Wreckage Of Titan Submersible Reveal How It Imploded
Summary
TLDRScott Manley discusses the ongoing investigation into the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible, which occurred while exploring the Titanic wreck. He shares details from witness testimonies and new footage of the wreckage. Key points include the design flaws of the sub's carbon fiber hull, possible failure points, and testimonies from fired engineers and experts. Manley explores the science behind the sub's catastrophic failure and provides his own analysis on why the implosion likely began at the interface between the carbon fiber and titanium end rings.
Takeaways
- 🔍 The investigation into OceanGate's Titan submersible disaster, which occurred while exploring the Titanic, is now public, revealing detailed testimonies and insights.
- 🛠️ Several key engineers, including one who was fired after questioning design choices, have testified, sharing their concerns about the sub's safety.
- 🚤 The submersible's lead engineer and operations manager, both fired for raising safety concerns, emphasized design flaws, including an incident where the CEO crashed a submarine into the Andrea Doria wreck.
- 📉 The sub’s final moments showed unreliable communications via an acoustic modem, with the last message stating they had dropped two weights, indicating an attempt to slow descent, not an emergency.
- 💥 The implosion was violent and instantaneous, with evidence suggesting a catastrophic failure at the carbon fiber hull’s forward section, which is where water pressure likely penetrated first.
- 🔧 Carbon fiber, used in the Titan’s pressure hull, was questioned for its reliability, despite successful Navy use of similar materials, though design and manufacturing flaws likely contributed to the failure.
- 📹 New footage from an ROV shows extensive wreckage, with the forward carbon fiber pressure hull shattered and the rear sections more intact, indicating the failure started in the front.
- 🧪 Engineering analysis, including finite element studies, predicted buckling in the pressure hull, but real-world construction flaws may have exacerbated the structural weaknesses.
- 🔩 A key interface between the titanium rings and the carbon fiber hull may have been the weak point where the failure began, possibly due to mismatched compression properties between the materials.
- ⚠️ Cost-cutting, regulatory sidestepping, and poor-quality control during manufacturing—such as improper humidity control during carbon fiber layup—likely compounded the risks and led to the disaster.
Q & A
What is the focus of the investigation mentioned in the transcript?
-The investigation focuses on the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible during its expedition to the Titanic wreck.
Who were the key witnesses mentioned in the testimony so far?
-Key witnesses include a lead engineer who was fired for questioning design decisions, David Lockridge (a Scottish submersible expert), and Tim Catterson, who managed the launch of the submersible.
What incident involving the CEO Stockton Rush was highlighted by David Lockridge?
-David Lockridge detailed how CEO Stockton Rush crashed a submarine into the wreck of the Andrea Doria, a prior incident involving poor operational decisions.
What are the suspected causes of the Titan submersible’s failure?
-The suspected cause is the failure of the carbon fiber pressure hull, potentially due to a weak interface between the carbon fiber barrel and the titanium end rings, causing the vessel to implode under extreme pressure.
What was unusual about the communication system on the Titan submersible?
-The submersible used an acoustic modem, sending clicks through water to communicate with the ship. Communication was unreliable, with the last message indicating the sub had dropped weights to slow its descent before contact was lost.
What did the first footage from the ROV reveal about the submersible wreckage?
-The ROV footage revealed the tail cone of the submersible, which was largely intact. It also showed the shattered carbon fiber around the pressure hull, suggesting a failure at the front of the pressure vessel.
What evidence suggests that the failure started at the front of the submersible?
-Debris patterns indicated that the failure began at the forward bulkhead, with the carbon fiber being pushed backward into the tail cone. This suggests that water entered from the front, causing the implosion.
Why was carbon fiber considered a poor material choice for the Titan’s pressure hull?
-Many experts believed that using carbon fiber was risky because it is less predictable under high pressures, unlike steel or titanium. There were concerns about manufacturing imperfections and stress at the interfaces.
What was unusual about the oxygen scrubber design used in the Titan submersible?
-The oxygen scrubber was a homemade design involving a plastic container with a small fan to blow air over the absorbent material, which raised safety concerns.
What role did cost-cutting and regulatory avoidance play in the Titan's failure?
-Cost-cutting and regulatory avoidance were significant contributors to the failure. CEO Stockton Rush ignored warnings, fired engineers who questioned safety, and implemented substandard designs to reduce costs.
Outlines
🔍 Investigating the Titan Submersible Disaster
The speaker, Scott Manley, begins by discussing the investigation into the Titan submersible disaster that occurred over a year ago near the wreck of the Titanic. The testimony of several witnesses has revealed new details, such as the firing of a lead engineer who questioned design decisions and the testimony of submersible expert David Lockridge, who highlighted operational failures. Manley expresses his fascination with engineering disasters and the learning opportunities they present, discussing the instantaneous nature of the sub’s failure and the initial certainty that no survivors would be recovered.
🛠️ Submarine Design and Failure Speculation
Manley goes on to describe the design of the Titan submersible, which consisted of a carbon fiber pressure section and titanium hemispheres. He explains that while carbon fiber was deemed risky by many, the U.S. Navy had successfully used it in the past. The key questions in the investigation center on where the failure occurred—whether it was in the carbon fiber or other parts of the sub. The recent release of documents and engineering studies suggest the likely failure point was a buckle in the middle of the vessel, but imperfections in translating designs to working products are always a concern.
📡 Unreliable Communications and ROV Footage
This section explains the unreliability of communications between the submersible and the surface ship, using acoustic modems to send data. The final message sent from the sub indicated the dropping of weights, but nothing indicated an emergency. Manley details new footage from an ROV showing the wreckage of the sub, including the nose cone and shattered carbon fiber pieces. The implosion likely began at the forward dome, with water rushing in and pushing debris towards the rear of the sub, resulting in the catastrophic failure.
⚠️ Analysis of the Sub’s Implosion
Manley provides a technical breakdown of how the implosion may have occurred, speculating that the failure began at the forward bulkhead. He suggests that once a crack forms, water rushes in, causing rapid destruction, particularly in the carbon fiber hull. He contrasts his theory with previous simulations, which often showed the failure in the middle of the sub due to peak stress. Manley believes this new evidence will lead to revised analyses and discusses the epoxy interface used between the carbon fiber and titanium sections of the sub.
🧩 Design Flaws and Subpar Materials
In this section, Manley discusses concerns about the materials and construction of the submersible, such as the quality of carbon fiber and the possibility of improper environmental conditions during assembly. He references a 300-page study on the U.S. Navy’s use of similar materials and how differences in compression moduli between carbon fiber and titanium can create stress points. Manley also criticizes the design of other key systems, like the atmosphere scrubber, and expresses concern over the numerous cost-cutting measures implemented by OceanGate's CEO.
💡 Final Thoughts on the Sub’s Failure
Manley concludes by reflecting on the various corners cut in the design of the Titan submersible and how these decisions likely contributed to its failure. He highlights the troubling nature of seeing photos of the construction process and describes one particular design flaw involving the layup of carbon fiber in a spiral pattern. Despite being intrigued by the new information, he expresses discomfort with learning through such a tragic disaster and acknowledges that further details will likely emerge from the ongoing investigation.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Titan Submersible
💡Carbon Fiber Pressure Hull
💡Implosion
💡Finite Element Analysis
💡Titanium Hemispheres
💡Acoustic Modem
💡Epoxy Glue Interface
💡Stockton Rush
💡Buckling
💡ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle)
Highlights
Investigation into OceanGate’s Titan submersible incident has begun after over a year of speculation.
The lead engineer was fired after raising concerns about design decisions despite his experience working on the space shuttle solid rocket boosters.
David Lockridge, a Scottish submersible expert, was also fired after repeatedly confronting the CEO, Stockton Rush, over safety concerns.
CEO Stockton Rush previously crashed a submarine into the wreck of the Andrea Doria, raising further questions about his competence.
The testimony by Tim Catterson, who was involved in the operation, details how communication with the Titan submersible was lost just before disaster struck.
The implosion was instantaneous due to extreme water pressure, described as a transition where human biology turns into physics.
New footage from an ROV shows the failed pressure hull and parts of the submersible, giving clues to the cause of the disaster.
Initial assumptions pointed to the carbon fiber pressure hull being the point of failure, as carbon fiber was seen as a risky choice for deep-sea submersibles.
The US Navy had previously tested carbon fiber submersibles, but OceanGate’s design was criticized for potential flaws in how materials like carbon fiber and titanium were integrated.
The ROV footage suggests the implosion began at the front of the pressure vessel, causing carbon fiber to be pushed back and crushing everything inside.
The failure likely occurred at the interface between the carbon fiber barrel and the titanium end rings, potentially due to poor material integration or stress at the joints.
David Lockridge highlighted potential construction issues, such as humidity and substandard prepreg carbon fiber material being used in building the hull.
Poor construction practices, including potential excess stress at the joints and mismatched material compression properties, may have contributed to the failure.
Footage of the epoxy glue interface between carbon fiber and titanium shows concerns about the build quality of the vessel.
Stockton Rush's cost-cutting decisions, including a homemade CO2 scrubber and avoidance of regulatory oversight, raise further concerns about safety and design integrity.
Transcripts
hello it's Scott Manley here it's been
over a year since ocean Gates Titan
submersible was crushed while visiting
the wreck of the Titanic and now we are
finally getting a look at the
investigation that has been going on
into what happened for the last couple
of days I've been watching and listening
to Witnesses who have been testifying
before uh you know US Coast Guard uh
inquiry I think we've got like another 9
days wor of testimony and a lot of
witnesses but the ones we've seen so far
are well they've been they've told me a
lot and this is I'm fascinated by the
way things fail but we have the lead
engineer who was fired after questioning
some of the design decisions his
background by the way includes work on
the space shuttle solid rocket boosters
and then yesterday we had uh David
Lockridge who's a Scottish submersible
expert who ran their operations uh right
up until the point he get fired for you
know embar ing the CEO a little too many
times he went into detail on how the CEO
Stockton Rush crashed a submarine into
the wreck of the andread DOR and then
there's Tim catterson who he put the sub
in the water he watched it go down had
breakfast came back and found out they'd
lost Communications he ended up sticking
around throughout the search and rescue
and recovery and I'm sure you know that
I am fascinated by engineering disasters
and you know understanding why things
failed does a lot is a lot to do with
how I learn how things work and so yes I
have a you certain you know let's say
morbid Fascination about how exactly
this failed obviously very early on uh I
was sure this was going to be a failure
and it was going to be recovering not
bodies but remains with water pressures
of 400 atmospheres or thereabouts the
failure of the submarine would have been
mercifully instantaneous
at the time I believe the phrase that I
used was that you know humans in this
situation stopped being biology and
started being physics and honestly that
was paraphrasing
XKCD but even with this knowledge that
the implosion of the submersible would
have been violent and instantaneous that
still left a lot of questions about
exactly how this would happen would it
was the implosion a failure in the
carbon fiber around the middle at the
ends was it the the window which of
course was not rated to those depths
what exactly happened and we didn't have
any clues we had some pictures of
wreckage well now we actually have
footage from an ROV from pelagic
research these uh this this was actually
I believe the second ROV the first one
was from a different uh ship and it was
not able to handle the depths and got
crushed but this shows us the footage
which was the moment where they were
absolutely sure there was no recovery
possible showing the T tail cone from
Ocean Gate submersible damaged but
actually largely intact and many people
have been pointing out the ratchet strap
which is wrapped around it and it seems
to have worked just fine so this was a
non-pressurized section in the hull that
contained support equipment it contained
like batteries it contained
Communications it powered the thrusters
and in front of that was actually the
pressurized section this section didn't
fail this was just separated from the
rest when the pressure vessel in front
of it had a catastrophic failure the
basic design had a cylindrical carbon
fiber pressure section with titanium
hemispheres on each end the service
module on the back and then around this
there were the thrusters the landing
gear uh and various other pieces of
hardware and the general assumption was
that the carbon fiber had failed why
because everybody thought that carbon
fiber being used in a submersible was a
bad idea albeit despite the fact that
the US Navy had in fact successfully
built a carbon fiber submersible that
went to deeper depths for many more um
voyages the advanced underwater search
system was basically a one-off carbon
fiber pressure Hull vehicle and they had
been testing it because they wanted to
consider moving larger submersibles to
um you know Carbon Fiber based system
because it would be easier to build that
kind of stuff I believe this also used
titanium hemispheres at each end so
there was a lot of detail out there on
how this thing gets built as part of the
hearing they've also posted a number of
other documents online giving us new
details into you know the this the work
that was done including a bunch of
engineering studies finite element
analysis looking at the structure and
specifically saying well you know the
failure mode The Logical failure mode
would be a collapse a Buckle in the
middle of the vessel and sure well this
shows the could work on paper
translating the paper into a working
product sometimes leads to imperfections
anyway one of the important things they
also published was the transcript it and
they did it in the form of an animation
showing basically the final um you know
desent and what is important to take
away from this is that this wasn't
something where they thought there was
something going wrong if there it was
that wasn't evidence in any of the
communications what we do see is the
communications were really unreliable
this is via an acoustic modem basically
it's making click sounds that are
traveling through the water to the ship
up top and the messages are piggybacked
on top of this there's also some
Telemetry being sent up and that's how
they know the depth that it's at now the
last message that was sent says dropped
two weights and then a few seconds later
contact is lost this was at a depth of
33 346 M they still had a few hundred M
to go towards the bottom this wasn't an
emergency situation if they were wanting
to come back up they would have dropped
more weights no this was just to slow
their descent so that they wouldn't come
to the bottom you know and potentially
Bang into things I I mean to be clear we
can't know for sure maybe the hull was
making weird noises and people were
asking to go back up and he just said oh
we'll drop a couple of Weights we don't
honestly know but now as of a few hours
ago we have the first footage from the
ROV showing the failed pressure Hull and
this does show probably where the
failure began to happen so what we're
seeing here that is the nose cone that
is the Sor of the front hemisphere there
we saw that come up to the surface
without the window in it it doesn't look
like the windows there but there is the
main pressure Hull and around it you can
see shattered pieces of carbon fiber
composite you can also see the rear uh
hemisphere you can tell it's the rear
hemisphere because it has the anchor
points for the the tail cone there so if
we pause it like first of all you can
see that a lot of the carbon fiber
composite has essentially been pushed
back inside that tail cone and yes that
is where the occupance would be and and
you can imagine with that pressure
pushing that material in very quickly it
would just be a mess like the human
brain works on orders of a fraction of a
second this would take milliseconds the
the the brain simply wouldn't perceive
this happening before it stopped
functioning so now in front of the rear
Dome you can also see the titanium ring
which was interfaced to the barrel
section to the the carbon fiber section
now if you compare this to the nose it's
just sitting there like on its own
there's very little debris around it so
this is telling me that the failure that
happened was at the front of the
pressure module so the water is all
flowing in from one end carrying the
debris down and the other end is more or
less just kicked off by the rebound
that's why it's kind of clean also we
know that it wasn't the window that
failed because if the window had failed
you would have water flowing in and then
you would basically have the uh Hull
getting blasted outwards instead we see
uh carbon fiber being pushed into the
rear of that hemisphere that means it
was an implosion of the carbon fiber
vessel starting at the forward Dome and
the difference is so Stark this leads me
to believe that this is actually a
failure at the interface between the uh
carbon fiber barrel and the titanium
rings which are used to mount on the end
plates now notably nowhere in this
footage do I see any sign of that
forward ring it was clearly kicked away
from this and moved sufficiently fast
that it it's fallen out of sight and to
be fair it is probably more you know
like aerodynamic hydrodynamic I guess
than those big spherical end caps so
it's likely that it moved a bit further
after the initial event and given that
the event probably began around that
ring I could see it getting pushed a bit
faster I suspect we're going to get more
details on this uh in coming days I I'm
pretty sure there will be some evidence
on the forward ring which was absolutely
brought to shore okay so just to explain
what I I just said the this is what I
think actually happened I think the
failure begins somewhere along this
front bulk head right somewhere between
these two things and you got to imagine
yes that there is a bulk head here sorry
they have a sphere right here right and
you've got the window on the front and
somewhere around this
circumference water basically starts
pushing in or it breaks or there's a
crack and the cracks once a crack starts
it propagates backwards right you get
water will start pushing its way in and
you got imagine that this stuff starts
getting pushed in all the way around
right so the water is pushing this in
and as it runs down you're going to have
these cracks and more stuff is going to
get pushed backwards like this as the
sides get squished inwards right so this
is what's happening now equally you got
the water is kind of rushing into this
Gap here and it fills this Gap and will
pop this window out that's why it's not
in there there and the pressure will
also just knock this entire section off
on its own right the water's like flying
backwards it smashes into this bulkhead
obviously everything in here gets
smashed up against this bumps into this
and the tail will get detached off on
its own as it recoils so what you're
left with is the hemisphere the
ring and uh a whole bunch of carbon
fiber debris and whatever is left left
inside this all shattered that's what I
think this is showing this is why I
think we have a failure here if we had a
failure in the middle then this sort of
failure process would would propagate in
both directions and you would have
carbon fiber debris in here and in here
right that is my conjecture I should
also point out that this is radically
different from all the other uh Ocean
Gate Titan failure simulations and
there's been a lot of these on YouTube
using a very sophisticated techniques I
will say great work but they all show a
failure in the middle of the vessel
because that's where the peak stress is
so now I'm sure we'll see some of these
people redo their work with the new
knowledge that we have gained in the
last uh you couple of days and so we do
actually have footage of the
installation of these titanium end Rings
the end rings that act as the interface
to the hemispheres and the way this
works it is literally like an epoxy glue
that gets laid on along the end of this
you don't want it to be too thick it has
to be a nice thin even layer and then
you have to do the same to your titanium
rings and you see that they have a
Groove which more or less matches to the
dimensions of the uh the carbon fiber
pressure Hull and then of course you got
to line this up drop it in there and it
will stick in place and that's your
interface and if you're sitting there
looking at this and saying well that's
obviously a newbie stake they shouldn't
have done that this is pretty much what
the US Navy did on their design so um
it's not necessarily bad but I think the
problem is a little more subtle than
this being a dumb idea so there's like a
300 page paper on that US Navy submarine
design and they actually test models to
destruction but they they point out that
when they did the test of Destruction
they did it using steel end plates and
if if I remember correctly they go into
some detail pointing out that you have
to match basically the compressive modu
so in engineering you have like the
modulus of compression and tension
basically how much force you put on it
changes the length of something so
modulus of compression is just like how
much it changes when you apply a certain
pressure and you need to have the
titanium section and the carbon fiber
section both agree rough on how much
they Flex when pressure is applied
otherwise what will happen is you will
get a transfer you will get extra stress
at the joins like over the last year
we've heard a lot of stories about how
the carbon fiber composite used in this
may have been you know a little cut
price that they might have bought some
prepreg cheap from boing that was passed
at sell by dat that they might not have
you know controlled the environment
during the the layup as well as they
could have there could be excess
humidity that there might have been
there might have been no like testing
that was performed and so if this was
even you know off by a few percent then
that could well add up to extra stress
at these interfaces that M might
accidentally or might ultimately explain
why we got this failure here of course
it could just be that the glue was crap
and that fell apart but you know I'm
trying to find um interesting answers
let's say and yeah interesting is one
way of describing some of the photos
that we saw of the construction like
this jubia o-ring design uh these were
brought out by David this is a piece of
carbon fiber composite which was cut off
the end on the right there that is
showing light from a flashlight shining
through this now to be fair this is from
the end piece of the very first one that
they did when you are like laying up a
cylinder right you're basically running
this stuff in a spiral pattern it's like
a ribbon you're laying as a spiral
pattern and as you get to the end you
have to change direction and when you
change direction then the layup doesn't
quite lay flat so you get a little
excess at the end where things aren't
quite as good as they should be and of
course you then fix this by just cutting
off those end pieces and they gave out
those end pieces to uh like friends
people that were involved and of course
that doesn't it doesn't look great but
that was an end piece so hey you know
maybe it's okay how about this this was
uh Stockton's idea for how they would do
atmosphere scrubbing as I'm sure you
know the human body metabolizes its food
and it you're exhaling excess carbon
dioxide and water and if you're not
dumping the atmosphere overboard you
need to scrub that out so you have
things like lithium hydroxide and you
will blow air over it and it will absorb
it well his homade oxygen scrubber
design was a you know a plastic
container with uh a base that was
instead a grill of metal you would put
your absorbent in that and then there
was like a little PC you know computer
fan at the top that would blow air
through it I'm not sure how well this
would work but frankly I'm just
terrified that that was you know what
their prototype was I mean people are
making jokes about the video game
controller but actually I don't have a
problem with that at all it was the
multitude of other Corners which were
cut in the name of cut
costs compounded by his uh continual
efforts to sidestep regulations and fire
anybody who thought they knew better and
disagreed with the designs so look I'm
sure we're going to find out a whole lot
more in the coming days I know I'm going
to be listening I'm sure some of you
might start but uh I I I'm sure some of
the people will tell me all sorts of
fascinating and new interesting things
but I wish I didn't have to learn things
this way I'm Scott Manley fly safe
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