How drones are shaking up the air war in Ukraine

Summary

In this discussion with military aviation expert Professor Justin Bron, the impact of drones on the evolution of warfare is explored, particularly focusing on the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conversation delves into the challenges drones pose to traditional air power, the strategic implications of their use in targeting helicopters and airfields, and the potential for long-range drone attacks to alter the dynamics of air warfare. The talk also touches on the defensive measures needed to counter these new threats, emphasizing the importance of ground-based air defense and the role of passive hardening in protecting airbases.

Takeaways

• 📈 Drones are increasingly shaping modern warfare, as evidenced by their use in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, impacting global military strategies.
• 🚁 FPV drones have been utilized in attempts to counteract attack helicopters like the Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28, demonstrating new aerial combat dynamics.
• 🛰️ The script highlights the challenges of using FPV drones against helicopters due to range limitations and the time it takes to reach and intercept targets.
• 🔄 Russia's military tactics have evolved, bringing helicopters closer to fluid front lines, providing new opportunities for drone interceptions.
• 💥 Ukraine has successfully scaled the production of one-way attack UAVs, functioning similarly to small cruise missiles, for long-range strikes.
• ⚔ The use of UAVs for attrition and harassment attacks presents Russia with difficult choices regarding the allocation of its limited air defense resources.
• 🛬 Long-range drone attacks on airfields force a strategic rethink on the positioning and operation of aircraft, potentially reducing the frequency of attacks on front lines.
• 🛡️ Passive defenses like hardened aircraft shelters are highlighted as cost-effective solutions against UAV attacks, complementing active defense measures.
• 🔍 Ukraine's experience with UAV production and acoustic detection networks provides a foundation for developing sustainable UAV defense strategies.
• 🚀 The discussion points to the necessity of ground-based short-range air defense systems at airfields, adapting to the emerging threat landscape.
• 🗺️ The evolving nature of air warfare suggests a future emphasis on mobile operations and the potential for underground or dispersed basing strategies to evade detection and saturation attacks.

Q & A

What role have drones played in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

Drones have significantly changed the way war is waged, affecting not just the conflict in Ukraine but also the future of warfare globally. They have been used in various capacities, including targeting combat helicopters and conducting strikes from the air.

Who is Professor Justin Bron and what is his expertise?

Professor Justin Bron is a senior research fellow for air power and technology at the Royal United Services Institute in London. He has been writing extensively about the development in air warfare in Ukraine and its implications for the world.

What challenges did the Armed Forces of Ukraine face with Russian helicopters during the counteroffensive in 2023?

The Armed Forces of Ukraine struggled to counter Russian K-52 and Mi-28 Havoc helicopters, which were launching anti-tank guided missile attacks from about 10 km behind the front lines, often outside the range of traditional short-range ground-based air defense systems.

Why were FPV drones not successful in intercepting Russian helicopters in 2023 according to the transcript?

The lack of success was primarily due to range and travel time limitations of small FPV drones. They were unable to reach the helicopters' location in time to intercept before the helicopters moved off, even when launched from the spearhead of a breakthrough.

How have the dynamics of helicopter operations changed with the fluid front lines?

With more fluid front lines, Russian helicopters are coming closer to FPV operators, providing more opportunities for FPV drone interceptions. The helicopters are now operating in areas where deep defenses have not been established, making them more vulnerable.

What is the significance of Ukraine's use of one-way attack fixed-wing UAVs?

Ukraine has successfully produced a range of one-way attack fixed-wing UAVs, essentially small cruise missiles, which can travel long distances, albeit slowly. These UAVs are used for harassing attacks, serving both attrition and a psychological impact on the enemy.

What dilemma does the use of long-range drone attacks on Russian air bases present for Russia?

Russia must choose between concentrating its limited ground-based air defense capacity around air bases or accepting regular losses. If not enough air defenses are dedicated to airfields, they become vulnerable to UAV attacks, forcing aircraft to operate from further away, reducing the number of glide bombs launched at the front lines.

How do the attacks on Russian air bases impact the overall war strategy?

Attacks on air bases can force Russia to either spread its air defenses thin across potential targets or accept losses, which over time could become unsustainable. This strategy aims to reduce the number of glide bombs launched at the front lines by increasing the operational distance for Russian aircraft.

What is the impact of UAV attacks on the future of air warfare and air base security?

UAV attacks have highlighted the need for ground-based short-range air defense at airfields and the value of passive hardening measures like hardened aircraft shelters. They also suggest a potential shift towards more mobile air base operations to avoid saturation attacks.

What challenges do UAVs pose to traditional air defense systems, and how can they be countered?

UAVs, especially those that are cheap and mass-produced, are small and do not travel far, making them difficult to intercept with traditional air defense systems. Countermeasures include the use of UAV missile defenses, passive hardening, and moving aircraft around air bases frequently to avoid detection.

What is the significance of the acoustic detection, classification, and tracking network in Ukraine's defense against UAVs?

Ukraine's acoustic detection network is a significant asset in detecting and tracking UAVs, as it is difficult to jam or attack. This network aids in the early warning and interception of UAVs, which is crucial for defense against such threats.

Outlines

00:00

🛫 The Role of Drones in Modern Warfare

This paragraph discusses the significant impact of drones in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, highlighting their role in changing traditional warfare tactics. Professor Justin Bron, a military aviation expert, emphasizes the increasing use of drones in combat, including their use against helicopters and fixed-wing reconnaissance drones. The challenges faced by Ukraine in countering Russian attack helicopters with FPV drones due to range and response time limitations are also covered. The paragraph sets the stage for an in-depth analysis of drone trends and their implications for future air power dynamics.

05:01

💥 The Strategic Use of UAVs in Air Warfare

The second paragraph delves into the strategic deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by Ukraine, focusing on their use in long-range attacks against Russian air bases. The narrative explains how these attacks force Russia to allocate air defense resources between protecting air bases and frontline positions, potentially weakening their overall defense. The discussion also touches on the challenges of using mass-produced, small UAVs for long-range missions and the importance of electronic warfare in facilitating these operations. The paragraph underscores the broader implications of UAVs on air power and the need for new defensive strategies.

10:01

🛠 The Evolution of Air Defense in Response to UAV Threats

This paragraph examines the evolving nature of air defense in the face of UAV threats. It discusses the limitations of Russia's air defense systems and the impact of Ukraine's efforts to destroy these systems over time. The paragraph also highlights the importance of ground-based air defense at airfields and the value of passive hardening measures, such as hardened aircraft shelters, in defending against UAV attacks. The discussion points to the necessity for air forces to adapt to these new challenges, suggesting a combination of soft and hard kill measures to counter UAV threats effectively.

15:04

🏰 Reinforcing Air Base Defenses Against UAVs

The fourth paragraph continues the discussion on air defense, focusing on the specific challenges of defending against medium-altitude reconnaissance UAVs that can call in ballistic missile strikes. It emphasizes the need for sustainable methods to intercept these UAVs and the potential solutions, including the use of UAV missile defenses and passive defenses like hardened aircraft shelters. The paragraph also touches on the importance of mobility within air bases to avoid saturation attacks and the limitations imposed by the range and fuel efficiency of aircraft like the Soviet-era MiG-29s.

20:05

✈️ The Challenges of Operating Aircraft Amidst UAV Threats

In the final paragraph, the conversation turns to the operational challenges faced by the Ukrainian Air Force, particularly in relation to the use of UAVs for observation and targeting. It discusses the need for effective countermeasures against observation UAVs to prevent the completion of kill chains by Russia. The paragraph also addresses the logistical challenges of refueling and rearming aircraft, especially given the lack of aerial refueling capabilities and the vulnerability of forward arming and refueling points to enemy observation. The summary concludes with a call to action for viewers to support the channel for continued coverage of these developments.

Keywords

💡Drones

Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles that can be remotely controlled or fly autonomously. In the context of the video, drones have significantly impacted modern warfare, particularly in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. They are used for various purposes such as reconnaissance, targeting, and attacks, as mentioned with the FPVs hitting combat helicopters.

💡Full-scale War

Full-scale war refers to a large-scale military conflict involving the mobilization of all resources and forces of the warring parties. The script discusses the full-scale war against Ukraine by Russia and how it has escalated the use of drones in warfare.

💡FPV Drones

FPV stands for 'First Person View' and refers to drones that allow the operator to see from the drone's perspective in real-time. The script mentions FPV drones being used in attempts to target helicopters in the conflict, highlighting their role in direct combat scenarios.

💡Air Power and Technology

Air power and technology encompass the capabilities and advancements in military aviation, including aircraft, weaponry, and surveillance systems. The video discusses the evolution of air power in the context of the Ukraine conflict, with a focus on how drones are changing traditional air warfare.

💡Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare involves the use of electromagnetic spectrum to control the battlespace and deny the enemy's use of the same spectrum. In the script, electronic warfare is mentioned as a factor affecting the control link of drones and as a tactic to suppress air defenses.

💡Reconnaissance Drones

Reconnaissance drones are used for gathering information about enemy forces and positions. The script discusses large, fixed-wing reconnaissance drones being targeted by smaller FPV drones, indicating a shift in how air surveillance is conducted and countered.

💡Air Defense Systems

Air defense systems are military equipment designed to detect, track, and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles. The video script discusses the limitations and challenges of air defense systems in the face of drone attacks and the need for adaptation.

💡Attrition

In a military context, attrition refers to the gradual depletion of the enemy's forces and resources. The script mentions the use of drones for attrition warfare, where the goal is to wear down the enemy by causing continuous losses.

💡Strategic Bombers

Strategic bombers are long-range aircraft designed to carry large payloads of weapons for strikes deep into enemy territory. The script discusses the impact of drone attacks on strategic bombers, emphasizing their importance and the difficulty of replacing them.

💡Passive Hardening

Passive hardening refers to defensive measures that involve physical reinforcement of structures to withstand attacks. The video mentions the value of hardened aircraft shelters as a defense against drone attacks, illustrating the need for physical protection in addition to technological defenses.

💡GBAD (Ground-Based Air Defense)

Ground-based air defense systems are installations or equipment designed to protect against aerial attacks from the ground. The script discusses the limitations of GBAD systems in the face of drone swarms and the challenges they pose to traditional air defense strategies.

Highlights

Drones have significantly changed warfare tactics globally, impacting both the battlefield in Ukraine and future military strategies.

The use of FPV (First Person View) drones in combat, particularly against helicopters, has been attempted but faces challenges such as range and travel time.

Russian attack helicopters like the K-52 and Mi-28 Havoc have been problematic for Ukraine, operating just out of range of traditional air defense systems.

Attempts to use FPV drones for intercepting helicopters have been hindered by limitations in payload and control link maintenance under electronic warfare.

The fluidity of front lines in the conflict has brought helicopters closer to FPV operators, increasing opportunities for interception.

Ukraine has successfully scaled the production of one-way attack UAVs, functioning as small cruise missiles.

Long-range drone attacks on Russian air bases aim to force a strategic choice between air defense concentration and operational effectiveness.

Harassing attacks with UAVs serve to attrition Russian assets and present a dilemma for air defense allocation.

The impact of UAV attacks on air bases can lead to a reduction in the number of glide bombs launched at the front lines, affecting operational tempo.

The new paradigm of drone attacks on air bases challenges traditional air warfare strategies and the safety of airbase locations.

Russian attempts to defend against drone attacks have been met with the challenge of a finite number of air defense systems and sustained losses.

Passive hardening, such as hardened aircraft shelters, has become increasingly valuable in defending against UAV attacks.

Ukraine's experience with UAV production and defense systems has led to innovations in acoustic detection and tracking networks.

The challenge for Ukrainian air defense is the interception of medium-altitude reconnaissance UAVs that guide ballistic missile strikes.

Ukrainian airfields are adapting by frequently moving aircraft and maintenance teams to avoid saturation attacks.

The introduction of F-16s to Ukraine increases the importance of long-range air defense and the need for sustainable operational strategies.

The limitations of Soviet-era aircraft like the Mig-29 highlight the need for efficient use of fuel and strategic basing.

Ukraine's air force faces the challenge of sustaining operations against Russian observation UAVs to maintain the integrity of kill chains.

Transcripts

over more than two years of Russia's

full-scale war against Ukraine it is no

secret how much drones have played a

part in changing the way war is waged

not only here in Ukraine but for the

whole world and for the future of

warfare today we're going to discuss

this and more with one of the world's

top military Aviation experts Professor

Justin Bron is a senior research fellow

for air power and Technology at the

Royal United Services Institute in

London and he's been constantly writing

about the development in air Warfare in

Ukraine and its implications for the

world we're in an interesting uh kind of

phase in in the fullscale War uh against

Ukraine where we see more and more kind

of new types of combat in the air and

Strikes from the air that uh we'd never

seen in a war beforehand um we talk

about um fpvs hitting combat helicopters

above the battlefield as we've seen in

the operation in ksk we see more and

more uh fpv drones targeting other large

uh fixed Wing reconnaissance drones but

of course maybe more importantly we've

seen uh a constant Spate of attacks on

airfields on stationary so just from

your um perspective what kind of Trends

are you seeing here in terms of uh how

um drones in general are shaking up

the the traditional air power um

Battlefield and and what should we what

should we be looking out for so we've

seen uh the use of fpv uh type drones uh

attempted use at least against

helicopters quite a bit last year in

2023 during the counter offensive

because in that uh counter offensive the

the Armed Forces of Ukraine were

struggling to find good answers to

Russian uh k 52 and and um Mi 28 Havoc

helicopters uh sitting about 10 km

behind the front lines and launching um

anti-tank guided missile attacks on uh

the Ukrainian vehicles that did manage

to to periodically breach through those

very very deep defenses and because they

were hovering for only you know usually

five or six minutes at a time uh and

about 10 km back from the front lines

they were typically outside the range of

traditional short- range groundbased air

defense systems so those those Russian

Attack Helicopters were a significant

problem for for um Ukrainian attempts to

break through and exploit breakthroughs

what you then saw uh was attempts to use

fpv uh drones to Target those

helicopters to intercept them the big

problem that you had in that scenario

and the reason why there weren't as far

as I'm aware any confirmed successes

that during

2023 is basically range and travel time

uh so the the typical range of a of a

small fpv uh is depending on the number

of battery packs and and how many if you

put two battery packs on you you can

have a reasonable payload if you're

putting three battery packs on a sort of

standard mavic type then you're actually

really not carrying much and you're

still probably struggling to push much

Beyond far beyond about 10 kilm uh and

that's assuming Russian electronic

warfare was allowing you to maintain the

control link out that far which often it

wasn't uh and then in addition you have

travel time so to get to those extended

ranges right at the kind of edge of what

fpvs could do you can't really go up

full Sprint speeds uh and even for fast

racing drone derivatives you you're

looking at probably 3 to 5 minutes to

cover 8 to 10 kilm and so even where

those fpvs were being launched right

from pretty much the spearhead of a

breakthrough or or a newly captured

position if a Russian helicopter gunship

is on station for maybe 6 minutes to to

conduct atgm attacks there's almost no

way of getting it out there in time to

complete an interception before the

helicopter moves off even if you could

get the range what's changed with the

the Kur uh incursion is that uh because

the Russians are suddenly trying to

operate helicopters and fix swing

aircraft uh over and around front lines

that are much more fluid where they

haven't had time necessarily to set up

that kind of definitive front line with

deep defenses and so can have

helicopters just sat back behind them a

safe distance those helicopters are

coming much closer to fpv operators and

therefore there's more more

opportunities for um fpv type

interceptions of helicopters of the what

like we we saw with the the Havoc uh I

think last week um so it's it's mainly

just because of the range and the and

the time time distance problem that that

you typically have with with standoff

distances um and that's something you

see with with a lot of uavs um if you

have ones that are very cheap and

mass-produced they generally are quite

small and therefore they generally don't

go very far um the exception would be

Ukraine's attempt to produce at scale

rather successfully a range of one-way

attack fixed wing oneway attack uavs

essentially propeller powered small

cruise

missiles um those are either purpose

built designs or derived from ultr light

aircraft they can travel a very long way

but they do so very slowly um in order

to be efficient enough to carry enough

fuel to go that far and so the the the

challenge there is first of

all using them in large enough numbers

with sophisticated enough either root

planning or coordinated suppression

using electronic methods maybe harm um

suppression of of Russian air defenses

near the front lines to get those those

drones through the initial kind of belt

of defenses because once they're inside

Russia in depth even Russia with with a

lot of gbad groundbased air defense

systems it can't cover everything it

just doesn't have enough um gbad to to

cover all the possible routes that you

you could take for a small UAV um a

small slow efficient long range attack

UAV um and so it's a really good method

that Ukraine has found to basically

conduct harassing attacks which serve

two different functions in the air War

the first function that those harassing

attacks with the uavs serve is

straightforward attrition uh so where

they do manage to actually damage or

destroy Uh Russian Jets of course that's

fantastic that is a permanent loss of a

ultimately finite um number of

assets that's probably not the biggest

imp they have because unfortunately

Russia does continue to produce you know

flankers fullbacks um so most of it its

modern fighter types at a rate close to

or even in in the case of things like

the S35 exceeding the number the rate at

which they're losing them and where you

destroy aircraft on the ground or damage

them Beyond economic repair generally

speaking you're also not killing the

crew and so it's it's it's comparatively

easy for the Russians to replace those

losses over time but there is a

nutritional effect that matters in some

cases particularly where you're damaging

or destroying strategic bombers for

example which are much harder for the

Russians to replace um and where The

Fleets are in many cases much smaller uh

to begin with so you're having a greater

proportional impact on Russian Salvo

capacity for cruise missiles um and

ballistic missiles by targeting those

those assets I think perhaps the more

important effect for War as a whole of

these longrange drone attacks on Russian

air bases is to present Russia with a

choice either it has to concentrate a

disproportionate amount of its

ultimately limited groundbased air

defense capacity around all the

potential air bases that it might be

attacked that it uses for operations

against Ukraine and if it does that then

there are significantly fewer air

defenses to deploy along the front lines

which will make Ukraine's ability to use

haar's air delivered Munitions from uh

mig29 so 27 so 24 and and now F-16 um it

will make it easier for them to do that

if the Russians don't dedicate

significantly increased air defense to

defending those airfields in response to

the UAV attacks then they'll essentially

have to either accept fairly regular

losses which are probably even though

they can be born and and replaced if

it's just occasional if it becomes a

regular thing they will become

unsustainable so the alternative which

Ukraine is I suspect trying to force

Russia to do is if it doesn't pull its

air defenses back in significant numbers

to defend those air bases it will have

to move its aircraft uh to conduct a

majority of their operations from much

further away from Ukraine's borders and

that is probably the best way that

Ukraine currently has to reduce the

number of blide bombs that are being

launched at the front lines it's not

it's not really economically viable to

intercept the Glide bombs directly there

are just too many of them you would

deplete all your missile interceptors

incredibly quickly even if you were

intercepting them successfully so it's

not really viable to do that um and the

the the the aircraft launching the Glide

bombs are doing so from very high

altitudes at very high speeds from tens

and tens of kilometers behind the front

lines and so they're a very difficult

Target for fighters to intercept even

F16 all of which means that intercepting

the Russian Glide bomb launching sorties

is probably only regularly possible by

moving Patriot systems quite close to

the front line and attempting edge of

the edge of the the envelope shots which

have been successful on a number of

occasions but it's a huge risk every

time you do that that the Russians

locate and then strike that vital

Patriot system that is needed to defend

City's infrastructure

Paces um

so given all of those difficulties um

striking the Russian air bases even if

all it does is force them to move their

Jets back to flying from air bases

further back that means each Glide bomb

sorty will take more flight time to get

to the front lines and to get back which

means that a given Fleet can launch

fewer Glide bombs there will be more

attrition on the airframes over time

they will burn more hours they will need

more frequent overhauls per Glide bomb

the crews will get more tired so you

will you will again just passively

reduce the number of Glide bombs that

are being launched at the front line uh

so I think that's probably the main

incentive for for these longrange

attacks on Russian air bases but as you

as you explain it it does create uh

dilemmas and it makes me curious about

whether this basic new paradigm of being

able to to overwhelm um air bases with

with with cheap drones that completely

changed the equation in air Warfare in

general about where it's now safe to

have um to station station aircraft

where can you can you still have air

bases being being used at what range so

yeah the the Russians have failed to

come up with a with a perfect response I

think the the the big kind of unanswered

part of that question and probably

unanswerable in open source at least

is how many of the drones is Ukraine

having to launch in order to get the

number that get through through I.E what

is the interception rate um because that

fundamentally dictates what can and

can't kind of be done to defend I.E how

much more is there that the Russians

could be doing versus how much are they

already doing and I suspect the number

intercepted is fairly High um as a

proportion of those fired unless Ukraine

and except when Ukraine is able to

commit a lot of other enabling

capabilities uh to essentially opening a

window for them so using harm using um

electronic warfare maybe firing High

Mars at Targets near the air defenses in

those sectors at the same time so that

the air defenses have to choose whether

to intercept the harms or so the highs

or the harms or um the the the uavs that

are passing through at a similar Point

um but you know essentially Russia has a

couple of of limitations there obviously

one of them is the the number of air

defense systems that Ukraine has managed

to destroy over the past two and a half

years it's not that Ukraine can can can

destroy all the air defenses in a given

area um they never managed to do that

but they are inflicting a steady rate of

losses over time against particularly

book uh so sa 11 17 27 in NATO terms and

we've also seen some successful strikes

with a combination of uavs and attacks

uh against S400 and s300 sites um in

particularly in Crimea in in the past

six months so you there is a material

shortage for Russia of ground based air

defenses so given the range of some of

these uh you know relatively slow but

nonetheless relatively large scale uad

attacks there is a huge number of

potential targets that Russia feels

needs to defend and of course we've also

seen attacks on a lot of oil

infrastructure oil and gas

infrastructure we've seen attacks on

factories we've seen attacks even

symbolically on Moscow and so again this

is just increasing the number of

potential targets that Russia feels it

has to defend with fundamentally finite

groundbased air defense resources that

have also seen attrition in terms of

Defending against these sort of attacks

uh for air forces in in general going

forward I think what this primarily does

is first of all mean that having some

degree of groundbased short range

groundbased air defense at airfields is

probably non-negotiable as a requirement

for a serious Air Force

now but primarily I think and and that

will be a combination of of soft kill so

to to try and disable and or degrade

navigation to reduce the accuracy of

incoming Munitions uh and also then hard

kill to shoot down ones that either

still get through or are hardened

against that sort of thing but will

therefore be more expensive and in

smaller numbers uh and the second thing

though is to really increase the value

of Cold War style passive hardening so

there is huge value in hardened aircraft

shelters um because while they

absolutely can be defeated by ballistic

missiles and by cruise missiles uh as

Russia has done to Ukrainian bases uh

throughout the invasion um a the

probability of kill of a single cruise

missile or ballistic missile against a a

a hardened aircraft shelter is about5

to7 uh depending on the model of of

missile uh and then it gets a bit lower

if you add in some electronic warfare

defense for the area so for a start

you're not you're not getting a one:1

kill ratio even with those multi-million

dollar missiles but for uavs I mean no

small UAV is getting through aaz um you

know aaz is re metal reinforced concrete

uh it's it's not going to be penetrated

by a a a long range cheap UAV with with

maybe a few kilos of of Warhead on it up

to a shaad which might have up to 40 40

kilos of Warhead on it it's not enough

to reliably penetrate a has so those

passive defenses which are relatively

cheap um compared to active defenses are

are potentially a significant asset in

defending against UAV type attacks the

problem for defending Ukrainian airbases

at the moment is not so much attacks by

Shahs it's having something that can

sustainably deal with the the oran

theala class um medium altitude

reconnaissance uavs that are then

calling in ballistic missile strikes in

real time um and it's not that they're

difficult to intercept per se it's that

there's a lot of them and they're

relatively cheap and so Ukraine is

struggling to intercept them all just

because of the drain that it represents

on finite missile defense ammunition

well UAV missile defenses are probably

the most sustainable way of of going

about this um and Ukraine has a lot of

experience of rapidly increasing

production of new types of uavs so

there's probably quite a lot of national

capacity there uh Ukraine's partners and

allies can help to some degree uh

although not all the Western Supply um

systems have worked as well some have

worked well some have not and and the

great thing is that also Ukraine already

has

a very very capable acoustic detection

classification and tracking network uh

across the country that's very difficult

to jam or attack um that can help do the

detection and tracking piece of that UAV

defense puzzle um which for a lot of

countries the detection and tracking is

actually the really hard bit and Ukraine

has kind of already got that um so it

it's it's a problem that that can be

solved and must be solved

um but it's one that is probably not

suitable for being answered by

traditional air defense systems I think

um people started to realize this this

threat of the of the medium- range Recon

drones and and now it's interesting to

see as you said uh those being

intercepted by fpvs but still that's

like medium range that's you know around

up to maybe 100 kilomet so if we're

talking about the long range if we're

talking about the equivalent problem for

for long range um uh airfields well

further back from the front uh which is

of course more and more important now

especially with with f-16s coming in um

do you think on the Ukrainian side it

seems like the odds would be even more

against them potentially is is the

answer here just to go underground the

main threat there is uh obviously

ballistic and cruise missiles as well as

potentially shads so a lot of Ukrainian

airfields are quite large um and moving

them moving a relatively small number of

aircraft and a relatively small number

of Techni maintenance teams with

equipment quite regularly so every few

hours on the Airfield so that they're

never just parked in one place for more

than a few hours at a time that will in

itself provide a reasonable degree of

protection because actually even with

something large like a like a ballistic

missile um most of an Airfield is just

grass and concrete cluster munition

equipped versions of escanda are the

biggest problem because they can cover a

fairly wide area so it doesn't get you

out of the problem entirely uh and they

could always get the Russians could

always get lucky but moving on the air

base is is is a key part of this and

then obviously as often as you can and

as much as you can moving between air

bases so that to to stay ahead of that

Russian strategic targeting

cycle because you know while you might

be able to do some air defense anything

can be

saturated and you know Ukraine has a lot

of requirements for limited air defense

assets and air defense ammunition one of

the limitation one of the constraints

for the Ukrainian Air Force is that it's

a very large country and uh particularly

the Soviet era uh Mig 29s are very short

ranged uh especially when you fly them

at low level uh so anything that you fly

at very low altitude with a jet engine

will use a great deal more fuel than if

it's flying at high altitude um just

because of the way jet engines work and

the way drag Works um and so when you're

in a position where anywhere within at

least 150 km of the front lines you're

flying pretty low to stay out of those

S400 missile engagement zones uh an s300

and and also to try and make it harder

for Russian fighters to detect and

reliably track and engage at long ranges

um you're using a huge amount of fuel

and so if you're flying from bases far

back Ukraine doesn't have aerial

refueling tankers and in any case aerial

refueling tankers would be pretty

vulnerable again anywhere near the front

lines because longrange Russian air

defenses so they're generally going to

have to land refuel and rearm uh either

on the way in or the way out or possibly

both um and so where you see Ukrainian

Jets being hit by things like

lancets um it's typically going to be a

forward arming and refueling point point

and that again comes to that problem of

Russian observation uavs so you need to

have for the survivability of the Air

Force you have to have a a way to

sustainably shoot down or lands zala's

for posts um because without those

assets being able to hover and and and

observe then Russia can't complete those

kill chains generally fast enough to

intercept aircraft while they're doing

dispersed operations

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