#463 | Jim Sciutto: Are the US, China, and Russia on the Path to World War? - The Realignment Pod

Summary

In this episode of the 'Realignment' podcast, Marshall interviews CNN's Chief National Security analyst, Jim Sciutto, who discusses his new book, 'The Return of Great Powers.' The conversation delves into the precarious nature of current global geopolitics, focusing on potential conflicts in regions like Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Russia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. Sciutto argues that the world may be at a brink of a significant conflict, emphasizing the need for strategic foreign policy decisions to prevent or deter war. The discussion also touches on the role of major powers like Russia and China and the importance of understanding their actions and alliances in this geopolitical context.

Takeaways

• 😀 Marshall hosts CNN's Chief National Security Analyst Jim Shudo on the Realignment podcast, discussing the potential for global conflict in the context of current geopolitical tensions.
• 🌍 The conversation centers on the precarious state of global affairs, particularly focusing on Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Russia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East.
• 📚 Jim Shudo introduces his new book, 'The Return of Great Powers: Russia, China, and the Next World War', arguing for the necessity to understand our geopolitical moment through the possibility of a global conflict.
• 🔍 The discussion highlights the complexity of foreign policy and national security choices facing nations, underlining the importance of deterrence and conflict prevention strategies.
• 🇷🇺🇨🇳 Shudo emphasizes the unique danger of the current geopolitical landscape, marked by the alignment of Russia and China against the interests of the US and its allies.
• 📞 A key concern raised is the erosion of diplomatic communication channels and treaties that previously helped avoid open conflicts, alongside the rise of cyber warfare and the weaponization of space.
• 💣 The potential for a direct conflict, akin to a 'hot war', is discussed, with a focus on how to recognize and navigate the 'ingredients' that could lead to such a scenario.
• 🕊️ Jim Shudo stresses the importance of seeking paths to peace, consulting with global leaders and diplomats to explore avenues for avoiding a full-scale global conflict.
• 📈 The conversation delves into the significance of understanding the interconnectedness of regional conflicts and how actions in one area can influence aggressions in another.
• 📅 The podcast sheds light on the role of the American electoral process and its potential impact on international alliances and the global security architecture.

Q & A

What is Jim Shudo's book about, and why is the title 'The Return of Great Powers' considered provocative?

Jim Shudo's book, 'The Return of Great Powers: Russia, China and the next World War,' discusses the current geopolitical tensions and the possibility of a global conflict involving major world powers like Russia and China. The title is considered provocative because it suggests a shift towards a more confrontational and dangerous global situation, reminiscent of past world wars.

Why does Jim Shudo believe the current geopolitical situation is more dangerous than the Cold War?

Jim Shudo believes the current geopolitical situation is more dangerous than the Cold War due to the presence of two great power adversaries, Russia and China, and their 'no limits' partnership. Additionally, he points to the lack of communication channels, such as hotlines and treaties, that previously helped avoid open conflict, as well as new categories of weapons and declining nuclear treaties.

What parallels does Jim Shudo draw between the current geopolitical moment and the year 1939?

Jim Shudo draws parallels between the current geopolitical moment and 1939 by noting the aggression of a great power (Russia) in redrawing borders through force, similar to Hitler's actions with the Sudetenland and Poland. He also mentions the appeasement tactics of some, likening them to Neville Chamberlain's approach, and the danger of underestimating an aggressor's ambitions.

How does the concept of 'appeasement' relate to the current conflicts involving Russia and China according to Jim Shudo?

The concept of 'appeasement' relates to current conflicts involving Russia and China as some believe making concessions, like ceding territory, might lead to peace. Jim Shudo argues this is a mistaken belief, drawing parallels to historical appeasement of Hitler, and suggests that concessions to aggressors like Putin may only encourage further aggression.

What impact does Jim Shudo suggest the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict might have on Taiwan?

Jim Shudo suggests that the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict could significantly impact Taiwan, as a Russian victory could embolden China to consider military action against Taiwan, seeing it as an opportunity to advance its territorial ambitions with less fear of international intervention.

How does the potential re-election of Donald Trump factor into Jim Shudo's analysis of global security?

Jim Shudo factors in the potential re-election of Donald Trump into his analysis by suggesting it could lead to major shifts in U.S. foreign policy, including the possible abandonment of NATO and other alliances, which could significantly impact global security and embolden adversarial nations like Russia and China.

What is Jim Shudo's stance on the American public's engagement with foreign conflicts like Ukraine and Taiwan?

Jim Shudo believes the American public should be more engaged and informed about foreign conflicts like Ukraine and Taiwan. He argues that while there is initial support for such conflicts, there tends to be a decline in interest over time, which can impact the U.S.'s ability to effectively respond and support these nations.

Why does Jim Shudo emphasize the interconnectedness of global conflicts in today's geopolitical climate?

Jim Shudo emphasizes the interconnectedness of global conflicts to highlight how actions in one region, like Eastern Europe or the Indo-Pacific, can influence behaviors and decisions of states in other regions. He argues that understanding this interconnectedness is crucial for developing comprehensive strategies to maintain global stability and deter aggressors.

What arguments does Jim Shudo present against the notion of isolationism in response to global conflicts?

Jim Shudo presents arguments against isolationism by stressing that ignoring or withdrawing from global conflicts can lead to greater instability and embolden aggressors. He believes active engagement and deterrence are necessary to maintain international order and prevent the spread of conflict.

What does Jim Shudo suggest are the key components to avoiding the 'next World War'?

Jim Shudo suggests that the key components to avoiding the 'next World War' include recognizing the seriousness of current geopolitical tensions, maintaining strong alliances, communicating clear deterrence strategies, and making informed decisions based on historical precedents and the interconnected nature of global affairs.

Outlines

00:00

🌍 The Precarious State of Global Politics

Marshall introduces Jim Shido, CNN's Chief National Security Analyst, to discuss his new book 'The Return of Great Powers: Russia, China, and the Next World War'. The conversation revolves around the current volatile geopolitical climate, emphasizing the risk of a global conflict involving major powers like Russia and China. Shido argues that the world is at a precarious moment, drawing parallels between today's international tensions and past conflicts. The discussion underlines the significance of understanding the dynamics between major powers and the potential for these tensions to escalate into war. Key points include the importance of deterrence, the challenges posed by new forms of warfare like cyber attacks, and the necessity for strategic international relations policies to prevent conflict.

05:01

🔍 Analyzing the Return of Great Power Conflicts

This segment delves deeper into the concept of the 'return of great power conflict', with Shido explaining the choice of titling his book to imply the imminent risk of a world war rather than a new Cold War. He highlights the uniqueness of the current geopolitical situation, including the alliance between Russia and China, the dissolution of key treaties, and the absence of mechanisms to prevent escalation. The conversation also covers historical parallels to the 1939 prelude to World War II, emphasizing Putin's aggressive expansionism reminiscent of Hitler's actions. The discussion shifts to the strategic mistakes and potential consequences of underestimating Putin's ambitions, comparing current global tensions with past conflicts and the importance of recognizing and addressing these challenges to avoid a similar catastrophic outcome.

10:04

🛡️ The Stakes of Eastern European Security

This paragraph focuses on the security concerns of Eastern European countries in the face of Russian aggression. It discusses the perspectives of leaders from countries like Estonia and Poland, who view themselves as potential next targets of Russian expansion. The narrative contrasts the sense of urgency and preparedness in Eastern Europe with the varying levels of concern in Western European nations. It also touches upon the strategic importance of NATO's unity and commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause, in deterring Russian aggression. The conversation sheds light on the complexities of European security dynamics and the critical role of transatlantic alliances in maintaining regional stability.

15:06

🌐 The Global Implications of American Leadership

This part examines the potential consequences of U.S. leadership changes on international security and alliances, particularly focusing on the contrasting foreign policy approaches between the Biden administration and Donald Trump. It explores the implications of Trump's skepticism towards NATO and traditional U.S. alliances, and how such attitudes could drastically alter America's role in the world. The segment discusses the concern among European leaders regarding the unpredictability of U.S. commitment to global security under different administrations. It highlights the strategic and existential dilemmas faced by the U.S. and its allies in the context of great power competition, underscoring the importance of leadership in shaping the international order.

20:08

🔖 Reflecting on Taiwan's Geopolitical Vulnerability

The conversation shifts to Taiwan's precarious position in the face of potential Chinese aggression, drawing parallels with Ukraine's situation. The segment addresses the political dynamics within the U.S. affecting support for Taiwan and Ukraine, and how shifts in American foreign policy could influence the outcomes of these conflicts. It discusses the importance of a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. to support democracies facing aggression and the challenges of maintaining such support over time. The narrative emphasizes the need for strategic clarity and the risks associated with failing to deter authoritarian powers from encroaching on sovereign states.

25:10

📚 Leveraging Historical Insights for Contemporary Strategy

This paragraph explores how lessons from historical conflicts and diplomatic crises can inform current strategies to manage and prevent global conflicts. It discusses the importance of understanding the dynamics that led to World War II and how similar patterns of aggression and expansionism are observable today. The segment also touches on the significance of deterrence, the role of military alliances like NATO, and the necessity of engaging the public in conversations about national security and the costs of potential conflicts. The narrative advocates for a nuanced approach to foreign policy that learns from the past while addressing the complexities of the present geopolitical landscape.

Keywords

💡Great Power Competition

Great Power Competition refers to the strategic rivalry between major world powers, particularly in the context of military, economic, and political influence. In the video, this concept is central as it discusses the dynamics between the United States, Russia, and China, highlighting how these countries' interactions could potentially lead to global conflict. The script illustrates the idea by mentioning Russia and China's 'no limits' partnership and the military aggressions in regions like Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, underlining the precarious state of current geopolitical relations.

💡Return of Great Powers

The term 'Return of Great Powers' in the script underscores the resurgence of influential nations, specifically Russia and China, asserting their power on the global stage. This resurgence is characterized by aggressive territorial ambitions and a challenge to the existing international order, signaling a shift away from a unipolar world dominated by the United States to a more multipolar world order. The concept is crucial as it frames the discussion around how these powers' actions, especially in regions like Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, could precipitate a next world war.

💡Geopolitical moment

The 'Geopolitical moment' described in the video script refers to the current state of international relations marked by heightened tensions, conflicts, and strategic competition among major powers. This moment is precarious due to the potential for these tensions to escalate into more significant conflicts, as seen in Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific. The script uses this term to emphasize the importance of understanding and addressing these tensions to prevent a global conflict.

💡Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade adversaries from taking unwanted actions, typically through the threat of retaliation. In the video, deterrence is discussed as crucial for preventing conflicts, especially in the context of the United States and its allies responding to aggressions by Russia and China. The script mentions the need for credible deterrence measures to prevent further territorial expansions and maintain global peace.

💡1939 moment

The '1939 moment' is a historical analogy used in the script to compare the current geopolitical tensions with the period just before the outbreak of World War II. This comparison is made to highlight the seriousness of today's geopolitical risks and the potential for large-scale conflict if current tensions are not managed properly. It serves as a cautionary reference, urging for proactive measures to prevent history from repeating itself.

💡Treaties and Communication

In the script, 'Treaties and Communication' refers to the diplomatic and legal mechanisms that have historically been used to prevent conflicts or manage tensions between countries. The discussion points out that many of these mechanisms either no longer exist or are ineffective in the current geopolitical climate, increasing the risk of misunderstandings or unintended escalations that could lead to conflict. This concept underscores the importance of establishing and maintaining open lines of communication and agreements to ensure global stability.

💡Cyber weapons

Cyber weapons are sophisticated software tools designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems, networks, or digital devices, often used in the context of cyber warfare or espionage. The script mentions cyber weapons as part of the modern arsenal in the great power competition, highlighting their use in ongoing low-level conflicts between major powers and the need for treaties and norms to manage this new domain of warfare.

💡Weaponization of Space

The 'Weaponization of Space' refers to the development and deployment of weapons in outer space, or systems on Earth that can attack space assets. This concept is mentioned in the script as an emerging battleground in the rivalry between great powers, emphasizing the need for international agreements to prevent space from becoming a conflict zone. The script highlights the lack of existing treaties covering this new domain, raising concerns about the potential for an arms race in space.

💡Nuclear treaties

Nuclear treaties are agreements between countries that aim to regulate and limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. The script discusses the decline of nuclear treaties and the absence of such agreements with China, which is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. This situation is presented as a critical risk factor for global security, emphasizing the need for new treaties to prevent an arms race and potential nuclear conflict.

💡Paths to Peace

The term 'Paths to Peace' in the script refers to the strategies and diplomatic efforts needed to prevent the escalation of current geopolitical tensions into a global conflict. This concept is crucial as it encapsulates the discussion around finding solutions that address the root causes of tensions, encourage dialogue and cooperation, and ultimately steer the world away from the brink of war. It represents a call to action for leaders and policymakers to work towards sustainable peace.

Highlights

Jim Sciutto discusses the precarious current geopolitical moment through the lens of a possible global conflict involving major powers like Russia and China.

The discussion emphasizes the interconnectedness of various global conflicts and the importance of deterrence in preventing escalation.

Sciutto argues that we are in a more dangerous situation than the Cold War due to multiple great power adversaries and the erosion of communication and treaties.

The concept of a 'no limits' partnership between Russia and China is highlighted as a significant factor in the geopolitical landscape.

Sciutto suggests the current era is more volatile due to new categories of weapons, cyber warfare, and the decline of nuclear treaties.

The book discusses the importance of recognizing the signs of escalating conflict and finding paths to peace.

There's a comparison between Putin's ambitions to Hitler's actions, suggesting a parallel in their attempts to expand territory by force.

The conversation explores how Eastern European countries view the threat from Russia based on historical experiences.

Discussion on how the West's reaction to Russia's aggression towards Ukraine could influence China's actions regarding Taiwan.

The potential impact of a second Trump term on NATO and US foreign policy is critically examined.

Sciutto emphasizes the interconnectedness of global conflicts and the necessity for a unified response.

The book explores the possibility of a hot war and the importance of preparing for the consequences of such conflicts.

The discussion touches on the public's role in understanding and responding to global conflicts.

Sciutto calls for a substantive debate on the costs and benefits of American military involvement in conflicts like Ukraine and Taiwan.

The conversation concludes with a reflection on the challenges of rallying a divided America and the world in response to great power conflicts.

Transcripts

Marshall here welcome back to the

YouTube version of the realignment

podcast my guest today is CNN's Chief

National Security analyst Jim Shido he's

got a new book out it's called The

Return of great Powers Russia China and

the next World War obviously that's a

very provocative title but I think in

this conversation Jim makes a pretty

convincing case that we should

understand how precarious our current

geopolitical moment is through the lens

of a possible global conflict we have

everything in Ukraine Eastern Europe

Russia obviously the indopacific and the

Middle East there are a bunch of bills

that could come due over the next few

years and understanding how we can work

to either deter or prevent a conflict

like this is going to be absolutely key

I think another key point of this

conversation is that we Face a variety

of huge choices when it comes to each of

these conflicts separately and obviously

all of them together so understanding

the foreign policy and National Security

choices we have is key to moving forward

hope you all enjoy the

conversation Jim shudo welcome welcome

to the realignment thanks so much for

having me yeah I'm glad to have you here

you're kind of kicking off a Spate of

books focused on great power competition

there are a bunch of these uh books

coming out in the next few months so I'm

glad we can start here I want to start

with the actual title of the book

because you make a very specific choice

that folks who are dialed into these

debates were probably going to take

notice of so the title is the return of

great Powers Russia China and the next

World War why did you choose to title it

the next next World War and not the next

cold war or not end the new Cold War why

did you make the world war choice

because I think it is not a Cold War I

think it's hotter than that it's it's

not quite a hot War but it has the

ingredients for it and while there are

parallels to the last Cold War there are

a lot of differences that make it

fundamentally more dangerous in my view

one of which is that instead of having

one great power adversary for the US and

its allies in Russia you have two russan

and China and those two joining hands I

I talk a lot in the book about how uh

they they announced this no limits

partnership uh Xi Jinping and and

Vladimir Putin did just weeks before the

Ukraine Invasion uh so that's one piece

that is that is different we also are

are in in a time when a lot of the uh

treaties means of communication the

hotlines and so on they either don't

exist or they don't exist anymore never

existed or don't exist anymore uh ways

that we had developed in the last Cold

War to avoid open conflict uh they're

just not there and we have whole new

categories of weapons where there's

already a kind of simmering conflict

underway cyber weapons you know regular

attacks back and forth the weaponization

of space and and a decline of nuclear

treaties with Russia and no nuclear

treaties with China which is rapidly

ramping up its nuclear Arsenal I I'm not

I'm certainly not rooting for a hot War

for the next World War um and I don't

think it's inevitable but I do think the

ingredients are there and that we have

to recognize those ingredients and then

find paths to peace the the last chapter

of the book is called paths to peace so

uh in which I pull uh smarter people

than myself leaders around the world

diplomats and so on for ways to avoid it

becoming the next uh the next uh World

War um but I do think it's fundamentally

different from a cold war that's really

interesting cuz I like the way you

answered that because immediately I

started thinking about how well you know

in the 80s during the Cold War we armed

the mujahadin against the Soviet Union

but at a key point though to your point

about how Russia and China are very

intertwined China was aligned towards us

during that period so it's even within

like the metaphor of us thinking about

previous eras where we've used US

military and intelligence support with a

qu quas like proxy situation um even

that's going to differ a lot from the

current situation we're in now so let's

take another step back um and in your

previous um podcast appearances and in

the book itself you talk about how we

are living in a 1939 moment I'd like you

to Ru like expand and articulate why you

think that's true so I I've been writing

for some time and Reporting on the

deteriorating relationships between the

US Russia and China I wrote a book in

2019 called The Shadow War the thesis of

that was that there was already a

low-level conflict China and Russia

seeking to undermine the US and its

allies but below the threshold of an

open War of a hot War a shooting war in

February 2022 I found myself in Ukraine

as the Russian invasion began uh and as

I saw those cruise missiles falling on

Ukrainian cities and the tanks rolling

across the border it with Russia

beginning the largest War we've seen

since World War II uh the bloodiest uh

that that was a clean break with with

that past if things had been

deteriorating sliding towards this

return of great power conflict that was

the clean break a a state a great power

adversary said decided that it could use

military force in fact the bulk of its

conventional military forces to slice

off a giant piece of Europe not not a

tiny sliver right but the largest

country in Europe by force of arms and

and that struck me as fundamentally

different um and with a lot of parallels

to

1939 uh Hitler did the same with the

sudet land with with Poland um and there

were very similarly at the time those

who said let's just give it to him let's

not start another war war the Neville

chamberlains of the world and that it

all will be fine and he'll be satisfied

Putin like Hitler shows no evidence of

being satisfied with each land grabb as

he attempts to rebuild the old Soviet

Union uh he takes one and then he says

okay what can I take next there's uh I

speak at Great length with the Estonian

prime minister kayak kalis who's right

on the front lines of this conflict and

she she quotes frequently uh Winston

Churchill about Hitler the crocodile uh

that that an appeaser is someone who

feeds the crocodile expecting that he or

she will be its last meal and she sees

parallels between Hitler and Putin Putin

that the make a deal Camp imagines that

if you just seed this piece of Ukraine

or that piece of Georgia or that piece

of mova or this next bigger piece of

Ukraine all will be fine and we can go

back to where we were but the fact is I

I don't believe that's true and the

folks I spoke to for this book around

the world Europe Asia they don't believe

that's true and there's a direct

connection between the fate of Ukraine

with the fate of Taiwan as well because

China might very well make that

crocodile's choice right if if Ukraine

were to fall and say you know what maybe

I can get away with taking Taiwan I

don't mean to quibble but I want to be

precise about something you said you

said this was the biggest war um since

uh World War II we're obviously meaning

in the context of Europe um there were

obviously Vietnam War was was bigger um

the you know various wars Civil Wars in

postc colonial Africa um especially um

in central Africa were bigger but I

think at a key point if we're

understanding why the US succeeded in

the Cold War I'd say the way of

measuring our success was twice in two

generations we had to send millions of

American soldiers um Marines Etc there

weren't Airmen at the time but over to

fight um over those conflicts and the

fact that that didn't happen from 45 to

1991 is a real achievement so the fact

that you're seeing another one of those

Wars that brings in obviously American

assets and then makes us ask questions

about our status of forces our

commitments that's what the real post

disaster is listen and to be clear I was

certainly talking about the largest war

in Europe since World War II and don't

mean to forget the lessons of Vietnam

and it's interesting because folks have

asked me you know is this a new domino

theory in effect which of course was

used to justify the Vietnam War now when

you look back at history uh the the the

Domino Theory didn't hold in Vietnam

because there was a fundamental us

reading of what that war was about right

we we looked at it as well this is

really a Soviet thing uh that that

they're looking to grab a piece of Asia

when when in reality was a Civil War and

uh when you look at the historical

record it wasn't really their fight I I

would argue that this one very much is

Russia F but it is Russian forces right

that have come across the border and and

as we as we try to assess what Putin's

view is of it just listen to what he

says right listen to how he talks about

how Ukraine never existed as a country

uh and then how he talks about his next

targets he says very similar things

about the Baltic states that they should

never have been independent and by the

way if you look at history you know for

centuries they've been part of you know

he he manufactures the history to his

own convenience um and that's why I I I

believe that that and again I don't use

the Domino Theory uh mantra for this

book but that this one is more

substantively these conflicts more

substantively tied to the great power

conflict than than Wars of the past that

that we misread I I think the historical

record is shown when I think that the

the actual issue with Vietnam is it's

not just to your point um the US foreign

policy establishment misinterpreting a

postcolonial Civil War as being a part

of a broader geopolitical um world

situation it's actually that that was

offensive in our sense as in the point

was okay so we see this conflict we're

going to deploy millions and millions of

American um troops um in order to affect

what one side of the war here at a key

point though we have said from the start

we are not deploying um American troops

um in Ukraine and secondly when we're

talking about the implications for

Poland for the Baltic companies

countries we're speaking in purely

defensive manners we are not saying okay

there's this domino theory let's Rush In

And reach for Moscow by winter we are

just saying hey let's maintain our

alliances let's back stop our production

let's B our supply chains ready and I

just feel that so many times on the kind

of Quasi isolationist side that ISS she

was missed in terms of how we're

actually determining our response to the

strong possibility that this could

extend beyond Ukraine it's a great it's

a great point the other the other piece

is that listen to our allies on this

right when when the Polish leaders and

the Estonian leaders and lithuanians and

others speak about the Russia threat in

very Stark terms and they say we're

Russia's next targets we should listen

to them because they're not basing this

on imagination right have a real world

personal direct experience of living

under the Russian yo yoke only a

generation ago not decades ago Estonia

got its independence in 1991 right I was

in college um you know the Warsaw Pact

only dissolved you know in the in the

early 1990s so the Poland of the world

they know what it's like to live under

Russia and they're saying we don't want

that again you know so I think um again

it's not a it's not a policy that

developed independently in in you know

the think tanks of Washington right this

is something that is developed from the

choices the actual choices of people in

Eastern Europe or I mean look at the

ukrainians you know Russia has been

meddling in Ukraine going back to 2000

well long time but back to the 2004

election when there was a candidate

there you may remember Victor Yenko they

didn't like him he was leaning too far

uh to towards Western Europe which

Ukrainian voters by the way wanted him

to do and they poisoned him you know uh

that that was the that was the upset in

Russia it was it was not that it was a

Us coup or anything like that it was

because they saw Ukraine making a choice

to move away from Russia and they would

not allow that and you know 18 years

later they they decide to invade let's

talk about Europe because the area where

I am most sympathetic to critics of the

Biden administration's approach is

basically this idea that if this is so

existential as you and I are agreeing

about if the stakes are so high why are

the Western Europeans dragging their

feets in way feet in ways that don't

seem consistent with the rhetorical

Stakes now you set out clearly the

Baltic countries the former Soviet Block

members Ukraine Poland Etc they are

currently acting in accord with all of

the rhetoric and the actual like policy

we're putting together here but it seems

as if part of the difficult uh position

we find ourselves as in is we're having

to defend Europe as a whole I mean just

like rhetorically and politically yet

there's Eastern Europe there's Central

Europe and there's Western Europe I'd

love for you to like articulate from

your reporting your personal experience

how we should understand these combined

Dynamics there there's definitely a

difference in point of view As you move

from east to west in Europe it's not

uniform but there's a difference the

Eastern facing Partners based on their

history and their proximity to the

Russian threat they are the most

concerned Kaya kalas Estonian prime

minister says in no uncertain terms we

will be next if Ukraine were to fall the

the Polish uh leaders say similar and

and and oftentimes and and a good deal

of this is in the book I coloss will

talk about how when she speaks to some

of her Western NATO the leaders of

Western NATO allies uh she says there

they're they're just not they're like ah

you know maybe it's going to be okay and

she's like no it's not going to be okay

she has to kind of rattle their cages a

bit it's not uniform right because if

you look at the

UK the furthest European NATO NATO Ally

from Russia they have been very

forthright from the beginning in terms

of weapon supplies and how they see this

threat and you've also seen a shift over

time I mean at the start of the war

Germany's foreign policy was engagement

with Russia through through years of

angala Mer merkel's leadership and

economic dependency energy dependency on

Russia they have broken both of those

those policies economic policy and

foreign policy macron he was talking to

Putin days before the Ukraine Invasion

saying there's a way out of this they're

not that serious we could find a way you

listen to macron's words today he's much

more forthright about the Russia threat

so there's been some shift but it's not

the same and some of that you see in

their defense Investments right uh

Estonia well above 3% some of those

central European Western European

countries well do we really need to

right now you know they've certainly

required more uh prodding you know over

time you know something I'm curious

about because there's actually two

different arguments that those Western

Europeans should be thinking about so

there is just the basic Russia threat

Ukraine needs to win argument which is

the one that the Biden Administration um

and other Western allies have been

advancing but the other deeper argument

is there's entirely a world it seems

like we're in a coin flip election

scenario where a empowered Donald Trump

fundamentally shifts the United States

away from Europe and if you know

anything about defense production and

all these like defense policy issues you

can't just wake up one day in 20126

after the US is out of NATO and say okay

we're going to start ramping up our

defense production we're going to start

making sure our supply chains are secure

that our energy policies are set you

actually have to start moving now so

that's the person that concerns me the

most um it seems to me that like it's

one thing for me as an American to

bemoan a trump who could remove us from

NATO on the other hand it sort of feels

like you're tearing hair out saying no

do you not understand how serious this

is and that's entirely different as I

said from the debate about well can the

Russians be held what we're really

describing here is the United States

that could entirely shift its post-war

positioning towards Europe so I'd love

to hear how you're seeing that reality

play out it's a great point I I have a

chapter on this in the book called the

Trump wild card you know whatever your

politics this election uh American

voters have a choice uh on how the US

interacts with the world and it's a

stark Choice B Biden uh you know called

a globalist but you know committed to

those uh those alliances committed

calling Russia and China out for for

what they are in North Korea and Iran

and not claiming As Trump and and many

of his supporters do that well we can

work with this guy and I I know how to I

know how to handle them um you know

whoever wins in November uh you either

stay the course on on what is a decades

old bipartisan us approach to adversar

and allies or you do a 180 a significant

180 under Donald Trump and for that it's

not just me or you talking I speak to

Trump's former senior advisers his

former Chief of Staff General John Kelly

his former National Security adviser

John Bolton his former deputy National

Security adviser Matthew pottinger

involved in his his Asia policy and they

say in a second Trump term he will leave

NATO or at least attempt to um Congress

has passed some legislation that

requires Congressional approval

but the fact is as commanderin-chief if

he says I am not going to send troops to

Estonia to defend it from Russia then

Article 5 of NATO means nothing he has

they say very little interest in the US

defense agreement with South Korea he

even talked in his first Administration

about taking troops off the peninsula

not a lot of interest in defending Japan

and with regards to Taiwan I have a

story in the book that Bolton tells of

trump in the Oval Office that when he

was president he would sit at the desk

and and take out a Sharpie and point to

the tip of the Sharpie and say see this

that's Taiwan and then point to his desk

and say that's China to make the point

that Taiwan has no chance against China

and therefore we have no business

defending them uh those are not nuances

or minor shifts on US policy US foreign

policy how it deals with the world those

are major shifts a reversal and not just

from Biden but from presidents going

back you know to FDR uh that's a choice

and and the the results November are

going to determine that not just for the

us but for our partners partners in

Europe Partners in Asia do you see the

Europeans especially in the west

internalizing this excellent political

reality you just described I asked them

all the time and I was like guys you

know this is a real possibility I now if

I ask them in public forums they'll say

well America's been a long all we we you

know we we have confidence in the

American system all that kind of stuff

I'm not going to comment on politics if

you ask them in private they know they

know that this is a major choice and

they are let's be frank they are rooting

against it very much because it it it

enormously affects their security uh

you've heard some public comments from

European leaders macron among them

saying we have to do more on our own now

we can't rely on the US as much and it's

true right I mean that's not a judgment

you if if you have a potential US

president who says things like Russia do

whatever the hell you want to NATO

allies if they don't pay up you got to

take that to heart and you got to make

plans for your own National Security um

so they know it it's interesting I

talked to um the Canadian foreign

minister in the book too and she talks

about this phenomenon of trump proofing

some agreements and plans and so on I

mean you can only do so much because the

US is such a dominant player in NATO our

military is the biggest in the world

there are things that only we can do but

they've tried to lock in some agreements

beyond the election to provide some

continuity the trouble is you know we're

we're the we're the Bear right we're

we're the Bear in this in this um in

this conflict and you know if if you

have a president who takes us out of it

or believes he could make accommodations

with Putin or she or Kim um that has

enormous effect you know speaking of

Taiwan something I'm really curious

about I think this is something that

folks should be increasingly focused on

is I if I'm in Taiwan my number one

concern would be how do I prevent what

happened with Ukraine from happening to

us and I don't mean in the sense of I

mean obviously like geopolitically

militarily they don't want to have a

Chinese invasion happen but what I'm

really talking about is the political

reality within Washington the war in

Ukraine starts um there's a very clear

consensus on a bipartisan level that

okay we should defend Ukraine we should

pass these Aid packages like there's a

consensus and then what you have happen

over the course of basically two years

is slowly and slow slowly slowly and

slowly the more isolationist parts of

the right or let's say the more America

First parts of the right so they would

describe themselves start gaining more

influence in the debate the political

Dynamics start shifting a bit it seems

clear to me that pretty quickly in 2025

let say there's any type of Taiwan

conflict you would see that similar

scenario replicate itself in a bunch of

ways I'm curious how you looking at but

both the foreign policy but also the

political dynamics of this issue would

see what should the Taiwanese learn from

the Ukraine experience in terms of the

bipartisan consensus falling apart you

know T when I came back from Ukraine in

Spring of 2022 after covering the start

of the invasion it struck me that I got

plotts from the left and the right from

Democratic and Republican congressmen

you know boy CNN you was you brought

such powerful stories from there uh you

know it was a and folks in the street

right they were watching that coverage

they felt that Ukraine was wronged uh

this shall not stand right and that was

that was the public commentary at the

time from left and right bipartisan

support for Ukraine uh it has changed uh

today now there are still majorities in

Congress that support aid for Ukraine

the big changes are one Donald Trump he

does not and and they don't want to get

on the wrong side of Donald Trump um so

that's one change the other is just a

kind of general and I've seen this in so

many wars even our own Wars American uh

short attention span right that in the

in the early days of the war they were

on it now it's lasted a little long why

isn't it over yet and do we you know are

do we really care that much and the

images of you know dead Ukrainian

civilians you see them less often so

it's easier to put a distance between

yourself and them um I mean listen we we

ran out of interest in our own Wars

right when you look in Iraq and

Afghanistan I certainly experienced that

as a reporter covering those Wars that

in the early days we didn't stop talking

about it then after a couple of years

you couldn't get on the news anymore so

I think you know one part of that trend

is is just the nature of how we operate

right I mean we're short attention span

we're a short attention span country but

the other piece is political and and his

name is Donald Trump he does not want to

help Ukraine and a lot of lawmakers even

ones Republicans who know the US should

fear their

own for their own political lives and

and don't um you know don't want to get

on the wrong side of him and I think you

could see similar with Taiwan if Trump

if if Trump believes uh you know the US

shouldn't be involved you'll see his

party line up as as as we've seen on so

many things so how does Taiwan manage

that I don't know I mean the difficulty

on CH Taiwan right is that at least this

President Biden has committed the US to

a military response I talk about this in

the book four times he has said in

public we will defend Taiwan militarily

which no US president has ever said

before we had strategic ambiguity sort

of a I don't know maybe we will maybe we

won't China but you know just you make

make your own bet on that and maybe we

show up right and now he's committed the

us and that that's fundamentally

different right because that that means

us lives service members lives at risk

which is another debate we should have

right is should the US go to war and

lose potentially many thousands of

service members which all the war games

show about Taiwan but I think some of

those Dynamics are likely to be

consistent you know my I'm curious what

you think about this just of observing

observing this as a um you know

political National Security analyst my

reaction has been a a key mistake that

was made and this is and saying the word

mistake is complicated because there's

always different actors and institutions

and players um it made a lot of sense at

the start of Russia's Invasion to so

personalize Ukraine around president

zilinski once again he stays in keev for

the first three days look at you know by

contrast you know the president of

Afghanistan fleeing with like gold in

his suitcase he was he was an exchange

student at my uh high school so you know

the worst ever Lake oo high school

graduate U but you know so so within six

months seeing the worst case of a US

Ally fleeing versus a US Ally staying

obviously personalizing that story

really matters and also once again we're

coming out of a world where so many

Americans have a deep personal

relationship or at least historical

relationship to Winston Church

leadership in World War II it made so

much sense in those first three months

to focus on that aspect of it but I feel

as if as we got further and further out

we just quickly saw that the person the

the personality based reality of that

relationship made it so it became so

easy for this to become a partisan

scuffle between individual with

political actors and zalinsky himself

instead of making it kind of about um

Ukraine broadly so I was so my kind of

thought here is if I'm Taiwan I want

this to be about Taiwan I want this to

be about the Taiwanese people um making

this about the specific relationships

that the president of Taiwan has or that

the lead of the Taiwanese military has

with specific American political actors

would probably be inadvisable in this

partisan environment but I'm curious

what You' think about that read I think

it's a good point I mean you want to

nationalize it as much as possible

because people can be as we've seen with

zalinski they could be right I me

the right has tarred zalinski often

based on nothing he's corrupt you know

he's he's doing it for the money you

know here's a guy who is you know under

threat they just you know Russia just

dropped a cruise missile uh on Odo while

he was there with the Greek Prime

Minister a few yards from where he was

standing so this is a guy genuinely

risking his life to to help defend his

country um you know it strikes me that

there is historical Parallels for this

if you go back to World War II right you

know Churchill is a hero today FDR as a

hero today but at the time in America

there were divisions over how FDR was

seen it's interesting you know the

America First camp in 1939 1940 they

said a lot of the things about the war

uh that we now say about a war like

Ukraine it's too far away they're not

really they're not really our people and

by the way Pearl Harbor was a conspiracy

to get us in that war you know people

accused FDR of that from the right at

the time so there's there's historical

basis for these kinds of things um you

know it so what do what does Taiwan do

to avoid that fate it's it's hard to say

I mean I think you know we've seen a lot

of accounts of ukrainians civilian

suffering and that moved people

Americans for a time it's fading over

time there's less coverage of it and

people just get bored right um Taiwan

has an added factor which is it is

Central to the world the modern

technology high technology economy more

than 80% of chips are manufactured there

and you know you hear some communication

of that from Biden Administration

officials and others to say that if

China gets this we're screwed right

because literally everything thing you

know your your phones your car you know

you know nothing survive our weapon

systems nothing survives without those

chips and if China controls that uh

we're in trouble that that gives a

slightly better argument um maybe it

moves people I don't know uh because I

think that you know oftentimes the

American public doesn't react until they

see the costs of something as opposed to

talking about the costs uh of something

um and again there's a lot of historical

precedent for that right world World War

II was a distant War until the bombs

started dropping on Pearl Harbor and it

affected us we haven't had that with

this War uh yet and um you know with

Taiwan you would probably feel those

effects but right now that seems like a

distant possibility and we're not great

at looking into the future hey it's

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you know I'd love to hear you talk about

the rationale for American engagement

with a Taiwan crisis because I I really

as a person who's Pro Taiwan I really

don't like how centered the

semiconductor chips conversation has

been in terms of why we need to defend

Taiwan and do things because you know

very quickly and I I survey the American

right like that's my like intellectual

background very

what the isolationist right will say to

people who make the semiconductor Cas is

no blood for semiconductors they're

going to appropriate the no blood for

oil talk from the 2000s um I don't have

children but you've talked about you you

have you know teen you have teenage boys

like they're not on the field now but

they would be almost of certain um draft

age during a probable conflict I don't

see a word where as a father you wake up

in the morning and you say like man I

love my 2024 forward but if we can't get

that 2026 forward because the chips

aren't ready you know it's just not a

convincing case and I think the better

case is more just the fact that we like

the status quo we like how great Powers

no longer invade other powers to take

territory and start wars and actually

get Domino's collapsing we don't like

seeing trade disrupted and what the

American policy in Taiwan in the Asia

Pacific is aimed around is just

maintaining the peaceful status quo and

any actor whether it's Russia China Iran

Hamas who's launching an offensive War

is actually disrupting that status quo

and that's what we're really defending

against we're trying to deter a conflict

from happening and I think that's just

so much of a better consensus

articulation than just overdoing it on

chips because no one we we just wouldn't

do that we we it doesn't make any sense

if you actually think about the

Electoral coalitions and the actual like

Spa Spate of uh scenarios here I hear

you listen uh you know I me personally

I'm an old school idealist right it

matters to me uh that the Ukrainian

people good people and they're getting

bombed and killed and raped by Russia

they they want to have uh sovereignty in

their own country and they want to move

closer to Europe and Russia is not

allowing that and is willing to murder

right to prevent that that upsets me as

as an individual as an American and I

feel the same about Taiwan I went to

Taiwan uh researching this book in fact

I brought both of my boys because they

they they're interested in Asia they're

both studying Chinese Taiwan is a

vibrant uh country it is it is a

beautiful country it's an Innovative

country it's a country uh well I say

country China won't allow that it's a

it's a state that uh wants to be does

not want to be you know the the the you

know an outpost of the CCP they don't

and and I I fundamentally support that

as an individual I suppose the question

is when you're making decisions as a as

a nation to go to war potentially you

have to justify that on a number of

fronts you know I think the values case

is an important one and I agree with you

that it that it goes far beyond ships

and and this is how I try to articulate

this to people that you may think that

this is a distant War whether it be

Ukraine or Taiwan uh that doesn't affect

you or me but but the fact is we have

all benefited from the rules-based

international order which sounds wonky

but is a real thing we've all benefited

from that and from a core piece of that

is that borders matter and that you

cannot redraw Maps based purely on force

and you cannot kill your political

opponent wherever they are in the world

and you cannot pressure businesses as

China does if they're on the wrong side

of a deal with a state owned Enterprise

right that we we allow open trade and

open uh travel of goods through the

through the uh the Asian shipping lanes

or through you know through Europe that

benefits Us in in in you know

superficial ways things are cheaper you

know you you can you can do trade around

the world but also we can travel to

these places you know when I was a kid

you couldn't go to Eastern Europe right

you know our our kids can study there

now U you can open a business there now

you can have a branch of your office

there um without that that affects our

lives in many ways which is not just a

values case but it's a self-interest

case and I would argue that if you grant

the ground to the crocodile right he

will want more and eventually he'll well

he's he's going to bite your allies and

eventually he'll bite you I think all

that together is part of the case um so

I agree we shouldn't make it

fundamentally a self interested you know

if you want your EV and the chips in the

EV case we have to go broader than that

but some people are moved by some things

and some by other things and I and I

suppose you just have to make as broad a

case as possible you know something I'd

love to talk about with you is you know

let's talk about the words we use to

describe the various people on this

debate because you know earlier in the

episode like I I said the word

isolationist I've made reference to the

word aaser like you've brought up these

terms and when we use them I I cringe

because these terms have real resonant

meanings within like American political

history and the real context that it's

being used so when we use the term aaser

we're not just describing someone with

like quasi like Nazi sympathies of which

there were people in the British

American establishment during the 1930s

but we're also describing people who

make a fundamental error of misreading

Winston um of misreading Hitler of

misreading um the Japanese of misreading

musolini um today though there are so

many different individual decisions we

have to make that I worry if I smear

people who disagree with me as

isolationist or appeasing it actually

Cuts away at some of the broader Nuance

so for example um you talk about this in

the book but

I once again I'm doing this as an

armchair analyst podcaster so I'm saying

that with like awareness I became

incredibly concerned leading into the

second Ukrainian counter offensive that

there was just too much weight placed in

the success of that counter offensive in

a way that just wasn't politically

sustainable I remember um you know David

ignacius of the Washington Post he's

coming on in a few months to talk about

his book so I hope he's not listening

right now David Ignus had a um had a

Washington Post editorial where he said

that this counter offensive is Ukraine's

D-Day and my reaction was that is a

disastrous political articulation of

what's going on there because once again

this is why history and these terms

matter if you say D-Day is what's at

stake there the American po public is

going to have a very specific

expectation of what the result is going

to be obviously like in actual D-Day

they spend all the way into July

fighting in hedro and it's horrible and

it's horrible and horrible and you can

imagine you know the Germans throwing

them back into the sea but the point is

by September you're moving into ANP and

you're moving hopefully we're going to

reach Germany by you know Christmas that

didn't happen so by setting things up

within that D-Day Language by using that

World War II imagery it's not a shocker

that after the counter offensive fails

for a variety of complicated reasons

you're going to see a real plummeting in

excitement in interest and you're going

to say people start to say hey like I'm

not an appeaser but like man y'all need

to switch to a defensive um State maybe

you need to sue for peace so I I threw a

lot of things at you but I'm just

curious how you think about these

Dynamics and these terms well I'm going

to get to the terms in a moment because

I agree with you and and there's such

hot button terms we need to To Tread

carefully just briefly on the counter

offensive I agree you know it's

interesting the Munich security

conference kind of the military Davos

right just happened and if you compare

the feeling at this year's versus last

year's last years there was so much

confidence about Ukraine and the primary

fear and this was before the counter

offensive but all the buildup to it and

the fear then was well Russia can't lose

too badly you know because that would be

catastrophic and you know they you know

things might collapse and you know we

got to kind of look for an off ramp for

Russia here this year it's flipped to

the other side as like oh my gosh you

Ukraine could lose you know the truth is

probably somewhere in between right I

think you know the risks for Ukraine are

severe right now uh but Russia is not

totally recovered it's got its own

weaknesses but that that flip that 180

degree turn is notable given all the

buildup to the counter offensive on the

terms I hear you and I think that you

know I I think about that with the 1939

comparison or even Hitler comparisons to

Putin no Putin has not sparked you know

led the Holocaust

but he certainly has shown no reluctance

to kill civilians Wholesale in Ukraine

and for soldiers to rape and pillage and

that kind of thing but he hasn't done

that but you know the parallel to Hitler

is that he is redrawing the borders by

force and not just once multiple times

Georgia 2008 Ukraine 2014 again 2022 all

that he's trying now with transnistria

and mova he's doing it in ways big and

small and that you know I'll make the

case why 1939 fits that I'll make the

case why why Hitler the Hitler

comparisons on on aggression fit that um

and and I think you can make the case

why some uh some folks are appeasers

that Donald Trump is willing to

sacrifice Ukraine that to me is an

appeasement position now folks who are

skeptical of going to war or worried

about escalation with Russia uh in in

Ukraine are worried about a direct war

with China I I share those concerns

frankly like you said I don't I don't

want my sons to die on a carrier in the

Taiwan Strait in three or four years

time I don't uh and that kind of War

would be devastating for all sides

involved um but I feel like in in that

category you know you're you're really

you're you're trying to to have a

reasonable substantive debate about

costs and benefits yes there are costs

and risks to standing up with firmness

and with the threat frankly of military

action and there are costs to not doing

that as well right and we have to debate

and have a public debate about it an

honest one John Kelly talks in the book

here here's a guy a retired Marine

General Decades of military service

going back to the Vietnam War who lost

his son in Afghanistan he is a gold star

father who says in the book he says

listen I don't think we've had a

conversation with the American public

about war over Taiwan and we should

because you know we you could see

thousands perhaps tens of thousands of

American Service members die is the

American public ready for that is that a

price they're willing to pay you have to

ask them right because it would be their

sons and daughters dying that's a fair

debate to have but uh when you have the

folks like Tucker Carlson going to a

single Moscow supermarket and somehow

saying it's better than here that's just

ignorant right that's ignorant that is

that is ignoring how Russia treats its

own people and people outside its

borders and on those positions I'll go

head to-head right you know and I will

call them appeasers on that but to the

other folks I say listen let's have a

debate and let's see and I have I

personally worked out you know whether

the the military whether it is MIL

Justified as an American to go to war of

Taiwan I don't know you know it's

um I support the people uh but that's a

lot to ask of the American public yeah

and I really like what you just said

there and I want to call this out about

1939 as the metaphor because I don't

think cuz obviously and you see this on

the kind of uh new right or like the

like Neo isolationist right or the

America first right um they invoke the

references to Munich and Hitler and say

well look you know when lay is hanging

Kennedy about not intervening in the

Cuban Missile Crisis he's bringing up

Munich um so they're rightfully saying

look this has been weaponized to near

disaster before let's avoid that and I

think I agree I think there's something

very true and very wise in that warning

but what I focus around my focus on

Munich and my focus on the Sudan land um

and the anas with Austria and Ethiopia

all those 1930s conflicts is there are

questions that are raised by the US and

Western and League of Nations response

to those crises and it's useful to place

our situation in the lens of those

questions so the question raised by

Munich is what do we do if we misread

the dictator we're making a deal with

like that's what m it's not that Putin's

Hitler it's he doesn't have to be

running the Holocaust what if we make a

deal with him and leave NATO because it

doesn't really matter and then he goes

into Poland yeah that actually really

matters okay what if we leave he goes

into Poland and then all of a sudden

Western Europe is filled with nukes

because they have no confidence in the

US in the us-led security order we where

we offer the nuclear umbrella those are

questions that are raised by Munich that

don't require anyone making the case

that Putin is Hitler or that Xi Jinping

is Hitler I just think it's so important

to refocus around their interesting and

relevant historical questions and once

again the reason why Kennedy is correct

uh in rejecting L's weaponization of you

know his father Joseph P Kennedy's bad

performance at Munich and in that depas

era is that actually doesn't meet the

Munich test um Cuba doesn't meet the

Munich test there are a variety of ways

we could accomplish the goal AKA

non-offensive nuclear weapons there it

didn't require launching air strikes so

I think that's just so key so here's the

question for you what are some questions

that are raised by this 1939 period that

you think policy makers should be and

the American people should be thinking

about well it's a basic question right

some Wars are worth fighting and some

are not right you know that that's a

basic qu and some some are Munich like

moments and some are not I mean Saddam

Hussein was called Hitler uh he's a bad

guy but he didn't have thousands of

nuclear warheads as as um as does

Vladimir Putin um so these are

qualitative judgments we have to make

along the way and we've made some good

calls and some bad calls in our in our

recent and distant American history I

talk about 1962 in the book and the

Cuban Missile Crisis and how JFK had

every member of his cabinet read The

Guns of August uh the Barbara tuckman

book that had come out earlier in 1962

which is all about momentum towards War

uh H how entangling alliances and

misreadings and so on can lead you to a

conflict that nobody wanted going in and

there's a great quote in the book of JFK

at the time said you know here's the

guns of August I don't want anybody to

write a book called The missiles of 1962

he he didn't want to be you know the guy

who started a you know a World War uh so

and they found a way out and by the way

they found a way out and and instituted

some guard rails to prevent that from

happening again treaties and hotlines

and so on many of which have disappeared

now which again as we were talking

earlier put us in in danger again of a

conflict I mean the thing is you know

this is the debate and and and some some

comparisons to to that moment will be

fair and some will not be I just think

as I do in the book you can make a very

strong case that that this is a 1939

moment in a way that Cuba was not or or

or even you know Iraq was not you know

more recently um these are hard

decisions to make you know it's um Kaa

kalas again I keep talking about her

because I just find the estonians

fascinating because they're right on the

front lines right and they make these

warnings about Russia based on their own

personal and recent experience of living

under Russia's yoke they don't make it

based on imagination and she's reading

books all the time she was she was

telling me the list of histories and

biography she's been reading of

Churchill of the Cuban Missile Crisis um

of Russia of Putin because she wants to

be informed by history as she makes

decisions today for her own country she

doesn't want a war either right she

wants to avoid a war but she also wants

to avoid being absorbed by Russia which

is a cost she's not willing to pay right

understandably so are we willing to

sacrifice the estonians to Russia

because ah we just don't want to get

involved this time I'm not personally

and I think we could make a very good

case as you mentioned you know what that

would mean for Europe going forward I

mean these you know these are hard

questions for for leaders they're not

easy ones and and they're also ones that

the American public needs to be involved

in because they will be part of the

solution right or they'd be part of the

conflict so for the last section here

I'd love to hear from you uh um the

moving forward part you know speaking to

the last chapter of the book because

hearing everything you're articulating

thinking about these topics deeply I

could say the fair consensus between our

viewers are okay we we don't want either

ourselves or our children to have to

fight a a war in the indo-pacific we

don't want the war in Ukraine to

escalate um Beyond

um Beyond Ukraine we obviously want the

ukrainians to take the maximum amount of

their territory back that they can um

but a core level I think deterrence is

just the way to understand this moment

um if we're in a pre-war era another

another way the 1939 is a useful metap

for is okay the Allies failed to deter

Hitler um Hitler did not believe that

the British would actually declare war

over Poland you know he he should be uh

Hitler should be understood as a gambler

who just gambled gambled gambled okay

I'm going to break the Treaty of

Versailles okay I'm going to intervene

in the Spanish Civil War okay I'm going

to um for like uh you know connect

Germany of Austria Sudan land taking all

of Czechoslovakia etc etc etc and he

finally just gambled too far so

obviously like he's a murderous evil

dictator like that's on him by

definition but you could imagine a

better world where the British and the

French better signaled no seriously we

have drawn a hard line here same thing

is true of 2021 um in Ukraine it's hard

to imagine a world where the Russians

would have invaded the way they invaded

knowing the Western response that they

actually received knowing the

seriousness of the Ukrainian people I

know obviously that was a mix because

they didn't believe it was a real state

so they decid it would really collapse

but what would you say the lessons for

deterrence are moving forward because my

theory of the case of how we avoid the

next World War is by deterring those

great autocratic Powers who are on the

offensive from doing it in the first

place yeah it's a great point I me

because you look back to World War II

it's not like it was a big Kumbaya

moment and people recognize Hitler for

what he was right away there were a lot

of there was a lot of seating of ground

right uh and same with Japan prior to

World Harbor Ian they were hoovering up

large parts of Asia before they struck

Hawaii and and and arguably we should

have seen it before um and same with

Putin you look at the Europe's and

America's frankly reaction to the 2014

partial invasion of Ukraine which was

limp right um and you can understand why

Putin C might calculate are they really

going to get in the way if I if I take

more or take all of it you could even

connect that to the Afghanistan

withdrawal which I don't think is an

unreasonable uh point along the way if

the US is not interested in that place

it sunk so many lives and so many

billions of dollars in Afghanistan if

they're not interested there are they

really going to get involved in Ukraine

to any degree you could see why you know

Putin could put that into his calculus

now you could argue that he was going to

invade all the time because he doesn't

recognize Ukraine as an independent

state and has long wanted to rebuild the

Soviet Union but but it's hard also to

imagine that those W those weren't

factors in in his calculus you know and

that's why there's so much talk today

about what China reads from the world's

reaction to Ukraine um you know how much

is the West willing to arm Ukraine and

for how long seems like Western Unity is

is flagging right now certainly with the

delay and US assistance how long does

NATO stay together on this and what can

China learn about how the world would

then react to um to its invasion of

Taiwan so these things are they're

connected for sure and they're reading

the signals and I think deterrence is

exactly the point deterrence requires

strength it requires

credibility um it requires a belief that

for instance NATO would abide by Article

5 if if I'm Putin and I look at a trump

presidency based surely on what he said

in public I would begin to doubt that

you know depending on how the election

comes out in November so you know it's

um and it's great that you point out

that there's history to this you know it

didn't begin in 1939 Hitler was around

for a few years and he was rattling his

saber long before that moment while a

lot of Americans were saying well maybe

we could work with this guy doesn't

sound that dissimilar from the way folks

talk about Putin so last two questions

here so number one I'm curious and this

is actually really why I think the world

war metaphor is really helpful because

there are just so many theaters involved

it's not just that we are sitting in

Eastern Europe backstopping the

ukrainians there could be a conflict

over Taiwan you're going to see a Hamas

attack La a war over Gaza that's going

to deeply involve the American uh

American foreign policy for a variety of

complicated reasons this just can't be

just thought of as just like one

specific theater that we hand once at a

time in the way that Iraq was one at a

time in terms of Desert Storm or that um

Vietnam could be thought of as this

thing or that Korea was this specific

thing so what is your advice for

Americans who are having to find

themselves thinking about just this real

scope and not having them basically just

respond and this is kind of like the

bridge kby argument wow like we really

can't do everything at once we need to

really focus on specific areas because

it seems like the real consensus is we

have to do everything at once to our Max

impossible ability that's where the

interesting part of this debate is so

how do you like think about that aspect

I mean I think we do still have to

prioritize but but the part of my

argument in the book is that these

events are connected right that that

Ukraine is connected to Taiwan and what

we saw in Ukraine in 2014 is connected

to 2022 and that transnistria this

distant place it's sort of funny to

pronounce is connected as well uh and

that the cyber attacks by Russia and

China on the US and its allies are

connected and that Russia sending it a

s300 missile system to Hezbollah in the

midst of the Israel Gaza war is

connected because Russia wants to

disrupt and occupy the US and its allies

and that Iran and North Korea supplying

weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine

is connected and they want something in

return missile technology and nuclear

technology that these things are not

isolated that they are part of this new

great power conflict and that all those

players they don't want anything good

for us you know whatever Trump says and

I could work with them no they they've

made strategic decisions to undermine

the us because they see that as in their

interests and that we as Americans have

to see those connections and respond in

a connected way it doesn't mean we go to

war over every front we're just not

capable of that and we don't want it

right and and and arguably I mean the

Russians and Chinese don't want direct

conflict with the US I've been told

repeatedly but there are you know there

are red lines we have to communicate

those red lines and sometimes it is

worth fighting you know I always think

we talk about World War II we still have

a movie every year about World War II

and how America stood up and you know

fought back against the Holocaust and

fought back against Hitler and

imperialist Japan every year there's

another one where we congratulate

ourselves we're being tested today you

know we can't keep hearkening back to 80

years ago and patting ourselves on the

back when when some of those same

challenges exist today you know that

that's the test so here's the last

question I found myself thinking about

in the beginning of your book um so this

is obviously a book of of reporting you

have like recommendations but you're

really writing this as you know the

chief you know for foreign affairs um

Analyst at um CNN I know if that's not

your exact title but work with me here

um you know if we're if we're thinking

about the press and National Security an

interesting reality between World War II

and today is that I was obviously in a

pre Watergate prev Vietnam War um era of

American society where at a societal

trust perspective and frankly just at a

Norms perspective members of the press

were very very confident around the idea

that their job was to advance Victory

their job is to in some ways act as a

stenographer for the you know US

Government um and you were talking about

at the start of your book of how like

when you were talking about all the US

intelligence that predicting a war um in

Ukraine like some of your colleagues

were like hey like careful there Jim

like you don't want to just be a

stenographer you don't want cuz in many

ways if we're looking where did the

Press fail Vietnam it's like that early

press was just once again applying that

uh World War II level okay like General

West warland telling us things are great

we've got a victory plan so I'm just

telling that story um so there's an

obvious like worst case scenario there

but how do you just think of and once

again we're talking about World War

level situation where the stakes are

that high quasi Total War how do you

think about how the Press acts in a

scenario like that well some push back

for a moment cuz I've never felt and

don't think I've operated like a

stenographer right I mean when I was

reporting us intelligence assessments

about Russian uh military buildup and

intentions to invade Ukraine uh that was

based not just on my understanding of

what the intelligence showed but also

I've been I've been going there for

years right writing books about uh

Putin's intentions what he said publicly

what his vision is uh of Europe so I you

know I think all of us have to do more

than just pick up the phone and say oh

is that what you're saying you know Mr

intelligence Source we we all have to

you know connect our dots and and put

context in it I I mean I I agree that

you know we're in a different time now

there there is no there's not going to

be a Walter kronite moment with the

Vietnam War right where the most trusted

newsman in America said you know in

effect says it looks like we're losing

this war and and the majority of

Americans say well if he says it I

believe it because our news environment

has been so atomized now and folks in

their bubbles right and and beyond that

there's just a decline of confidence in

institutions across the board people

don't trust Congress or the white house

or the Supreme Court or the or the

intelligence industry or the FBI which

is problematic right because it's um

could you Marshal this country to an

effort like we saw in World War II

against a global actor like Hitler with

with genuine sacrifice of lives and

blood and you know rationing and all

that kind of stuff it's hard to see who

who would who would be that leader that

could rally the troops you know um in

this highly partisan environment with

information bubbles I don't know maybe

it's not possible I mean I have seen

instances where you break through that

bubble I saw that in the early stages of

the Ukraine war when there was a ground

swell of support here I I saw it in the

wake of October 7th right where there

was a ground swell that this this shall

not stand um but it's a heck of a lot

harder it's a great it's a great point I

think that's the perfect place to close

just because once again this is why the

I'm I'm personally just obsessed with

the 30s period because once again the

questions are there um it took we kind

of tell the Arsenal democracy story as

if it started on December 7th you know

1941 but actually like we started

rearming and preparing for mobilization

not just like in 1939 but in many ways

like the Civilian Conservation Corps

early New Deal response like literally

served as a training ground for like the

for the World War II era Army like you

know George C Marshall led the CCC like

that's a really interesting thing but

appeasers and isolationists like

actively attempted to undermine that pre

period by using societal distrust

against weapons makers during that World

War I period to say oh like let's not

you know convert factories let's not

prepare for weapons orders let's not go

to those 50,000 planes because we saw

what those distrustful people did last

time so I think that what people in our

space have to do is we're talking to

this really sort of um disassociated

countri right now is understand that our

job is not to be stenographers is to be

skeptical but I think it's very easy to

lean into the distrust narrative in a

way that's dangerous um very very very

active when we see those examples so um

Jim this has been really great great

thank you so much for joining me I truly

enjoyed the conversation I I love diving

into history so uh I hope we can keep it

up