsĀ Ā
production of defense goods for the war that theĀ United States would ultimately be fighting. SoĀ Ā
that would have significant implicationsĀ for Ukraine's ability to defend itself,Ā Ā
particularly given the state ofĀ Europe's defense industrial base,Ā Ā
which is probably in an even more precariousĀ position than that of the United States.
Beyond the West, however - the war isĀ being closely watched by clients ofĀ Ā
Russiaās defense industry. Who areĀ deriving conclusions of their own.
If you think about a country like India,Ā for example, which has been a very keyĀ Ā
defense partner with Russia, I think IndianĀ defense planners are probably very concernedĀ Ā
about what their military kit is actuallyĀ capable of. Ultimately, there's a lot ofĀ Ā
countries around the world that were buyingĀ Russian military equipment. I think they'llĀ Ā
be looking to other sources becauseĀ so far, the performance of the RussianĀ Ā
military and its military equipmentĀ has not been particularly impressive.
Letās take stock. In determining howĀ the war has changed the global economy,Ā Ā
weāve looked at energy, food and defenseĀ - and weāve seen a few commonalities. ButĀ Ā
perhaps the one thatās most strikingĀ of all, is that it forced a rethinkĀ Ā
of previous arrangements throughĀ the lens of geostrategic risk.
If before, you could generally go where economicsĀ said is the most profitable place to be and letĀ Ā
the politics be the politics. Now, firms haveĀ seen just how quickly traditional trade flowsĀ Ā
can be disrupted by geostrategic risksĀ and suddenly they are thinking about//Ā Ā
What are governments going to do to protectĀ and insure themselves against future tensionsĀ Ā
with their rivals? And all of that is comingĀ together to make investment more cautious,Ā Ā
more local, less willing to roll the diceĀ on a far flung and perhaps fragile supplyĀ Ā
chain. And all of that has implications,Ā of course, for real people and real jobs.
That said - the established chains of globalĀ commerce canāt and wonāt be easily undone.Ā Ā
And this newly urgent sense of caution is moreĀ likely to apply to some sectors more than others.
You probably won't necessarily see massĀ movements of existing production, but youĀ Ā
might see diversion of where new factoriesĀ were going to get built or expansions areĀ Ā
going to go. Just because the cost involved inĀ moving some of this stuff is staggeringly high.Ā Ā
It depends on the types of production you'reĀ looking at. So already several industries haveĀ Ā
been identified as particularly strategicallyĀ important. So semiconductors it is very clearĀ Ā
that the US and the EU are going to throwĀ considerable resources and regulatory muscleĀ Ā
behind trying to make sure that they haveĀ localized strength in semiconductor manufacturing.
The lesson that closer trade and economicĀ relations might not ultimately lead toĀ Ā
more peace - and that those tiesĀ can in fact be weaponized - wasĀ Ā
a hard one to learn - but the warĀ might ensure it is one that sticks.
There used to be an aphorism in internationalĀ trade that no two countries in the world withĀ Ā
a McDonald's have ever gone to warĀ with each other// This was like oneĀ Ā
of these cliches in international relations.Ā Well, I've eaten at the McDonald's in Kiev,Ā Ā
and I've eaten at the one inĀ Moscow, so we can park that one now.
A world at war is a world divided intoĀ camps. And fragmentation brings with itĀ Ā
difficulties in terms of solving global problems.
Especially if there is a disappearing baselineĀ for what counts as acceptable behavior betweenĀ Ā
sovereign nations - and disagreement asĀ to how transgressions should be addressed.
The number of countries that is actually notĀ necessarily against Russia when it comes to theĀ Ā
war. Ratio is actually quite big in populationĀ terms. It is only 35% of world population thatĀ Ā
is actually sanctioning Russia. The rest isĀ either neutral or is even with Russia. Now,Ā Ā
this is important as far as the effectiveness ofĀ sanction is concerned because the potential forĀ Ā
sanctions leakage, namely trying to help RussiaĀ to bypass the sanction, is actually quite big.
But if the war in Ukraine has put paid toĀ the notion that mutual economic dependencyĀ Ā
unites countries and forces them to abideĀ by the same set of rules - which guidingĀ Ā
idea would then take its place? The longer theĀ war goes on, the bigger this question becomes.
First, the war needs to come to an end.Ā Everybody will see the benefits of thatĀ Ā
war coming to the end. And then maybe we canĀ take it. We can take it from there. Small wins,Ā Ā
small gains, small successes is whatĀ I would go for. Try and solve smallĀ Ā
problems one at a time and solve them with asĀ many countries around the table as possible.
And thatās it for this edition of BusinessĀ Beyond. If you want to see more of what we do,Ā Ā
our recent video on whether ChinaĀ is ever going to be the worldāsĀ Ā
biggest economy is a good place to start.Ā Thanks for watching and see you later.
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