The Boeing 787: Broken Dreams l Al Jazeera Investigations

Summary

波音787梦想飞机，被誉为人类智慧的结晶，却因电池问题和生产质量问题陷入困境。调查发现波音公司为赶进度牺牲了工程质量，工人和前工程师对飞机安全性表示担忧。尽管波音和FAA声称问题已解决，飞机已安全，但仍有诸多质疑声音。

Takeaways

• 🚀 波音787梦想飞机曾被誉为人类智慧的十年或一代人的成就，但后来发现存在严重的安全隐患。
• 💸 波音公司为了节省成本和提高华尔街回报，削减了研究投资，改变了其工程文化和商业模式。
• 🔧 波音将梦想飞机的部分制造工作外包给了全球的供应商，这导致了质量和安全标准的不一致性。
• 🔥 梦想飞机的锂电池问题导致了紧急着陆和飞机停飞，暴露了波音在电池安全性测试上的不足。
• 🛠️ 波音在南卡罗来纳州的工厂存在严重的生产问题，包括工人技能不足和对质量控制的忽视。
• 🗣️ 波音的前工程师和管理人员提出了对梦想飞机安全性的担忧，但遭到了公司的忽视甚至报复。
• 📜 波音内部文件显示，公司曾要求继续生产，即使这意味着偏离了首选的质量流程。
• 🚫 波音公司对外界关于梦想飞机质量问题的质疑进行了否认，并坚称其产品符合所有安全和质量标准。
• 💼 波音的高管和大股东从公司的利润中获得了巨额收益，而普通员工则面临着养老金削减的问题。
• 🤝 波音与美国政府有着密切的联系，通过游说和政治影响力来维护其商业利益。
• 🛫 尽管存在争议和问题，梦想飞机仍然是波音的畅销产品，航空公司和乘客对其仍抱有期待。

Q & A

波音787有什么别称？

波音787也被称为“梦想飞机”(Dreamliner)。

波音787的主要卖点是什么？

波音787的主要卖点包括节省燃油、提供乘客无与伦比的舒适度，并为波音公司带来丰厚的利润。

波音787的锂电池问题导致了哪些严重后果？

波音787的锂电池问题导致了飞机紧急着陆、火灾以及全球范围内的波音787飞机停飞。

调查发现波音公司在生产波音787时有哪些问题？

调查发现波音公司在生产波音787时存在改变自身的质量标准、缩短工程流程以满足时间表、忽视安全问题等问题。

前波音员工如何描述波音公司的质量流程？

前波音员工描述波音公司的质量流程被简化，为了满足生产进度而牺牲了工程质量。

波音公司如何解决锂电池的安全问题？

波音公司采取的解决措施包括安装更强的钢制外壳、增加绝缘材料以及安装有毒气体排放系统。

波音787的电池充电器是由哪家公司制造的？

波音787的电池充电器是由位于亚利桑那州图森市的Securaplane公司制造的。

波音公司在生产波音787时采用了哪种新型的生产模式？

波音公司在生产波音787时采用了全球分散制造的模式，由全球多家公司设计和制造零件，波音公司负责最终的组装。

波音公司在南卡罗来纳州设立生产线的原因是什么？

波音公司在南卡罗来纳州设立生产线的原因是该州提供了廉价的土地和劳动力，以及近十亿美元的支持，同时该地区没有工会。

波音787的梦想飞机项目对波音公司的财务状况产生了什么影响？

波音787梦想飞机项目对波音公司的财务状况产生了负面影响，项目耗资巨大且距离盈利还有数年时间，公司的利润主要来自于旧型飞机的销售。

Outlines

00:00

🚀 波音787梦想飞机的辉煌与挑战

该段落介绍了波音787梦想飞机的推出，这是一款被宣传为创新和革命性的飞机，旨在为航空公司节省成本，为乘客提供无与伦比的舒适度，并为波音公司带来巨大利润。然而，该段落也揭示了该飞机面临的挑战，包括严重的延误、飞机停飞、安全问题以及对波音公司质量标准的质疑。

05:04

🔋 锂电池的危险与挑战

这一部分讨论了锂电池在波音787梦想飞机中的使用，以及由此带来的风险。提到了2006年Securaplane公司的一次电池测试爆炸事件，以及锂电池在商业飞机上的使用历史。波音公司选择了最强大的锂电池，但也是最不稳定的。此外，还提到了波音公司如何通过外包和合作伙伴关系来降低成本，但这可能导致了质量问题。

10:08

🛫 波音787的复出与问题

该段落描述了波音787梦想飞机在经历两次锂电池故障后被迫停飞的情况。波音公司未能找到故障的根本原因，但提出了一种解决方法，包括更强的钢制外壳、更多的绝缘材料和有毒烟雾的排放系统。尽管有科学家对此解决方案表示怀疑，但美国联邦航空管理局（FAA）对此表示满意，并在2013年4月允许787重新投入使用。

15:10

🏭 波音公司文化与商业模式的转变

这一部分探讨了波音公司自1997年与麦道公司合并以来的变化，包括公司文化和商业模式的转变。波音公司减少了对研究的投资，以降低成本并提高华尔街的回报。这种转变导致了对产品质量和完整性的担忧，以及对波音公司传统工程精神的背离。

20:11

🛠️ 波音787生产过程中的质量问题

该段落揭示了波音787生产过程中的质量问题，包括波音公司如何忽视工程师的建议，为了满足生产进度而牺牲质量标准。提到了内部文件和工程师的证词，表明波音公司在意大利的合作伙伴Alennia在生产过程中存在严重问题，而波音公司却要求继续生产，不顾质量检查的结果。

25:12

🔍 波音787工厂内部的调查

这部分内容涉及了对波音787工厂内部情况的调查，揭示了工人对飞机质量的担忧。一些工人表示，他们不会乘坐自己参与制造的飞机，因为他们亲眼目睹了生产过程中的低质量标准和糟糕的工作条件。此外，还提到了工人对工作环境的不满，包括药物使用和缺乏适当的技能培训。

30:21

💼 波音公司的政治游说与监管问题

这一部分讨论了波音公司与美国政府之间的关系，以及公司如何通过政治游说来影响监管政策。提到了波音公司雇佣了大量前政府工作人员作为游说者，以及公司高管与政府官员之间的密切联系。此外，还提到了FAA对波音787项目的监管问题，以及一位前FAA官员在退休后加入了波音公司的游说团队。

35:23

💬 波音公司对质疑的回应

该段落描述了波音公司对上述问题和质疑的回应。波音公司否认了牺牲安全和质量的指控，并表示其采访是敌对的、不专业的，并符合小报式电视新闻的最差传统。公司还表示，其电池修复措施是有效的，并且其在埃弗雷特和查尔斯顿的787生产都遵循了FAA批准的统一质量体系。

Keywords

💡波音787

波音787，又称为“梦想飞机”，是波音公司生产的一款远程双通道宽体客机。该机型以其燃油效率和乘客舒适度而著称，但在视频中也揭示了其存在的问题，如电池故障和生产质量问题。

💡质量标准

质量标准是指在生产过程中所遵循的一系列规范和要求，以确保产品达到既定的安全和性能水平。在视频中，波音公司被指控为了赶进度而放宽了质量标准，这引起了对飞机安全性的担忧。

💡电池问题

电池问题是指向波音787梦想飞机的锂电池系统出现的一系列故障和安全隐患。视频中提到了锂电池在商业飞机上的使用是前所未有的，而且波音787的电池问题导致了飞机的紧急着陆和全球范围内的停飞。

💡生产延误

生产延误指的是波音787梦想飞机在制造过程中遭遇的进度推迟情况。视频中提到，波音787项目经历了多次延误，从最初的三个月推迟到两年，这对波音公司的声誉和财务状况造成了重大影响。

💡外包生产

外包生产是指企业将其生产活动委托给其他公司来完成的做法。波音787项目采用了全球合作伙伴网络来生产飞机的各个部分，这种模式旨在降低成本，但也带来了协调和管理上的挑战。

💡监管机构

监管机构是指负责监督和管理特定行业或领域的政府或独立机构，以确保行业的安全和合规性。在视频中，FAA（美国联邦航空管理局）作为航空业的主要监管机构，负责对波音787进行安全审查和认证。

💡内部告密者

内部告密者是指在组织内部揭露不当行为或违规活动的员工。在视频中，波音公司的前工程师John Woods因为对787生产过程中的质量问题提出警告而被解雇，他后来向FAA提出了告密投诉。

💡工会

工会是指代表工人利益的组织，通过集体谈判来争取更好的工作条件和待遇。在视频中，波音公司在南卡罗来纳州设立工厂时，选择了一个没有工会的地区，以此来减少劳动力成本和避免罢工等问题。

💡财务问题

财务问题通常指企业在资金管理、盈利能力和成本控制方面遇到的困难。视频中提到波音公司在787项目上的巨额投资和延误导致了财务压力，同时公司高层的高薪和养老金问题也引起了关注。

💡政治游说

政治游说是指企业或个人为了影响政策制定而对政府官员进行的劝说或施压活动。波音公司在视频中被描绘为在华盛顿拥有强大的游说力量，通过前政府官员和政治联系来推动其利益。

💡安全问题

安全问题是指可能对人员、财产或环境造成损害的潜在风险或已知威胁。在视频中，波音787梦想飞机的电池故障和生产质量问题引发了对其安全性的严重关切。

Highlights

波音787被称为“梦想飞机”，是人类智慧的十年甚至一代人的成就。

波音787为航空公司提供了低成本飞行，为乘客提供了无与伦比的舒适度。

波音公司为满足日程，牺牲了工程质量，引发了安全隐患。

波音787的锂电池问题导致了紧急着陆和飞机停飞。

波音787的电池问题在两周内发生了两次，导致全球范围内的波音787停飞。

波音公司改变了自己的质量标准，以加快生产进度。

波音787的生产过程中，存在严重的工程问题和质量问题。

波音公司在南卡罗来纳州的工厂生产延误严重，生产错误频发。

波音公司的质量保证检查员在南卡罗来纳州工厂的工作只是签字确认。

波音787的工程师因为坚持质量标准而被解雇。

波音公司雇佣有精神健康问题的工程师，忽视其专业意见。

波音公司的前FAA监管人员在退休后加入了波音公司的游说团队。

波音公司在过去12年中获得了超过10亿美元的联邦税收退款，尽管报告了430亿美元的利润。

波音公司的高管和最大股东获得了最大的利益，而普通员工的养老金被削减。

波音南卡罗来纳州工厂的工人不愿意乘坐他们自己制造的飞机。

波音公司否认了所有的指控，并坚称787飞机没有比以往的型号更多的问题。

波音公司表示，其电池修复措施可以防止未来的故障。

波音公司在过去的12年里没有支付联邦所得税，尽管报告了430亿美元的利润。

波音公司是游说高手，有超过100名注册游说人员，其中78人是前政府工作人员。

波音公司的CEO Jim McNerney 在2012年赚取了2750万美元。

Transcripts

THE BOEING 787.

SOLD AS A "DREAMLINER".

Jim McNerney: A once in a decade if not once in a generation achievement of human ingenuity.

FOR AIRLINES IT'S CHEAP TO FLY.

FOR PASSENGERS IT OFFERS UNPARALLELED COMFORT.

"wow"

FOR BOEING IT PROMISED WINDFALL PROFITS.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: The Dreamliner is the plane of the future.

BUT AL JAZEERA DISCOVERS A DARK SIDE TO THE DREAMLINER:

STAN SORSCHER: unimaginable that we could be three years late, have a fleet grounding,

have fires on the airplane.

OUR INVESTIGATION FINDS BOEING ALTERED ITS OWN QUALITY STANDARDS

COLE: They're shortchanging the engineering process to meet a schedule.

WE UNCOVER A WHISTLEBLOWER FIRED AS HE FOUGHT FOR SAFETY:

WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs going out the door on the 787 aircraft.

WE GO BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, ONTO THE FACTORY FLOOR, TO REVEAL A WORLD BOEING KEEPS SECRET.

UC WORKER VIDEO: I wouldn't fly on one of these planes…

Because I see the quality of the fu**ing sh*t going down

around here.

TITLE: "BROKEN DREAMS: THE BOEING 787" JANUARY 16TH, 2013.

TAKAMATSU, JAPAN - A BRAND-NEW BOEING 787 DREAMLINER MAKES AN EMERGENCY LANDING.

PASSENGERS KNEW THE PLANE WAS IN TROUBLE: AOYA KAZUNORI/passenger: I looked outside

and saw white smoke.

That's when I realised the danger.

KEN'ICHI KAWAMURA/passenger: The burning plastic smell got worse.

/ I thought we were going to crash.

TAKEUCHI KOJI/Fireman: On closer inspection, we observed a blue box that had expanded in

size.

THE BLUE BOX WAS ONE OF THE DREAMLINER'S TWO LITHIUM ION BATTERIES –THE MOST POWERFUL

- AND RISKY - EVER PERMITTED

ON A COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT.

Newsreader: It's just the latest in a string of embarrassments for Boeing's state of the

art aircraft.

NINE DAYS EARLIER A DREAMLINER BATTERY HAD CAUGHT FIRE IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

TWO BATTERY FAILURES IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.

NEWS BITE: Japanese carrier All Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines have grounded their fleets

of Boeing 787

Dreamliners.

JAPAN AIRLINES AND ANA HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO FLY THE DREAMLINER - NOW THEY BECAME THE

FIRST TO CANCEL ALL FLIGHTS.

NEWS BITE: Breaking news.

The United States Federal Aviation…

WITHIN 24 HOURS, THE U.S. SAFETY REGULATOR, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, GROUNDED

THE 787.

NEWS BITE: All 50 of the new Boeing 787 Dreamliners have now been grounded…

THE REST OF THE WORLD FOLLOWED.

NO BOEING FLEET HAD EVER BEEN FORCED FROM SERVICE.

BUT ON JANUARY 17, 2013, THE DREAM WAS OVER.

I'M WILL JORDAN.

FOR A YEAR, MY TEAM AND I HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING THE DREAMLINER.

IT'S THE BOEING COMPANY'S BIG BET ON THE FUTURE…

A PLANE CREATED TO SAVE FUEL, IMPROVE COMFORT, AND BOOST PROFITS.

AND ONE BUILT IN A NEW WAY - DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY SCORES OF COMPANIES AROUND

THE GLOBE.

THE COMPANY THAT MAKES THE BATTERY IS GS YUASA, BASED IN KYOTO.

WE WANTED THEM TO TELL US WHAT HAD GONE SO WRONG.

SOUND: Security Guard in Japanese.

Will: Al Jazeera.

Guard: Al Jazeera.

We wonder whether you might be able to do

an interview?

THEY REFUSED.

SPOKESWOMAN: We have a contract with Boeing so we can't, we can't tell any comments to

you.

THE BATTERY IS ONLY ONE PART OF THE DREAMLINER'S COMPLEX ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.

THERE'S ALSO A CHARGER, MADE AT A FACTORY THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES AWAY.

WHAT HAPPENED THERE, SHOWS BOEING LEARNT YEARS AGO JUST HOW DANGEROUS A LITHIUM ION BATTERY

COULD BE.

IN TUCSON, ARIZONA, WE TRACKED DOWN MICHAEL LEON – AN ELECTRICAL TECHNICIAN.

MICHAEL LEON / Former Securaplane technician: I've been working electronics since I was

17 years old, and I joined

the paratroopers and I was assigned to an electronics battalion of the 82nd airborne.

LEON: this is the first time I've been here since, since 2007.

It's hard to believe that this is what's left of a

three story engineering structure.

ON A NOVEMBER MORNING IN 2006, LEON AND DOZENS OF OTHER WORKERS CLOCKED IN AT SECURAPLANE

- THE COMPANY THAT MAKES

THE BATTERY CHARGER.

LEON: I started a pot of coffee then I went into my lab and started working on my battery

charging unit.

AND THEN IT HAPPENED.

LEON: …and there was a very loud explosion and all of a sudden I was lying on the floor

and there it was coming out

the side of this battery.

It was about that big, and it wasn't like fire.

It looked like a jet afterburner, like

jet exhaust.

THE PROTOTYPE BATTERY SECURAPLANE WAS USING TO TEST ITS CHARGER HAD EXPLODED.

KIRK WINES / Former Securaplane technician: I heard a very loud series of metallic rattling

bangs.

A kind of

shhhhhh.

And just this jet of steam.

LEON: The fire was literally rolling up the walls around me and, and on the ceiling, I

could just see it eating up

all around me…

WINES: I know if that had happened on board an aircraft, there, there would be no chance

of survival.

IT WAS THE BIGGEST CHEMICAL FIRE IN TUCSON'S HISTORY.

A TEN THOUSAND SQUARE FOOT, THREE-STOREY STRUCTURE, BURNT TO THE GROUND.

RICHARD LUKSO / Securaplane founder: …after my building burned down, after that they realized

very emphatically

the danger of this chemistry.

RICHARD LUKSO KNOWS WELL THE CHEMISTRY OF THE DREAMLINER BATTERY.

BOEING CHOSE THE MOST POWERFUL THERE IS…

BUT ALSO THE MOST VOLATILE.

LUKSO: they went to lithium cobalt which is way up

here as far as danger.

LUKSO STEPPED DOWN AS SECURAPLANE PRESIDENT JUST BEFORE THE FIRE.

HE STARTED A NEW COMPANY TO MAKE LITHIUM ION BATTERIES FOR BUSINESS JETS.

LUKSO WAS A TRUE BELIEVER IN THE TECHNOLOGY.

THEN HE BEGAN TESTING.

BULLET TEST VIDEO: Two, 3.3 amp hour series battery pack bullet test.

LUKSO WENT BEYOND EVEN THE LATEST INDUSTRY GUIDELINES - GOING SO FAR AS TO FIRE BULLETS

INTO BATTERIES, TO SEE IF

THEY COULD BE MADE SAFE FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS.

(BATTERY WALK/TALK) LUKSO: Yeah.

You could run the test that you feel that you need to meet the requirements to

be safe, but you also need to have a conscience that's going to tell you I want to do the

extreme."

IN THE END, TESTING WITH A CONSCIENCE, LUKSO COULDN'T MAKE THE BATTERIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS.

HIS NEW COMPANY FAILED.

LUKSO: …we became proficient in destroying batteries.

And, and the more we learned about it, the worst it got.

I

mean, oh, my God, we kept digging and digging.

We were saying I wonder what the rest of the guys are doing.

Well,

I guess we knew.

BY REST OF THE GUYS HE MEANS BOEING.

AND THEY WERE TESTING TO A WEAKER STANDARD…

ONE WRITTEN BY THE FAA SPECIFICALLY FOR THE DREAMLINER.

IT'S THE FAA'S JOB TO REGULATE AIR SAFETY.

BUT WHEN IT COMES TO BUILDING AIRPLANES, THE FAA DELEGATES OVERSIGHT ALMOST COMPLETELY

TO THE AIRCRAFT

MANUFACTURERS.

WHEN IT COMES TO THE BATTERY AND BEYOND, BOEING LARGELY POLICES ITSELF.

THE BATTERIES PASSED BOEING'S TESTS.

IN LINE WITH THE FAA RULES, BOEING SAID THE 787 BATTERIES WOULD VIRTUALLY NEVER CATCH

FIRE ON BOARD AN AIRCRAFT.

THEN, THEY FAILED TWICE IN JUST NINE DAYS.

BOEING HAS NOT UNCOVERED THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE FAILURES.

IT FOUND A WORK AROUND: A STRONG STEEL CASE, MORE INSULATION, AND AN EXHAUST FOR NOXIOUS

FUMES.

SINNETT: …any fire will be impossible because there's not enough oxygen to support combustion.

BUT SEVERAL LEADING SCIENTISTS HAVE THEIR DOUBTS.

DONALD SADOWAY / MIT: I don't think it's a sufficient fix / Even inside that steel box

with all of its

fortifications, all of the elements are still there for fire.

DESPITE NOT KNOWING THE ROOT CAUSE, AMERICA'S SAFETY REGULATOR, THE FAA, WAS SATISFIED.

AND IN APRIL 2013, THE DREAMLINER WAS BACK.

BUT THIS STORY GOES FAR BEYOND A BURNING BATTERY.

IT BEGINS AT BOEING ITSELF.

"This is it.

The first American commercial jet capable of economical transatlantic service.

The Boeing 707 jet

clipper.

SINCE ITS CREATION IN SEATTLE NEARLY A CENTURY AGO, BOEING HAD DEVELOPED A REPUTATION AS

A WORLD-CLASS ENGINEERING

COMPANY.

BUT IN 1997 BOEING CHANGED.

IT MERGED WITH COMPETITOR, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.

TWO COMPANIES WITH TWO VERY DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS.

STAN SORSCHER / Former Boeing engineer: the merger was all about transforming our successful

culture and business

model into the same business model that McDonnell Douglas had used unsuccessfully.

ABW-002 / 1:05 ABOULAFIA: you basically shortchange engineering,

you stop doing aggressive new product developments; you run the

business for cash.

THE NEW BOEING MOVED ITS HEADQUARTERS FROM SEATTLE, THE ONLY HOME THE COMPANY HAD EVER

KNOWN, TO CHICAGO.

IT BEGAN SLASHING INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH, IN ORDER TO CUT COSTS AND MAXIMISE WALL STREET

RETURNS.

CYNTHIA COLE / Former Boeing engineer: I felt it was wrong, I felt it was going to take

the company in the wrong

direction and I thought that quality would suffer and the integrity of the product would

suffer.

KEVIN SANDERS / Former Boeing manager: I feel that that legacy and that history and that

competence has been

hijacked by a bunch of corporate thugs.

BY 2003, IT WAS TIME TO LAUNCH A NEW PLANE.

BUT BOEING'S NEW BOARD WAS RELUCTANT TO INVEST THE BILLIONS NEEDED.

DOMINIC GATES / Seattle Times: The board made it clear that they wanted this plane made

for less money.

They

wanted it made for $5 billion and they wanted partners to come in and pay the rest.

ABW-002/ 9:35 Richard Aboulafia: It's expensive.

So how do you make that happen?

Well, you promise them that you can do it for

less / and then worry about the consequences later.

BOEING CAME UP WITH A PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF MONEY.

IT WOULD PUSH THE COSTS ONTO ITS MAJOR SUPPLIERS.

BOEING WOULD CALL THEM PARTNERS – AND THEY WOULD DESIGN AND PAY FOR THE PARTS THEY BUILT.

BOEING'S JOB WOULD BE TO ASSEMBLE THE PLANE.

GATES: It was almost as if at times you thought Boeing executives believed, well, maybe they

could sit in Chicago

and have / other companies / do things, and they would just rake in the money somehow

by putting it all together

and putting a Boeing sticker on it at the end.

RIGHT ON SCHEDULE, BOEING ROLLED OUT THE DREAMLINER ON SUNDAY JULY THE 8TH 2007, 7-8-7.

Tom Brokaw: Airlines with us today have made a big commitment to Boeing and to this airplane.

So far they have

ordered 677 of them.

ABOULAFIA: I think in a lot of ways, July 8, 2007 was one of the more magical moments

I've seen in the industry…

Brokaw: Watching us live around the world, broadcasting I'm told in 45 countries in 9

languages for the premier of

this very exciting Boeing 787 Dreamliner.

GATES: We were all inside the factory with artificial lighting, big stage, Tom Brokaw,

huge screens…

Then they

opened the doors of this giant assembly bay…

ABOULAFIA: And in rolls this beautiful, beautiful aircraft.

GATES: And there it is, sitting in the sun and we all stream outside and we all touch

it and none of us noticed.

Smile!

ABOULAFIA: And I'm reassured by the executives involved that it's going to fly within two

months.

One, two, three.

JON OSTROWER / Wall Street Journal What I realized walking around it is that

you could look up in the wheel well and you could see daylight.

GATES: We learned that the whole thing was a sham.

MIKE BAIR / 787 Program Manager: Beautiful isn't it?

Absolutely beautiful…

GATES: They rolled out this fake airplane.

OSTROWER: I realized the doors were made of plywood.

GATES: This plane that we were admiring was completely a shell inside

JAMES MCNERNEY / BOEING CEO: None of this would be possible, of course, without exceptional

leadership.

ABOULAFIA: There's only two conclusions you can draw: You have executives there who are

either lying, in which

case they are completely clueless because they are going to get caught in two months,

or you have a complete

disconnect between the people who are working on the plane, the engineers, and the executives

who are saying this.

MCNERNEY: And so to each and every member of the 787 global team, I say, 'Thank you,

congratulations, and keep up

the great work.'

SANDERS: More than any other single event it was the big lie, and it was a statement

that the Boeing Company is

now all about the big lie.

THE DAY AFTER THE ROLLOUT, WALL STREET PUSHED BOEING STOCK TO A TEN YEAR HIGH.

BUT IT WAS ALL ABOUT TO UNRAVEL, AS REVEALED IN BOEING'S INVESTOR CALLS.

Hello and welcome to our quarterly update on the 787 program.

SEPTEMBER 2007: BOEING ANNOUNCES ITS FIRST DELAY.

MIKE BAIR: It's not a failure in how the airplane goes together.

It's just a really complicated puzzle."

OCTOBER 2007: THE THREE-MONTH DELAY BECOMES SIX MONTHS.

JIM MCNERNEY: We wish we didn't have to do this.

New kinds of innovation present challenges and we're doing our

best to meet them.

OCTOBER 2009: SIX MONTHS BECOMES TWO YEARS OF DELAYS.

JIM MCNERNEY: We know that we can and must do better.

And I'm confident that despite our setbacks we will get the

787 through the flight test program and into the hands of our customers.

GATES: It just kept getting worse and worse and it seemed unbelievable.

You have to understand, this was

unprecedented.

There had never been a Boeing delay in a Boeing program.

ABOULAFIA: The sequence of events looked an awful lot like a catastrophe rather than just

a manageable series of

delays.

THE DREAMLINER BUSINESS STRATEGY WAS BACKFIRING.

DESIGNED TO SAVE SO MUCH MONEY, IT WAS COSTING BOEING BILLIONS.

GATES: The outsourcing plan failed very badly.

/ All these different suppliers who were going to / build these

major sections couldn't actually do it.

TO FIX THE DREAMLINER, BOEING DISPATCHED HUNDREDS OF QUALITY INSPECTORS TO STRUGGLING SUPPLIERS

AROUND THE GLOBE

INCLUDING TO ITS PARTNER ALENIA - IN SOUTHERN ITALY.

Riccardo Busca / Alenia plant manager: We are just working through the final part of

the process.

ALENIA WOULD TAKE ON THE TASK OF CONSTRUCTING THE BODY OF THE PLANE - NOT WITH ALUMINIUM

PANELS…

BUT WITH COMPOSITE

PLASTIC BARRELS.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVE: TO LOSE WEIGHT, SAVING FUEL AND MAKING THE 787 CHEAPER TO RUN.

BUT NO ONE HAD EVER MADE ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE, NOT BOEING, AND ESPECIALLY NOT ALENIA.

Busca: There is nothing comparable with that on the market.

Will: there's nothing built like this.

BOEING'S QUALITY INSPECTORS HAVE ONE OVERRIDING PRIORITY, TO MAKE SURE THE JOB IS DONE CORRECTLY.

IN 2009, WHEN INSPECTORS FOUND FLAWS IN PARTS MADE IN THIS ALENIA PLANT, THEY ORDERED WORK

TO STOP.

A YEAR LATER, IN ALENIA'S OTHER FACTORY THEY AGAIN FOUND SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND AGAIN THEY

ORDERED WORK TO STOP.

BUT THIS TIME, MANAGERS OVERRULED THE QUALITY INSPECTORS.

THIS INTERNAL BOEING DOCUMENT, FROM 2010, REVEALS EXECUTIVES ORDERED ALENIA TO "CONTINUE

WITH FABRICATION…

WITHOUT

DELAY."

DONATO AMOROSO / ALENIA COO: We followed at the time the procedure to stop but with the

help of a Boeing specialist

at the time and while we were in the disapproved condition they took responsibility for approving

the quality and

we will continue to work in engineering at the time the product.

IN THIS SEPARATE MEMO, OBTAINED BY AL JAZEERA, BOEING STATES THAT "SCHEDULE MAY REQUIRE DEVIATIONS

TO THE PREFERRED

QUALITY PROCESS".

WE RECEIVED THE MEMOS FROM AN ENGINEER WHO, LIKE MANY WE SPOKE WITH, WAS AFRAID TO APPEAR

ON CAMERA.

SO HE ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS BY EMAIL.

SOURCE: They changed basic engineering principles to meet schedule…

We all protested.

…Would you fly on a plane that you knew was built with major flaws?

THE QUALITY ENGINEER TOLD US DEVIATING FROM THE PROCESS COMPROMISED SAFETY.

ALENIA AND BOEING SAID IT DID NOT.

CYNTHIA COLE: 6,7,8,9,10…

SO I BROUGHT THE MEMO TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF BOEING'S ENGINEERS UNION.

Cynthia Cole: So My name is Cynthia Cole, C-y-n-t-h-i-a.

Last name is C-o-l-e.

CYNTHIA COLE SPENT 32 YEARS AT THE COMPANY BUT NEVER ON THE DREAMLINER PROGRAMME, SO

SHE HAD NEVER SEEN THIS MEMO

BEFORE.

COLE: The program schedule may require deviation to the preferred process.

See?

That one sentence right there,

that one fragment of the sentence / You know, you don't change your quality process for

schedule.

You make quality

happen in the schedule.

// They're shortchanging the engineering process to meet a schedule and they're not even

allowing quality control to do their job and their telling them this is how it's going

to be.

// I don't see how

these people who write these things and agree to these things, you know, and the signatures

down here, how they

sleep at night.

I just don't get it.

How can you do that?

// As an engineer I find that reprehensible.

Male Voice: How does it make you feel as a flyer?

Oh, yeah.

I'm not flying on a 787.

That just makes, you know…

Because I've been kind of avoiding flying on a 787

and seeing this, I would definitely avoid flying on a 787.

TEASE: IN PART TWO – INSIDE A BOEING 787 PLANT, WORKERS REVEAL THEY FEAR TO FLY THE

PLANE THEY BUILD.

IF THE DREAMLINER REPRESENTS BOEING'S FUTURE, THEN I'VE COME TO THE PLACE WHERE THAT FUTURE

WILL BE BUILT.

IN THIS ASSEMBLY PLANT IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

I'VE BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING WITH A MAN WHO WORKS INSIDE THE PLANT.

HE'S TAKING A HUGE RISK EVEN TALKING TO ME.

SOURCE: It's been eating me alive to know what I know, and have no avenue, no venue

to say anything.

AT HIS REQUEST, WE USED A DIFFERENT VOICE.

SOURCE: 300 souls on the plane / their lives / it's bigger than me.

WE HAD SEEN REPORTS OF BAD WORKMANSHIP IN THE PLANT.

BUT THE MAN CLAIMED THE PROBLEMS GO FAR DEEPER.

SOURCE: With all the problems reported on the 787 / there's 90 percent that's getting

swept away…hushed up.

/ It's

an iceberg.

SOURCE: The people that actually work on it are the biggest problem.

// there is / an uneducated, under-skilled

and uncaring staff that are building these planes and I'm not the only one that feels

that way.

AND HE WAS PREPARED TO PROVE IT, WEARING A CAMERA INSIDE THE PLANT TO RECORD WHAT SOME

WORKERS SAID ABOUT THE

DREAMLINER.

UC PLANT WORKER 1: … They hire these people off the street dude.

Working, fucking flipping burgers for a living or

making sandwiches at subway…

SOURCE: You can't have somebody from McDonald's do heart surgery.

/ That's trusting somebody with your life.

That's what we're doing here.

UC PLANT WORKER 2: The thing about it is, they don't realize the seriousness of putting

something together and

putting it together right.

Because if this fucker breaks, it can't come over to the curb, it's gonna come down.

SOURCE: I've seen a lot of things that should not go on at an airplane plant…

/ people talking about doing drugs,

looking for drugs…

UC PLANT WORKER 3: It's all coke and, um, painkillers and, what's the other one…

You can get weed here, you can get

some really good weed here.

SOURCE: Really, like in the plant?

WORKER 3: Yeah.

SOURCE: Like there's somebody who has it right now?

I could walk up to them and just…

WORKER 3: No, I don't know if they have it right here.

You've got to place your order.

SOURCE: You gotta place your order.

SOURCE: I have never seen anybody or heard of anybody having to take a random urinalysis.

As far as I know random

drugs tests just don't happen.

UC PLANT WORKER 2: they don't drug test nobody.

SOURCE: I know they don't.

WORKER 2: There's people that go out there on lunch and smoke one up.

SOURCE: Do they?

WORKER 2: Hell yea.

SOURCE: You know for a fact.

WORKER 2: Hell yeah.

WHEN BOEING FIRST ANNOUNCED THE 787, BACK IN 2003, NOBODY EVER DREAMT IT WOULD HAVE

BEEN ASSEMBLED ANYWHERE BUT

WASHINGTON STATE.

THE ONE PLACE BOEING HAD ALWAYS MADE ITS COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT.

BUT NEW BOEING WAS PLAYING BY NEW RULES.

SO IT DID SOMETHING IT HAD NEVER DONE BEFORE - AUCTIONED OFF FINAL ASSEMBLY TO THE HIGHEST

BIDDER.

DOMINIC GATES: They were going to hold a competition for it.

/ A state against state, nationwide competition,

where to build this plane.

I ran to my editor after I put the phone down, I think it was 5:00, and I said, "You're

not going to believe this.

They're not necessarily going to build it here."

WASHINGTON STATE WON, BUT ONLY BY GIVING BOEING WHAT WAS THEN A RECORD THREE BILLION DOLLARS

IN TAX BREAKS. "Power!

Union Power!

Union Power!

Union Power!"

FIVE YEARS LATER, BOEING'S MACHINISTS WALKED OFF THE JOB AFTER CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS STALLED.

THE STRIKE COST BOEING BILLIONS AND ADDED TO THE DREAMLINER'S DELAYS.

BOEING STOCK WAS IN A FREEFALL, AMID A GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS.

GATES: … that strike / really enraged the top executives at Boeing.

And so / early in 2009 they made it very

clear that they wanted a second assembly line somewhere else.

THAT TURNED OUT TO BE SOUTH CAROLINA.

THE STATE OFFERED CHEAP LAND AND LABOR … CLOSE TO ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN SUPPORT…

AND NO UNIONS.

GATES: The decision to build the second 787 assembly line in Charleston, South Carolina/

was made because of the

strike in 2008.

/ They wanted to do it there because they wanted to weaken the union, and they did.

SORSCHER: It kind of has a shameless feel to it, right?

It's very manipulative and not very hometown.

That's not

the way you treat your people in your community, unless they're not in your community, unless

you see them as a

source of gains to be extracted.

BUT FOR BOEING, LEAVING BEHIND A WORLD-CLASS UNION WORKFORCE FOR THE GREENER PASTURES OF

NON-UNION CHARLESTON WOULD

COME AT A PRICE.

WORK IN THE PLANT IS SIGNIFICANTLY BEHIND SCHEDULE AND PLAGUED BY PRODUCTION ERRORS.

Repair worker: I seen some crazy stuff, ya know, putting fasteners and just beatin' the

shit out of em to get em

to go in the hole.

SOURCE: I know of one customer / They'll no longer accept planes from Charleston due to

quality issues.

They will

only accept final assembly done in Everett, Washington.

SOURCE: Everyday when you go to work, not only are you doing your job, but you are looking

at the previous job to

see if someone has messed something else up on that and chose not to tell anyone.

UC PLANT WORKER 4: That machine malfunctioned in there.

Fucked those holes up.

And they just went ahead and filled

them.

And I've gone ahead and told managers about that and nothing has been done.

Nothing.

TO BE SURE EVERYTHING IS DONE CORRECTLY AND THE PLANE IS SAFE, BOEING HAS QUALITY ASSURANCE

INSPECTORS

PAINSTAKINGLY CHECK EVERY STEP OF THE WORK.

BUT IN SOUTH CAROLINA, THIS INSPECTOR SAYS HE ONLY SIGNS OFF ON FINISHED JOBS.

UC PLANT WORKER 5: Here you will do the whole job and we just final it.

You know and I'm supposed to verify that

oh, you checked the hole, you did the sealant, you put in the fastener.

I never saw all that.

But I'm supposed to

final it and say that it's good.

That's one of the problems I have.

SOURCE: you think Everett's better?

UC PLANT WORKER 2: I think Everett will do what's right, to make the plane right because

of the union, they have

to.

/ Here everybody is being pushed to meet this fucking schedule regardless of quality.

Will: which do you think is the priority then, schedule or quality?

SOURCE: Schedule.

IF IT'S A CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN QUALITY AND SCHEDULE, WE FOUND ONE CASUALTY - 100'S

OF KILOMETERS FROM SOUTH

CAROLINA -- IN MISSISSIPPI.

JOHN WOODS / Former Boeing engineer: My name is John Woods, I'm an aerospace engineer.

I worked for General

Electric, Lockheed, Boeing.

JOHN WOODS SPENT A CAREER IN THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FIELD OF AEROSPACE COMPOSITES.

BOEING HIRED WOODS KNOWING HE HAD QUALIFIED PSCHIATRIC CONDITIONS - ATTENTION DEFICIT

DISORDER, OBSESSIVE

COMPULSIVE DISORDER, AND MILD DEPRESSION.

HIS JOB WAS TO WRITE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO REPAIR PARTS DAMAGED DURING THE MANUFACTURING

PROCESS.

WOODS: It's my job to make sure that that aircraft is safe.

WOODS SAYS WHEN HE TRIED TO ENFORCE QUALITY STANDARDS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT HE WAS

BERATED BY HIS BOSSES.

WOODS: In a couple of meetings, there were several, a group of managers screaming at

me to dumb down my work

instruction.

// saying, you have to remove requirements from your work instructions.

It's going to take too much

time.

WOODS SAYS HE WITNESSED DAMAGED PARTS BEING IGNORED, PAPERED OVER AND HIDDEN FROM VIEW.

WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs going out the door on the 787 aircraft.//

I am worried that sooner

or later, there's going to be a structural failure on the fuselage.

WOODS APPEALED TO BOEING'S HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT CLAIMING HE WAS BEING HARASSED

FOR DOING HIS JOB.

INSTEAD OF COMING TO HIS DEFENSE, BOEING MANAGERS PUT WOODS UNDER REVIEW.

WEEKS LATER, THEY FIRED HIM.

WOODS: I'll never forget this.

The day before I was terminated, I was telling my brother how proud I was to be

working at Boeing.

It's true.

WOODS: So instead of saying thanks for doing a good job, because I thought I was doing

what I was supposed to be

doing.

/ I had to leave in shame really.

I was embarrassed for my own family.

HE STILL HAD NOT LOST FAITH IN THE SYSTEM.

HE TURNED TO THE FAA - FILING A WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINT.

THE DOCUMENT ALLEGED SEVEN SERIOUS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT.

MARY SCHIAVO / Former Inspector General, USDOT: So I've gotten to the page where they reached

their conclusions

and their discussion and what they found is, of all the allegations, all but one of them

they could not

substantiate and the one that they could substantiate, they asked Boeing to fix it.

Boeing said, "Okay, we fixed

it."

And then they closed the investigation.

That's pretty much how they all go.

I've seen this so many times.

Woods in coffee shop: "thank you" SCHIAVO: I always tell people, when they call

me, they call me up with information and they say, "Well, I have all

this information about this dangerous situation.

Should I blow the whistle?"

I said, "Well, you know, not unless

you have a private trust fund or another job to go to because you'll have a problem earning

a living."

WOODS: I had to maximize all my credit cards to survive, to support the family.

There was a lot less money for the

kids, for college and everything else.

/ It shouldn't be this hard to do the right thing.

WHEN WE LOOKED AT WOODS' FAA COMPLAINT, WE NOTICED A FAMILIAR NAME -- ALI BAHRAMI.

HE WAS THE FAA'S MAN IN CHARGE OF THE DREAMLINER.

IN 2011, THREE YEARS BEHIND SCHEDULE, BOEING CELEBRATED FINAL APPROVAL FOR THE 787 TO FLY.

AND IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED THE ORDER.

Fancher at Certification Party: "Thanks also in recognition for Ali Bahrami, manager of

the FAA's transport

airplane directive.

Ali …" IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED OFF ON THE DREAMLINER

BATTERIES.

AND AFTER TWO FAILED AND THE FAA GROUNDED THE DREAMLINER … IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED

IT BACK INTO THE AIR.

SHORTLY AFTER THAT HE RETIRED FROM THE FAA.

TWO WEEKS LATER BAHRAMI WAS HIRED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, WHICH

LOBBIES ON

BEHALF OF BOEING.

ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS HE DID WAS TO APPEAR BEFORE CONGRESS TO CALL FOR GREATER SELF-REGULATION

FOR COMPANIES LIKE

BOEING.

Ali Bahrami / Congressional hearing: ‘We urge the FAA to allow greater use of delegation,

not only to take full

advantage of industry expertise, but to increase the collaboration that improves aviation safety."

MR.

BAHRAMI DECLINED OUR INTERVIEW REQUEST.

SCHIAVO: One day you're regulating the airline and the next day you're working for it.

// You can't possibly be tough on the industry

that you're regulating because you'll never get that plum job after you

leave.

The regulators at the FAA will rarely cross Boeing.

They simply won't.

IT'S THE WASHINGTON INFLUENCE GAME - AND BOEING IS A MASTER.

LAST YEAR, THE COMPANY HAD OVER 100 REGISTERED LOBBYISTS, 78 OF THEM WERE FORMER GOVERNMENT

WORKERS.

THREE WERE FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

BOEING CHIEF EXECUTIVE JIM MCNERNEY IS CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S EXPORT COUNCIL.

THE PRESIDENT'S FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF CAME FROM BOEING'S BOARD, AS DID HIS SECOND COMMERCE

SECRETARY.

AS SECRETARY OF STATE, HILLARY CLINTON HELPED BROKER A 3.7 BILLION DOLLAR SALE OF BOEING

PLANES TO A RUSSIAN

AIRLINE.

EVEN PRESIDENT OBAMA BOASTS THAT HE WORKS FOR BOEING.

OBAMA AT BOEING EVENT: "So I tease 'J' ever time I see him.

I say, "I deserve a gold watch because I'm selling your

stuff all the time."

"J" IS JIM MCNERNEY.

IT'S CLEAR WHAT BOEING GETS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

WHAT'S NOT SO CLEAR IS WHAT IT GIVES BACK.

SCOTT KLINGER / Think tank analyst: Boeing paid no taxes in 2013, no federal income taxes.

/ That's not a unique

year.

Over the last 12 years, they claimed over $1.6 billion in federal tax refunds even though

they reported $43

billion in U.S. profits.

43 BILLION DOLLARS IN PROFIT.

BUT NONE OF THAT COMES FROM THE DREAMLINER, WHICH HAS COST BILLIONS AND IS YEARS AWAY

FROM MAKING MONEY.

ALL OF BOEING'S COMMERCIAL PROFIT COMES FROM OLDER AIRCRAFT – THOSE CREATED PRIOR TO

THE DREAMLINER, PRIOR TO JIM

MCNERNEY, AND PRIOR TO THE MERGER.

IT HAS BEEN THE TOP EXECUTIVES AND LARGEST STOCK HOLDERS WHO HAVE BENEFITTED MOST.

KLINGER: Boeing's CEO, Jim McNerney, made $27.5 million in 2012.

That was enough to pay the salaries of the

president of the United States, the vice president, the 15 cabinet secretaries, the nine Supreme

Court justices,

the seven joint chiefs of staff, and all 100 U.S. senators.

MCNERNEY IS SET TO RETIRE WITH A PENSION OF CLOSE TO 250 THOUSAND DOLLARS A MONTH.

JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS 2013, BOEING DEMANDED PENSION CUTS FROM ITS UNION MACHINISTS.

SHANNON RYKER / Boeing machinist: For Jim McNerney to be earning a pension at approximately

a quarter of a

million dollars per month and think that it's okay for him to take my $2200 a month pension

is outrageous.

It's

absolutely outrageous.

BACK IN SOUTH CAROLINA, OUR UNAUTHORIZED TOUR WITH BOEING'S NEW WORKFORCE IS COMING TO A

CLOSE.

THERE'S ONLY ONE QUESTION LEFT TO ASK.

SOURCE: Would you fly on one?

WORKER: um…

no.

SOURCE: You won't fly on one?

WORKER: Noooooo SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these planes?

WORKER: I've thought about it?

I thought about it… no not really SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these mother

f**kers?

WORKER: Probably not.

SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these?

WORKER: Yeah it's sketchy.

SOURCE: Sketchy?

Yeah I probably would, but I kind of have a death wish too.

(laugh) OUR SOURCE ASKED FIFTEEN OF HIS CO-WORKERS

IF THEY'D FLY ON THE DREAMLINER.

TEN SAID NO.

UC WORKER 2: I wouldn't fly on one of these planes (shaking his head).

SOURCE: You wouldn't?

Why wouldn't you?

WORKER 2: Huh?

SOURCE: Why wouldn't ya?

WORKER 2: Because I see the quality of the fucking shit going down around here.

"Hi Mr. Loftis, Will Jordan" "I'm sorry, Will?"

"Will Jordan" WORKERS WHO FEAR TO FLY THE PLANE THEY BUILD…

QUALITY PROCESS APPARENTLY LOOSENED TO SPEED UP SCHEDULE…

WORKERS FIRED AFTER MAKING SAFETY ALLEGATIONS…

WE NEEDED ANSWERS FROM BOEING.

Larry Loftis: Right now we're at a very exciting point in time, we have brought our production

rate up to 10

airplanes a month, faster than any airplane in aviation history and to the highest level

of any wide-body airplane

in aviation history.

Will Jordan: There's a couple of documents I want to show you here.

I SHOWED HIM THE DOCUMENTS SUGGESTING BOEING HAD CHANGED QUALITY PROCEDURES AND OVERRULED

INSPECTORS TO SPEED UP

PRODUCTION.

MR LOFTIS WAS NOT MANAGER OF THE 787 PROGRAMME IN 2010, WHEN THE MEMOS WERE WRITTEN.

Larry Loftis: OK I am not familiar with this document.

Will Jordan: Former Boeing engineers have told us that these represent Boeing essentially

putting schedule ahead of

quality.

Short-changing the engineering process to meet a schedule.

Is that something you recognize?

Larry Loftis: The number one focus that we have at Boeing is ensuring the continued safe

airworthiness of an

airplane, the integrity of the airplane and the quality of the airplane going out.

Will Jordan: We've also heard directly from workers inside your South Carolina plant.

They paint a grim picture

really of things there.

They say the workforce isn't up to the job.

Larry Loftis: I'm extremely confident in the quality of the workforce in Boeing South Carolina.

Will Jordan: The Boeing workers at South Carolina don't share that confidence.

Here's what some of them said.

… Paul Lewis: Guys, Guys, Guys.

I'm gonna just call a halt here for a second.

Can you turn the camera off for a

secon?

Cameraman: Why would we need to turn the camera off?

What's the problem?

AND THEN, BOEING'S COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR STOPPED THE INTERVIEW.

Paul Lewis: So who are these employees that you're speaking to in South Carolina that

are making these points?

Will Jordan: I can't, Obviously I can't tell you who these employees are, but they are

Boeing workers who assemble

the planes that you build.

Paul Lewis: Well I'm not sure it's appropriate here and now.

Will Jordan: Well I'm assuming the buck stops with the Boeing Commercial Airplanes management

and so the most

senior managers are the ones to answer this.

We're here with the head of the 787 programme.

/ And we have these

things that you need to hear and you need to provide a response to.

Paul Lewis: We have not had a chance to review this or craft a proper response.

Paul Lewis: Larry, Larry, can you step out for a second?

Larry: OK but, as I do.

I have the highest degree of confidence in the production system we have, with the

employees we have at the Boeing company and our supply chain.

Thanks.

BOEING ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS IN WRITING, DENYING IT COMPROMISES SAFETY OR QUALITY.

IT SAID OUR INTERVIEW WAS HOSTILE, UNPROFESSIONAL AND IN THE WORST TRADITIONS OF TABLOID-STYLE

TELEVISION NEWS.

THE COMPANY SAID IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT ITS BATTERY FIX PREVENTS FAILURES.

BOEING SAYS IT USES ONE, COMMON, FAA-APPROVED QUALITY SYSTEM FOR THE 787 IN EVERETT AND

CHARLESTON.

BOEING NOTED ITS MEMO STATED IT DID NOT SIGNIFY AUTHORISATION TO SHIP PARTS THAT DON'T MEET

QUALITY REQUIREMENTS.

BOEING SAID IT DRUG TESTS IN LINE WITH COMPANY POLICY AND APPLICABLE LAW.

THE COMPANY DENIES ANY CUSTOMER HAS SAID THEY WILL ONLY TAKE PLANES FROM EVERETT.

AS FOR JOHN WOODS, BOEING SAYS HIS SAFETY CLAIMS HAVE "NO MERIT".

TORONTO.

MAY 18, 2014.

AIR CANADA CELEBRATES THE DELIVERY OF ITS FIRST 787.

THIS IS THE MODERN MARKETING REALITY OF THE DREAMLINER.

AIR CANADA EXEC: Today represents a huge milestone for Air Canada.

We've been waiting a long time for this

airplane.

It's going to allow us to grow in unprecedented ways.

PASSENGER: Because when you were eating before where did you put your iPad?

FLIGHT ATTENDANT: Well I think our passengers are going to be very receptive of some of

the new amenities.

PASSENGER: I just wanna see how for it goes back.

PASSENGER: The windows are huge.

FLIGHT ATTENDANT: We are just excited because we really genuinely love this aircraft.

REPORTER: Is there anything else you wanna add?

AIR CANADA PILOT: Uh, no we're very, very happy.

REPORTER: From a seating point of view how is it different?

REPORTER: Are there more restrooms?

BUT IS THERE ANOTHER REALITY?

ONE REVEALED BY A BURNING BATTERY.

BY THE WORDS OF THE WORKERS WHO BUILD THE PLANES.

UC WORKER: We're not building them to fly, We're building them to sell.

You know what I'm saying?

BY BOEING'S APPARENT CHANGES TO ITS OWN QUALITY PROTOCOL.

BOEING SAYS THE 787 HAS NO MORE PROBLEMS THAN PREVIOUS MODELS.

THE FAA SAYS THERE'S NEVER BEEN A SAFER TIME TO FLY.

THE DREAMLINER IS THE FASTEST-SELLING PLANE IN THE WORLD.

ONE DAY WE MAY ALL FIND OURSELVES ON BOARD.

WHEN WE DO, WE WILL TRUST BOEING HAS PUT QUALITY FIRST;

WE WILL TRUST THE REGULATORS HAVE BEEN RIGOROUS; ULTIMATELY, WE WILL TRUST THE PLANE IS SAFE.